Opinion
No. 340091
05-15-2018
In re D. T. DRONES, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Muskegon Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2008-037021-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, DD. Because the trial court failed to make findings on whether there were statutory grounds for termination, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BASIC FACTS
In 2008, respondent pleaded guilty to poisoning food, drink, water, medicine, or water supply in violation of MCL 750.436(2)(a). Respondent had filled a "sippy" cup with milk and bleach and set it near her baby, NV. Respondent's mother discovered the mixture and dumped it out. Respondent took the "sippy" cup to the bathroom and refilled it with orange soda and a cleaner. She then went to give the cup to NV, but was unable to do so because the baby was removed from the house by respondent's mother. Respondent was sentenced to eight years in prison for the conviction, and her parental rights to NV were terminated.
Shortly after respondent was released from prison, she became pregnant with DD. The child's father—who is not a respondent in this case—testified that, while pregnant, respondent sent him a text message stating that she was going to harm herself. Because of respondent's poisoning conviction and the resulting termination of parental rights to NV, as well as her threats to harm herself while pregnant, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) removed DD from respondent's care the day he was born.
In its initial petition, DHHS petitioned the trial court to terminate respondent's parental rights to DD. Respondent waived a probable cause determination, and the court authorized the petition. DD was placed with his father. Subsequently, on May 1, 2017, respondent pleaded to jurisdiction, admitting that in 2008 she had pleaded guilty to poisoning NV's food and water supply and admitting that her parental rights to NV were terminated. Respondent, however, did not voluntarily agree to release her parental rights. Instead, she made it clear that she would be contesting the termination proceedings. In its opinion terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court erroneously concluded that respondent had pleaded to statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights and only made findings on whether termination was in the child's best interests.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
B. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that a statutory ground for terminating her parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We agree. The record plainly reflects that the trial court made no findings with regard to whether petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination existed. Instead, the trial court erroneously concluded that respondent had pleaded to statutory grounds and that the only issue to be decided was whether termination was in DD's best interests. That constitutes reversible error because, in order to terminate a parent's parental rights, the court must find that there are grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Nevertheless, petitioner argues that termination is proper because, by pleading to jurisdiction, respondent admitted all the facts necessary to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii). Termination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii) if the respondent abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse included "attempting to commit . . . murder or voluntary manslaughter." Respondent admits that she was convicted of poisoning the food or drink supply for her baby in 2008, but she asserts that conviction is insufficient to now establish that she attempted to murder NV because she did not actually give the sippy cup to NV. Additionally, she notes that she was neither charged with nor convicted of attempted murder or attempted voluntary manslaughter. While we recognize that the statute does not require a parent to be charged with or convicted of attempted murder or attempted manslaughter, the statute does require clear and convincing evidence that a parent "abused the child or a sibling of the child." On the record before us, there is no evidence that NV was, in fact, abused by respondent. Indeed, the record reflects that before any abuse could happen, respondent's mother intervened and removed the child from the home. In addition, as DD was removed before respondent could provide him with any care, there is no evidence that she abused him, nor is there evidence that she attempted to kill him. Accordingly, we reject petitioner's argument that we should find—based on the evidence presented—that respondent's parental rights should be terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii).
The term "abuse" is not statutorily defined, so "we may turn to dictionary definitions to aid our goal of construing those terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings." People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed), defines the noun form of the word "abuse" as "[c]ruel or violent treatment of someone; specif., physical or mental maltreatment, often resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury." It provides the following relevant definitions of the verb form: "3. To injure (a person) physically or mentally. 4. In the context of child welfare, to hurt or injure (a child) by maltreatment." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed). The verb form of the word "abuse" is defined in Webster's New World College Dictionary (5th ed), as "2 a) to hurt by treating badly; mistreat b) to inflict physical, sexual, or psychological harm upon." These dictionaries support that the plain meaning of the verb "abuse" includes physical or emotional harm.
The dissent argues that we should apply the definition of "child abuse" from the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 et seq., which defines "child abuse" in part as "harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare that occurs through nonaccidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or maltreatment, by a parent." MCL 722.622(g) (emphasis added). We disagree.
Under the dissent's interpretation, MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii) would allow termination of a parent's parental rights if "[t]he parent abused [or threatened to abuse] the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse [or the threatened abuse] included 1 or more of the following . . . ." However, when interpreting a statute, we must not read anything into the statute that is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself, Mich Ed Ass'n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 218; 801 NW2d 35 (2011). Clear statutory language must be enforced as written. Velez v Tuma, 492 Mich 1, 1617; 821 NW2d 432 (2012). Here, the statute plainly requires that either the child or a sibling of the child be "abused." If the legislature intended to include threatened abuse, it would have added that language itself. In addition, if the legislature intended that the definition of "child abuse" from the Child Protection Law to be used in MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii), then it could have stated that as well. We are also cognizant that, unlike the Child Protection Law, termination of a parent's parental rights under the Juvenile Code, implicates a parent's constitutional right to parent his or her child.
On remand, the trial court shall hold a new hearing on whether there are statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights. Petitioner may again seek termination pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(viii) if additional legally-admissible evidence consistent with the statutory requirements is available. However, in evaluating the evidence presented, the trial court shall take particular note of MCR 3.977(E)(3), which provides that a court may only terminate a parent's parental rights at initial disposition if it
finds on the basis of clear and convincing legally admissible evidence that had been introduced at the trial or plea proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or more facts alleged in the petition:
(a) are true, and
(b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), or (n) [Emphasis added.]See also In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 17-18; 761 NW2d 253 (2008) (stating that termination at the initial dispositional hearing requires "clear and convincing, legally admissible evidence . . . to establish the grounds for termination").
We note that in the proceedings below, petitioner erroneously advised the court that "[a]s we are here on termination and best interest, the court rule MCR 3.977(H)(2) does state that the Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply, other than those with respect to privilege . . . ." Petitioner proceeded to introduce hearsay statements contained in the 2008 police reports. The legal representations made by petitioner were incorrect. MCR 3.977(H) applies only "[i]f the parental rights of a respondent over the child were not terminated pursuant to subrule (E) at the initial dispositional hearing . . . ." In this case, termination was sought at initial disposition, so MCR 3.977(H) did not apply. Therefore, contrary to petitioner's statement, the court was obligated to consider only legally admissible evidence. --------
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly