Opinion
No. 4-397 / 03-1009.
July 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Peter A. Keller, Judge.
Respondent appeals his civil commitment pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). AFFIRMED.
Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Matthew S. Sheeley, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Denise A. Timmons and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State of Iowa.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Rodger Britt appeals the jury verdict finding him to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). We affirm.
Background Facts.
Based on Britt's four prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the State filed a petition to commit Britt as a sexually violent predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). At trial, the district court denied Britt's request for a jury instruction stating that he was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator unless the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Following trial, the jury found Britt to be a sexually violent predator. Britt appeals.
In May 2000, Britt was convicted of one count of lascivious acts with a child in Madison County, Iowa. In December 1991, he was convicted of two counts of lascivious acts with a child in Polk County, Iowa. In October 1985, Britt was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child in Collier County, Florida.
Scope of Review.
We review alleged errors in jury instructions for correction of errors at law. Sleeth v. Louvar, 659 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Iowa 2003).
Discussion.
Britt argues that the district court erred in denying his request for an instruction stating he was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. Further, Britt contends that an instruction of this nature is required in a civil commitment case because the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, the same burden as in a criminal proceeding. The State argues there is no such requirement, nor should there be; therefore the district court did not err.
As long as a requested instruction correctly states the law, has application to the case, and is not stated elsewhere in the instructions, the court must give the requested instruction. Adam v. T.I.P. Rural Elec. Coop., 271 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Iowa 1978). However, error in giving or refusing jury instructions does not merit reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996).
Britt's proposed instruction read as follows:
Rodger D. Britt is presumed to not be a sexually violent predator. The presumption requires you to put aside all suspicion which might arise from the present situation of the Respondent. The presumption that he is not a sexually violent predator remains with the Respondent throughout the trial unless the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator.
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that a commitment proceeding under chapter 229A is civil, not criminal in nature. In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000). However, the legislature has imposed a high burden of proof on the State, "[a]t trial, the court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the respondent is a sexually violent predator." Iowa Code § 229A.7(4).
Britt argues that because the legislature has imposed such a high burden, the presumption of innocence or presumption of non predator is a necessary instruction to explicate that burden. Britt cites In re Wyatt, 701 N.E.2d 337 (Mass. 1998), for the proposition that a presumption-of-innocence instruction should be required. In Wyatt, such an instruction was given because the trial judge "believed the instruction was necessary to give meaning to, and to focus the jury's attention on, the requirement that the Commonwealth had the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a petitioner is sexually dangerous." Id., at 352-53. The reviewing court did not however hold that the instruction was constitutionally required. Id. at 351-54.
Although these proceedings are civil in nature, Britt points out some rights afforded defendants in criminal prosecutions are also granted to respondents in civil commitment cases. See generally Iowa Code § 229A.5 (the right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists to proceed to trial); id. § 229A.6(1) (the right to assistance of counsel); id. § 229A.7(2) (the right to a speedy trial); id. § 229A.7(3) (the right to a jury trial); id. § 229A.7(4) (burden of proof on State beyond a reasonable doubt); id. § 229A.7(4) (right to a unanimous jury verdict). However, the State's decision "to provide some of the safeguards applicable in criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal prosecutions requiring the full panoply of rights applicable there." Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2993, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 306 (1986). It is important to note that even in a criminal actionthe presumption-of-innocence instruction is not necessarily constitutionally mandated. Based on guidance found in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978), the Supreme Court has stated
[t]he failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution. Rather, under Taylor, such a failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances — including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors — to determine whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 2090, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640, 643 (1979). Based on these considerations, we agree with the district court's jury instructions as given.
Even if we were to find that the proposed instruction should have been given, we do not find the error was prejudicial. See State v. Trudo, 253 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 1997) (defining prejudice as a result of non-constitutional errors as sufficiently appearing that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice). Britt had four prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the State and Britt's expert diagnosed him as a pedophile, and the State's expert testified that Britt would more likely than not to reoffend if not committed. The district court's given jury instruction required the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Britt was a sexually violent predator and set out each element necessary for a finding of sexually violent predator. Therefore, no prejudice is shown on this record.
AFFIRMED.