Opinion
No. 05-15-00334-CV
03-18-2016
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN DON JONES
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. PR-14-02191-1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
Demetrice Deckard filed a notice of appeal "on behalf of his deceased wife, Margaret Jones" from the trial court's Judgment Declaring Heirship and Order of No Administration. Because Deckard does not have standing to bring this appeal, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Melvin Don Jones (the decedent) died intestate. Two of the decedent's siblings, Carl Edwards Jones and Linda Joyce Jones Calip, filed an application for determination of heirship and for an order that no administration of the estate was necessary. Carl and Linda listed themselves and their half-brother, Lester Lee Ransom, as the decedent's heirs. An attorney ad litem, who was appointed to represent the decedent's unknown heirs, objected to the application and reported to the trial court that she had discovered the decedent also had two sisters, Mabel Jones and Dessie Haddock; one brother, Joel T. Jones; and one half-sister, Pearlie Cooper; all of whom predeceased him. Dessie, Joel, and Pearlie all had children who were living. Carl and Linda filed an amended application for heirship and for an order that no administration of the estate was necessary, listing as decedent's heirs themselves; Lester; decedent's nephews, Eugene Cooper, Jr., David Cooper, Kenneth Haddock, Stephen Haddock, Derrick Haddock, and Darrell Jones; and decedent's niece, Brenda Cooper.
Due to the similarity of surnames, we will refer to individuals by their first names for the sake of clarity.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the amended application. Carl testified the decedent was never married, did not have any children, and did not adopt any children. Both of the decedent's parents had died, but the decedent had seven siblings, "Lester Ransom, Derek Cooper, Bessie [sic] Haddock, George [sic] T. Jones, myself Carl Jones, and Linda Caleb and Mabel Jones," Of the decedent's siblings, only Carl and Linda were still alive. Carl identified the decedent's nephews as Eugene, David, Kenneth, Steven, Derrick, and Darrell, and the decedent's niece as Brenda. To Carl's knowledge, the decedent had no other heirs.
At the hearing, Carl testified Lester had died since the amended application was filed. A second amended application was filed during the hearing that substituted, in place of Lester, the Estate of Lester Lee Ransom as decedent's heir.
Elma Faye Watson testified she had lived in the same neighborhood as the decedent and his family since 1955. The decedent was survived by his brothers Carl and Lester and his sister Linda. The decedent had several other siblings who died before him. Those siblings' children were Eugene, David, Kenneth, Steven, Derrick, Darrell, and Brenda. According to Watson, the decedent did not have any children placed into his home for the purpose of adopting them and never had any foster children.
Charlie Haddock testified he had been the decedent's brother-in-law for thirty years. To Haddock's knowledge, the decedent had two brothers, Carl and Lester, and one sister, Linda. The decedent had no nieces or nephews other than Eugene, David, Kenneth, Steve, Derrick, Darrell, and "Linda Cooper." According to Haddock, the decedent did not have or adopt any children and never had any foster children.
Based on his identification of "Linda Cooper" as a "niece" of the decedent, we conclude Haddock was actually referring to "Brenda Cooper."
On January 28, 2015, the trial court signed a Judgment Declaring Heirship and Order of No Administration. The trial court found that Carl, Linda, the Estate of Lester Lee Ransom, Eugene, David, Brenda, Kenneth, Stephen, Derrick, and Darrell were the decedent's heirs and determined the respective share of the estate each heir was entitled to receive. On March 8, 2015, Deckard, on behalf of his deceased wife Margaret Jones, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment.
This Court granted appellant's motion for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.
This Court sent a letter to the parties on February 25, 2016, questioning whether Deckard had standing to bring this appeal. We noted the record did not reflect (1) either Deckard or Margaret appeared in the trial court, requested any relief from the trial court, or were named in the trial court's judgment, or (2) what authority, if any, Deckard had to take action on behalf of his deceased wife. We informed the parties they could file letter briefs by March 8, 2016, responding to the jurisdictional issues raised by the Court and, after the Court determined the jurisdictional question, it would either dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or consider the merits of the appeal. Deckard did not timely file a letter brief addressing the jurisdictional issues. Counsel for Linda, Carl, and Brenda responded that they did not believe Deckard had standing to bring this appeal, but requested they be allowed to file a substantive response if Deckard filed a letter brief responding to the jurisdictional issues.
On March 14, 2016, Deckard filed a jurisdictional brief arguing he had a right to appeal under the doctrine of virtual representation.
Jurisdiction
Even if not raised by the parties, we are required to review issues affecting our jurisdiction over an appeal. M.O. Dental Lab. v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam). Whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. TV Azteca v. Ruiz, No. 14-0186, 2016 WL 766927, at *2 n.4 (Tex. Feb. 26, 2016); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). Appellate standing is typically afforded "only to parties of record." Id. (citing Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex. 1965)). A judgment in a proceeding to declare heirship may be appealed or reviewed at the request of an "interested person." TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.202(b) (West 2014). An "interested person" includes "an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estate being administered." Id. § 22.018(1).
An "heir" is "a person who is entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to a part of the estate of a decedent who dies intestate," TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.015 (West 2014), and includes the decedent's surviving spouse. Id.
Neither Deckard nor his deceased wife, Margaret, appeared in the probate proceeding prior to Deckard filing the notice of appeal, requested any relief from the trial court, or were named in the trial court's judgment determining heirship. Further, there was no evidence offered at the hearing establishing that Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, had any relationship with the decedent or any property right in, or claim against, the decedent's estate. See In re Litoff, No. 05-13-00556-CV, 2014 WL 1690746, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding "stranger to the estate" was not an interested party who had standing to pursue claims against independent executor of will). Accordingly, the record does not reflect that either Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, is a party of record or an interested person under the estates code who is entitled to appeal the trial court's judgment.
The record does not reflect what authority, if any, Deckard had to file a notice of appeal on behalf of his deceased wife. However, we need not reach this issue. --------
In probate cases, a person may also appeal under the doctrine of virtual representation. Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 725; see also Naylor, 466 S.W.3d at 789 ("Although the right to appeal is generally limited to parties of record, a third party may file an appeal where the prospective appellant is 'deemed to be a party' under the doctrine of virtual representation."). The doctrine of virtual representation is typically invoked to allow a person to assert an interest on appeal from a judgment to which he is not a named party in order to vindicate important rights. In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). To be allowed to appeal under this doctrine, the prospective appellant must establish: (1) he is bound by the judgment; (2) his privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record; and (3) there is an identity of interest between the appellant and a party to the judgment. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d at 789; Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 110 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
In his untimely jurisdictional brief, Deckard asserts he is entitled to appeal under the doctrine of virtual representation because "she," which we presume is a reference to Deckard's deceased wife, Margaret,
is bound by the judgment as she is, by the very terms of the judgment, excluded from heirship. Her interest appears from the record inasmuch as the judgment and proceeding below purport to establish all the heirs, but she is not mentioned. Finally, she has an identity of interest between her and the other parties to the judgment as she is also seeking heirship.However, there is no evidence in the record setting out what relationship, if any, Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, had with the decedent or the estate. Accordingly, the record does not establish that either Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, is an unknown heir of the decedent who was represented by the attorney ad litem or would otherwise be bound by the judgment. Cf. Capps v. Foster, No. 10-14-00061-CV, 2016 WL 279022, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 21, 2016, no pet. h.) (concluding any unknown heirs who were represented by an attorney ad litem in title dispute were bound by judgment). Further, because there is no evidence of the basis of any claim that Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, may be asserting against the estate, the record fails to establish either privity of estate, title or interest or an identity of interest between Deckard or his deceased wife, Margaret, and a party to the judgment. Accordingly, Deckard does not have a right to appeal under the doctrine of virtual representation.
Because neither Deckard nor his deceased wife, Margaret, was a party of record in the trial court or an interested party under the estates code and the doctrine of virtual representation does not apply, Deckard does not have standing to bring this appeal. See Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 725 (concluding court of appeals properly dismissed appeal because appellant "was neither a named party, a party by virtual representation nor a party by other device or theory known to the law"). "[A]n appeal filed by an improper party must be dismissed." Naylor, 466 S.W.3d at 787; see also Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 724-25. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE 150334F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. PR-14-02191-1.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Stoddart and Schenck participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It is ORDERED that appellees Linda Joyce Jones Calip, Carl Edwards Jones, and Brenda Cooper Childs recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Demetrice Deckard. Judgment entered this 18th day of March, 2016.