Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Super. Ct. No. CK58989 Marilyn K. Martinez, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Angela Williams, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COOPER, P. J.
Mother appeals from a juvenile court custody order awarding father sole legal and physical custody of her son, E.A., and an order terminating jurisdiction. We find the issue of custody is forfeited and, in any event, mother fails to show the juvenile court abused its discretion. We affirm the custody order and the order terminating jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2005, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleged that Felicia (mother) failed to supervise adequately E.A. and his half sibling. The petition alleged that mother left E.A. at home alone for an extended period of time endangering his health and safety. E.A. was eight at the time. The petition subsequently was sustained.
E.A.’s half sibling is not a part of this appeal and therefore no further references to him or his father are made. Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
E.A.’s father, Jason (father), came to the detention hearing, and the court ordered E.A. released to father. The court ordered reunification services for mother and allowed her monitored visitation and unmonitored phone calls. In June 2005, in a court ordered disposition plan mother was ordered to verify a sober and stable lifestyle. E.A. remained in father’s care.
In November 2005, mother completed a parenting class and began individual counseling. However, on November 18, 2005, mother tested positive for cocaine and, shortly afterwards, the court ordered mother to participate in random drug testing. In December 2005, DCFS reported that mother was consistently visiting E.A. DCFS recommended six months of reunification services. DCFS also reported that father took good care of E.A. The court ordered DCFS to continue reunification services for mother.
Mother attended individual therapy from November 2005 through January 2006. From November 30, 2005 to March 6, 2006, mother had six negative drug tests. However, in March and April mother failed to appear for two tests. After three additional negative test results, on June 7, 2006, mother tested positive for cocaine.
In June 2006, DCFS reported that although mother stated she was working as a manager for a property company, DCFS learned that mother was no longer a property manager and was being evicted for failure to pay rent. On June 22, 2006, DCFS filed a section 342 petition alleging mother tested positive for cocaine on November 18, 2005 and June 7, 2006 and failed to submit to a drug test or enroll in a drug abuse treatment program. Mother pled no contest. In July 2006, mother enrolled in an outpatient substance abuse program.
In July 2006, DCFS reported that “[f]ather is able to provide E.A. with all the necessities of life. DCFS finds that E.A. is well adjusted and safe in his father’s care.” During the dependency period, with the exception of one incident that involved father’s girlfriend, father regularly received positive reviews from the social worker visiting him and E.A. and father consistently took good care of E.A.
In September 11, 2006, the court ordered additional reunification services for mother. The court found that there were extenuating circumstances in that mother had difficulty arranging with her employer to enter an approved rehabilitation program; mother was making progress; and E.A. expressed a desire to be with mother. A letter written by mother dated October 26, 2006, indicates that when she was unable to attend the classes of the substance abuse program she entered because of her work schedule she enrolled in an online class and completed six courses.
On November 1, 2006, DCFS reported that mother tested positive for alcohol. Mother reenrolled in a substance abuse program and her anticipated completion date was May 1, 2007.
On January 8, 2007, the court continued mother’s reunification services. The court found the following extenuating circumstances warranted providing mother with an additional six month reunification period: mother was in compliance and making progress. The court also found that it was in the best interest of E.A. to continue reunification. The court allowed mother unmonitored visits with E.A. including overnights.
Then, on January 16, 2007, DCFS filed an ex parte application that the court changed its prior order of unmonitored and overnight visits. DCFS received mother’s latest drug test results which indicated a positive test for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The ex parte application was denied. The court found the ex parte application to be an improper request because a written motion was required.
DCFS filed a motion for reconsideration. The court indicated that “[g]iven the new information and new evidence that mother has just recently in early January tested positive for illegal substances, and reviewing all of the evidence that was submitted for the prior hearing, mother’s positive test is prima facie evidence that she has not made substantial progress in addressing the issues which have brought her children before this court. She may have attended [] programs, but she has made insufficient progress.” The court issued a custody order awarding father full physical and legal custody over E.A. Mother was ordered to have monitored visitation. The court terminated its jurisdiction. Mother appealed from the order terminating jurisdiction and the order granting custody to father.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding sole legal custody to father because “substantial evidence did not support an inference that Felicia was or would be unable to make conjoint important decision in her son’s life.” Mother correctly points out that when the children were detained they were generally healthy. She also emphasizes that E.A. initially and throughout much of the dependency period expressed a desire to return to mother’s care. Mother introduced evidence of a letter from E.A. telling her how much he loved her. In addition, throughout the dependency proceedings, mother expressed a desire to reunify with E.A.
The issue is forfeited as mother made no argument regarding the merits of the trial court order. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292.) “The purpose of [the forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court so that they may be corrected.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Mother did contest the order, but only on the basis that the juvenile court could not reconsider a prior order. Because mother failed to argue that she should have been awarded joint legal custody of E.A., the issue is forfeited on appeal.
However, even if we consider the issue on the merits, we find mother has not shown the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding father legal custody. We review the juvenile court’s order for abuse of discretion “and may not disturb the order unless the court ‘“‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].’”’” (Bridget A. v. Superior Court 48 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.)
The “‘presumption of parental fitness that underlies custody law in the family court . . . does not apply to dependency cases’ decided in the juvenile court.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.) In the juvenile court, there is no presumption in favor of joint custody. (Id. at p. 206.) In juvenile proceedings “[c]ustody orders are not made until the child has been declared a dependent of the court and in may cases . . . the child has been removed from the parents upon clear and convincing evidence of danger.” (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 974.)
Here, the court was well within its discretion in concluding that it was in E.A.’s best interest to award sole legal custody to father. Despite the extended reunification period, mother never demonstrated parental fitness. The reason for the initial detention was that mother left the children for lengthy periods of time without ensuring their supervision. That deficiency never was corrected. Although the court ordered unmonitored visits, almost immediately thereafter the order was amended because of mother’s positive drug test. During the course of the dependency proceedings, mother tested positive twice for cocaine and once for methamphetamine. The last positive test was more than 20 months after the children had been detained and after mother had twice entered substance abuse programs. As respondent argues, mother after 21 months had not made substantial progress in addressing the issues raised in the dependency. The time period is significant because in dependency proceedings the permanency and stability of the child are important. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.)
Although initially the court indicated its plan was to either return custody to mother or order joint custody with mother and father, that plan changed when mother was unable to conform her behavior to follow the court orders. Her anticipated completion date for her rehabilitation program was not until May 2007, two years after the detention. The order permitted mother only monitored visits, an issue not challenged by mother, indicating concerns about mother’s “ability to protect and care for [E.A.] in any but the most limited circumstances of supervised visits.” (In re Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 713.)
Mother’s argument that “substantial evidence did not support an inference that Felicia was or would be unable to make conjoint important decision in her son’s life” is based on an incorrect test. When a juvenile court makes a custody order, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. (In re John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.) At the time, the juvenile court ordered sole legal custody to father, the order giving only father the ability to make decisions regarding E.A.’s wellbeing was not arbitrary or capricious. “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 319.)
Mother raises no separate issue with respect to the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm that order separately listed in her notice of appeal.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order awarding father sole legal and physical custody over E.A. is affirmed. The order terminating jurisdiction over E.A. is affirmed.
We concur: FLIER, J., EGERTON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.