Opinion
Nos. CP01-002554-A, CP01-002555-A, CP01-002556-A
February 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On April 18, 2002, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed petitions against RM and GM, seeking to terminate their parental rights (TPR) to their biological children. On August 29, 2003, after hearing, the court (Rubinow, J.) terminated RM's parental rights to his Sons JM, born December 19, 1995; JCM born October 18, 1996; and CM, born December 22, 1998. This memorandum of decision addresses the TPR petitions brought against GM which seek to terminate her parental rights to JM, DCM, CM as well as to DR, born January 20, 1994. The petitions allege the sole ground of failure to achieve rehabilitation as the basis for terminating GM's parental rights. For the reasons stated below, the court finds these matters in favor of the petitioner and terminates GM's parental rights to all four children.
To best serve the interests of these children, the court has dealt separately with the issues raised by DCF's TPR petitions against each parent. Thus, although the TPR cases against GM and RM were tried together, this memorandum of decision disposes of only the TPR issues brought against GM.
DR's father, EF, is deceased. (Testimony of AlF.)
At oral argument on May 19, 2003, the petitioner withdrew the companion claim that GM's parental rights should be terminated due to an act or acts of maternal commission or omission.
Trial of this highly-contested matter took place on April 16 and 17, and May 19, 2003. After hearing on September 3, 2003, the court (Rubinow, J.) opened the evidence related to GM's ability and availability to parent the children. Relevant factual issues were addressed through a separate action involving GM that was brought before the United States Department of Justice, Immigration Court (Immigration Court). The Immigration Court order was issued on December 19, 2003, and the relevant appeal expired on January 20, 2004.
The petitioner, GM and the children were vigorously represented throughout the TPR proceedings. The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children at issue.
Pursuant to General Statutes 46b-129(k), the children's counsel also served as their court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL).
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence, which included the TPR social study, court records, police reports, and records of the Department of Public Safety. The court utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses, who included a police officer, DCF social workers, the children's therapist, a paternal uncle, a community service worker, and GM's treating physician. The court also received a report from the children's GAL. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial:
The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. Practice Book § 35a-9.
As was her right, GM did not testify before the court. See Practice Book § 32a-1.
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., CT Page 2164 53 Conn. App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn. App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). "It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." (Quotation marks and citations omitted.) In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). In child protection matters, as in other cases,"[t]he law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative force is concerned." (Quotation marks, citations omitted.) In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn. App. 151, 158-59, 256 A.2d 303 (2000). Furthermore, it is the factfinder's prerogative "to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) State v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 338, 746 A.2d 761 (2000); see also In re Adalberto S., 27 Conn. App. 49, 53, 604 A.2d 822 (1992).
Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.
I.A. HISTORY OF THESE PROCEEDINGS
GM was born on July 8, 1976. A native of Honduras, she has no legalties to the United States. (Testimony of AIF, FAMD.) GM's first child, DR, was born in the United States on January 20, 1994, when GM was seventeen years old. Subsequently, GM met RM, and they lived together with young DR. The couple's first son, JM, was born on December 19, 1995; their second son, JCM, was born on October 18, 1996. GM and RM married on February 23, 1997. When their son CM was born on December 22, 1998, he became the fourth child living in their household. (Exhibit 1.)
The death of DR's father ER is reflected in Exhibit 1.
DCF became involved with GM's family in May 2000, when the department received reports relating DR's failure to attend school on a regular basis, and concerning lack of supervision and inadequacy of supplies for the children. At the time, GM's physical condition was debilitated due to a chronic illness. (Exhibits 1, 4; Testimony of AlF.) DCF took the children into care, and on May 22, 2000 the court issued an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) for them. This order was sustained by the court (Dennis, J.) on May 31, 2000. Specific steps were imposed to guide GM toward improving her physical and emotional status, and enhancing her parenting skills. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF.) Comprehensive services were provided to the family through MFAP, a local social service agency whose mission was to assist those suffering from GM's chronic illness. With MFAP services in place, DCF satisfied itself that the children were safe and well-cared for in the custody of RM and GM. On July 31, 2000, the children were returned home under protective supervision. The protective supervision was allowed to lapse, and DCF closed this case in December 2000. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF.)
MFAP's services to GM and her family were coordinated and extended through the project's executive director, who served as her designated case manager. MFAP's support services for the family included individual counseling for both GM and RM, medical management and medication, day care, transportation assistance, a home health aide and visiting nurse services. Housing for RM, GM and the children was supported through Section 8 vouchers and/or from direct rental subsidies provided by MFAP. MFAP extended funds to GM for the declared purpose of helping to bring a family member to the United States for assistance with child care. In addition, MFAP helped the family pay their utility bills, obtain food through their food pantry or through food vouchers, assisted with automobile insurance, and covered the medical bills that were not covered by GM's state insurance or uncovered by RM's private health insurance. MFAP also utilized a Spanish-speaking case manager to communicate with GM, and referred her for individual counseling at a culturally competent mental health center (LMHC — NH), which was affiliated with a local hospital. (Testimony of StL, AlF.)
I.B. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE SECOND OTC, DATED JULY 26, 2001.
When her health was stable, GM provided her young children with satisfactory care and attention, aided by MFAP. However, there were frequent periods when GM's chronic illness rendered her medically fragile or necessitated her hospitalization, so that she was unable to serve as a responsible caretaker for her sons. Too often, while RM worked outside the home and GM was unable to provide appropriate supervision for the children, young DR was saddled with the responsibilities of tending his younger siblings, again causing him to have excessive absences from school. (Testimony of AlF.)
GM was hospitalized approximately twenty times, sometimes for a week or more, prior to her incarceration in January 2002. (Testimony of AlF.)
DCF next became involved with GM's family in late June of 2001, when a local social support agency reported that inadequate care was being provided to the children. DCF was informed that service providers were not being allowed to enter the home, and that GM was not complying with or accepting assistance from the visiting nurse, family counseling or the other community-based services that were being extended through MFAP. (Testimony of AIF, D'OB.)
On July 23, 2001, at a time when GM was too ill to care for the children, two-year-old CM, five-year-old JM, and seven-year-old DR were allowed to play without supervision in a roadway upon which traffic often traveled fast. As a result, CM was almost run over by a passing police car. RM was arrested, taken into police custody, and charged with three counts of Risk of Injury to a Minor for his failure to properly supervise the children. (Exhibit 6.) The next day, although she had no legal driving privileges, and although she was ostensibly too ill to participate in counseling and other services, GM drove to the police department. She walked into the lobby of the building to request information about RM. GM was transported by ambulance to the hospital for evaluation. With the approval of the police, the children remained under the care of an unrelated neighbor, as neither parent has family resources available. The next day, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on the children and placed them in foster care. (Exhibits 1, 6, 7.)
I.C. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE UNCARED-FOR ADJUDICATION OF FEBRUARY 19, 2002.
On July 26, 2001, the court (Riefberg, J.) issued a second ex parte OTC for the four children; this order was sustained (Riefberg, J.) on July 30, 2001. DCF also filed neglect petitions for the children, alleging that they had been denied "proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and that they were "being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious" to their well-being. (Exhibit 1.) All four children have remained in DCF custody since that time, pursuant to court orders. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF.)
On July 30, 2001 the court (Riefberg, J.) imposed new specific steps for GM. Among other things, these steps required GM to: keep her appointments with the MFAP home health aide; avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system; maintain adequate housing and legal income; and inform DCF of any changes in the composition of his household. GM visited with the children as often as DCF permitted, in compliance with the steps. The physical and emotional bond between mother and children was apparent on each of these visits. (Exhibit 3.)
During the fall of 2001, GM's medical condition was being addressed by the staff at two large, local hospitals. GM's stomach complaints were diagnosed and attributed to a parasitological disease that was native to her place of birth. Medication was prescribed for GM to control this condition and the related vomiting and dehydration. However, she was uncooperative with the medication-adherence support system that MFAP extended, refusing to let a specially assigned nurse or MFAP representatives enter her home to provide care. (Testimony of StL.) While the children were absent from her home, GM allowed or permitted several adult males to reside in her children's bedrooms. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF.) On December 27, 2001, RM was stopped by police and was found to be in possession of "4 `bundles' (a 'bundle' is a street term for 10 glassine envelopes of heroin held together by a rubber band) from his person." (Exhibit 8.) When the police performed a subsequent search of the home occupied by GM and RM, they found approximately $16,800 worth of heroin. The contraband was packaged for street sale in 840 glassine envelopes which had been stored in a dresser drawer, a storage location that would have been easily accessible to curious young children. All of these envelopes were stamped "`Good News' in blue." Both RM and GM were taken into police custody and charged with Possession of Narcotics. Each parent posted a $200,000 bond. They left police custody pending appearance in court. (Exhibits 1, 8, 11; Testimony of Pal.)
RM's mother, JV, was also present when this heroin was found; she, too, was taken into police custody and arrested on December 27, 2001. (Testimony of Pal.)
On January 8, 2002, accompanied by RM, GM came to the police department Lobby to inquire about obtaining the return of their private property, which included a canine. When they drove to the local dog pound, where RM was stopped and arrested for Operating under Suspension. During a search incident to arrest, RM was found to have six glassine envelopes of heroin on his person; each bag was "stamped `Good News' in blue" just like the envelopes of heroin that were found on December 27, 2002. RM was then charged with Possession of Narcotics, two counts of Sale of Illegal Drugs, and Disorderly Conduct. He has remained incarcerated since that date. GM was also arrested at the scene, taken into police custody and charged with a number of drug-related offenses (Exhibits 1, 8, 9, 10, 12; Testimony of PaL.) Due to its involvement with drug-related activities, the family was evicted from their public housing. (Exhibits 1, 11.)
On August 30, 2002, RM was convicted on a substitute information of Sale of Narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277(a), relating to the offense that had occurred on December 21, 2001. Incarcerated since January 2002, he was then sentenced to serve thirteen years of incarceration for this offense; his other pending charges were nolled. (Exhibit 11.)
GM then entered Department of Corrections (DOC) custody to await trial. At the time, she was extremely debilitated, almost totally lacking an immune situation, affected by fungal lesions of the skin and dehydration. The DOC medical staff diagnosed GM with an immunosuppressive disease and a related disorder of the intestinal tract. GM's condition remained relatively unchanged during the first months of her incarceration. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of FAMD)
The court file reflects that on February 19, 2002, while both RM and GM remained incarcerated, the neglect petition was amended to reflect the allegation that all four children at issue were uncared for. Upon the respondent parents' admissions to the uncared for allegation, the court (Brenneman, J.) adjudicated the children to be "uncared for, homeless," on that date, and committed them to DCF custody.
The Appellate Court has tacitly approved the court's practice of taking notice of all prior court actions, in the course of reaching a decision. In re Amanda A., 58 Conn. App. 451, 452-53, 755 A.2d 243 (2000); In re Jessica M., 49 Conn. App. 229, 233, 714 A.2d 64 (1998); C. Tait, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001) § 2.16.5, Judicial Proceedings and Records.
I.C. EVENT'S FOLLOWING THE UNCARED FOR ADJUDICATION OF FEBRUARY 19, 2002 CT Page 2148
DCF brought the children to visit with GM once a month while she was incarcerated. The visits were appropriate, although GM often became quite emotional in the children's presence. (Testimony of D'OB.) TPR petitions were filed against GM on April 18, 2002.
The DOC continued to provide GM with medical treatment. Initially, she was treated as a terminal patient, and required multiple hospitalizations for treatment of dehydration and infections. After she had been incarcerated for approximately seven months, GM came under the treatment of FAMD. After a biopsy of the small intestine, GM was found to be affected by an organism that causes illness in severely immunosuppressed patients. FAMD procured appropriate treatment for GM. At trial, FAMD opined that with continuing, appropriate treatment, GM will live an active, independent life as far as her physical status is concerned. However, he explained that if she fails to obtain the necessary medication, GM's underlying chronic condition will again threaten her life. Through the time of trial, GM had not yet reached a point where the DOC officials would permit her to administer her own medication, although she was physically able to do so. Instead, GM was required to visit the medical unit twice a day, where she had to ingest her medication under direct DOC observation. (Testimony of FAMD.)
There was insufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that the disease-causing organism that the DOC physician identified during the summer of 2002 was the same as the parasitic phenomenon that had been identified by GM's local medical providers while she was at liberty. (Testimony of FAMD, StL.) See Part I.B.
Through his demeanor at trial and the content of his testimony, GM's treating physician appeared to be quite aligned with the respondent mother. The court properly considered this witness's clear interest in the outcome of the proceedings when scrutinizing the degree of weight that could reasonably be attributed to his opinions. State v. Owens, 63 Conn. App. 245, 251, 775 A.2d 325 (2001); see also In re Ashley E., supra, 62 Conn. 316; In re Pascacio R., 52 Conn. App. 106, 114-15, 726 A.2d 114 (1999).
On November 21, 2002, GM tendered an Alford plea, and was convicted on a substitute information of one count of Conspiracy to commit Possession of Narcotics with the Intent to Sell Narcotics. The conviction related to the December 2001 arrest; nolles were entered for all charges stemming from the January 2002 arrest. GM was sentenced to serve seven years in jail, suspended after eighteen months, with five years of probation. (Exhibits 10, 12.)
It is unquestioned that after she completed serving the unsuspended portion of her sentence, GM was not released into the community. Instead, she remained in the custody of authorities in connection with removal proceedings that had been brought against her by the United States Department of Justice. On September 3, 2003, the court (Rubinow, J.) opened the evidence related to GM's ability availability to care for children, given the uncontroverted information related to GM's recent completion of her sentence of incarceration, her improved physical status, her continued detention, and the pending deportation matter.
At the hearing, when the court (Rubinow, J.) was advised that the respondent mother was not at liberty, but would remain in government custody pending completion of pending immigration proceedings, orders were issued for an individual psychological evaluation of GM and interactional evaluations of GM and the four children.
On December 19, 2003, after hearing, the Immigration Court (Straus, J.) determined that GM was subject to removal from the United States and ordered her removal to Honduras. No further action was requested from the Immigration Court; the order's appeal period expired on January 20, 2004.
I.D. THE CHILDREN
From mid-May through mid-July 2000, during their first removal from the custody of GM and RM, all four children were placed together in a temporary foster home. (Exhibit 1.)
Following the second removal in July 2001, DR and his younger half-brother JM were placed together in one foster home. Consistent with the care taking role to which he had been relegated when he lived with GM, DR exhibited highly parentified behavior in this placement. He often inquired about GM's health and asked to see her. JM also asked about GM, but to a lesser extent. Both DR and JM have developed a strong bond with their foster mother. They are well-adjusted in this setting, and perform well in school. The boys' foster mother loves both children and is interested in adopting them. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of D'OB.)
Following their July 2001 removal from GM and RM, the two younger children were placed together in a foster home apart from their brothers. Both JCM and CM displayed aggressive and disruptive conduct during this placement; they have attended therapeutic day care in an effort to resolve their behavioral issues. JCM and CM are maturing and have improved their academic and socialization skills. However, at the time of trial, their foster mother was not an adoption resource (Exhibit 1.)
At DCF's referral, all four children have participated in a long course of weekly counseling at the CG-DPH program, to address their adjustment issues related to their status in foster care. Each of the children is eligible for continued CG-DPH counseling through age seventeen. (Testimony of InR.)
II. ADJUDICATION
In the adjudicatory phase of this hearing, the court considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial, as failure to achieve rehabilitation is the sole ground alleged against GM. As discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to this respondent.
"Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).
"Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)], the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a GM has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 748, [ 789 A.2d 1024] (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn. App. 230.
II.A. LOCATION AND REUNFICATION EFFORTS
As a predicate to terminating parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that "DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see also In re Ebony H., 68 Conn. App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). Here the court finds that the petitioner has met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the reunification efforts extended to GM were reasonable under the circumstances of this case. In addition, based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that GM is both unwilling and unable to benefit from the reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 348. A review of the clear and convincing evidence and related circumstances impels these conclusions.
"Although `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn. App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
On January 14, 2002, the court (Dennis, J.) found that further efforts toward reunification were no longer appropriate as to GM. However, as the record does not reflect whether or not this finding was based on clear and convincing evidence, the court declines to rely on this factor with regard to the reunification element at issue.
II.A.1. EXTENSION OF REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
As a part of its reasonable efforts to promote reunification following the July 2001 OTC, DCF provided GM with appropriate family treatment and permanency plans, case management services and administrative case reviews, supervised visits, and transportation so that the children could visit with her once she entered incarceration. (Exhibit 1.) DCF provided counseling for the children, as described in Part I.D. (Testimony of InR.)
DCF was not the only agency that provided reunification efforts to GM and her family, however. To further promote family integrity, GM, RM and the children received comprehensive support from MFAP, which had extended culturally competent case management, referrals to individual counseling that was appropriate for GM, transportation, emergency financial aid, food supplements, and home nursing services for GM. In addition to providing financial support and assistance in maintaining adequate housing, MFAP made a Spanish-speaking parent aide available to assist GM at home. Through MFAP's Spanish-speaking staff, GM was referred to appropriate medical consultation regarding her physical problems. GM was similarly referred to LMHC-NH for individual counseling that was appropriate to meet her apparent need for treatment of depression, frequent emotional upsets, and periods of crying. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF., StL.) See In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 473 (reunification services should reasonably meet parent's needs).
See footnote 11. In reaching its decision that reasonable reunification services were extended to GM, as contemplated by the statute, the court has fully acknowledged the abundant support extended through MFAP. GM has offered no basis, in law or reason, for requiring DCF to duplicate in-home aides, financial support, rehabilitation services or other reunification services that are otherwise extended to a parent through a corollary social service agency such as MFAP.
Once GM was incarcerated in January 2002, neither DCF nor MFAP was able to extend any direct reunification services to her other than visitation, as the Department of Corrections (DOC) alone is able to designate rehabilitation services for particular inmates. (Exhibit 1.) See In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn. App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998) (excusing DCF from providing reasonable efforts at reunification, other than visits, for incarcerated parent). GM participated well in the monthly prison visits that were extended to her, although the children were sometimes less interested in their mother and more interested in the toys available at the prison. (Testimony of D'OB.) While incarcerated, GM made effective use of the medical treatment available to her, and achieved a great improvement in her physical health. (Testimony of FAMD.)
As a related reunification effort, DCF subsequently investigated and considered placing the children with paternal relatives. (Exhibit 1.) However, these individuals either declined to maintain an interest in the children; lacked housing to meet their needs; had left the country; or had criminal histories that precluded such placement. (Testimony of D'OB, JoM.)
II.A.2. INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO BENEFIT FROM REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
As found in Part I.C., following the completion of her DOC incarceration, GM remained in government custody in connection with the immigration proceedings that had been brought against her. As described above, the Immigration Court has determined that GM is subject to removal from the United States and has ordered her return to Honduras. The appeal period for this order expired on January 20, 2004, without request for further action by the Immigration Court. As a practical matter, this deportation order has effectively rendered GM unable to timely or effectively benefit from any such reasonable reunification services as are contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts in a timely way so as to assist the child). As such, DCF has prevailed in proving this requisite element of the TPR petitions.
Even if GM is able and willing to engage in rehabilitation and reunification services while residing in Honduras, the evidence compels the inference that given her children's lengthy stay in foster care, and given their special needs, any such benefit that she may reap from such services would be acquired much too late in time to allow a positive effect upon any of the boys at issue. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385.
Other aspects of the clear and convincing evidence establish that GM is either unable or unwilling to benefit from the reasonable reunification services. Although MFAP had specifically referred GM to appropriate individual counseling to address her mental health needs, the respondent mother attended only one session. She failed to attend any of the subsequent therapy appointments that had been scheduled on her behalf by MFAP. This non-compliance manifests GM's unwillingness or inability to participate in or obtain benefit from the therapy that was appropriate for her condition and emotional symptoms. Due to her failure to comply with the counseling regimen, LMCH-NH terminated its mental health services for GM. GM argues that because she was physically unable to participate in mental health treatment due to illness, the court should not find that she was "unable" to benefit from services as contemplated by the statute. This claim is defeated by the clear, convincing and credible evidence that despite her chronic illness GM was often able to venture out and leave her home when it served her own purposes. For example, when GM desired to see RM who was in police custody after his arrest in July 2001, she was physically able to drive to the police station and walk into the front lobby of the building. (Exhibit 7.) GM was also physically able to walk into the police department lobby in January 2002, when she and RM were seeking the return of their dog and other personal property. (Exhibit 9.) On multiple occasions when she desired to obtain financial assistance from MFAP, the respondent mother was physically able to visit the MFAP director's office and present her requests for funds. (Testimony of StL.) From this evidence, the court reasonably infers that GM was unwilling to attend the counseling that was scheduled for her by MFAP, even though she was able to attend more than one session.
This argument is also defeated by the Appellate Court's rulings that termination is properly recognized as being in the best interests of the child when the parent has an illness which renders him or her unable to adequately meet the needs of the offspring. See In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn. App. 473; In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn. App. 598, 605, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2 519 (1987). The clear and unambiguous language of § 17a-112(j)(1) allows the petitioner to establish a primary element of the termination Statutes through clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is either " unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." (Emphasis added.)
In reaching this factual determination, the court acknowledges that upon leaving the building, police officers observed that "[GM] appeared not to understand what was going on around her. She got out of her vehicle and laid down on the grass." (Exhibit 7.)
Moreover, after the OTC was granted in July 2001, GM began to demonstrate her unwillingness to accept any benefit from MFAP's wrap-around service programs, other than those that involved financial aid. For instance, although MFAP extended assistance from an adherence nurse, who would help the respondent mother comply with her medication regimen, GM argued that she was so physically debilitated that she could not utilize this visiting nursing service. This argument is defeated by the credible evidence that on a number of occasions, the respondent refused to let the adherence nurse even enter her home, let alone extend her professional assistance to her. (Testimony of StL.) Similarly, GM refused, on occasion, even to allow the MFAP case manager enter her house, although he had known the respondent and her family for several years as the result of their supportive work together. (Testimony of StL.)
It is also notable that toward the end of 2001, GM's solicitation of MFAP's monetary aid diminished in frequency; the cessation of the family's requests for funds from MFAP is contemporaneous with law enforcement's determination that RM was locally selling large quantities of heroin in packets stamped "Good News." See Part I.B. (Testimony of StL, Pal.) At about the same time, as found in Part I.B., GM further demonstrated her inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the conditions of her MFAP-supported residence by allowing unidentified adult males to occupy her children's bedrooms. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of AlF.) Taken as a whole, this clear and convincing evidence reasonably supports the inference that GM had reduced her reliance on any agency's monetary support, and had become unwilling to allow service providers into her home, because she was allowing or permitting activities to take place in her home which violated MFAP's protocol and which gave her access to income flowing from illegal drug sales.
GM may argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification, under the analysis utilized in In re Vincent B., 73 Conn. App. 637, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. Notably, in Vincent B., the Appellate Court found that "the department had made no efforts at reunification at all" when it could and should have promoted the reunion of the father and child at issue. Id., 645. The Appellate Court identified "a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have been made . . . after [the parent's] completion of the treatment program." Id., 644-45. In the present case, although services were extended to GM, she did not comply with the counseling, medication support or home aide services provided by MFAP. Due to GM's prolonged incarceration, subsequent detention, and deportation from the United States, DCF never encountered the "window of opportunity" contemplated by In re Vincent B. Accordingly, that decision is not binding upon the present matter.
For instance, GM may argue that DCF's monthly prison visits provided her with an insufficient opportunity to visit and maintain a relationship with the children. However, the court file does not reflect any efforts on GM's behalf to expand the visitation schedule. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 425, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), affirmed per curiam, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003) (reasonable to expect parent to make affirmative efforts to achieve increased contact with the child whose custody is at issue). See also footnote 15. Moreover, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF acted reasonably in scheduling visits on a once-monthly basis, in view of the children's school and therapeutic schedules, and the distance between the children's residences and GM's place of incarceration. (Testimony of D'OB.)
The Appellate Court commented that "[a]lthough making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances, it was not so" under the facts of In re Vincent B. Id., 645.
Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted not by the conduct of the department, but by GM's failure to cooperate with services and her involvement in criminal activities. It was this behavior which led to GM's incarceration and prolonged separation from the children. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn. App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350. The reasonable reunification efforts extended by DCF and through MFAP toward GM proved to be ineffective and futile due to GM's unwillingness to participate in services and her lack of availability while imprisoned or when subject to removal from the United States. As GM is now functionally unable to benefit from any statutory reunification services, the petitioner has met her burden of proof as established by § 17a-112(j)(1).
II.B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — GM's FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that GM's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). As the children were adjudicated uncared for on February 19, 2002, the critical issue for this court is whether GM has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."
"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires . . . that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the] child's life. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)] . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [the] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather whether [the parent] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001).
Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the inauspicious conclusion that GM has not yet achieved, and will not within a reasonable time achieve, a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in the lives of her children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. First, as found in Part II.A., the overwhelming evidence establishes that since her incarceration in January of 2002, GM has been unavailable to serve as a parent for her children and that due to the orders of the Immigration Court, she will not be available to fulfill this role for a prolonged period of time. Not as a result of her status, but because of her physical remoteness from the children, GM is now and long will be unable to serve as a parent for her sons. Thus, GM's return to Honduras renders her effectively unable to serve as a responsible parent to her children, as contemplated by the rehabilitation statute. While she remained incarcerated, while she was held in detention, and/or when she is removed from the United States, GM will lack the capacity to serve as an effective, responsible parenting resource for her sons. In pragmatic terms, she will be unavailable and therefore unable to provide DR, JM, JCM, or CM with what are fundamental attributes of productive parenting including physical, emotional, social, educational, and religious guidance and support. In re Deana E., 61 Conn. App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 45 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001). All of the children have the particular need for a consistently present parenting figure with whom they can develop a trusting, supportive and loving relationship. (Testimony of InR.) While GM is unavailable to fulfill this essential role, surrogates will have to supply the boys' age-commensurate needs for continuous supervision, nurturing, and assistance in completing the activities of daily living in a healthy manner. Viewing the clear and convincing evidence from this perspective, the court is constrained to conclude that from the time of the uncared-for adjudication through the time of trial, GM had not gained, and is not likely in the foreseeable future to gain, the ability to care for the particular needs of the children at issue. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448.
It is GM's inability to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her deportation per se, that leads the court to find that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn. App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356 cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999). Given the court's obligation to consider the particular needs of the four young children involved in this case, when assessing GM's degree of rehabilitation, it would be unreasonable for the court to overlook the fact that while she is subject to removal, the respondent mother simply will not be available to serve as a valid parent for her sons. Under similar circumstances, at least one other court has recognized that TPR is appropriate when a parent's confinement while awaiting deportation creates an "impediment to personal rehabilitation." In re Vincento N., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, judicial district of Waterbury (July 26, 1994, Barnett, J.).
A second aspect of the clear and convincing evidence, reflecting GM's inability or unwillingness to exercise good parenting judgments, also establishes that GM will be unable to play a responsible role in the lives of her children in the reasonably foreseeable future. The empirical evidence establishes that when GM was at liberty, she had not yet developed the judgment necessary to serving as a safe, dependable caretaker. For instance, when she was physically unable to care for the children, instead of securing alternate child care or adequate supervision, GM often inappropriately allowed young Daniel to function as the caregiver for the younger children. Thus, this child was deprived of the opportunities for education, social instruction and community exposure that would have been available if he had attended school. Furthermore, the younger children were subject to the dangers they faced as a result of inadequate supervision.
The empirical evidence permits the further inference that GM made poor judgments even with regard to her own conduct even after the children were removed from her care in July 2001. As found in Part I.C., GM caused or allowed three unrelated adult males to inhabit her apartment during the fall of 2001, failing to honor the court's order that she notify DCF of any change in the composition of his household, and violating the conditions of her sponsored residence. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of AlF, StL.) GM allowed or permitted a large quantity of heroin to be stored in a accessible dresser drawer when she knew or should have known that such conduct was not only criminal, but was inimical to safe parenting behavior, being dangerous to the health of children who could be exposed to drug activity. (Exhibits 1, 8; Testimony of PaL, InR.) GM refused to allow MFAP's medication compliance nurse and home health aide to enter her home, notwithstanding the court-ordered specific steps which required her cooperation in this effort for the obvious purpose of accommodating the respondent mother's physical condition. As previously discussed, while she was at liberty, GM made only a cursory attempt to participate in the individual counseling that was reasonably likely to have addressed her judgment issues, although an appropriate service was extended to her through MFAP. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of StL.)
The children's therapist credibly testified that children would be adversely affected if they are raised in a home in which drug transactions take place, even if the parenting figures do not use drugs themselves. The environmental effect will cause the children to mimic the drug transactions to which they become accustomed, as they will perceive such a living situation to be the norm and therefore acceptable. (Testimony of InR.)
Similarly, the empirical evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that GM did not improve her judgment-making capacity during the major part of her incarceration. As found in Part I.C., although GM achieved significant improvement in her physical health during the latter part of her confinement, she was not deemed reliable or stable by the DOC staff. At the time of trial, the DOC had not yet found GM to be trustworthy enough to administer her own medication, so that she was still required to take her pills under observation. (See Testimony of FAMD.) The court fully credits the circumstantial evidence thus establishing that while she was incarcerated, GM had not yet developed the capacity or conscientiousness necessary to be responsible for maintaining her own health or tending to important personal needs. It reasonably follows that despite her eighteen months of incarceration, GM had not even gained the skills needed to keep herself safe, and still lacked ability to appropriately attend to the needs of others who might be dependent upon her judgment. Even if GM has improved the ability to manage her own life as the result of the medical care she received in prison, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that she has not gained the ability to care for her young children, who must be totally cared for and supervised to ensure their well-being. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. In view of the limited degree of improvement in the respondent mother's condition, these children "should not be further burdened by having to wait for [GM] to achieve the level of competency necessary to parent [them] . . ." In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 385; § 17a-112(p). (See Testimony of InR.)
In reaching the conclusion that GM had not achieved rehabilitation during her incarceration, the court paid close heed to the axiom that "[R]ehabilitation does not require that a parent be able to assume the full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs . . ." In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App. 245, 253 (2003), citing, inter alia, In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn. App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986). However, the clear and convincing evidence impels the conclusion that if GM could not be trusted to take her own medication in the restrictive environment she encountered in prison, she could not reasonably be relied upon to administer medication to others, such as a son suffering from a routine childhood illness, when she was at liberty. Moreover, based on the other empirical evidence, it would require improper speculation for the court to conclude that the respondent mother has, or can acquire within a reasonable time, the ability to implement appropriate judgment-making skills in a community setting, even when support programs are available to her. Id.
It is GM's inability to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her status as a person who was incarcerated or who is subject to deportation per se, that leads the court to find that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn. App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999). While acknowledging that GM's incarceration or immigration status, in and of itself, does not dictate the determination that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation, it would be unreasonable for the court to overlook the fact that while she is confined or unable to enter the country, GM simply will not be available to serve as a valid parent for her sons.
Altogether, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that GM will not achieve rehabilitation within the reasonably foreseeable time period contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. Given the developmental and social needs of DR and JM, the two older, school-aged children, and in view of the particular emotional needs of JCM and CM, it would be manifestly unreasonable and inappropriate to require them to spend any additional portion of their childhood years without the stable parenting situations which they so require and deserve. GM's four sons have remained in foster care since July of 2001, a period of over two and a half years. Each child has the intrinsic need for stability and permanency in their lives in order to enhance his ability to grow and develop in a healthy manner. (Testimony of InR.) Even if GM could now actively engage in rehabilitation, utilizing rehabilitative services during detention or after her return to Honduras, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for the children given the many months that have passed since their uncared-for adjudication. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).
GM may protest that the petitioner cannot prevail on the statutory ground of failure to achieve rehabilitation because her incarceration and deportation have unfairly limited her opportunity to fulfill many aspects of the July 2001 specific steps. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the pending TPR petitions allege failure to rehabilitate regardless of specific steps, in reliance on the standard established by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) instead of the step-related established by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(ii). Second, our courts have consistently held that it is appropriate for the court to determine that a parent has failed to achieve an adequate degree of rehabilitation notwithstanding specific steps that may have been issued. Third, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that GM, by her own choice of priorities, engaged in, associated with and/or condoned criminal activities. This choice had many negative consequences: it triggered her self-imposed restriction on appropriate use of MFAP services, led to a year and a half of incarceration, and brought her to the attention of the authorities who promoted her deportation from the United States. GM's access to effective rehabilitation services has thus been frustrated not by the unreasonable conduct of the department or any other third party, but by GM's own criminal behavior. See In re Amelia W., supra, 62 Conn. App. 506; In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn. App. 350.
"In determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn. App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); see also In re Migdalia M., [ supra, 6 Conn. App. 206];" In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).
GM may also argue that the court cannot properly find that she has failed to achieve rehabilitation because her treating physician opined that she is now capable of parenting her children. For a number of reasons, the court declines to credit this aspect of FAMD's testimony. Overall, FAMD lacked foundation for his opinion that GM is able to perform most, if not all, of the activities required in caring for her sons: he tendered this opinion without ever having met his patient's sons, without ever having seen GM interacting with any children, and without adequate information concerning the special emotional needs attributed to JCM and CM. In addition, although they communicated in Spanish, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that GM declined to advise FAMD of salient features of her social history. Thus, FAMD was never aware of GM's historical unwillingness to cooperate with home care workers or her opposition to MFAP's efforts to enter her home to render appropriate medical assistance. FAMD concluded that GM had not malingered, but assumed that GM was physically unable to attend individual counseling sessions, without ever having informed that GM was healthy enough to visit the police department when RM was arrested in July 2001, to return to the police department to obtain her personal property in January 2002, and to frequent the MFAP office when she desired financial support. (Testimony of FAMD.) Moreover, FAMD's bias in favor of GM was overtly apparent at trial, leading the court to extend little weight to his opinion on non-medical subjects.
See also footnote 17.
Taken as a whole, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that GM is unavailable and also unable to serve as a parent for DR, JM, JCM and/or CM as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). GM lacks the degree of judgment-making capacity that is necessary for a parent charged with raising four young children, and she remains subject to the order of the Immigration Court. Despite her children's lengthy stay in foster care, GM remains without the qualities necessary to resume a responsible role in the lives of these children. She cannot develop these qualities within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved GM's failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation.
III. DISPOSITION
As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child[ren]." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. 103. In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence.
The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find. "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."
"[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5 [now § 33a-9]." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn. App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).
III.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS
The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k), and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516.
III. A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)
While she was at liberty, multiple timely and appropriate services were provided for GM and her family through DCF and MFAP, as described in Parts I and II. Once GM entered incarceration in January 2002, DCF was only able to provide visitation services. See Part II.A.1.
III. A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)
Reasonable efforts to reunite the family were made by DCF and MFAP, a corollary social service agency, as contemplated by the amended federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal of these children from their home, as contemplated by federal law.
III. A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)
GM violated the July 2001 specific steps by the drug-related arrests in December 2001 and January 2002, which involved her with the criminal justice system; by failing to advise DCF of changes in the composition of her household, although unrelated adult males were permitted to live in the home; by failing to maintain the adequate housing that had been secured for her by the MFAP, to her eviction due to her criminal activity; and by failing to permit the MFAP home health aide to enter her home. (Exhibit 3.)
III. A.4. THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)
DR and JM maintain great affection for both GM and for their pre-adoptive foster mother, as well. JCM and CM are more bonded to their current foster-mother. All four children were happy and excited to see GM when they visited at her place of incarceration, although their interest is often diverted by the toys that are present. (Testimony of D'OB, InR.)
III. A.5. AGES OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(5)
DR was born on January 20, 1994; he has just passed his tenth birthday. JM was born December 19, 1995, and is eight years old. JCM was born October 18, 1996 and is seven years old. CM was born December 22, 1998, and has just turned five.
III. A.6. PARENT'S EFFORT TO ADJUST HIS CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)
While she was at liberty, GM did not make realistic and sustained efforts to conform her conduct to even minimally acceptable parental standards. There is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that GM was dependent upon heroin or that the possession of such a large quantity of heroin is consistent with drug dependence. Accordingly, the court is constrained to infer that GM was actively engaged in or cooperated with the sale and/or distribution of large quantities of this illegal drugs in late 2001 and early 2002, to the detriment of others in the community and in violation of Connecticut statutes. As the penalty for this criminal conduct, GM was convicted and was incarcerated for eighteen months. Given her current deportation status, providing GM with additional time could not reasonably be relied upon to bring her performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the children to be reunited with her.
III. A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH PARENT WAS PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN — § 17a-12(k)(7)
Although it is uncontroverted that GM was severely ill during the period immediately preceding her children's entry into foster care and for many months thereafter, she was not prevented from maintaining relationships with the children at issue due to any unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. Although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect, given the wrap-around support services available through MFAP, it is clear that GM's economic circumstances did not interfere with such relationships. As found in Part II.A., it was GM's own criminal and uncooperative conduct that impeded the maintenance of a relationship with her sons. There is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that the child protection agency, foster parents or nongovernmental third parties had in any way promoted the immigration proceedings that led to GM's deportation from the United States. See In re Vincento N., supra.
III. B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(j)(2)
In determining whether it would serve the children's best interests to terminate GM's parental rights, the court has applied the appropriate legal standards to the facts of this case. Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is not in the best interests of DR, JM, JCM, or CM to continue to maintain any legal relationship with GM. Based on the clear and convincing evidence presented and adopting the conclusions reached in Part II., the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
In determining whether termination of GM's parental rights would be in the children's best interests, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including their interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with their foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with their biological mother. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn. App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court has also considered "the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, [which] although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with GM. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
In reaching the determination that the children's best interests will be served by terminating GM's parental rights, the court has honored the axiom that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. The evidence is fully consistent with the report delivered by the children's statutory GAL, who emphatically stated that termination of GM's parental rights will serve the best interests of each of the four boys, even though no pre-adoptive home was available for JCM or CM at the time of trial. The GAL's recommendation is entirely compatible with the credible opinion presented at trial by the children's therapist, establishing that although the four boys love GM, they have a superseding need for the permanence that can best be afforded them by finding appropriate long-term parent figures who are available to them at the present. As their therapist credibly opined, in order to preserve their emotional health, these children deserve and require a permanent home now, not at some remote date in the future. (Testimony of InR.) On balance, the court is constrained to agree, having determined that in this particular case, the children's needs for a permanent resolution of GM's availability to serve as their parent clearly and convincingly outweigh the attachment they hold for their biological mother. See Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 314 (children's well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
Even prior to the maturation of the deportation proceedings against GM, the GAL urged the court to understand that even considering the strength of the bond between mother and children, the boys' need for stability remained primary.
In its totality, the clear and convincing evidence thus establishes that the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment will best be served by allowing them to immediately begin building a lasting, reliable bond with adults upon whom they can depend to meet their needs now and in the future. See In re Alexander C., supra, 60 Conn. App. 559; In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 167. The goal of accessing permanent homes for the children will be accomplished by terminating GM's parental rights, thereby ending the long period of uncertainty as to the legal or practical availability of their biological mother to serve as a care taker for DR, JM, JCM or CM. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court now terminates GM's parental rights to DR, JM, JCM and CM.
IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION
WHEREFORE, after due consideration of the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship DR and JM have with their foster Mother, and the totality of circumstances, including but not limited to GM's long period of unavailability due to her sentence of incarceration and her removal status; having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the children's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:
That GM's parental rights are hereby terminated as to the children DR, JM, JCM and CM.
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for these children for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for them, and that the Commissioner shall give primary consideration to placement in sibling groups.
That the petitioner shall submit a permanency plan within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law.
BY THE COURT,
N. Rubinow, J.