Opinion
No. H14-CP05-008362-A
February 15, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
In accordance with the General Statutes § 46b-124 and the Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
On June 27, 2006, the commissioner of children and families filed a petition seeking the termination of the parental rights of the respondents, Suzy L. and Desmond P. who are the biological mother and father of the minor child, Desziah P. ("Desziah"), born, June 9, 2004.
In addition, on June 28, 2006, the department of children and families (department or DCF) filed a motion to review its permanency plan for Desziah. The goal of the plan is the termination of the parental rights of the mother and father and adoption. The mother filed an objection to the permanency plan on August 31, 2006. The court, on September 1, 2006, consolidated the objection to the permanency plan with the termination of parental rights trial.
At the commencement of the trial, the court granted the petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on January 2, 2008, after there was no objection to the granting of the motion. In addition, on January 16, 2008, the court granted the petitioner's request to take judicial notice of the termination of the parental rights on February 1, 2005, of the father, to another child, after there was no objection to the granting of the motion.
The court takes judicial notice of the following facts after reviewing the court file and considering the motions that were granted for judicial notice:
1. On September 29, 2005, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold of the child Desziah P. pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g.
2. On October 3, 2005, DCF filed an ex-parte application for orders of temporary custody and a neglect petition with respect to said child.
3. On October 3, 2005, the court (Quinn, J.), granted the ex-parte order of temporary custody with respect to said minor child, which placed the temporary care and custody of said child with DCF. In issuing said order of temporary custody, the court found that the child was in immediate danger from her surroundings and as a result of said conditions, the child's safety was endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings was necessary to ensure the child's safety. The court also found that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of the child and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of the child were made by the state.
4. The parents, at the preliminary hearing of October 7, 2005, on the motion for orders of temporary custody, did consent to sustaining the order of temporary custody. The court (Quinn, J.), sustained the order of temporary custody and entered specific steps for the parents.
5. On March 30, 2006, Desziah, was adjudicated neglected and she was committed to the care and custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families as a neglected child. The court, on March 30, 2006, affirmed the specific steps for the mother, previously ordered with the order of temporary custody.
6. On June 27, 2006, DCF filed a petition seeking the termination of the parental rights of both parents.
7. Additionally, the court also takes judicial notice of the father's termination of his parental rights to another child of the father, Ve-oniza S., on February 1, 2005, docket number MO8-CP01-008996-A, pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner of the department of children and families.
With regard to the mother, the petition alleges the following grounds for termination of her parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3):
(B)(1) The child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for AND the mother has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
With regard to the father, the petition alleges the following grounds for termination of his parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3):
(A) The child has been abandoned by the father in the sense that the parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
(D) There is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the father that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral, or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
(E) The father of the child, under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated, pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner of the department of children and families.
The court finds that notice has been given in accordance with the General Statutes and the Practice Book. The court finds that it has jurisdiction in this matter. There is no other action pending in any other court affecting the custody of Desziah known to this court.
On January 14, 15, and 16, 2008, this matter was tried before the court at the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session, Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown. The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families was represented by an assistant attorney general. The minor child was represented by an attorney who also served as her guardian ad litem. The mother was present during the trial and was represented by an attorney. The father did not appear at the trial although he knew of the trial proceeding. The father was also represented by an attorney who was present for the trial.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [and as such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, CT Page 2438 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); see also In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
Our state statutes govern the termination of parental rights. See General Statutes § 17a-112 et al. The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the grounds alleged in the petition, as of the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment of the petition. Furthermore, the court, in considering whether the failure to rehabilitate ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, in the exercise, of its discretion, can consider whether a respondent has sufficiently rehabilitated as a parent though the date of the trial. In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); see also In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 749-50, 789 A.2d 1024 (2004); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b) and 35a-7.
Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d, 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo R., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
The trial of a termination of parental rights case proceeds in two stages, the adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory stage, the issue is whether the evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a) [now § 35a-7], in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); see In re Latifa K., supra, 67 Conn.App. 748.
If the court finds that DCF has proved by clear and convincing evidence at least one of the pleaded grounds for termination, the court then proceeds to the disposition stage. In that stage, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 618, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007). Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases may be at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional phase. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), supra, 194 Conn. 259; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988).
The court has reviewed the verified petition, heard the testimony of the witnesses produced at the hearing, and considered each full exhibit.
The petitioner introduced thirteen exhibits at the trial which included the criminal records for the mother and father, police reports, reports from the Rushford Center, the Wheeler Clinic, a psychological evaluation by Stephen M. Humphrey, Ph.D., social studies from the department of children and families, and records regarding the father from the Department of Corrections.
The mother introduced two exhibits, which included correspondence from Saint Mary's Hospital.
The father introduced four exhibits which included documents from the Department of Corrections, regarding father's participation in programs that he had taken while in prison.
The child's attorney did not introduce any exhibits at the trial.
The petitioner called nine witnesses who testified in this trial. They included a representative from the Wheeler Clinic, the Rushford Center and the Chase Center, that provided services to the mother, two police officers, a probation officer, a psychologist who performed the court-ordered evaluations and social workers for the department of children and families.
Neither the mother, father, or the child's attorney called any witnesses to testify at the trial.
The mother and father did not testify.
The court finds that the following facts were proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence.
The mother is twenty-four years old. She reported having a "chaotic" and "horrible" upbringing with her parents. She also reported that she was raised by her mother and father as well as other individuals. Her relationship with her parents is now somewhat estranged and chaotic. The mother did not graduate from high school but did receive her General Education Diploma in December 2003. Her work experience includes working at a restaurant when she was sixteen to nineteen years old. She has also worked for a retail store and as a bartender. She is currently working at a restaurant, according to the mother, although no verification has been provided. However, DCF does not dispute that she is currently employed.
The mother has reported that she first was prescribed Percocet at the age of fifteen years old. She reported that as she got older, she became more addicted to Percocet as it would mask the turmoil she endured. The mother also reported that when Percocet was not prescribed for her, she would buy it in the street and began to snort it. While the mother has also used marijuana, cocaine and designer drugs, her drug of choice is Percocet.
The mother also reports that she has been on psychotropic medication since she was fifteen years old.
In regard to her relationship with the father, the mother reported that she has been involved with him off and on since she was twelve years old. They are no longer involved with each other. She also reported a history of domestic violence with the father and that the abuse was so severe that at times she required medical attention for her injuries as a result of the domestic violence.
The mother's criminal history includes convictions on December 8, 2003 for possession of marijuana, sale of a controlled substance, failure to appear and violation of probation. She was also convicted on May 5, 2006, of the charge of possession of narcotics, which resulted in her being sentenced to two years in prison, suspended after ten days served, with two years probation. That conviction resulted from an incident that occurred on November 2, 2005, in which the mother forged a prescription for Vicoden by increasing the number of pills prescribed from six to sixty. She currently has a charge of violation of probation pending against her and faces the potential of being incarcerated for her two year sentence minus the ten days she has already served.
The mother's probation officer testified that the mother was in the technical violations unit of the probation department for her failure to complete the treatment at the Chase Center which was a condition of her probation. On May 1, 2007, the mother said that she was not going back to complete her treatment at the Chase Center despite knowing that her refusal to comply with the treatment program would result in a charge of violation of probation being filed against her. As a result, she is exposed to being required to serve the remaining sentence of two years minus the ten days served that was ordered on May 5, 2006.
The mother has previously resided with her mother and lived for a short period of time with a boyfriend in the fall of 2006. After the mother left the Chase Center on May 1, 2007, she returned to her mother's home for a short period of time. In the summer of 2007, the mother resided with a cousin. At the present, the department is unaware of the residence of the mother.
Over the past several years, the mother has had numerous referrals for both outpatient and inpatient substance abuse programs.
In March 2005, the mother was referred to the Wheeler Clinic substance abuse program for a substance abuse diagnosis but was discharged from the program for nonattendance and referred to the Rushford Center.
In October 2005, the mother was again referred to the Wheeler Clinic substance abuse program for a substance abuse diagnosis but was discharged on February 2, 2006, with a referral to the Rushford Center substance abuse treatment program.
On February 6, 2006, the mother attended the Rushford Center substance abuse treatment program but was discharged from the program on February 21, 2006, for leaving the program against clinical advice and not returning for treatment.
In May 2006, the mother was referred to parenting classes at the YWCA and domestic violence counseling with the Mothercare program at Prudence Crandall. The mother failed to complete the parenting classes and was discharged from the Prudence Crandall program for non-attendance on August 4, 2006. The mother then requested that the department make a new referral for her to Prudence Crandall. The department did make a new referral for the mother on August 13, 2006. The mother was scheduled to begin that program on August 22, 2006, but failed to complete the program.
In June 2006, the mother was attending the intensive outpatient program at Lifeline at the Wheeler Clinic for individual counseling and substance abuse treatment. In September 2006, the mother was discharged from the program for failing to attend the sessions and for testing positive for cocaine. Lifeline recommended inpatient services for the mother and allowed her to remain a client for case management only so they could help with a referral for inpatient treatment. The mother was in technical violation unit of probation due to her disclosures of continuing substance abuse resulting in a requirement of probation that she attend an inpatient substance abuse program.
On October 25, 2006, the mother began attending the Jail Diversion at Community Mental Health Affiliates where she engaged in group and individual counseling. After being referred to the Chase Center for inpatient substance abuse treatment in October 2006, the mother was admitted to the Chase Center in December 2006. While she was in the Chase Center, she received treatment in early 2007 for substance abuse and mental health treatment with St. Mary's Behavioral Health, a program through Saint Mary's Hospital where she completed their outpatient program and relapse prevention. She also completed an Easter Seal program and domestic violence counseling at Safe Haven.
In April 2007, the mother stopped attending the individual counseling and medication management at St. Joseph Center. On May 1, 2007, the mother left the inpatient substance abuse program at the Chase Center without permission. She was terminated from the program for her attendance. As a result of her leaving the treatment program, she was arrested for violating her probation, as her participation in the program was a condition of her probation. The violation of probation case is currently pending. The mother faces the imposition of the suspended portion of her two year sentence that was given to her on May 5, 2006.
In May 2007, the mother was referred to the Lifeline Program for outpatient substance abuse, individual counseling and medication management services. She began their program on June 6, 2007, but was discharged from the program on July 13, 2007, for failing to attend the program. She began another program at the Lifeline on September 14, 2007, but was again discharged for failing to attend. Lifeline recommended inpatient treatment for the mother. The mother did not want to attend the Lifeline program. It was reported by Lifeline that the mother had abused Percocet as recently as September 2007.
On November 14, 2007, the mother was referred for a substance abuse evaluation at Catholic Family Services. The mother failed to attend her appointment that was scheduled for December 5, 2007. The appointment was rescheduled to January 11, 2008 but the mother also failed to attend, cancel, or reschedule that appointment.
As to the contact with the mother and her daughter, the mother has visited with the child since the child was removed from her care. From the summer of 2007 until the time of the trial, the mother had been attending weekly visits but has missed approximately one third of the visits. The visits are appropriate and there is good interaction between the child and the mother. However, DCF has alleged that the mother has made some statements to the child during the visits concerning the child being returned to the mother that the department finds inappropriate.
The father is twenty-seven years old. He reports that he grew up in a very close knit family He also reports that his father had abused alcohol while he was growing up.
The father is reported to have graduated high school. His employment history includes being a sales associates for clothing stores as well as working in restaurants. He is currently working at a sandwich shop.
He has an extensive criminal history that spans the last ten years. The crimes he has been convicted of include larceny 6th, larceny 2nd, violation of probation, larceny 1st, reckless endangerment, possession of narcotics, assault 3rd, failure to appear, possession of marijuana, risk of injury, attempt to escape or elude the police, reckless endangerment, sale of hallucinogen/narcotic, failure to appear, operating under suspension and criminal impersonation. While he has been in prison numerous times during the past ten years, his last incarceration began in June 2005. He was released on March 21, 2007, to a community release facility, known as the Drapelik Center, where he remained until August 2007. He then moved into his girlfriend's parents' home, along with other children of the father. The father is currently on parole.
During the time the father was last incarcerated, he did complete a domestic violence program, an anger management program, a parenting program and substance abuse counseling. The domestic violence program that he completed at the prison recommended that he continue with a domestic violence program in the community. In addition, in June 2007, his counselor at the Drapelik Center recommended that he receive individual counseling. On June 28, 2007, DCF referred the father for individual counseling but the father refused the referral denying that counseling was not necessary. In addition, the father did attend a substance abuse evaluation at Intercommunity Mental Health on October 23, 2007.
The father was referred on September 19, 2007, to the Wheeler Clinic's Dove program to address his history of domestic violence but the father failed to attend his scheduled intake appointment on October 5, 2007, nor reschedule the appointment. The father, at the administrative case review of September 19, 2007, felt that additional services for him were not necessary. No evidence was presented at the trial that the father is currently in any program for domestic violence, or is receiving any other counseling or services.
As to the contact with the father and his daughter, he has not shown any significant interest in the child for over the past two years. While he was in prison, Desziah, was removed by DCF on September 29, 2005, when she was approximately fifteen months old. He did not request visitation with the child nor did he maintain contact with the child during his incarceration. In March 2007, upon his release to the halfway house, the Drapelik Center, the father began monthly visits with the child, with the first visit taking place on March 28, 2007. He has not been consistent in exercising his visitation and with his last visit taking place in November of 2007, the father having failed to visit in December 2007 and January 2008. He has shown minimal interest in his daughter and has not maintained contact with the DCF to arrange visits.
Desziah was born on June 4, 2004 and is now over three and one-half years old. The child has been in the care of DCF since she was first removed from her mother's care on September 29, 2005. At the time of her removal, the father was incarcerated on drug related charges. Desziah was initially placed, on an emergency basis, with her maternal grandmother. However, the child was removed from that placement in October 2005, as the maternal grandmother's boyfriend, a convicted felon, was in the home.
The child was then placed in her second foster home with her maternal aunt. That placement was changed to a non-relative foster home due to a stressful situation in the home as a result of problems within the maternal family.
In November 2006, the child was placed in her third and current foster home. The home consists of two foster mothers and their adopted daughter who is now six years old. Desziah is very comfortable and content with this placement and is bonded with the foster mothers and their daughter. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt Desziah should she become available for adoption.
Desziah is a medically complex child due to asthma. She also is currently enrolled in a preschool program and is in play therapy.
Dr. Stephen M. Humphrey, Ph.D., testified as an expert in the clinical evaluation of adults for substance abuse, the clinical evaluation of adults for purpose of assessing child care-taking and in the assessment of children's needs in the context of placement and care-taking.
Dr. Humphrey conducted a psychological evaluation of the mother and interactional evaluations on May 11, 2007, pursuant to an order of the court. His report, dated June 12, 2007, of the evaluation was entered as an exhibit by the petitioner. He testified that the mother has a history of using various substances with her drug of choice, being Percocet. It was reported by the mother to Dr. Humphrey that she had a peak use of Percocet of fifty pills per day. It was further reported that the mother, at the time of the evaluation, had been clean of drug use for approximately five months. His report further provides evidence of the mother's drug use in which the mother tested positive at Wheeler's Lifeline program six times for substances including marijuana, opiates, methamphetamine, cocaine and benzodiazepines, based on screens that were reported conducted between October 25, 2005, and January 6, 2006. In addition, drug screens on April 5, 2006, showed the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine and benzodiazepines; on May 4, 2006, for marijuana and cocaine; and on June 16, 2006, for cocaine. In his testimony, Dr. Humphrey diagnosed her with poly-substance abuse, with the primary substance of abuse being the painkiller, Percocet. Dr. Humphrey further testified that in regard to the mother being the primary caretaker of the child, his prognosis at the time of the writing of his report was guarded because of the substance abuse by the mother, her history of mental illness which presented to him as problems with depression and anxiety, her criminal history related to drug abuse, the lack of independent housing and the lack of any solid employment. As of the date of the report, June 12, 2007, Dr. Humphrey did not believe that the mother should serve as the caretaker of the child and that the child should remain in her foster home. He also testified to the importance of achieving permanency for a young child's development.
Dr. Humphrey also reported that the mother did have a satisfactory interaction with the child.
As to the father, Dr. Humphrey did not perform an individual assessment of the father, but did perform an interactional evaluation with the father and the child, Desziah. He testified that there was a pleasant interaction between the father and the child. However, he does not believe that there was a parent/child relationship between them.
The court (Quinn, J.), ordered specific steps for the mother and father when the orders of temporary custody were granted on October 3 and October 5, 2005. In addition, specific steps were ordered on March 30, 2006, when the child was adjudicated neglected.
The mother did not comply with the specific steps as evidenced by the exhibits, testimony and as detailed in this decision, including, but not limited, to the following. She has also failed to visit with Desziah consistently. The mother has been in a variety of individual counseling and treatment programs to address her substance abuse, mental health and parenting deficits. The mother has at times been compliant with some of the programs, but has failed to complete or follow through with treatment programs and the recommendations of service providers. She has tested positive for illegal substance on multiple occasions since the issuance of the specific steps, while Desziah remained committed to DCF. The mother has also had involvement with the criminal justice system both prior to and after the filing of the petition for the termination of her parental rights. She is also currently facing charges of violation of probation.
The father did not comply with the specific steps as evidenced by the exhibits, testimony and as detailed in this decision, including, but not limited to the following. He has failed to have a single visit with Desziah, from the date of her placement, being September 29, 2005 until March 28, 2007, period of one and one-half years. Although he was in prison for most of that time, he did not desire visitation and chose to have no involvement with his daughter. He has also not exercised his visitation from March 28, 2007, to the date of the trial on a consistent basis, having missed his scheduled visits in December 2007, and January 2008. He has not provided DCF with reliable phone numbers where he can be reached and he has not contacted the Department to arrange visits. In addition, the father has failed follow through with treatment programs or recommendations of the service providers, including addressing his history of domestic violence. He has declined a referral for individual counseling as was recommended upon his release from the halfway house, the Drapelik Center.
ADJUDICATION A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
Prior to the granting of a petition for the termination of parental rights, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1) requires that the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that "the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . . unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required." "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ryan R., supra, 102 Conn.App. 619. "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999); In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 547, 744 A.2d 915 (2000).
The court hereby finds by clear and convincing evidence, that the petitioner has made reasonable efforts to locate the mother and father and reunify them with the child. The mother and father are unable or unwilling to benefit from those reasonable efforts and further efforts to reunify the child with the parents are no longer appropriate.
As detailed in this decision and as evidenced by the exhibits and testimony presented, DCF has assisted both parents in referring, assisting and monitoring service providers for the parents to help them address their domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health and parenting concerns. The parents have been unable or unwilling to benefit from those reasonable efforts accordingly, DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with the child.
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO THE MOTHER, PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE: GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that the parental rights of the mother should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(1), which provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "has been found by the . . . Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."
"[R]ehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 480, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231, citing In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). The court in In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165, (1999), quoting from In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 840, 724 A.2d 546 (1999), stated that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Desziah was found to be neglected on March 30, 2006, and that the mother and the father were her parents.
As of the adjudicatory date of June 27, 2006, the mother, by clear and convincing evidence, was unable to achieve such degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. The mother has tested positive for numerous illegal drugs and has failed to successfully complete numerous treatment programs. In addition, the mother was convicted on December 3, 2003, and May 5, 2006, on drug-related offenses.
Post the adjudicatory date, the mother has made limited progress in completing some substance abuse and counseling programs. However, she has failed to complete numerous other programs to address her substance abuse and other problems as previously detailed in this decision. The mother's decision to leave the Chase Center on May 1, 2007, without permission, resulted in her being arrested for the violation of her probation. The mother is now facing criminal charges for said violation of probation and has exposure of approximately two years in prison in said case. The mother has also admitted to the misuse of Percocet as recently as September 2007.
For these reasons, as well as the other reasons discussed in this decision, and as evidenced by the exhibits and testimony presented, the court concludes that the mother has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of Desziah.
Accordingly, by clear and convincing evidence, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the petitioner has sustained its burden of proof on the issue of failure to rehabilitate and concludes that the mother has a child who has been found in a prior proceeding to have become neglected or uncared for and has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO THE FATHER, ABANDONMENT: GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
It is alleged by the petitioner that the parental rights of the father should be terminated because the child has been abandoned by the father in the sense that he has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility in the welfare of the child within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). "Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 14, 438 A.2d 801 (1981)." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993); In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 394, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "[a]ttempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). "In the context of termination of parental rights due to abandonment, this court has stated that among the generally understood obligations of parenthood are the expression of love and affection for the child, and the expression of personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child." In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 426, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003).
By clear and convincing evidence, based on the evidence presented and disclosed in this decision, the court finds that the petitioner has sustained its burden of proof on the issue of abandonment and concludes that the child has been abandoned by the father under § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
The petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that, as of the date of the filing of the petition, June 27, 2006, the child has been abandoned by the father in the sense that the father has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility in the welfare of Desziah. The father has not seen the child for lengthy periods of time, did not send her gifts, cards or financial support and had no telephone calls or other communication with her, from at least September 2005, until March 2007, a period of approximately eighteen months. During this time, while the father was in prison, he declined visitation and contact with his daughter. Even after his release from prison, the father has shown minimal interest in his child, has not visited with the child for the past two months and did not even attend the termination of parental rights trial.
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO FATHER, LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP: GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(3)(d)
It is alleged by the petitioner that the parental rights of the father should be terminated because there is no ongoing parent-child relationship within the meaning of General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). This means that, pursuant to the evidence presented, the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met, on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
The petitioner must establish (1) that "no ongoing parent-child relationship exists"; and (2) "the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). The term "no ongoing parent-child relationship . . . contemplate[s] a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).
By clear and convincing evidence, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the petitioner has sustained its burden of proof and finds as to the father, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met, on a continuing day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child, and that to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. The court further finds that no positive, emotional aspects of the relationship between the father and the child survive.
The petition for the termination of parental rights was filed on June 27, 2006. For the period of at least September 2005, until March 2007, the father had no contact with Desziah. This includes substantial periods of times both before and after the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights. The father has not been the caretaker of Desziah since at least June 2005, which is two and one-half years ago. Desziah does not have a bond with him. The father has had inconsistent visitation with the child since March 28, 2007, until the present.
Dr. Humphrey conducted an interactional evaluation of the father and daughter and concluded that there does not exist a parent/child relationship between them. The father has not been a part of his daughter's life for almost her entire life. Desziah does have a significant bond with his foster parents and their daughter.
This finding is based upon the evidence presented in this case including the exhibits and testimony of the witnesses and as discussed in this decision.
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO THE FATHER PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE: GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)
It is alleged by the petitioner that the parental rights of the father should be terminated because the father has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E), which provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated, pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."
"[R]ehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 480, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231, citing In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). The court in In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999), quoting from In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 840 724 A.2d 546 (1999), stated that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the father is the parent of a child under the age of seven years old, the child having been born on June 9, 2004. The child was adjudicated as a neglected child and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner on March 30, 2006. The father's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department of children and families in that the father's parental rights were terminated on February 1, 2005, as to his child, Ve-oniza.
In addition, the court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that the father has failed and is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, the father could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, Desziah. The father, despite his extensive criminal record, and domestic violence issues, has failed to seek counseling and domestic violence assistance in contravention of the request of the Department of Corrections programs. Despite being offered assistance by DCF, the father has failed and neglected to benefit from the programs made available to him. He has also failed to visit with his child over the past several years on a consistent basis and has had lengthy periods of no contact with the child. The father is not in a position to assume a responsible position in the life of his daughter within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of his child.
Accordingly, by clear and convincing evidence, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the petitioner has sustained its burden of proof on the issue for failure to rehabilitate and concludes that the father is a parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, and that the father has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previous terminated through a petition filed by the commissioner of children and families.
DISPOSITION
"If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 689; In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000). Before granting the petition for the termination of parental rights, the court must find by "clear and convincing evidence" that the "termination is in the best interest of the child" as required by General Statutes § 17a-112(j).
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist for the termination of parental rights. The petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the mother should be terminated on the statutory grounds of failure to rehabilitate, and as to the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment, lack of ongoing parent-child relationship and failure to rehabilitate.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(k), except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights, the court shall consider and make seven written findings. These seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 104. The court makes the following findings required as to the mother and father, which findings are made upon clear and convincing evidence.
1. Finding regarding the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided, and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.The mother and father have been provided with ample services to facilitate the return of the child. The services were described in the exhibits entered by the court, as testified to by the DCF, workers and substance abuse providers, as well as detailed in this decision. The services were offered in a timely basis and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.
2. Finding regarding whether the department of children and families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.The department of children and families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother and the father with the child. The court finds that the reunification efforts under all of the facts and circumstances of this case were reasonable. Those efforts were described in the exhibits entered by the court, as testified to by the DCF workers and substance abuse providers, as well as detailed in this decision.
3. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court-order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such orders.The mother and father did not comply with the specific steps ordered by the court. This finding is based upon the evidence presented in this case, including the exhibits and testimony of the witnesses and as discussed in this decision.
4. Finding regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of the child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.The child has strong emotional ties to his foster parents and their six-year-old child, with whom Desziah has resided with since November 2006. The foster parents have indicated a willingness to adopt the child should the child be legally free for adoption.
The child does not have an emotional bond to the father. The father has had no contact with the child from at least September 29, 2005, until March28, 2007, and has minimal and inconsistent contact thereafter. The father has not been a significant part of his child's life for the majority of her life. The court also finds that no positive, emotional aspects of the relationship between the father and child survive.
The child does have an emotional bond to the mother.
5. Finding regarding the age of the child.
The child is three and one-half years old.
6. Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to: (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions; and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child. Neither parent has been able to adjust his or her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return home in the foreseeable future as detailed in this decision and as evidenced by the exhibits and testimony presented in this trial. 7. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.The court finds that neither parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of either parent.
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: GENERAL STATUTES § 17a-112(j)(2)
The court, by clear and convincing evidence presented, finds that it would be in the best interest of Desziah to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father. The court, in addition to considering the above-referenced seven factors, has considered multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, continuity of her environment, the length of stay in foster care, the nature of her relationship with the foster and biological parents, and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); see also In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). In addition, the court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
The attorney and guardian ad litem for the minor child is also requesting that this court terminate the parental rights of the mother and father.
Desziah is now three and one-half years old. She has not been in the care and custody of her parents since September 29, 2005. She has been in three different foster homes during her life and has been in her current foster home since November 2006. The present foster family would like to adopt the child with both the child and the foster family having an appropriate and caring relationship. Since the child was approximately fifteen months old she has been out of the custody of her parents. The present lack of permanency and its negative effects on this child's life is not consistent with the child's best interest. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a bond between Desziah and the mother, the termination of his parental rights can nevertheless be in the child's best interest, and this court so finds. See In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 105-07; In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 536, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).
ORDER
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, based upon the testimony and evidence presented, it would be in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father at this time. The finding is made after considering the child's sense of time, the child's need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship that the child has with her biological parents and foster parents, and the totality of the circumstances that the termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. It is accordingly ordered that the parental rights of the mother, and the father, are hereby terminated as to Desziah. It is ordered that the commissioner of children and families be appointed as a statutory parent of the child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or families, or other permanent placement of the child. The commissioner shall file with this court a written status to affect such permanent placement within thirty days following the date of this judgment and file such other reports as required by state and federal laws.
The clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of the child, shall notify, in writing, the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain, Connecticut of the date when said adoption is finalized.
In addition, as to the permanency plan filed by the petitioner on June 28, 2006, and the mother's objection to said plan, the court hereby overrules the objection of the mother to said plan, and approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, finding by clear and convincing evidence, that said plan is in the best interest of the minor child. In addition, the court finds that the department of children and families has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans of termination of parental rights and adoption.