Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-951, c/w 99-984 1346, Section "N"
June 21, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Trico's and Diamond B's Joint Motion to Dismiss Claims of Jeannie Marie Bennett Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
"Trico" refers collectively to Trico Marine Assets, Inc. and Trico Marine Operators, Inc., the owners/operators/owners pro hoc vice of the CANE RIVER.
"Diamond B" refers to Diamond B Marine Services, Inc., the owner and operator of the MISS BERNICE.
A. BACKGROUND
These consolidated cases arise from the March 25, 1999 collision of Trico Marine's downbound vessel, the OSV CANE RIVER, and Diamond B Marine's upbound vessel, the C/B MISS BERNICE, while operating in the fog on the Mississippi River below Venice, Louisiana.
Subsequent to the collision, Trico and Diamond B both filed exoneration/limitation actions in federal court. Several parties filed claims in these proceedings, including Lonnie Fontenot, Wayne Thibodaux and Alan LeBlane (collectively, "the passenger claimants"), who were passengers aboard the MISS BERNICE at the time of the collision; the passenger claimants' family members; James Bennett, who was the captain of the MISS BERNICE; and Jeannie Marie Bennett, Captain Bennett's wife. Before he recused himself, Judge Schwartz ruled that the passenger claimants and their families could not bring claims for nonpecuniary damages under the general maritime law. The issue now presented is whether Jeannie Marie Bennett's claims should be dismissed for the same reasons.
Trico also filed suit in federal court against Diamond B for damages in admiralty, and all three cases were consolidated before Judge Schwartz.
Judge Schwartz recused himself because he owns stock in Texaco, which moved for, and was granted, leave to intervene.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
1. Judge Schwartz's Previous Rulings Disallowed Non-Pecuniary Damage Claims
In two previous rulings, Judge Schwartz ruled that the passenger claimants and their families could not bring claims for nonpecuniary damages. These rulings require detailed explanation.
First, on February 23, 2000, Judge Schwartz denied the passenger claimants' Motion to Amend to assert claims for punitive damages. The claimants sought to amend their claims to include allegations of"gross, wanton and outrageous conduct," which they believed warranted the imposition of punitive damages. Judge Schwartz, however, concluded that such an amendment would be futile. "[B]ecause punitive damages do not compensate pecuniary losses," Judge Schwartz ruled, "they are not recoverable under the general maritime law, whether sought by a seaman against his employer or a non-seaman."
In reaching this decision, Judge Schwartz relied primarily on two cases, Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990), and Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp, 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1046, 116 S.Ct. 706, 133 L.Ed.2d 662 (1996). In Miles, the Supreme Court held that, in order to achieve uniformity in maritime law, loss of society damages (a form of non-pecuniary damages) are not available in a general maritime law action for the wrongful death of a seaman. In Guevara, The Fifth Circuit held that, in light of Miles, punitive damages are not available in cases of an employers' willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure to an injured seaman. Judge Schwartz acknowledged that neither Miles nor Guevara are directly on point with the case at bar, since the passenger claimants were not seaman. Nonetheless, wrote Judge Schwartz,
Judge Schwartz also noted the relatively weak support for punitive damage claims in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
this is a vessel collision case involving alleged personal injury which bears a substantial connection to traditional maritime activity. This is not the "on the fringes" type of admiralty case involving jet skis or pleasure craft or an aircraft which happens to fall into navigable water. It is your typical admiralty case which involves a collision of commercial vessels in the ordinary course of maritime business, on a navigable waterway, which is subject to heavy commercial traffic.
Thus, disallowing punitive damage claims on the facts of the case at bar would adhere to "Mile's refrain (i.e., uniformity of admiralty law) . . . ." Judge Schwartz also agreed with the district court's observation inWalker v. Braus, 861 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1994), that a contrary holding "would lead to the anomalous result that seamen — those who are entitled the greatest protection under maritime law — would be afforded a lesser degree of protection than non-seamen." Id. at 536 n. 12 (quoting Newhouse v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Nev. 1994)).
On March 27, 2000, Judge Schwartz was again called on to determine whether a particular set of claims was permissible under the general maritime law. In granting Trico's and Diamond B's Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Judge Schwartz again answered the question in the negative. Specifically, Judge Schwartz ruled that the passenger claimants' family members could not recover on any of their claims, "since they are nonpecuniary in nature and[,] thus, not recoverable under the general maritime law." In explaining his reasons for this decision, Judge Schwartz expressly incorporated the analysis set forth in his February 23, 2000 ruling. In addition, Judge Schwartz rejected the family members' argument that, under Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996), general maritime law does not provide exclusive remedies in this case, which involves non-seamen. InYamaha, the Supreme Court held that state remedies remain applicable in wrongful death and survival actions arising from accidents to nonseamen in territorial waters. However, "[q]uite unlike Yamaha," which was a "wrongful death/product liability case involving wrongful death on account of a recreational jet ski accident in territorial waters," Judge Schwartz noted that the case at bar "involves the personal injury claims of passengers aboard a commercial vessel as the result of a head-on collision with another commercial vessel in navigable waters." In a case such as this one, "pure unadulterated federal maritime law governs . . .," and, therefore, Judge Schwartz ruled that the uniformity principle dictates that the family members cannot recover non-pecuniary damages.
2. The Law of the Case Governs
Trico and Diamond B argue that Ms. Bennett's claims should be dismissed pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. Under this doctrine, a court may, in its discretion, refuse to reconsider matters once resolved in a continuing proceeding. See Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2000); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 4478 at 788 (1981). The Court agrees. Although Judge Schwartz did not rule that Ms. Bennett's claims should be dismissed, he did so rule with respect to substantially identical claims, and there is no legal or factual distinction that would require the Court to treat Ms. Bennett's claims differently. Cf. Gantt v. Boone. Wellford. Clark. LanZschmidt and Pemberton, 559 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (M.D. La. 1983) (earlier decision was the "law of the case" and would not be disturbed, "particularly because counsel has produced no new or different law or facts from those previously adduced"). Thus, in order to maintain consistency, the Court shall dismiss Ms. Bennett's claims. See Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 3 F.3d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1032, 114 S.Ct. 1541, 128 L.Ed. 2d 193 (1994) (quoting Wright, et al. for the proposition that "[t]he law of the case doctrine was developed to "maintain consistency and avoid [needless] reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. These rules do not involve preclusion by final judgment; instead, they regulate judicial affairs before final judgment.")
Judge Schwartz dismissed the Fontenot, Thibodaux and LeBlane family members' claims for loss of consortium, society and services. At issue here are Ms. Bennett's allegations of loss of consortium, support and guidance.
Moreover, even aside from considerations of judicial economy and internal consistency, the Court agrees with Trico and Diamond B that Judge Schwartz's earlier rulings were correct and that the Miles uniformity principle requires dismissal of Ms. Bennett's claims. InCarnival Cruise Lines v. Red Fox Industries, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1993) (Clement, J.), aff'd in part without opinion, 18 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1994) and 30 F.3d 1493 (5th Cir. 1994), this Court considered and rejected arguments that loss of society damages should be available under the general maritime law as against a third party. In so ruling, the Court stated that "[t]he uniformity sought by the [Supreme] Court inMiles is best served by a rule that denies loss of society damages as against a third party manufacturer when they would be similarly denied against an employer." Id. at 1187. See also Earhart v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 852 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. La. 1993) (Clement, J.) (dismissing claims for loss of consortium, society and service against non-employer defendant). The Court finds the Carnival Cruise rationale applicable in the instant case and respectfully disagrees with Judge Lemmon's contrary holding in In the Matter of Denet Towing Service, Inc., 1999 WL 329698 (E.D. La. May 21, 1999), upon which Ms. Bennett relies.
C. CONCLUSION
In light of Judge Schwartz's previous rulings, the Court finds that Ms. Bennett's claims for non-pecuniary damages must be dismissed. The Court finds that Judge Schwartz's previous rulings were correct, that there has been no change in controlling law since those rulings, and that no facts warrant different treatment for Ms. Bennett's claims. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Trico's and Diamond B's Joint Motion to Dismiss Claims of Jeannie Marie Bennett Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.