Opinion
A122223
7-15-2009
In re D.Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.Y., Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Following a contested dispositional hearing the juvenile court committed defendant to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of 16 years and 8 months. In this appeal defendant complains that the DJJ commitment is not supported by evidence of benefit to him, and the restitution order is unauthorized in part. We conclude that the dispositional order was not an abuse of the trial courts discretion, and the restitution order was proper. We therefore affirm the judgment.
The DJJ was formerly known as the California Youth Authority (CYA). In this opinion we will use the initials DJJ, but will not change the references to CYA in opinions cited.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In light of the plea, the facts related to the underlying offenses are taken from the probation reports.
On the afternoon of September 5, 2006, defendant, his "best friend" Robert, the victim, and another close friend Michael, sat in defendants car in front of his apartment on Collier Boulevard in Napa, listening to music. Defendant was in the drivers seat; Robert occupied the front passenger seat; Michael sat in the back. Defendant was in possession of a 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun he had purchased a few days before in Vallejo. He was displaying the loaded gun to his friends in the car when it "went off." Robert was hit by a single shot in the chest.
For the sake of confidentiality we will refer to defendants friends by their first names.
Defendant and Michael carried the victim upstairs to the apartment, and called defendants mother to inform her that Robert had been shot. Defendants mother then directed her son Ronald "to call 911." Defendant threw the gun used to shoot the victim and another firearm into a closet.
When police officers responded to the scene, Robert was found lying on his back just inside the front door of the apartment. He was subsequently pronounced dead by paramedics.
Police officers interviewed defendant at the scene of the shooting; he was "very emotional" and crying. Defendant stated that Robert was shot by an "unknown suspect" who approached the car in which they were sitting and shot a gun through the drivers side window. Defendant said that he did not own a gun. Defendant was interviewed further at the police station, where he continued to adamantly deny that he shot the victim by "accident," as suggested by the officers. He stated to the officers that he did not immediately call for emergency assistance for the victim, but rather attempted to stop the bleeding with a wet cloth.
After one of the officers again challenged defendants version of the shooting, defendant admitted that he "did it," but not "on purpose." Defendant explained that he purchased the gun and two magazines — one empty and one partially loaded — four days before on the streets in Vallejo for protection from local Surenos who had been giving him and his friends "problems." On the day of the shooting, defendant said he retrieved the gun from his room and brought it to the car to show the victim. He did not realize the magazine in the gun was loaded. Defendant and the victim then "passed the gun back and forth." As defendant was "playing with the trigger," he "pulled it by accident," and a shot was fired that struck Robert in the chest. After the shooting occurred, defendant threw the gun and the clip in the living room closet of his apartment. Defendant also admitted that he had another gun which usually he kept in his bedroom.
A search of defendants apartment resulted in discovery of a 9 millimeter Taurus semi-automatic handgun and a black revolver in the living room closet, a black handgun ammunition magazine on a mattress in defendants bedroom, numerous Ecstasy pills and U.S. currency in a Ziploc bag on the same mattress, and more Ecstasy pills in an Altoids canister on a closet shelf. Defendant initially admitted that he possessed the Ecstasy pills, but later claimed that the drugs "belonged to Michael." A witness told the police, however, that defendant possessed and sold Ecstasy at his apartment and elsewhere.
The petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) was filed on August 17, 2007. On November 2, 2007, defendant admitted that he committed the charged offenses of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)), possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and misdemeanor battery on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a), along with enhancements for being personally armed with a firearm and personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subd. (c), 12022.5, subd. (a)) in commission of the involuntary manslaughter offense.
The admission of the battery offense was based on an earlier incident in which defendant hit a 12-year-old boy in the face at Redwood Middle School. As part of the negotiated disposition, additional charges of possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246) were dismissed upon motion by the prosecution.
At an uncontested dispositional hearing on December 7, 2007, the juvenile court considered the reports and the evaluations submitted by two defense psychiatrists in support of the request for camp placement rather than DJJ commitment. Both psychiatrists stated in their evaluations that defendant suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder and depressive symptoms (Dysthymic Disorder), and would be better treated in a local camp facility rather than DJJ. The report noted that defendant performed successfully during his stay of over one year in the structured setting of juvenile hall by graduating from high school and completing an anger management class. Following the hearing the court placed defendant on probation, granted him credit for 459 days of time served in juvenile hall, and ordered him committed to the Bar-O-Boys Ranch camp program until age 19. He was also ordered to pay a restitution fine and restitution to the victims.
On March 21, 2008, respondent filed a notice of probation violation based upon possession of methadone in the Bar-O-Boys Ranch following a visit from his mother. The result of a urine test on March 11, 2008, indicated that defendant tested positive for use of methadone. When first confronted with the accusation that he possessed the methadone, defendant implicated "another minor" at the camp. Defendant later acknowledged that he obtained eight methadone pills from his mothers purse without her knowledge during an overnight visit. He took half a pill himself, and dispersed other pills to four minors in the camp. The Bar-O-Boys Ranch terminated defendants placement in the camp, and he was transported to juvenile hall.
Defendant turned 18 years old before the probation violation occurred.
Defendant declined to provide a urine test the day before.
A contested dispositional hearing on the probation violation allegation was held on July 21, 2008. The dispositional report recommended placement of defendant at DJJ. The report stated that defendant failed to take advantage of the opportunity and services in the "full term camp program" offered at the less restrictive setting of Bar-O-Boys Ranch, and therefore an "escalation of supervision and placement is warranted." The need for a "lengthy program" to assist defendant in dealing with issues of "depression and possible PTSD" was noted. According to the report, counseling services to address defendants mental health issues, along with substance abuse counseling, anger management, victim awareness and vocational courses, would be available to defendant as part of a DJJ commitment.
At the dispositional hearing defense counsel argued in favor of continued placement of defendant in a residential program, and pointed out that a single facility, Amicus House in Santa Clara, considered him eligible for services that included treatment for PTSD. The probation officer asserted that funding for defendants placement at a residential placement facility by the department was problematic due to the fact that defendant was over 18 years old, although defendants mother indicated that she would pay for any "additional counseling" for defendant. Respondent also asserted that Amicus House is a "12-step drug and alcohol program," not a facility that provides the "psychological services" defendant needed, and is "not a locked facility." Defense counsel countered by advising the court that Amicus House has "licensed family therapist" available "once a week" who has "training on PTSD."
Respondents counsel questioned the financial means of defendants family to pay for a commitment to Amicus House.
The juvenile court offered the opinion that any PTSD which afflicted defendant was not "in any way related" to his act of violating his probation by bringing methadone into the Bar-O-Boys Ranch facility. Rather, the court stated, defendant acted in "blatant disregard" of the courts orders and the opportunity granted to him in a less restrictive placement. The court found that defendant needed "to participate in a lengthy commitment at DJJ," a secure, disciplined environment, and take advantage of the counseling services available to address his mental health issues. A finding of probable benefit to defendant from the "reformatory, education, discipline and other treatment provided by" the DJJ was also made by the court. Defendant was committed to the DJJ for a term not to extend beyond his 25th birthday, with credit for time served.
DISCUSSION
I. The Commitment to DJJ.
The primary contention presented by defendant in this appeal is that his commitment to the DJJ was error. Defendant points out that he had "no history of prior adjudications," and never received "the counseling and medical treatment he required" in his prior placement. He asserts that the court "ignored the unanimous opinions of the mental health professionals," who recommended that he receive treatment for PTSD and symptoms of depression in a local facility. Defendant also argues that "no evidence" was presented to support the courts finding "of probable benefit" to him from programs available at the DJJ. He therefore claims that the disposition order is an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
We review the commitment order in light of the purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws, which "`is twofold: (1) to serve the "best interests" of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and "enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community," and (2) to "provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . ." (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615 [noting also that [Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 202, subd. (b), authorizes punishment consistent with rehabilitative objectives]; see [Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 202, subds. (a), (b), (d).)" (In re Schmidt (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 694, 716; see also In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1321-1322.) "To accomplish these purposes, the juvenile court has statutory authority to order delinquent wards to receive `care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of [the juvenile court law] . . . . [Citation.]" (In re Charles G., supra, at p. 615.) The juvenile courts have "broad discretion to choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507; see also In re Antoine D., supra, at pp. 1321-1322.)
A commitment to the DJJ must be supported by substantial evidence in the record of 1) probable benefit to the minor, and 2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 566-567; In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576; In re Ismael A. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 911, 918.) The current law, while retaining the best interest of the minor as a commitment consideration, has placed a greater emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation and a means of protecting the public safety. (In re Domanic B. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 366, 372; In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473; In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.) A DJJ commitment may not be made for the sole reason that suitable alternatives are unavailable; instead, "the court must be `fully satisfied that a CYA commitment probably will benefit the minor," and less restrictive alternatives are unavailable or inappropriate. (In re Aline D., supra, at p. 562; In re George M., supra, at p. 379; In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151; In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 58.) "The court must find that CYA would likely benefit the ward ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 734), and that it otherwise serves the statutory aims." (In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th 480, 488.)
"The appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion . . . . Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a CYA commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.] A CYA commitment may be considered, however, without previous resort to less restrictive placements." (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396; see also In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556; In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) "`"We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." [Citation.]" (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.)
We commence our analysis by reaching a conclusion that is not subject to sincere dispute: the current felony findings along with defendants prior minor incident of criminal behavior and the serious offense he committed following his commitment to a residential facility thoroughly justified the DJJ commitment. Defendant not only engaged in a succession of criminal acts, but committed an exceedingly grave felony offense which involved use of a gun and the death of the victim. Evidence also shows that he possessed and sold a controlled substance, and illegally possessed firearms. He then violated the terms of his probation and prior commitment by testing positive for methadone use and admitting distribution of methadone to others in the Bar-O-Boys Ranch. The nature, extreme gravity and repetition of offenses support the disposition. "The gravity of the offense is by statute a proper consideration at disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5.)" (In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.)
We further observe that defendant displayed a pattern of failing to take responsibility for the offenses, and blamed others, until he was confronted with evidence that strongly implicated him.
Further, as the dispositional report specifies, commitment to a residential facility is unavailable or inappropriate, as that very form of less restrictive alternative failed when defendant not only used methadone but distributed drugs to others in the camp. He thereby demonstrated that he is not only unlikely to succeed in a residential facility, but also poses a risk to others committed in a less restrictive placement with him. The DJJ commitment order is necessary for the protection of the public. (See In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 379; In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.)
Defendants challenge to the placement order is thus distilled to a complaint that the DJJ fails to offer the rehabilitative programs necessary to benefit him, specifically, his identified "mental health needs." While we realize that a commitment order must be supported by evidence demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a CYA commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives, we find in the record substantial evidence of benefit to the minor to support the commitment order. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396-1397; In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.) We disagree with defendants assertion that his "mental health needs" were overlooked or discounted by the juvenile court. Defendants individual therapeutic needs were explicitly identified by respondent and the court: PTSD and associated symptoms of depression caused by the killing of his friend; substance abuse; and placement in a highly structured, locked facility. The court mentioned that the experts reports had been read and considered. As we read the record, the juvenile court did not disbelieve or ignore defendants mental health needs in deciding upon an appropriate commitment. The court recognized the opinions of the psychiatrists who evaluated defendant, but found that defendant did not commit the most recent probation violation as a result of his PTSD. The courts finding is justifiable in light of two factors, which were mentioned by the court in its statement of reasons: first, that defendant used and dealt drugs before the shooting of Robert occurred and the PTSD symptoms ensued; and second, that defendant thrived while committed to Napa County Juvenile Hall after the shooting.
Defendant has further pointed to the juvenile courts statement that he is not in need of a "treatment program," as a manifestation of the courts lack of consideration of his best interests. We do not interpret the courts remark as an indication that defendants mental health needs were improperly disregarded, as defendant suggests. The context of the statement reveals to us that the court was only making the assessment that a DJJ commitment, not just a treatment program in a residential facility, was necessary for defendant.
Under the facts presented, we agree with the juvenile courts determination. The record, particularly the dispositional report, furnishes support for the finding that the DJJ commitment would benefit defendant. The report articulates that the DJJ offers not only "mental health counseling services," but also treatment for his substance abuse, anger management and victim awareness counseling, vocational courses, and an escalation of supervision through placement in a secure, disciplined environment. In fact, the evidence intimates to us that a DJJ commitment may offer beneficial services in a greater degree than those available at the Amicus House alternative proposed by defendant. The finding of benefit to the minor is supported by the evidence. With the failure of a less restrictive placement, commitment to a locked facility is the only alternative that may serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and safety of the public. The dispositional order of commitment to the DJJ in this case was not an abuse of discretion. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1397; In re Travis W., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 379-380;In re Domanic B., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 366, 374; In re George M., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 380.)
II. The Restitution Order .
Defendant also argues that the restitution order was unauthorized in part and must be reversed. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 (section 730.6), defendant was ordered to reimburse Linda Smernes, who he concedes is the victims "mother" for purposes of the reimbursement statute. In addition, defendant was ordered to reimburse Illya Lebow-Smernes, the victims sister-in-law, and his aunt Donna Gilliam Hamilton, for lost wages, travel and other expenses related to attending the victims funeral, in the amounts of $1,424.56 and $908.00, respectively. Defendant argues that "neither of these women qualify under section 730.6" as the victims "`immediate family and are not among those for whom the Legislature provided should receive compensation under the statutes." He asks us to reverse the restitution awards to Illya Lebow-Smernes and Donna Gilliam.
Defendant does not challenge the restitution award to Linda Smernes, who as the victims mother clearly qualifies as a victim under the statute. (People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1507.)
"Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in California. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498 ; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)" (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045; see also People v. ONeal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 817, 820.) "Section 730.6 governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. [Citation.] Section 730.6 parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, which governs adult restitution." (In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) Pursuant to section 730.6, "When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the juvenile court must order restitution to reimburse a victim for `any economic loss resulting from the minors conduct bringing him within the courts jurisdiction. (§ 730.6, subds. (a)(1) & (h).)" (In re Brian N. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 591, 593.) "The Legislature very clearly intended `that a victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant convicted of that crime. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)" (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th 644, 659.)
"`[T]he Legislature is under an express constitutional mandate (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)) to enact laws requiring trial courts to order restitution "in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss . . . ." [Citation.]" (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 655.)
Therefore, to interpret the scope of Welfare & Institutions Code section 730.6 we will refer to cases that have interpreted Penal Code section 1202.4. (See People v. Bergin (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1172.)
"`The juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution in a manner that will further the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587-1588.) "`"The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. . . . [Citations.] [Citation.]" (People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045.) " `"A victims restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." [Citation.] "`When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court." [Citation.] [¶] The juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution in a manner that will further the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior." (In re Brian N., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 591, 593-594.) However, defendants contention that the statutory condition of a qualifying victim for a restitution order under section 730.6 has not been met is a question of law "which we will consider without deference to the trial courts action." (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661-662.)
For purposes of section 730.6, "the term `victim [is] defined expansively to include `the immediate surviving family of the actual victim. [Citation.]" (People v. Torres (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1, 4; see also People v. Hamilton (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 932, 939.) "A `derivative victim is `an individual who sustains pecuniary loss as a result of injury or death to a victim. [Citation.] A pecuniary loss is `an economic loss or expense . . . . [Citation.]" (People v. ONeal, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 817, 821.)
The term "immediate surviving family" of the actual victim is not further defined in section 730.6, so we must interpret the statute to determine the scope of the definition. "`"A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In construing a statute, our first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] When the language is clear and there is no uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and simply enforce the statute according to its terms. [Citations.]" [Citations.] [Citation.] [¶] In examining the restitution statute, `[t]he intent of the voters is plain: every victim who suffers a loss shall have the right to restitution from those convicted of the crime giving rise to that loss. [Citation.]" (People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046.)
The request for restitution by Illya Lebow-Smernes for lost wages and travel expenses to attend the funeral was submitted on behalf of the victims older brother, Daniel Smernes. Under any definition of the term, the victims brother and his wife are members of the immediate surviving family of the victim for purposes of section 730.6. (People v. ONeal, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 817, 820-821.)
The request for restitution from Illya Lebow-Smernes noted that Daniel Smernes was "too distraught" to personally submit a victim impact statement or file a financial impact statement.
Donna Gilliam Hamilton is the victims aunt. While her family relationship with the victim may not have been quite as close as a brother, we conclude that under the facts presented she also qualifies as a member of the victims immediate family. In her victim impact statement, Donna Gilliam Hamilton stated that the victim spent the summers with her and they annually took vacations together. Section 730.6, unlike some other penal statutes, does not specifically define immediate family in terms of precise familial relationships. (Cf. Pen. Code, §§ 422, 646.9.) We therefore must deduce that the Legislature did not provide a single, inflexible definition of "immediate surviving family" for purposes of section 730.6, but rather intended the term to apply more broadly to include those relatives who have the requisite close family relationship with the victim to make a restitution award deserving and appropriate.
For purposes of the crime of making terrorist threats Penal Code section 422 provides that "`immediate family means any spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household." Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (l) defines "`immediate family" similarly to mean "any spouse, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household."
An adaptable, encompassing definition of the term is also consistent with the objectives of the victim restitution statute. "The purpose of an order for victim restitution is threefold, to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating him for his economic losses." (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.) "In view of the strongly expressed concern for persons who have suffered loss as the result of criminal conduct, our Supreme Court has given the term `victim a broad and flexible meaning. (People v. Crow [(1993)] 6 Cal.4th [952,] 959-960 [`victim includes government agencies and nonresidents]; People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1075 [22 Cal.Rptr. 278, 856 P.2d 1134] [`victim includes anyone suffering an economic loss, not merely physical injury].)" (People v. Ortiz (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 791, 796-797.) The facts demonstrate to us that Donna Gilliam Hamilton, as the victims aunt, who spent summers and shared vacations with him, had the kind of intimate familial bond with him that makes her loss immediate and profound. We thus find that she also qualifies as a member of the victims "immediate surviving family" within the meaning of section 730.6.
While defendant has not also challenged the nature of the losses for which restitution was granted to the victims, we further conclude that the awards of lost wages and travel expenses to attend the victims funeral fall within the definition of "loss" in section 730.6. "[C]ompensation for those who suffer injuries or incur expenses as a result of an offense is proper, `regardless of the nature of their loss. [Citation.]" (People v. ONeal, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th 817, 821.) "The restitution statute allows for recovery of a broad variety of economic losses that are incurred as a result of the defendants criminal conduct. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)" (People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046.) "Although subdivision (h) of section 730.6 lists certain categories of economic loss as providing an appropriate basis for a restitution order, it is not intended to be an inclusive list. The term `economic loss in the juvenile restitution statute must be given an expansive interpretation because any interpretation that limits a victims rights to restitution would derogate the expressed intent and purposes of Article 1, section 28, and the provisions of the implementing statutes. (In re Johnny M. [(2002)] 100 Cal.App.4th [1128,] 1131 , citing People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].) The court in In re Johnny M. held that the use of the term `including in section 730.6, subdivision (h), like the use of the term `including, but not limited to, in Penal Code section 1202.4, suggests a legislative intention to allow broad discretion in providing for recovery of a victims economic loss from the offender. (In re Johnny M., supra, at pp. 1135-1136.)" (In re M.W., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6; see also Keichler, supra, at p. 1045.) "Under the statutory authority, the juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution to further the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior." (In re M.W., supra, at p. 6.) "The only limitation the Legislature placed on victim restitution is that the loss must be an `economic loss incurred as the result of the defendants criminal conduct. [Citations.]" (People v. Crisler, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508.)
Here, the victims brother, sister-in-law and aunt lost wages and sustained travel expenses to attend the victims funeral. The losses and expenses were reasonably incurred, and caused by defendants commission of the involuntary manslaughter offense. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding restitution for those expenses. (People v. Crisler, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1509; People v. Rubics (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 452, 461.)
DISPOSITION
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Marchiano, P. J.
Margulies, J.