In re Diocese of Lubbock

Full title: IN RE DIOCESE OF LUBBOCK, RELATOR

Court: SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Date published: Jun 11, 2021

624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021)

Opinion

No. 20-0127

06-11-2021

IN RE Diocese of LUBBOCK, Relator

Michael B. Bennett, Houston, for Amici Curiae Texas Ethics and Religious Liberty Committee of the Southern Baptists of Texas Convention, Baptist General Convention of Texas, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention. Allen Ryan Paulsen, Ryan N. Gardner, for Amicus Curiae Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty. Jessica C. Schidlow, Marci A. Hamilton, Alice A. Bohn, Tahira Khan Merritt, Dallas, Robert D. Friedman, for Amicus Curiae CHILD USA. Cameron L. Davis, Scott A. Brister, Austin, Kathryn E. Boatman, Houston, for Amicus Curiae Members of the Texas Legislature. Natalie D. Thompson, Kyle D. Hawkins, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Ryan Lee Bangert, for Amicus Curiae The State of Texas. Steven C. Levatino, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops. Ryan E. Price, Nick Luis Olguin, Amarillo, for Real Party in Interest. Eric Christopher Rassbach, Thomas C. Riney, Amarillo, Kerri L. Stampes, Dallas, William J. Haun, Eric S. Baxter, Alex L. Yarbrough, Amarillo, Victor H. Wanjura, for Relator.

Michael B. Bennett, Houston, for Amici Curiae Texas Ethics and Religious Liberty Committee of the Southern Baptists of Texas Convention, Baptist General Convention of Texas, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention.

Allen Ryan Paulsen, Ryan N. Gardner, for Amicus Curiae Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty.

Jessica C. Schidlow, Marci A. Hamilton, Alice A. Bohn, Tahira Khan Merritt, Dallas, Robert D. Friedman, for Amicus Curiae CHILD USA.

Cameron L. Davis, Scott A. Brister, Austin, Kathryn E. Boatman, Houston, for Amicus Curiae Members of the Texas Legislature.

Natalie D. Thompson, Kyle D. Hawkins, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Ryan Lee Bangert, for Amicus Curiae The State of Texas.

Steven C. Levatino, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops.

Ryan E. Price, Nick Luis Olguin, Amarillo, for Real Party in Interest.

Eric Christopher Rassbach, Thomas C. Riney, Amarillo, Kerri L. Stampes, Dallas, William J. Haun, Eric S. Baxter, Alex L. Yarbrough, Amarillo, Victor H. Wanjura, for Relator.

Justice Devine delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Guzman, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle joined.

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them." Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. 696, 714, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (quoting Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 733, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871) ). The doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment, which protects the right of religious institutions "to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church , 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952).

In this original mandamus proceeding, the Diocese of Lubbock, as relator, asserts that ecclesiastical abstention prohibits the trial court from assuming jurisdiction over a suit brought by one of its ordained deacons against the Diocese and that the trial court should have therefore granted the Diocese's plea to the jurisdiction. The suit arises out of an internal investigation by the Diocese into its own clergy, the inclusion of the deacon's name on a list of its clergy credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor, and the Diocese's public statements regarding the list and church reforms following its release to the Diocese's public website. The deacon maintains that he has never sexually abused a child and that the Diocese defamed him by publicly implying that those on the list were indeed guilty of such abuse.

The court of appeals denied the Diocese's petition for mandamus relief, concluding that the Diocese's investigation lost ecclesiastical protection when it went beyond church walls and related to an issue—sexual abuse—that is not strictly and purely ecclesiastical. 592 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019). Under the First Amendment, however, courts must abstain from exercising civil jurisdiction over claims that require them to "resolve a religious question" or "impede the church's authority to manage its own affairs." Westbrook v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. 2007). We conclude that the substance and nature of the deacon's claims against his church will necessarily require the trial court to evaluate whether the Diocese properly applied Canon Law and are inextricably intertwined with the Diocese's internal directive to investigate its clergy. That is, the deacon's claims relating to the Diocese's publication and communication of the results of its investigation cannot be severed from its policy to investigate its clergy in the first place. Thus, we conditionally grant the Diocese's petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to dismiss the deacon's underlying lawsuit.

I. Background

Jesus Guerrero was ordained as a deacon of the Diocese of Lubbock in 1997. Deacons are ministers in the Catholic Church, authorized to baptize parishioners, assist the priest at Mass, preach homilies, celebrate weddings, and conduct funeral rites. In 2003, the Diocese temporarily suspended Guerrero's diaconal faculties after receiving reports of sexual misconduct involving Guerrero and a woman with a history of mental and emotional disorders. Upon completion of an investigation, the Bishop of the Diocese indefinitely suspended Guerrero's diaconal faculties and privileges. In July 2006, the Diocese granted Guerrero's request for reinstatement of his diaconal faculties. However, a new allegation and subsequent investigation of sexual misconduct involving Guerrero and the same woman led Bishop Placido Rodriguez to permanently withdraw Guerrero's diaconal faculties in November 2008. Although Guerrero may no longer perform sacramental functions, he was not laicized and remains an ordained deacon.

The Texas Catholic Church consists of fifteen dioceses, each led by a bishop. Each diocese uses its own website to communicate with its members. In September 2018, to assist victims of abuse and improve transparency with Catholics in all the Texas Dioceses, the Catholic Bishops of Texas decided to release the names of those clergy against whom credible allegations of sexual abuse of a minor have been raised. After the individual dioceses completed a review of their files and compiled their lists, the respective lists were posted on each diocese's website on January 31, 2019, along with an accompanying statement.

Guerrero's name was included on the Lubbock Diocese's list. The list, entitled "Names of All Clergy with a Credible Allegation of Sexual Abuse of a Minor," stated its purpose and the process of determining who belonged on the list; it also invited others to report any sexual abuse experiences to the Diocese. The list included names of priests or clergy against whom a "credible allegation" had been made since the Lubbock Diocese's inception in June 1983. A priest or clergy had a "credible allegation" of sexual abuse of a minor if "after review of reasonably available, relevant information in consultation with the Diocesan Review Board or other professionals, there is reason to believe [it] is true." To prepare the list, the Diocese's attorney "engage[d] the services of a retired law enforcement professional and a private attorney to review all clergy files for any credible allegations of abuse of minors." The list, as originally published, did not include the canonical meaning of the term "minor," which the Diocese asserts—under Canon Law—includes "a person who habitually lacks the use of reason" and encompasses any "person deemed vulnerable due to a health or mental condition."

The Diocese issued a news release the same day that it published the list. The news release stated the Lubbock Diocese joined the other Texas Dioceses "to release names of clergy who have been credibly accused of sexually abusing a minor, going back at least to 1950 or to the year of the establishment of the [D]iocese." The decision to release the list "was made in the context of [the Church's] ongoing work to protect children from sexual abuse" and "to promote healing and a restoration of trust in the Catholic Church." Bishop Robert Coerver explained in a letter that the Diocese released the names as part of a broader, good-faith effort to restore the trust and confidence of its membership and because the Diocese is "serious about ending the cycle of abuse in the Church and society at large."

A local news station interviewed Chancellor Marty Martin, the Lubbock Diocese's principal notary and administrative manager, about the list. The report stated that while the Church had previously disclosed past incidents of sexual abuse to the authorities and to other church members, the recent investigation stemmed from a desire to ensure that the Church was a safe environment for everybody. It quoted Chancellor Martin as saying that "the [C]hurch is safe for children."

Guerrero demanded a retraction of his name from the list. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055. In response, the Diocese sent Guerrero a letter explaining that the Bishops from the Texas Dioceses formulated a plan in 2018 to evaluate which of its priests and clergy had been credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor. The Lubbock Diocese derived its plan from the Charter for Protection of Children and Young People (the Charter), which was authored by the United States Conference of Bishops. The Charter encourages more transparency within the Catholic Church around issues of sexual abuse and represents a shift in how sexual abuse within the Church is addressed. For instance, the Charter arranges review boards to assess allegations of sexual abuse of a "minor" to determine a priest's or clergy's suitability for ministry. Consistent with Canon Law, the Charter defines "minor" to include those who habitually lack the use of reason and are therefore deemed vulnerable adults. The letter also detailed some of the separate reports of sexual assault that the Lubbock Diocese had received against Guerrero. It went on to state that "[t]he adult female involved in these incidents ... is severely bi-polar, is not allowed to drive, and may not have been on her medications at the time of the various instances which were witnessed." Based on the investigation by the Diocesan Review Board and an independent review committee, the letter concluded, the Lubbock Diocese had determined that the allegations of sexual abuse of a "minor" against Guerrero were credible, as understood by Canon Law.

Guerrero subsequently filed suit, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Diocese responded with a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), asserting that Guerrero's suit related to the Diocese's right to free speech. See id. § 27.003 The Diocese also filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the suit under the First Amendment. The trial court denied both motions. The Diocese appealed the interlocutory order denying the TCPA motion to dismiss, see id. § 27.008, and filed an original petition seeking mandamus relief from the order denying its plea to the jurisdiction.

The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's denial of the Diocese's TCPA motion to dismiss, Diocese of Lubbock v. Guerrero , 591 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019), and denied the Diocese's mandamus petition in a separate opinion, In re Diocese of Lubbock , 592 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, orig. proceeding). In denying mandamus relief, the court of appeals reasoned that, once the Diocese released the list to the public, the dispute was no longer ecclesiastical because it extended beyond the church polity and involved incidents that had occurred more than nine years prior. Id. at 202–03. The court concluded that the Diocese's decision to post the list online, engage with the media, and release public statements indicated an intentional effort to engage externally with the public instead of internally with the church. Id. at 203–04. This "pivotal nuance" of intentional public engagement, the court reasoned, demonstrated the absence of an ecclesiastical matter. Id. at 202. The list and accompanying statements revealed the Diocese's intent to engage with society at large without "any nexus between the Diocese's conduct and any theological, dogmatic, or doctrinal reason for engaging in it." Id. at 204. Finally, the court rejected the Diocese's argument that the case would require a court to determine the canonical meaning of "minor" because a statement's defamatory meaning (or lack thereof) is based on "how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the accusation." Id. The court of appeals determined that the list and the Diocese's accompanying statements referenced abuse of a "minor" and "children," which are terms of secular meaning and would not require consideration of any ecclesiastical meaning. Id. at 205.

In this Court, the Diocese petitions for review of the court of appeals' affirmance of the order denying its motion to dismiss under the TCPA and again seeks mandamus relief from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. We granted the Diocese's petition for review and consolidated it with the petition for writ of mandamus for argument. Because the jurisdictional issue presented in the mandamus petition is dispositive, we dismiss the cause in the accompanying TCPA appeal, see Diocese of Lubbock v. Guerrero , No. 20-0005, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2021 WL 2386208 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam), and turn to the request for mandamus relief, see BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd. , 513 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex. 2017) (addressing first the issue that would deprive a court of exercising jurisdiction).

II. Standard of Review

Mandamus relief is appropriate when the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case. See In re Crawford & Co. , 458 S.W.3d 920, 929 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) ; In re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W.3d 316, 320–21 (Tex. 2004). "Lack of jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis for the jurisdictional challenge."¹ Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 394. We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston , 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016). A court should deny a plea to the jurisdiction when "the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). "If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction," however, the plea should "be granted without affording the plaintiff[ ] an opportunity to replead." Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. , 487 S.W.3d at 160 (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004) ).

1 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC , 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the "ministerial exception"—a doctrine that is independent of but related to abstention and addresses employment disputes between churches and its ministers—"operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar." Id. at 188, 195, 132 S.Ct. 694 n.4. Some courts have taken this to mean that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine now operates only as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa , 421 P.3d 284, 290–91 (Okla. 2017) ; Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington , 877 N.W.2d 528, 534–35 (Minn. 2016) ; St. Joseph Cath. Orphan Soc'y v. Edwards , 449 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Ky. 2014). Other courts have continued to apply the doctrine as a jurisdictional bar after Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g., Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc. , 531 S.W.3d 146, 157 (Tenn. 2017) ; Diocese of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Gallagher , 249 So. 3d 657, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) ; In re St. Thomas High Sch. , 495 S.W.3d 500, 513–14 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). This past term, the Supreme Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 207 L.Ed.2d 870 (2020), reaffirmed religious institutions' ecclesiastical autonomy in matters of faith, doctrine, ministry, and governance. Id. at 2060–61. The Court left undisturbed its pronouncement in Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), that those matters implicating "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government or the conformity of the members of the church to the standards of morals required"—that is, those matters that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine covers—relate to a court's jurisdiction to hear a case. Id. at 733. And Watson remains binding until the Supreme Court says otherwise. See Bosse v. Oklahoma , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2, 196 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

A

The Lubbock Diocese contends that mandamus relief is appropriate because the First Amendment forecloses the courts' jurisdiction. The First Amendment prohibits government—and courts—from interfering with a believer's ability to observe his faith and from interfering with a church's management of its internal affairs. EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of America , 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ; see Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral , 363 U.S. 190, 191, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) (per curiam). Churches have a fundamental right under the First Amendment to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church governance as well as those of faith and doctrine. Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 397 (citing Watson , 80 U.S. at 728–29 ). It is a core tenet of the First Amendment that in resolving civil claims courts must be careful not to intrude upon internal affairs of church governance and autonomy. Id. Autonomy extends to the rights of hierarchical religious bodies to establish their own internal rules and regulations and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over religious matters. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 708–09, 724–26, 96 S.Ct. 2372. And it extends to a church's conclusions regarding its own ecclesiastical rules, customs, and laws. Brown v. Clark , 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360, 363 (1909). Government action that interferes with this autonomy or risks judicial entanglement with a church's conclusions regarding its own rules, customs, or laws is therefore prohibited by the First Amendment. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) ; Kedroff , 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143 ; Brown , 116 S.W. at 363.

The First Amendment does not bar all claims against religious bodies, though. Tilton v. Marshall , 925 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. 1996). A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government. Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 398–400. Under the neutral-principles methodology, "courts decide non-ecclesiastical issues such as property ownership based on the same neutral principles of law applicable to other entities, while deferring to religious entities' decisions on ecclesiastical and church polity questions." Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex. , 422 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2013) (internal citation omitted); see also Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 399. Although we have yet to apply the neutral-principles methodology outside church property disputes, lower courts in Texas have found them applicable in certain, narrow circumstances. See, e.g., Shannon v. Mem'l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S. , 476 S.W.3d 612, 624–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (concluding ecclesiastical abstention did not bar a suit that arose out of a church's violation of a settlement agreement, which was not an inherently ecclesiastical activity). Indeed, any exception to ecclesiastical abstention by application of neutral principles must be narrowly drawn to avoid inhibiting the free exercise of religion or imposing secular interests on religious controversies. Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 603–05, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) ; Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 710, 96 S.Ct. 2372. In other words, courts should consider not only whether a neutral principle exists without regard to religion, but also whether the application of neutral principles would impose civil liability upon a church for complying with its own internal rules and regulations or resolving a religious matter. Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 400.

The Diocese argues that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars Guerrero's suit because civil court intervention in this dispute would (1) impede church governance and (2) require interpretation and review of Canon Law. Guerrero, however, contends that abstention does not apply because the alleged defamatory statements are "not strictly and purely ecclesiastical in nature." According to Guerrero, the Diocese was not clear in what it meant by the term "minor" when it released its list. To Guerrero, this omission is "the crux of this case" because the surrounding context of the list suggests that the Diocese meant "child" when it said "minor." Guerrero suggests that had the Diocese explained it meant "vulnerable adult" when referring to "minor," or that it referred to minor "according to Canon Law," then the determination of whether to include him on the list may have been a strictly ecclesiastical one and therefore protected from intrusion by the First Amendment. Moreover, Guerrero contends that this is not an issue of church governance because the statements extended beyond church walls and reflect the Diocese's desire to engage with society on a social issue—sexual abuse.

B

In determining whether ecclesiastical abstention applies, courts will analyze whether a particular dispute is ecclesiastical or merely a civil-law controversy in which the church happens to be involved.² See Tran v. Fiorenza , 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). In making this determination, we look to the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims. See Patton v. Jones , 212 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). Because courts are prohibited from risking judicial entanglement with ecclesiastical matters, see Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069, 207 L.Ed.2d 870 (2020), if the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with matters of doctrine or church governance, then the case must be dismissed, Jennison v. Prasifka , 391 S.W.3d 660, 665, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

2 Put differently, a church is not immune from tort liability merely because it is a church, regardless of whether a church member or non-church member brings the suit. See, e.g., Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church , 836 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1992) (church member slip-and-fall claim against church); Zion Missionary Baptist Church v. Pearson , 695 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ denied) (contract claim against church for unpaid balances).

In his petition, Guerrero alleges that the Diocese defamed him by including his name on a list of clergy "credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor," disclosing that list to the public, and discussing the list with the media. He goes on to assert that the Diocese's communications were defamatory "both in their particular details and in their main point, essence or gist," "in that they falsely state that Jesus Guerrero was and had been ‘credibly accused’ of sexual misconduct of [sic] a minor." Guerrero maintains that the Diocese reached its conclusion to include him on the list despite a lack of evidence supporting that conclusion, asserting that he "has never admitted to any sexual misconduct, he was not criminally charged with anything[,] and no one ever testified that Guerrero did anything inappropriate" with the woman who was the subject of the abuse allegations. He disputes whether the woman would qualify as a minor under Canon Law and whether the Diocese has credible allegations against him generally. He reiterated these claims at oral argument.

As the Lubbock Diocese explained in response to Guerrero's request for a retraction, the list arose out of and was created in accordance with the Charter—a directive authored by the United States Conference of Bishops for each diocese to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct committed by its clergy against minors. In conducting its review, and as reflected in its revised list released in April 2019, the Lubbock Diocese investigated allegations of abuse committed against "person[s] who habitually lack[ ] the use of reason" or those deemed "minors" under Canon Law. Evidence in Guerrero's file coupled with a two-tiered review process led the Diocese to determine that it possessed credible allegations against Guerrero of sexual abuse of a "minor." In compliance with its directive to be more "open and transparent in communicating with the public of sexual abuse of minors by clergy," it placed the list on its website—the Diocese's means of ordinary communication with its members.

To the extent that Guerrero's claims directly call into question the Diocese's investigation and conclusions that led to the creation of the list, they necessarily reach behind the ecclesiastical curtain. In Westbrook , we acknowledged that the plaintiff properly abandoned her defamation claim regarding the defendant's statement about her "biblical impropriety" because such a question would have required the Court to delve into the religious question of whether her behavior was biblically improper. 231 S.W.3d at 396. Resolution of the plaintiff's defamation suit would have required the Court to evaluate the meaning of biblical impropriety and whether the defendant was accurate in his conclusions. This is because "[t]rue statements cannot form the basis of a defamation complaint." Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne , 109 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citing Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson , 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995) ). As Guerrero states in his petition, determining whether the Diocese incorrectly included his name on the list would require a court to evaluate whether the Diocese "falsely state[d] that Jesus Guerrero was and had been ‘credibly accused’ of sexual misconduct of [sic] a minor." However, as the Diocese informed Guerrero, it based the scope of its investigation on the canonical meaning of minor: "a person who habitually lacks the use of reason," which includes "vulnerable adults." Thus, a court would have to evaluate whether the Diocese had credible allegations against Guerrero under the canonical meaning of "minor." This would necessarily entail a secular investigation into the Diocese's understanding of the term "minor," whether a court agrees that the woman he allegedly sexually abused qualifies as a "minor" under Canon Law, and whether the allegations it possesses were sufficiently "credible." See Kavanagh v. Zwilling , 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 247, 252–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's libel per se claim based on a church's press release that plaintiff "was found guilty by a Church court of multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor").

This inquiry would not only cause a court to evaluate whether the Diocese properly applied Canon Law but would also permit the same court to interlineate its own views of a Canonical term. Indeed, any investigation would necessarily put to question the internal decision making of a church judicatory body. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Smith , 896 F.3d 362, 373–74 (5th Cir. 2018) (trial court's pretrial order compelling religious organization to respond to discovery was an abuse of discretion because it would, in part, reveal internal communications and interfere with decision-making processes of the religious organization). But courts may not investigate and resolve the application of religious doctrine and practice. See Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church , 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice."). And, to prevent courts from impermissibly influencing church governance, see Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. , 140 S. Ct. at 2060, courts may not second-guess the decisions reached by a church judicatory body in the application of its own rule, custom, or law, see Brown , 116 S.W. at 363. Thus, to the extent Guerrero's suit directly challenges the Diocese's application of Canon Law in its internal governance process, the court lacks jurisdiction.

The court of appeals concluded that a "pivotal nuance" in this case is that the Diocese's communication went beyond church walls. 592 S.W.3d at 202. It reasoned that a key fact in determining whether ecclesiastical abstention applies is to whom the church communicated. Id. The court observed that a church publicizing "matters historically deemed ecclesiastical" undermines a church's ability to argue that the "dispute remains an internal ecclesiastical or church polity issue." Id. That is, the court of appeals focused primarily on the publication of the list without regard to the Diocese's reason for including Guerrero on the list. Id. at 202–04.

Whether a party's claims against a church are barred by ecclesiastical abstention, though, is based not on whether a publication goes beyond church walls but rather whether the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims implicate ecclesiastical matters, including a church's internal affairs, governance, or administration. Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 396–97 ; Williams v. Gleason , 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The court of appeals' distinction runs afoul of our directive in Westbrook that a court may not rely on neutral principles when application of those principles would impose civil liability on a church that complies with its own internal governance. 231 S.W.3d at 400. The court of appeals' focus on the publication ignores the real critical nuance in this case: that Guerrero's suit is "inextricably intertwined" with the Diocese's decision to investigate its own clergy, judicial review of which would impermissibly interfere with a church's ability to regulate the character and conduct of its leaders. Jennison , 391 S.W.3d at 668 ; see Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 201, 132 S.Ct. 694.

In Westbrook , a former church member claimed that her secular counselor—who was also her pastor—violated a secular duty of confidentiality when he disclosed to church elders information she had discussed during counseling. 231 S.W.3d at 396, 402. We concluded that ecclesiastical abstention barred the suit. Id. at 402–05. We reasoned that the pastor had conflicting duties, one as a secular counselor to maintain the confidentiality of his clients and the other to comply with church directives to disclose a member's conduct that may be unbecoming of the church's moral standards. Id. at 391–92, 402–03 ("[T]he publication about which [the former member] complains was made in the course of the church disciplinary process and communicated by [the counselor] pursuant to the requirements of that process."). In holding that the First Amendment barred adjudication of the suit, we recognized that allowing the former member's professional negligence claim to proceed would impose civil tort liability on a pastor who complied with an internal church directive and policy to disclose the relationship in a manner consistent with church teaching. Id. at 402 (citing Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 717, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (stating that "questions of church discipline and composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern")).

Similarly, Guerrero's suit seeks to impose liability on the Diocese for complying with its directive to investigate allegations of sexual abuse of its clergy. See Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 190, 132 S.Ct. 694 (prohibiting "government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself"). Investigations that relate to the character and conduct of church leaders are inherently ecclesiastical. See id. at 201, 132 S.Ct. 694 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[B]oth the content and credibility of a religion's message depend vitally on the character and conduct of its teachers.... For this reason, a religious body's right to self-governance must include the ability to select, and to be selective about, those who will serve as the very ‘embodiment of its message’ and ‘its voice to the faithful.’ "). Although tort law imposes a duty not to defame or intentionally inflict emotional distress upon others, see Hersh v. Tatum , 526 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. 2017) ; In re Lipsky , 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015), a civil suit that is inextricably intertwined with a church's directive to investigate its clergy cannot proceed in the courts.

And as the Diocese disclosed to Guerrero, it was acting in accord with the Charter's directive to investigate its clergy. The Diocese stated that it applied Canon Law and instituted a review process by which it would evaluate whether the allegations and evidence it possessed against its clergy were credible. It is the fruit of this investigation about which Guerrero complains, and the publications he contests merely reflect the investigative result. Bishop Coerver's official list and accompanying explanation provide general information about each clergy on the list, the Diocese's news release offered its motivation for conducting the investigation, and the accompanying news reports describe the Diocese's transition to more transparency. Thus, Guerrero's challenge to any publication is ultimately a challenge to the Diocese's underlying investigation into its own clergy and application of Canon Law. A civil court, though, is prohibited from determining whether a church properly applied its own principles and policies, see NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chicago , 440 U.S. 490, 502, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979) ; Brown , 116 S.W. at 363, and from interfering with internal management decisions that are central to its mission, such as investigating the conduct and character of its clergy, see Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. , 140 S. Ct. at 2060 ; Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 201, 132 S.Ct. 694 (Alito, J., concurring).

The court of appeals' opinion in Shannon provides a helpful contrast. In that case, Memorial Presbyterian Church and its former employee, Jessica Shannon, reached an agreement settling a dispute about her termination. 476 S.W.3d at 618. The agreement included a nondisparagement clause. Id. After Shannon obtained employment at Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary as a development officer, which required her to raise funds for the Seminary, it reached out to Memorial Presbyterian for her references. Id. The church's executive director, acknowledging that the parties had reached a settlement agreement that limited what he could say, made a variety of statements regarding Shannon's ability to carry out her duties to raise funds, which Shannon alleged led to her termination. Id. at 618–19. In concluding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not bar the suit, the court reasoned that Shannon's claims were directed at Memorial Presbyterian's violation of the nondisclosure agreement. Id. at 624. The statements that Shannon identified as leading to her termination related to her capacity to operate as a development officer and raise funds, unrelated to any ministerial or clerical role. See id. at 624–25. The court could apply neutral principles of contract law to determine whether the church disparaged her in violation of the settlement agreement without intervening in areas traditionally held to involve religious doctrine; interpreting church constitutions, by-laws, or governing documents; or deciding matters of the congregational or hierarchical nature of the church. Id.

The same is not true for Guerrero. Unlike in Shannon , Guerrero's claim is tied to the Diocese's decision to investigate allegations against its clergy. The actions complained of in Shannon were divorced from the employee's underlying termination and any other traditional matter of church governance. Id. The reference provided by Memorial Presbyterian's executive director was about Shannon's capacity to function as a development officer, not a pastor. Id. Thus, the court was able to apply neutral principles of contract law to determine whether the church complied with the settlement agreement, which was not itself ecclesiastical, and the claims did not require the court "to intervene in the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of the Church's clergy" or the exercise of its First Amendment rights. Id. at 624.

Although Guerrero contends that neutral principles could resolve this dispute, his own pleadings and concessions cut against this argument because his suit ultimately challenges the result of a church's internal investigation into its own clergy, which is inherently ecclesiastical. Even to the extent that his suit challenges the publication of the list, as the court of appeals concluded, the Diocese only published the results of its own investigation. That is, Guerrero's claims are inextricably intertwined with the Diocese's decision to include his name on the list—which it published on its website as an ordinary means of communication to its membership—at the culmination of its investigation into its clergy. The Diocese's public statements about the list neither mention nor reference Guerrero's name. Thus, the list's publication, and Guerrero's suit, cannot be severed from the process that led to its creation.

The dissent disagrees, arguing that the underlying investigation is immaterial because Guerrero's suit complains only about the Diocese's including his name on the list published to its website. Post at ––––. However, the reason Guerrero appeared on the list is that the Diocese conformed to the Charter, an internal directive to investigate its clergy. The Diocese's compliance with its directive, and the results of that investigation, is a predicate to Guerrero's suit. Exercising jurisdiction over it would necessarily "encroach[ ] on the church's ability to manage its internal affairs." Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 395. Thus, even assuming the dissent is correct that a court could apply neutral principles to interpret a Canonical term, post at ––––, doing so would invade a religious institution's "autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution's central mission," Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. , 140 S. Ct. at 2060. Here, exercising jurisdiction would invade the Diocese's internal management decision to investigate its clergy consistent with its own norms and policies.

Moreover, that the Diocese made public statements about its new policy and a statement at the completion of its investigation does not necessarily foreclose ecclesiastical protection. See Patton , 212 S.W.3d at 555 n.12 (noting that scope of publication is "not a bright-line rule"). The doctrine allows a religious institution to engage freely in ecclesiastical discussions with more than just its members. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo. , 289 F.3d 648, 658 (10th Cir. 2002). It extends to publications that relate to a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission. Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 188, 132 S.Ct. 694. The Diocese, in exercising its right to shape its own faith and mission, disclosed to the public its reforms to handling sexual-abuse allegations within the church. Such discussion of changes in church policy, which the Diocese explains were rooted in broader church governance decisions, do not revoke ecclesiastical protection. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health , 896 F.3d at 374 ("[T]he importance of securing religious groups' institutional autonomy, while allowing them to enter the public square, cannot be understated...."); see also Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 201, 132 S.Ct. 694 (Alito, J., concurring) ("A religious body's control over such ‘employees’ is an essential component of its freedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the outside world."). Curtailing First Amendment protections when a church exercises its right to shape its own faith and mission threatens to entangle the courts in a religious dispute.³ See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert , 264 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) ("Particularly, when the adherent's claim, as here, involves only intangible emotional damages allegedly caused by a sincerely held religious belief, courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a religious dispute."). Such entanglement here could allow a court to secularize a church term—who may constitute a "minor" under Canon Law—and jeopardize a church's ability to establish its own rules and regulations for adequately investigating its clergy. See Brown , 116 S.W. at 363. In other words, allowing Guerrero's suit to move forward would threaten the Diocese with civil tort liability for acting in accord with its directive to investigate its clergy or for not conducting that investigation consistent with judicial standards, thereby depriving the Diocese of its "right to construe and administer church laws." Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 400 (collecting authorities).

3 Of course, First Amendment rights are not unlimited. See District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (citing United States v. Williams , 553 U.S. 285, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ). We have previously stated that the "[f]reedom to believe may be absolute, but freedom of conduct is not, and conduct even under religious guise remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert , 264 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008) (collecting cases); see Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) ("In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."). The Diocese's investigation and subsequent statements about its investigation, however, do not cross this line.

IV. Conclusion

Religious groups have a First Amendment right to decide for themselves—free from court interference—matters of ecclesiastical governance as well as faith and doctrine. Id. at 397, 405. Exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case will not only require the trial court to evaluate whether the Lubbock Diocese properly applied Canon Law but will also encroach on the Diocese's decision to investigate its clergy consistent with its internal policies. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the Lubbock Diocese's petition for writ of mandamus, vacate the trial court's order denying the Diocese's plea to the jurisdiction, and direct the trial court to dismiss the underlying case for want of jurisdiction. Our writ will issue only if the trial court does not comply.

Justice Blacklock filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Boyd filed a dissenting opinion.

Justice Blacklock, concurring. "[I]n this world of sin and woe," our judicial system, like democracy in general, "is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time...." Winston Churchill, Speech at the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947). We seek justice in every case, but the justice dispensed by courts is never perfect, often unsatisfying, and sometimes, many would say, downright unjust. This will always be so because the judgment courts provide is human judgment. As with everything human, it is limited and imperfect. Courts, like all of government, are necessary in the first place because men are not angels. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Sherman F. Mittell ed., 1937). Judges are no exception.^{1 1} The faithful among us look forward to a day when God's unlimited, perfect judgment "will wipe away every tear from their eyes." Revelation 21:4 (English Standard Version). That day is yet to come, and we are left, for now, with the ugliness of litigation as the least bad way to settle many of our differences.

1 "It is fit and proper that there should be an end to litigation ... and to accomplish this end courts of last resort have been established. It does not follow that the judgments of the highest courts or judicatories are always right, for everything done by man is at best imperfect, and liable to be erroneous, but it is the best system which has yet been devised for the well-being of society.... The utter impolicy of the civil courts attempting to interfere in determining matters which have been passed upon in church tribunals, arising out of ecclesiastical concerns, is apparent." State ex rel. Watson v. Farris , 45 Mo. 183, 197–98 (1869).

1 Letter of His Holiness Pope Francis to the People of God , The Holy See (Aug. 20, 2018), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/letters/2018/documents/papa-francesco_20180820_lettera-popolo-didio.html.

The intractable imperfection of human judgment is one of many reasons our Constitutions deny government authorities—including courts—any power over churches. Both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution compel judges to acknowledge that there are places where our imperfect judicial system does not belong, places where earthly judges have no power.^{2 2} The human impulse to right every wrong is understandable, but it can become totalitarian, unless it is accompanied by an acknowledgment of our human incapacity to truly right all wrongs, our incapacity as imperfect people to dispense perfect justice. There are certain places in our world—places like the church and the family—whose character as independent sources of authority apart from the state is best preserved by keeping courts and judges out of the picture.^{3 3} This may mean that some wrongs are not righted in this life, though it would be a mistake to assume that human judges, if given the chance, would always right them wisely. We preserve the independence of our most precious private institutions from the all-consuming power of the state by drawing clear lines and abiding by them, even if doing so seems—from our limited, imperfect perspective—to leave a wrong unrighted. Our Constitutions draw many such lines, none clearer than their protections for religion.

2 See Tex. Const. art. I, § 6 ("No human authority ought, in any case whatever , to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion....") (emphasis added); U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....").

2 Id.

3 "The judicial eye of the civil authority of this land of religious liberty, cannot penetrate the veil of the Church, nor can the arm of this Court either rend or touch that veil for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of the excinded members." Shannon v. Frost , 42 Ky. 253, 259 (1842).

3 Id. ; cf. Heather McAdams, Holding the Catholic Church Responsible on an International Level: The Feasibility of Taking High-Ranking Officials to the International Criminal Court , 53 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 229, 230 (2020) (describing "the Catholic Church's history of covering up the sexual abuse of minors committed by its clergy").

Like all of us, the Diocese of Lubbock will have to answer to God for the words it chooses.⁴ Because of our Constitutions, however, it does not have to answer to earthly judges. A robust rule of ecclesiastical abstention prevents the judgments of courts from influencing the words or actions of churches, whose mission is to seek conformity with God's perfect judgment, not with man's imperfect variety. A church is not truly free to manage its affairs, practice its faith, and publicly proclaim its doctrine if lawyers and judges lie in wait to pass human judgment on whether the church should have chosen its words more carefully. When a church makes public statements on ecclesiastical or spiritual matters, it is not for courts to apply the earthly standards of defamation law to the church's words. Our Constitutions prohibit courts from imposing imperfect human justice on words spoken in pursuit of God's perfect justice.

4 See Matthew 12:36 (English Standard Version) ("I tell you, on the day of judgment people will give account for every careless word they speak.").

I respectfully concur.

Justice Boyd, dissenting.

The Catholic Church has publicly confessed that a "culture of abuse" existed within its communities.¹ With "sorrow and shame," Pope Francis personally acknowledged "the atrocities perpetrated by consecrated persons, clerics, and all those entrusted with the mission of watching over and caring for those most vulnerable."² He also conceded that, beyond the abuse itself, the victims' pain "was long ignored, kept quiet or silenced."³

But now, the church has pledged to publicly "condemn these atrocities and join forces in uprooting this culture of death."⁴ It has promised to extend "an outstretched hand" to the victims "and rescue them from their pain."⁵ And it has committed itself to a "penitential openness that can allow [the church] to be renewed from within."⁶ Unfortunately, that commitment to "openness" led to the filing of this lawsuit.

4 Letter of His Holiness Pope Francis to the People of God, supra note 1.

5 Id.

6 Id.

Consistent with the Holy Father's commitment, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, requiring that all U.S. Catholic Dioceses "be open and transparent in communicating with the public about sexual abuse of minors by clergy within the confines of respect for the privacy and the reputation of the individuals involved."⁷ Pursuant to this directive, the Texas Dioceses undertook to investigate all allegations of sexual abuse of a minor by a clergy member and to publish lists of all such persons against whom a "credible allegation" had been made. When the Lubbock Diocese produced its list, entitled "Names of All Clergy with a Credible Allegation of Sexual Abuse of a Minor," it posted the list on its public website, issued a press release saying the list was issued as part of the church's effort to "protect children from sexual abuse," and provided an interview about the list to a Lubbock news station in which the Diocese's chancellor assured the public that the church is safe "for children. " [Emphases added.]

7 Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People , U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops (June 2018), https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/upload/Charter-for-the-Protection-of-Children-and-Young-People-2018-final.pdf.

Jesus Guerrero, an ordained deacon, asked the Lubbock Diocese to remove his name from the list. When the Diocese refused, Guerrero filed this suit for defamation, contending that he has never been accused—credibly or otherwise—of sexually abusing a child. The Diocese does not disagree, but it asserts that, under Catholic Canon Law, the word "minor" is defined to include adults "deemed vulnerable due to a health or mental condition." According to the Diocese, Guerrero was accused—many years before the Diocese published the list—of engaging in "sexual misconduct" with an adult woman who had a history of mental and emotional illness, who "may not have been on her medications at the time of the various instances which were witnessed." The Diocese, however, did not provide its unique definition of the term "minor" when it published its list and other statements referring to abuse of "children" to the general public.

Under these circumstances, the Court's desire to protect the Diocese against anything that might inhibit its commitment to "openness" is understandable. But the rule the Court announces today—which no other court has ever announced before—is as unwise as it is unsupported by the constitutional provisions on which the Court relies. The First Amendment indisputably prohibits courts from interfering with a religious organization's internal activities and operations, including investigations and disciplinary actions involving its clergy and members. But courts throughout the country, both federal and state (including several state supreme courts) have consistently agreed that the First Amendment does not prohibit courts from hearing a defamation claim against a religious organization or official when (1) the claim is based on statements made to the general public and (2) the courts can resolve the claim on strictly secular grounds. In rejecting this holding, the Court refuses to even address this national consensus in the caselaw, much less identify any court that has ever held otherwise.

Unlike the federal Constitution, the Texas Constitution expressly guarantees not only the freedom of speech, but also that the law will hold people responsible "for the abuse of that privilege."⁸ Our courts must stand as the vanguard of enforcement for both those guarantees. However desirable the outcome of today's decision may be in this particular case, the precedential effect of the Court's holding will apply to every group that asserts a religious identity and will immunize defamatory statements publicized under far less sympathetic circumstances. And after today's decision, the First Amendment now means something different in Texas than it means throughout the rest of the country. Of course, that cannot be correct. Because I agree with all the courts around the country that have held that the First Amendment does not prohibit courts from hearing a defamation claim against a religious organization when the claim involves statements made to the general public and courts can resolve the claim on strictly secular grounds, I respectfully dissent.

8 Tex. Const. art. I § 8.

I.

The Ecclesiastical-Abstention Doctrine

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution famously prohibits Congress from making any "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes this restriction on the states. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church , 393 U.S. 440, 441, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). The provision prohibiting the establishment of religion means, among other things, that the government may not interfere with a religious organization's "ecclesiastical decisions." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C. , 565 U.S. 171, 189, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012).

As a result, courts may not decide "quintessentially religious controversies," Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich , 426 U.S. 696, 720, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), or "cases of ecclesiastical cognizance," Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 729, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). Because secular law "knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect," courts must abstain from hearing a claim that is "strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character." Id. at 728, 733. This includes claims that require courts to evaluate and assess "the faith and mission of the church," Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 190, 132 S.Ct. 694, the "centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith," Hernandez v. Comm'r , 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989), matters of "religious law and polity," Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, "religious doctrine and practice," Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull , 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, matters of "faith and doctrine," Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am. , 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), or "questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law," Watson , 80 U.S. at 727.

For example, courts cannot interfere with a religious group's choices regarding its "internal governance," including its decision "to fire one of its ministers." Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 181, 188, 132 S.Ct. 694. Courts cannot resolve "church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice." Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). They cannot hear "church disputes over church polity and church administration," or claims involving a religious organization's "internal discipline and government." Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 710, 724, 96 S.Ct. 2372. Nor can they decide whether a church's actions "depart substantially from prior doctrine," Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull , 393 U.S. at 450, 89 S.Ct. 601, resolve a "theological controversy," or determine the "conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them," Watson , 80 U.S. at 734.⁹ But the First Amendment's bar against courts hearing ecclesiastical disputes is not without its limits. Just as the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse religiously motivated citizens from "compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate," Smith , 494 U.S. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, the Establishment Clause does not prevent courts from deciding disputes involving religious organizations by applying "neutral principles of law," Jones , 443 U.S. at 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020 ; Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull , 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601.

9 Courts have often treated this "ecclesiastical abstention" or "religious autonomy" doctrine as a constitutional bar to the courts' jurisdiction, as the Court does in this case today. Ante at. In Hosanna-Tabor , however, the United States Supreme Court explained that the "ministerial exception" it recognized in that case operates "not [as] a jurisdictional bar" that affects the court's "power to hear [the] case," but "as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim." 565 U.S. at 195 n.4, 132 S.Ct. 694 (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. , 561 U.S. 247, 254, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) ). Nevertheless, this Court holds today that the bar remains jurisdictional, attempting to distinguish Hosanna-Tabor on the ground that the "ministerial exception" is "independent but related to" the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine. Ante at n.1.
The Supreme Court's decisions do not support that distinction. The Supreme Court used the "ministerial exception" label in Hosanna-Tabor to refer to a specific type of ecclesiastical claim the First Amendment prevents courts from addressing—namely, a "minister's" claim that a religious organization for which the minister worked violated employment-discrimination statutes. Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 176–77, 188, 132 S.Ct. 694. As Justice Thomas later noted, the label is actually a "misnomer" because "[t]he First Amendment's protection of religious organizations' employment decisions" sometimes extends "to the laity" as well as "to members of the clergy." Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 n.1, 207 L.Ed.2d 870 (2020) ( Thomas , J., concurring). In any event, the Court recognized the "ministerial exception" in Hosanna-Tabor both because the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause "precludes application of [employment-discrimination statutes] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers," and because the First Amendment's Establishment Clause "prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions. " Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 188–89, 132 S.Ct. 694 (emphasis added). In other words, the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor was based on the same constitutional provisions and the same application of those provisions as all its other decisions applying the ecclesiastical-abstention (or religious-autonomy) doctrine.
The Supreme Court confirmed this in Our Lady of Guadalupe , explaining that the "constitutional foundation for [its] holding [in Hosanna-Tabor ] was the general principle of church autonomy to which we have already referred: independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government." Our Lady of Guadalupe , 140 S. Ct. at 2061 (emphasis added). It further emphasized that the precedent on which the Court relied in Hosanna-Tabor "drew on this broad principle, and none was exclusively concerned with the selection or supervision of clergy." Id. Applying this broad "understanding" of the First Amendment, the Court held that the defendants in Our Lady of Guadalupe qualified for the same "exemption" the Court had recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. Id. at 2066, 132 S.Ct. 694.
This Court's suggestion today that the Supreme Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe somehow backed off of its jurisdictional analysis in Hosanna-Tabor, see ante at –––– n.33, is simply unsupported by either of those decisions. Consistent with its holding in Hosanna-Tabor , the Supreme Court never mentioned "jurisdiction" in Our Lady of Guadalupe. Instead of dismissing the claims in that case for want of jurisdiction, it reversed the appellate courts' decisions (which themselves had reversed the district courts' summary-judgment orders) and remanded the cases to those courts for "proceedings consistent with this opinion." Our Lady of Guadalupe , 140 S. Ct. at 2069. In other words, it acted consistent with its holding in Hosanna-Tabor that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine is "not a jurisdictional bar," but "an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim." Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 195 n.4, 132 S.Ct. 694.
This case comes to us as a petition for writ of mandamus, urging us to order the trial court to grant the Lubbock Diocese's plea to the jurisdiction. The Court grants that relief, see ante at ––––, even though the Supreme Court held in Hosanna-Tabor and confirmed in Our Lady of Guadalupe that the First Amendment's prohibition against courts hearing claims involving ecclesiastical issues establishes an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. For this additional reason, I cannot join the Court's opinion or disposition in this case.

II.

Texas Precedent

This Court has addressed and applied the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine in a handful of cases. Initially, we held in a pair of decisions that the First Amendment prevented the courts from hearing tort claims against a religious organization when the resolution of the claims would require the courts to interfere with internal religious requirements and conduct. In Westbrook v. Penley , 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007), a former church member sued the church's pastor for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress¹⁰ after the pastor disclosed the member's confession of an extra-marital affair to the church's elders, who—with the pastor's aid—reported the affair in a letter to the church's members¹¹ and called on the members to "break fellowship" with her. Id. at 393–94. The former member argued that because the pastor was also a state-licensed professional counselor and she disclosed the affair to him during a "secular" counseling session, the courts could hear and decide her claims based on neutral principles without deciding ecclesiastical issues. Id. at 396, 399. We disagreed, holding that even assuming the counseling session was "purely secular in nature," the pastor's state-imposed duty of confidentiality conflicted with his church-imposed duty to disclose her conduct to the elders and other church members. Id. at 392. Although we agreed "that the First Amendment does not necessarily bar all claims that may touch upon religious conduct," id. at 396, we concluded that "parsing" the pastor's conflicting roles and duties "would unconstitutionally entangle the court in matters of church governance and impinge on the core religious function of church discipline," id. at 391–92.

10 The former member "originally asserted but later abandoned" a claim for defamation. Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 396.

11 This "letter admonished the congregation to treat the matter as a ‘members-only issue, not to be shared with those outside [the congregation]. ’ " Id. at 393 (emphasis added).

The following year, we held in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert , 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008), that the courts could not hear a teenage church member's claims that the church had forcibly restrained her while "laying hands" on her and praying over her during a "spiritually charged" youth-group gathering. Id. at 3, 8. The teenager and her parents sued the church, its pastors, and some members, seeking damages for "mental, emotional and psychological" injuries. Id. at 5.¹² We held that the claims were not cognizable because, "[a]lthough the Free Exercise Clause does not categorically insulate religious conduct from judicial scrutiny, it prohibits courts from deciding issues of religious doctrine." Id. at 11. Because the resolution of the claims would require inquiry into "church beliefs on demonic possession," we concluded that "the imposition of tort liability for engaging in religious activity to which the church members adhere would have an unconstitutional ‘chilling effect’ by compelling the church to abandon core principles of its religious beliefs." Id. at 10–11.

12 The plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, assault, battery, loss of consortium, and child abuse. 264 S.W.3d at 5.

More recently, we held in a pair of cases that the First Amendment does not prevent courts from hearing and resolving disputes over ownership of church property when they can resolve those disputes based on "neutral principles of law." In Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas , 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013), we adopted the "neutral principles" standard for resolving church-property disputes because that standard best balances the courts' "constitutional duty to decide disputes within their jurisdiction while still respecting" the First Amendment's limitations. Id. at 596. We acknowledged that courts cannot "decide questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature, so as to those questions they must defer to decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers." Id. at 605–06. But because courts are "[duty-]bound to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by the Texas Constitution and cannot delegate their judicial prerogative where jurisdiction exists," we held that courts must "apply neutral principles of law to non-ecclesiastical issues involving religious entities in the same manner as they apply those principles to other entities and issues." Id. at 606.

Applying Masterson , we held most recently that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine did not prohibit courts from deciding whether the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth or the national Episcopal Church from which the Diocese had split owned church property within the Fort Worth area. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church , 602 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Tex. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. All Saints' Episcopal Church (Fort Worth) v. Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1373, 209 L.Ed.2d 120 (2021), and cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1373, 209 L.Ed.2d 120 (2021). While acknowledging that courts cannot make "ecclesiastical determinations" or "resolve disputes turning on tenets of faith," and thus could not decide "which faction is the true diocese loyal to the church and which congregants are in good standing," id. at 432–33, 435, we concluded that courts could resolve the property-ownership issue because, by "applying neutral principles to the organizational documents, the question of property ownership is not entwined with or settled by [ecclesiastical] determinations." Id. at 433.

III.

Defamation Claims

Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether or when the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine applies to defamation claims. See Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 196, 132 S.Ct. 694 (expressing "no view on whether" the doctrine bars actions alleging "tortious conduct by ... religious employers"). Many other courts have, however, and they have consistently agreed that the doctrine does not bar defamation claims that (1) are based on statements made to the general public, outside the religious organization itself, and (2) can be resolved by applying neutral principles, even when the statements were published by a church, its clergy, or another member of a religious organization.

A. Statements made to the general public

When deciding that the First Amendment bars courts from hearing a defamation claim against a religious organization, numerous courts—including two state supreme courts—specifically reasoned that the bar applied because the statements were made only internally, solely to the organization's leaders or members. In Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts , 437 Mass. 505, 773 N.E.2d 929 (2002), for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an Episcopalian priest could not sue a parishioner for defamation based on a letter the parishioner sent to the church's bishop, in which she confessed to having an extended sexual relationship with the priest, in part because the letter "was published solely in a canonical context" and used solely "to invoke the Church's internal disciplinary procedures." Id. at 936. The court specifically noted that its analysis was "predicated on the fact that the only defamatory publication allegedly made by [the parishioner] was made to the Church itself, within its internal disciplinary procedure," and it explained that the "absolute First Amendment protection for statements made by a Church member in an internal church disciplinary proceeding would not apply to statements made or repeated outside that context." Id. at 937 n.12 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington , 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016), the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed two excommunicated parishioners' defamation suit against their former church and pastors because "[a]ll of the statements on which the [parishioners] base their claims occurred during church disciplinary proceedings, and [the First Amendment] prohibits civil courts from inquiring into any statements made during the course of a church disciplinary proceeding." Id. at 536. Like the Massachusetts court in Hiles , the Minnesota court specifically noted that it would "be troubled ... if the statements were disseminated to individuals outside of the religious organization." Id. at 540 (emphasis added). But because the ministers "only disseminated those statements to members of the congregation," the court held that the First Amendment barred the defamation claim. Id. at 541.

Numerous other courts, including our own state's courts of appeals, have also expressly noted, when holding that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine barred a defamation claim, that the alleged defamatory statements were published only to members of the religious organization as part of the organization's internal investigatory or disciplinary process. See, e.g., Yaggie v. Ind.-Ky. Synod, Evangical Lutheran Church in Am. , 64 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (noting that "the alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with the mediation process and strictly within the confines of the church"); Hubbard v. J Message Grp. Corp. , 325 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1219 (D.N.M. 2018) (mem. op.) ("[T]o the extent that the allegations in the Complaint suggest that the allegedly defamatory statements were published exclusively to the [religious organization's] membership, this fact strengthens the Court's conclusion that Plaintiff's claims, having occurred in the context of an ecclesiastical dispute with [the religious organization], are barred by the First Amendment."); Jennison v. Prasifka , 391 S.W.3d 660, 667–68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (noting that the "only defamatory statements allegedly made by [the defendant] were made to the church itself in connection with the church's disciplinary process," and plaintiff made "no allegation the allegedly defamatory statements were made in any other forum"); Stepek v. Doe , 392 Ill.App.3d 739, 331 Ill.Dec. 246, 910 N.E.2d 655, 667 (2009) (noting that defamation claim was based on statements that "were published solely within the Catholic Church's internal disciplinary proceedings"); Patton v. Jones , 212 S.W.3d 541, 555 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (holding First Amendment barred minister's defamation claim in part because "the alleged ‘publication’ [was] confined within the church"); Heard v. Johnson , 810 A.2d 871, 885 (D.C. 2002) (holding ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine "extend[s] to defamation claims, when: (1) such a claim flows entirely from an employment dispute between a church and its pastor so that consideration of the claim in isolation from the church's decision as to the pastor is not practical, (2) the alleged ‘publication’ is confined within the church , and (3) there are no unusual or egregious circumstances") (emphasis added); Schoenhals v. Mains , 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]e believe that the fact that the letter was disseminated only to other members of the Church strengthens the conclusion that Mains' statements involved and were limited to Church discipline.").

Under this same reasoning, however, numerous other courts have held that the First Amendment does not prohibit courts from hearing a defamation claim based on statements communicated beyond the religious organization to members of the public. In Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of United Methodist Church , 663 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003), for example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a church member's defamation claim based on a letter that was "mailed not only to members of the congregation but also to other persons living in the Shell Rock community." Id. at 405. The court observed that courts could not hear the claim "had the matter been divulged solely to the members of" the church, but "if publication solely to church members justifies ecclesiastical status for otherwise defamatory communications, proof of publication to non -church members arguably supports the opposite conclusion." Id. at 406–07.

Similarly, in Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints , 18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied), a decision this Court declined to review, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment did not bar a church member's defamation claim arising from the church's disclosure of information regarding his mental condition outside the church, including to his grandparents. Id. at 896. The court explained that the church's external disclosure of the information did not concern "internal policies of the Church or matters of faith or ecclesiastical doctrine," and the court's resolution of the claim based on that external disclosure would not "actively involve the government in the Church's religious activities or excessively entangle the government with religion." Id.

And in Lipscombe v. Crudup , 888 A.2d 1171 (D.C. 2005), the D.C. court of appeals held that the First Amendment did not bar a church member's defamation claim against the church's pastor, in part because the member's allegation "that the statement was made ‘to the public in an open meeting’ sufficiently alleged that others besides church members were present," and his affidavit "asserted explicitly that ‘[t]he public gathering was not part of any church service and members from the public, including accountants, heard the Statement.’ " Id. at 1173 & n.2.

Numerous other courts, including Texas courts of appeals, have adopted this same reasoning. See, e.g., Hadnot v. Shaw , 826 P.2d 978, 985 (Okla. 1992) (noting that statements contained in letter were not defamatory, even assuming "the lay leader communicated the letters' contents outside the Church"); Kelly v. St. Luke Cmty. United Methodist Church , No. 05-16-01171-CV, 2018 WL 654907, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas, Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine did not bar defamation claim "respecting statements allegedly published to persons outside the church"); Ausley v. Shaw , 193 S.W.3d 892, 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister's slander claim because statements "were made in the presence of Church members, local law enforcement, and members of the surrounding community").

Here, Guerrero alleges—and the Lubbock Diocese does not dispute—that the Diocese publicized the list that included his name among those credibly accused of sexually abusing "minors" (along with statements referring to the safety of "children") not merely to and within the church, but to the general public through the church's website, a press release, and an interview with local media. By choosing to broadcast the statements beyond the church and involve the general public in the church's disciplinary procedures, the Diocese altered the nature of the constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God , 264 S.W.3d at 12 (noting that "religious practices that might offend the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to an adherent within the church"). At that point, the church's conduct was no longer "strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character," Watson , 80 U.S. at 733, and Guerrero's complaint became more than a "quintessentially religious controvers[y]" involving only the church's "internal discipline and government," Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 720, 724, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (emphasis added).

The Diocese's assertion that its religious teachings required it to publicly disclose the list in compliance with Pope Francis's commitment to "openness" does not alter this conclusion. Nor does the Court's assertion that Guerrero's claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the church's directive that the Diocese internally investigate its clergy. Ante at ––––. The Court asserts that the church's decision to publish a list of those credibly accused of abusing minors cannot be severed from its decision to investigate its clergy, ante at ––––, but Guerrero's defamation claim does not complain about—and a jury would not be required to evaluate—either of those actions. The Diocese investigated allegations against Guerrero years before the church published the list, and Guerrero has never complained about the church's decision to conduct that investigation. Guerrero's defamation claim does not challenge that investigation or the Diocese's decision to publicize the list; he complains of the Diocese's inclusion of his name on the list, which he asserts falsely defames him by communicating to the public that he had been credibly accused of sexually abusing a "minor."

The Diocese's—indeed, the entire church's—commitment to public transparency as it seeks to leave its "atrocities" behind is both understandable and laudable. But the issue here is not whether the Diocese should have investigated Guerrero, internally disciplined him, or even published a list of those who had been accused of sexual misconduct. Nor does Guerrero complain that the Diocese concluded internally that he had been accused of sexually abusing a "minor," as Canon Law defines that term. His complaint is that the Diocese should not have broadcast to the general public an allegation that he had been credibly accused of sexually abusing a "minor."

Exercising jurisdiction over Guerrero's claim would not second-guess or threaten the church's (or any other religious organization's) decision to investigate its clergy, finding of misconduct by a clergy member, or imposition of internal disciplinary measures against a member within the church's religious activities. What it would threaten is a religious organization's ability to make false and defamatory statements about its clergy or members to the general public, outside of the organization's internal operations. The issue here is simply whether the First Amendment prohibits courts from hearing a claim that the information distributed to the general public in and with the Diocese's list falsely defamed Guerrero. Like all the other courts around the country, I conclude it does not. "It is one thing to say that churches must be free of governmental interference to conduct matters of internal discipline and organization , even when those matters touch upon the reputations of those effected." Hayden v. Schulte , 701 So. 2d 1354, 1356–57 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). But it is "quite another to say that churches have the unfettered right to make unsubstantiated statements of an essentially secular nature to the media destructive of a priest's character." Id. at 1357. By extending its internal disciplinary procedures and beliefs into the public arena, the Diocese subjected itself to the public laws that govern that realm.¹³

13 The Court suggests in passing that the First Amendment bars this suit because the Free Exercise Clause permits a religious organization to "engage freely in ecclesiastical discussions with more than just its members." Ante at –––– (citing Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo. , 289 F.3d 648, 658 (10th Cir. 2002) ). According to the Court, a religious organization's decision to "enter the public square" does not "revoke ecclesiastical protection." Ante at –––– (quoting Whole Woman's Health v. Smith , 896 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2018) ). This argument misrepresents the decisions in both those cases. In Bryce , a minister and her same-sex partner alleged that the minister's church's leaders and members made "sexually harassing remarks" in letters between the senior minister and "other church leaders" and "at a series of church meetings." 289 F.3d at 657. Applying the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, the court held that the First Amendment barred the minister's and her partner's claims because the letters "discussed an internal church personnel matter and the doctrinal reasons for [the] proposed personnel decision," and the church meetings "facilitated religious communication and religious dialogue between [the senior] minister and his parishioners." Id. at 658. In stating that the church could "engage freely in ecclesiastical discussions with members and non-members," the court was specifically referring to the fact that the minister's partner, who was not a member of the church, was present at the meetings. Id. The court concluded that the First Amendment also barred her claims because she "voluntarily attended" the meetings and "voluntarily became part of [the church's] internal dialogue on homosexuality and [the minister's] employment." Id. Bryce did not involve a church's broadcast of allegedly defamatory statements to the general public or to "non-members" who had not voluntarily chosen to participate in a church's internal doctrinal discussions.
In Whole Woman's Health , the plaintiff, who sued to challenge a state statute and regulations that imposed restrictions on the disposal of fetal remains, sought through a third-party discovery subpoena to force the Texas Conference of Catholic Bishops (a non-party) to disclose its internal communications regarding public testimony it provided in support of the restrictions. 896 F.3d at 365–66. The court quashed the subpoena, holding that by "engag[ing] in activity in the public square," the Conference did not forfeit the First Amendment's protection of the Conference's "inner workings" and "internal communications." Id. at 372. The court relied not on the First Amendment's religion clauses or the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, but on the clause that protects the "freedom to associate," which protects the internal deliberations not just of religious organizations but of "citizens' groups" and all other organizations that participate in the public square. Id. Neither Bryce nor Whole Woman's Health held—or even discussed whether—a religious organization's right to engage in the public arena gives it the right to falsely defame others within that arena. See id.

B. Neutral principles

In addition to barring court intrusions into a church's "internal" operations and proceedings, the First Amendment precludes judicial inquiries into a religious organization's "particular beliefs," Hernandez , 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, matters of "religious law," Milivojevich , 426 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, and issues of "religious doctrine," Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull , 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601. "The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires," Smith , 494 U.S. at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, and courts have no business evaluating the soundness of a church's doctrinal teaching or whether one has conformed to or strayed from those teachings, Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull , 393 U.S. at 450, 89 S.Ct. 601 ; Watson , 80 U.S. at 733–34. Because of this, courts have held that the First Amendment bars a defamation claim when a statement's defamatory nature or its truth or falsity depends upon the interpretation and application of religious doctrine and teachings. In O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 77 Hawai'i 383, 885 P.2d 361 (1994), for example, a member of the Catholic Church who published a newspaper that was critical of the local Diocese and Bishop sued them both after the church excommunicated him, asserting that they defamed him by publicizing allegations that he had committed " ‘criminal penal ecclesiastical’ violations," created a "schism," misrepresented the Catholic faith "against the warnings of the Holy See," was a "fanatic[ ]" who "came from a neolithic mind frame," was disloyal to the Pope, and had "caused others to suffer the loss of their immortal souls." Id. at 367–68. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred courts from hearing these claims because, "to determine the truth or falsity of the statements, a state court would have to inquire into church teachings and doctrine" and determine "doctrinal correctness" by "analyzing church law." Id. at 368.

Other courts have reached the same conclusion when faced with similar circumstances that required them to evaluate religious and doctrinal issues to resolve a defamation claim. See, e.g., Pfeil , 877 N.W.2d at 538 (observing that statements "cannot serve as the basis for a defamation claim" when "adjudicating the truth or falsity of the statements would require the court to consider and interpret matters of church doctrine"); Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc. , 124 Ohio App.3d 24, 705 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding First Amendment barred defamation claim when its resolution would require "biblical interpretation" and a determination of plaintiff's " ‘conformity ... to the standard of morals required of’ him by his church," matters that are "inextricably intertwined with ecclesiastical or religious issues over which secular courts have no jurisdiction"); Schoenhals , 504 N.W.2d at 236 ("Since examination of the truth of [the defendants]' statements would require an impermissible inquiry into Church doctrine and discipline, the district court did not err in concluding that the defamation claim is precluded by the First Amendment.").

But as numerous courts—including at least six other state supreme courts—have recognized, the First Amendment does not bar a defamation claim, even if it arises from a religious context, when courts can resolve the claim by applying only non-religious, neutral principles. In Kliebenstein , for example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could pursue her claim that a church defamed her by publicizing an accusation that she had the "spirit of Satan," because the phrase "spirit of Satan" has "a secular, as well as sectarian, meaning." 663 N.W.2d at 405, 408. Because the phrase has a secular meaning that a jury could evaluate "without resort to theological reflection," the court concluded that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine did not apply. Id. at 405, 407.

Similarly, in Bowie v. Murphy , 271 Va. 127, 624 S.E.2d 74 (2006), the Virginia Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a church deacon's claim that the church's minister and other members defamed him by publicizing statements that he had "assaulted" another member. Id. at 76–77, 79–80. The court reasoned that although courts could not consider claims challenging the church's decisions involving its internal governance, they could evaluate the defendants' "statements for their veracity and the impact they had on [the deacon's] reputation the same as if the statements were made in any other, non-religious context." Id. at 79.

And in Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church , 406 S.C. 156, 750 S.E.2d 605 (2013), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not bar defamation claims asserted by a church's trustees against the church's pastor, who allegedly accused the trustees of mismanaging (and, impliedly, stealing) the church's property and of lying to the pastor about their conduct. Id. at 606–07. The court reasoned that the bar would apply if, for example, the pastor had accused the trustees of being "sinners," of being "not true followers of God," or of violating church law. Id. at 608. But because courts could determine whether the pastor actually made the statements and whether they harmed the trustees by applying "neutral principles," without requiring "any inquiry into or resolution of religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administration," the court held that the First Amendment did not bar the claim. Id. at 607–08.

Numerous other courts have consistently agreed with this reasoning. See, e.g., McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc. , 966 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim brought by executive director of church's local mission board against church's national mission board, based on alleged statements accusing director of refusing to meet with national board's president, because resolution of claim would not "require the court to address purely ecclesiastical questions"); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church , 991 F.2d 468, 471–72 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar minister's libel claim against church based on false statements church allegedly made about minister's wife, because resolution of claim would not "definitely involve the district court in an impermissible inquiry into the Synod's bylaws or religious beliefs"); Tubra v. Cooke , 233 Or.App. 339, 225 P.3d 862, 864 (2010) (holding First Amendment did not bar pastor's defamation claim based on church leaders' statements that minister "had misappropriated church funds and was dishonest during his time as pastor"); Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila. , 601 Pa. 577, 975 A.2d 1084, 1107 (2009) (holding First Amendment did not bar parents' defamation claim based on parochial school's alleged statements that child "brought a weapon to school" because "this is not a case in which religious authority would be directly relevant to a party's showing on the merits of his or her opponent's claims"); Lipscombe , 888 A.2d at 1173–74 (holding First Amendment did not bar defamation claim because resolution did not require "inquiry by the court into church religious practices or financial management"); McAdoo v. Diaz , 884 P.2d 1385, 1390–91 (Alaska 1994) (holding First Amendment did not bar church volunteer's defamation claim against pastor because "a determination of whether the statements were true and the amount of damage to [the volunteer's] reputation does not present a religious question"); Marshall v. Munro , 845 P.2d 424, 425, 428 (Alaska 1993) (holding First Amendment did not bar pastor's defamation claim against executive presbyter who told other churches that pastor "was divorced, was dishonest, was unable to perform pastoral duties due to throat surgery, and had made an improper advance to a [church] member," because courts need "only determine if the facts stated were true and if [the presbyter] made the statements with malice," without deciding whether the pastor was qualified to serve).

Here, the Court asserts that the First Amendment bars Guerrero's defamation claim because the resolution of that claim "will necessarily require the trial court to evaluate whether the Diocese properly applied Canon Law." Ante at ––––. Specifically, the Court suggests that resolution of Guerrero's claim will require courts to perform a "secular investigation into the Diocese's understanding of the term ‘minor,’ whether the court agrees that the woman he allegedly sexually abused qualifies as a ‘minor’ under Canon Law, and whether the allegations which the church possesses were sufficiently ‘credible.’ " Ante at ––––.

To be sure, the First Amendment bars courts from second-guessing a church's internal decisions regarding the meaning of words it uses in its internal doctrinal statements. The Catholic Church has painstakingly struggled with the "concept of ‘minor,’ " which "has varied over the course of time." Vademecum on Certain Points of Procedure in Treating Cases of Sexual Abuse of Minors Committed by Clerics , THE HOLY SEE (July 16, 2020), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20200716_vademecum-casi-abuso_en.html. Initially, the church defined the term to include only persons under sixteen years of age, but it expanded the definition in 2001 to include those under eighteen. Id. In 2010, the church announced that any "person who habitually has the imperfect use of reason is to be considered equivalent to a minor." Id. But this is to be distinguished from a "vulnerable adult," described as "any person in a state of infirmity, physical or mental deficiency, or deprivation of personal liberty which, in fact, even occasionally limits their ability to understand or to want or otherwise resist the offence," who, apparently, in some (but not all) circumstances, also qualifies as a "minor" under the church's laws. Id. In 2019, however, Pope Francis referred alternatively to "a minor or a vulnerable person," providing different definitions for each term. Apostolic Letter Issued Motu Proprio by the Supreme Pontiff Francis "Vos Estis Lux Mundi," THE HOLY SEE (May 7, 2019), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco-motu-proprio-20190507_vos-estis-lux-mundi.html (emphasis added). And just this month, the church revised (for the first time in over forty years) the penal provisions of the church's Code of Canon Law, which now refer in the alternative to "a minor or a person who habitually has an imperfect use of reason or one to whom the law recognises equal protection." 2021 CODE c.1398, § 1 (emphases added), https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2021/06/01/210601b.html.

But to resolve Guerrero's defamation claim against the Lubbock Diocese, courts need not struggle through the church's internal doctrinal definitions of the term "minor." To recover on his claim, Guerrero must only establish that the Diocese published a factual statement about him that was both defamatory and false, and that it did so "with the requisite degree of fault." Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum , 554 S.W.3d 614, 623 (Tex. 2018). Under neutral principles of Texas law, a publication is false—or not "substantially true" and thus actionable—if it "is more damaging to the plaintiff's reputation than a truthful broadcast would have been." Neely v. Wilson , 418 S.W.3d 52, 63 (Tex. 2013). And a publication is defamatory (or libelous) if it "tends to injure a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation." Id. at 60 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.001 ).

Importantly, courts must make these determinations based not on the speaker's intended meaning of the words it published, but "upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive" the statement, in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc. , 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. 2000). The statement's meaning, in other words, "and thus whether it is false and defamatory, depends on a reasonable person's perception of the entirety of a publication," not on what the Diocese may have intended when it used the word "minor." Id. at 115. To prevail, Guerrero must prove not what the Diocese meant when it publicly stated that Guerrero had been credibly accused of sexually abusing a "minor," but what the public would have understood that statement to mean, given all the circumstances. Noting that the Diocese's public statements regarding the list it publicized referred to the safety of "children," Guerrero alleges that the public would have understood that Guerrero had been credibly accused of sexually abusing a child.

Applying these neutral principles of Texas law "obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine." Jones , 443 U.S. at 605, 99 S.Ct. 3020. Indeed, the Catholic Church has itself agreed that its norms governing the reporting of suspected sexual abuse by clergy should "apply without prejudice to the rights and obligations established in each place by state laws." Apostolic Letter Issued Motu Proprio by the Supreme Pontiff Francis "Vos Estis Lux Mundi," THE HOLY SEE (May 7, 2019), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco-motu-proprio-20190507_vos-estis-lux-mundi.html. Courts need not delve into ecclesiastical issues to decide whether the Diocese's statement that "credible allegations" had been made that Guerrero sexually abused a "minor" was false and defamatory. Those determinations involve purely secular issues to be resolved by applying neutral principles of law.

When the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment did not bar a defamation claim based on statements accusing a minister of theft and misappropriation, it observed that such a claim was no "more (or less)" an ecclesiastical matter than a claim "accusing a pastor of child molestation." Tubra , 225 P.3d at 872. No matter how pure their intent, religious organizations cannot immunize themselves from court inquiries regarding such important societal concerns merely by incorporating those concerns into their religious doctrine. As a Louisiana court explained:

Society does not view child molestation as a matter of religious doctrine, as distinguished from, say, the procedures within the Church necessary to atone for such a sin. Child sexual abuse is anathema to society in general, even to atheists. It is prohibited by secular laws. The public has an interest in matters of child molestation. Therefore, where child molestation is at issue, it cannot be considered just an internal matter of Church discipline or administration. Child molestation is distinguishable from those cases where religious figures claim that their reputations were damaged because they were found to be poor administrators or where their private conduct did not comport with church standards, but the issue was not one of the violation of secular criminal laws. The Church cannot appropriate a matter with secular criminal implications by making it simultaneously a matter of internal Church policy and discipline.

Hayden , 701 So. 2d at 1356 (emphasis added).

IV.

Conclusion

The Court need not and does not decide today whether the Catholic Church has responded adequately or appropriately to the "culture of abuse" that existed within its midst. Nor need we decide whether the Lubbock Diocese should be held liable to Guerrero for defamation. Our views on those issues are irrelevant to the only issue before us: whether the First Amendment prohibits Texas courts from hearing Guerrero's claim. If it does, we must dismiss the claim and leave Guerrero and the Diocese to their mutual pursuit of righteousness and fellowship within the tenets of their shared faith.¹⁴ But if it does not, we are as duty-bound to hear and resolve Guerrero's claim as we would be to refrain from hearing it if the First Amendment did apply. See Masterson , 422 S.W.3d at 606. Because Guerrero's defamation claim is based on statements the Lubbock Diocese published beyond the church to the general public, and because courts can resolve that claim based on neutral principles without becoming entangled in ecclesiastical issues, I agree with all the federal and state courts around the country, which have consistently held that the First Amendment does not bar the courts from hearing such a claim. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

14 Some might contend that those shared tenets compel both parties to resolve their dispute without the courts' involvement regardless of whether the First Amendment bars Guerrero's claim. See 1 Corinthians 6:7 ("Why not rather be wronged?"). But that ecclesiastical issue is not for this Court to decide.