Opinion
A102324.
11-25-2003
In re EBONY N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EBONY N., Defendant and Appellant.
On December 19, 2002, defendant, 16-year-old Ebony N., had been visiting with her friend, Tracye, at Tracyes home. After the visit ended, Tracyes sister saw defendant take the keys to a car belonging to Tracyes mother, Leola B. Tracye, learning of defendants actions, ran outside, where she found defendant in the car with the engine running and the back up lights on. Tracye told defendant to turn off the engine. Defendant did so. Tracye called 911. The police responded. Defendant hid the car keys in her shoe, but they were discovered after she was arrested.
As a result of this incident, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed against defendant, charging her with two counts of receiving stolen property (one count presumably relating to the car itself and the other to the car keys). The petition further charged that defendant had unlawfully driven or taken a vehicle, had unlawfully attempted to drive or take a vehicle and had bought and received a motor vehicle. The truth of the allegations, by stipulation of the parties, was tried on the police reports. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that defendant had attempted to drive or take the vehicle. The court, however, ruled that the evidence did not support the other allegations, and dismissed those counts.
On March 13, 2003, the court adjudged defendant a ward of the court, and placed her on probation. As relevant, here, the court among other things ordered defendant to pay $50 to Ms. B. as restitution for wages lost as a result of being subpoenaed to appear in court. Defendant objected and the matter was set over for a restitutional hearing on April 10, 2003, after which the court affirmed the order.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendants sole appellate argument is that the juvenile court violated her constitutional rights by ordering her to pay restitution to Ms. B. for wages lost as a result of attending the court proceedings. Defendant concedes that such awards are authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, providing that unless the juvenile court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, it shall order the juvenile to pay "[w]ages or profits lost by the victim . . . due to time spent as a witness or in assisting the police or prosecution." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(4).) Defendant claims, however, that this statute is an unconstitutional violation of a juvenile defendants due process rights. Her theory is that a juvenile who forgoes his or her right to a hearing on allegations of having committed crimes, by admitting the allegations of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, will not have to pay the victims lost wages because the victim will not be required to attend the proceedings. It follows, in her opinion, that requiring the juvenile defendant to pay restitution to a victim who is compelled to appear at the jurisdictional hearing, effectively punishes the juvenile for exercising his or her constitutional right to a hearing on the truth of the petitions allegations.
It is true, as defendant claims, that the state is prohibited by the federal and state Constitutions from punishing a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 306-307; accord Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 362; In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278-279.) The defendant, however, is not the only person provided with constitutional rights. Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution also mandates restitutionary awards to victims of crimes, providing, "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)
It also is true that not all burdens placed on due process rights are unconstitutional. In People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, the court considered a claim that Penal Code section 987.8 places an impermissible burden on the exercise of a defendants constitutional right to a jury trial or acts as a deterrent to effective representation by counsel. As relevant, section 987.8 required (and still requires) the trial court to order a defendant who is able to pay attorney fees to reimburse the county for costs of counsel. The defendant pointed out that the fees of counsel for services rendered in a jury trial will be higher than they would be for services rendered in a non-jury trial, contending that the statute was unconstitutional as it could discourage a defendant from seeking a jury trial because of the possibility that he or she would be required to pay the fees of counsel. The court rejected the contention "because it is not required that no burden at all be placed on a defendants constitutional rights; it is only an excessive burden that is impermissible, and no excessive burden has been shown here. For instance, it is obvious that the danger of impeachment by evidence of a prior felony conviction places a heavy burden on a previously convicted defendants exercise of his right to testify in his own behalf. It is nevertheless settled that such burden on the right to testify in ones own behalf does not deny the defendant due process or infringe on his right to call witnesses to testify on his behalf. [Citations.] The burden which defendant suggests exists here is clearly no more excessive than the example given." (Id. at p. 28.)
In our opinion, the burden on a defendants due process rights resulting from having to pay the victims lost wages is not excessive, and is overbalanced by the victims constitutional rights to obtain restitution for losses suffered as a result of the defendants crimes. We conclude, therefore, that Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (h)(4) does not place an unconstitutional burden on a juvenile defendants due process rights.
Defendant cites People v. Lyon (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521. The issue in that case was not the constitutionality of a statute—there, Penal Code section 1202.4—but whether section 1202.4 authorized an order requiring the defendant to pay certain costs incurred by the victim. The Fourth Division of this court recognized that Californias Constitution expressly creates in crime victims a right to restitution from the persons convicted of crimes for losses suffered as a result of criminal activity. (Id at p. 1525, citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 28.) The court further recognized that Penal Code section 1202.4 is intended to implement this right by providing for victim restitution " `for every determined economic loss incurred as a result of the defendants criminal conduct. " (Ibid.) The question for the court, then, was whether the costs at issue could be characterized as "economic loss incurred as a result of the defendants criminal conduct."
The court concluded that the statute authorized an order providing restitution for sums spent by the victim to preserve an asset owned by the defendant, which would then cover a portion of the victims loss. The court found, however, that sums spent by the victim on a private attorney for the purpose of resisting defense discovery, was not an economic loss incurred as a result of the defendants criminal conduct. It was, rather, a loss resulting from the defendants defense of criminal charges. Those costs, therefore, were not authorized by Penal Code section 1202.4. (People v. Lyon, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.)
The holding in People v. Lyon has no application here where the reach of Penal Code section 1202.4 is not at issue, and the statute that is at issue—Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6—expressly authorizes the restitution awarded Ms. B.
Defendant complains that the prosecution acted unreasonably by "dramatically overfiling" the case by charging her with four felony counts when the facts supported nothing more than an allegation of misdemeanor joyriding, and by refusing to agree to a reasonable plea. The conduct of the prosecution cannot render a statute facially unconstitutional, and the prosecutions conduct does not alter our conclusion that defendants due process rights have not been unduly burdened by being compelled to pay Ms. B. for lost wages.
CONCLUSION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur, Swager, J., Margulies, J.