Opinion
No. C4-03-330.
Filed September 2, 2003.
Appeal from the Sibley County District Court, File No. PX0226.
Susan Conner Enwright, Somsen, Mueller, Lowther Franta, PA, (for respondent John C. Ohlemann, personal representative of estate); and R.J. McGraw, (for respondent Lynn W. Nelson)
C. Thomas Wilson, Peter D. Favorite, Gislason Hunter LLP, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Rita Keckeisen, a devisee under the will of testator Clayton Evenson, challenges the district court's determination that Evenson's will was ambiguous, adopting extrinsic evidence of his intent, and correcting the will to increase devisee Lynn Nelson's share to 15% of the estate. Because the district court did not err in concluding that the language of the will is ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence supplied a reliable guide to Evenson's intent, we affirm.
DECISION
This court reviews the district court's decisions on probate matters to determine if its findings are clearly erroneous or whether it erred in its legal conclusions. In re Estate of Sangren, 504 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Minn.App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993). A district court's finding of ambiguity is reviewed as a question of law. In re Estate of Zagar, 491 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Minn.App. 1992).
The purpose of construction of a will is to determine the testator's intent. In re Estate of Arend, 373 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn.App. 1985). This is done by examining the will, any codicils, and the surrounding circumstances at the time of execution of the will. Id. Extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent is admitted only if the will is ambiguous either on its face or because surrounding circumstances support more than one construction. Id. The district court here determined that Evenson's will is ambiguous because it purports to divide "[a]ll of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate of every nature and description and wheresoever situated," but still leaves 10% of the estate unaccounted for or intestate.
"The fact of making a will raises a strong presumption against a partial intestacy." In re Tweedie's Will, 234 Minn. 444, 448, 48 N.W.2d 657, 659 (1951). In Tweedie, the court admitted extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent, in part because it was clear that the decedent intended to dispose of his entire estate, but failed to do so. Id. at 449, 48 N.W.2d at 659. Evenson's will also purports to pass all the "rest, residue and remainder" of his estate, yet allows 10% of the estate to remain in partial intestacy. This inconsistency is sufficient to raise a question of ambiguity.
Appellant asserts that even if the will is ambiguous, the district court erred by relying on evidence of Evenson's previous will and the scrivener's notes of his discussions with Evenson while preparing this will. Citing In re Hartman, 347 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. 1984), appellant argues that such evidence is inherently unreliable and cannot provide a basis for a testator's intent. If the district court had simply consulted Evenson's prior will, appellant's claim of unreliability would arguably be true. Here, however, the district court had the dated notes of the scrivener, which provided a basis for the changes contemplated by Evenson in drawing a new will and a clear indication of Evenson's intent; this is further confirmed by comparison with the prior will and with the circumstances surrounding execution of the will.
Evenson explained that he wished to remove one sister as a devisee because she was living in a nursing home. He directed the scrivener to divide the sister's percentage among his blood relatives, while reserving the same total percentage to his blood relatives, and instructed the scrivener to make no changes to the bequests to his stepchildren and step-grandchildren. The only deviation from these instructions was an unexplained reduction in the devise to Evenson's stepson, Lynn Nelson, whose share was reduced from 15% to 5%. The scrivener's legal assistant confirmed that this reduction was an apparent typographical error.
Appellant correctly asserts that the court cannot "speculate what the testator would have done with knowledge of events subsequent to his or her death and thereby rewrite the will." Hartman, 347 N.W.2d at 484. But, as we have stated, "[n]othing in the history of Minnesota case law suggests cause for blinding the courts to evidence of the testator's intention in cases where the will contains contradictory language." In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn.App. 2001). The district court thus did not err in concluding that the will was ambiguous, admitting extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent, and correcting the will to reflect that intent.