Opinion
Nos. 47236-4-I c/w 47237-2-I, 47238-1-I.
Filed: January 14, 2002. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County, No. 98-7-00579-1, Hon. James Doerty, August 17, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Kira T. Franz, Washington Appellate Project, 1305 4th Ave Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Catherine Cruikshank, Asst. Atty. General, Ste 2000 Offc of Aty Gen, 900 4th Ave, Seattle, WA 98164.
Brenda Priestman appeals the termination of her parental rights to her youngest daughter, A.P., and the establishment of a guardianship for her two older children, M.P. and C.P. Because Priestman did not appeal the underlying dependency and disposition orders, she may not collaterally attack the validity of the dependency order in the present action. The State met its burden of proving the statutory allegations under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d)-(f) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The State also met its statutory burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the guardianship and termination were in the best interests of the children. We further conclude that, with minor exceptions, the challenged factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the termination of Priestman's parental rights did not violate either the ADA or a Washington statute stating that no parent may be deemed abusive or neglectful solely by reason of the parent's handicap.
We affirm the termination and guardianship orders.
Priestman is the mother of three children, fifteen-year-old M.P., thirteen-year-old C.P., and three-year-old A.P. Priestman has a long history of mental illness, and has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Her disorder causes paranoia, and she has long held the belief that her family and others are stalking her.
She was involuntarily committed sometime in 1986, and gave birth to M.P. later that year. Priestman put M.P. up for adoption, but family members intervened. With Priestman's consent, M.P. went to live with his maternal aunt and uncle, Don and Mirella Geyer. Don and Mirella cared for M.P. for more than a year, and then returned him to Priestman. Then, in April 1988, Priestman gave birth to her daughter, C.P. Between 1988 and 1991, Child Protective Services (CPS) received several referrals concerning Priestman's ability to parent her two children.
Motivated by her belief that her mother was stalking her, Priestman moved several times between 1991 and 1996, taking her two children with her. From the record, it appears that they lived in various apartments and shelters, in Washington and California. When describing this period in her life, Priestman testified that they had not left the house for five years, and stated that she home-schooled her children at one point because she was being stalked.
In June 1996, they returned from California to Washington, and the two children moved in with Priestman's relatives. They remained in the care of relatives from 1996 through 1998. CPS received several referrals during that period, including some from Priestman herself who feared that her relatives were abusing her children.
By the time Priestman gave birth to her third child, A.P., in August 1998, DSHS had filed dependency petitions for all three children. In December 1998, Priestman agreed to an order of dependency regarding her children.
Three weeks later, after a contested hearing, the court entered a dispositional order. M.P. and C.P. were to remain with their aunt and uncle, Dan and Linda Geyer. A.P. was to remain with Priestman `contingent upon her compliance with dispositional orders.' Approximately six months later, the court removed A.P. from Priestman's home.
In March 2000, DSHS filed petitions to terminate Priestman's parental rights to A.P., and to establish dependency guardianships for M.P. and C.P.
The court granted the petitions.
We accept Priestman's supplemental brief. The State is not required to respond.
Priestman argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving four of the six statutory allegations necessary to successfully terminate a parent child relationship or establish a dependency guardianship. We disagree.
We accord substantial deference to the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights. We must affirm an order terminating parental rights if substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings in light of the degree of proof required. Weight and credibility determinations are the province of the trial court. The `dominant consideration is the moral, intellectual, and material welfare of the child.' Accordingly, where `the rights of a child conflict with the rights of a parent, the rights of the child prevail.'
In re Dependency of A.W., 53 Wn. App. 22, 31, 765 P.2d 307 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1017 (1989).
In re Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 161, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).
In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 161.
In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 161; In re Dependency of J.W., 90 Wn. App. 417, 427, 953 P.2d 104, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1021 (1998).
In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 154.
To prevail on a petition to terminate parental rights, the State has the burden of proving each of the following six elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
In re Dependency of H.W., 92 Wn. App. 420, 425, 961 P.2d 963, amended on reconsideration by, 969 P.2d 1082 (1998).
(a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child;
(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130;
(c) That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, have been removed from the custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;
(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided;
(e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. and
(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists when the ultimate facts at issue are shown by the evidence to be `highly probable.'
In re Dependency of K.R. and R.J., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995).
The State must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parental relationship is in the best interests of the child.
To prevail on a petition to establish a guardianship, the State must prove six similar allegations under RCW 13.34.231, but need only do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
RCW 13.34.231 (listing the six allegations that the State must prove to establish a dependency guardianship); In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 928, 976 P.2d 113 (1999).
Dependency
Priestman first argues that the underlying dependency order is invalid, and that the State accordingly failed to meet its statutory burden of proving that the `child[ren] ha[d] been found to be dependent.' But Priestman did not appeal the agreed dependency order. Accordingly, we do not reach this argument.
To successfully terminate parental rights or establish a guardianship, the State must first prove `[t]hat the child has been found to be a dependent child.' On December 1, 1998, Priestman entered into an agreed dependency order as to all three of her children. She was represented by an attorney during the dependency proceedings, and expressly waived her right to a dependency fact finding hearing. Accordingly, the court made the following written findings of fact in support of the agreed dependency determination:
RCW 13.34.180(1)(a); RCW 13.34.231(1).
As to Priestman's waiver of rights, the dependency order states that:
The mother of the child was informed of the right to introduce evidence, be heard in her own behalf, examine witnesses, and receive the decision of an unbiased fact finder based solely on the evidence adduced at a dependency fact finding hearing, and expressly and voluntarily waives that right in approving this order for entry.
The court finds the following facts establishing dependency are not disputed by the parties: The mother placed [C.P.] and [M.P.] with her brother and his wife approximately one year ago. Although [the] mother is taking care of [A.P.] in her home at this time, mother agrees that services in the dispositional order are necessary for a successful parenting of her children. The state believes [it has] enough evidence to prove the mother has a mental illness. The mother believes that her problems have been caused by her family stalking her.
Based on those agreed findings, the court concluded the children were dependent because they had `no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for [them], such that [they were] in circumstances which constitute]d] a danger of substantial damage to [their] psychological or physical development.' A few weeks later, the court held a disposition hearing and entered a dispositional order.
Priestman argues that the court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its dependency determination, and that the order is facially invalid on that basis. On these premises, she maintains, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the statutory allegation that her children had been found to be dependent.
This argument is nothing more than a collateral attack upon the December 1998 dependency judgment, which was final and appealable. Under RAP 2.2(a)(5), a party may appeal as a matter of right from `[t]he disposition decision following a finding of dependency by a juvenile court.' A final judgment includes any order, such as this one, `from which an appeal lies.'
RAP 2.2(a)(5).
CR 54(a)(1).
The court clearly found Priestman's children to be dependent. Had Priestman wished to contest the sufficiency of the factual findings underlying that determination, she could have done so on direct appeal from the dependency judgment. Because she did not appeal the dependency judgment, we will not review it.
In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d at 142 n. 7 (agreeing `that the time to contest the dependency and the facts supporting the dependency was on appeal of the dependency'); In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 565 n. 5, 815 P.2d 277 (1991) (`Because the dependency order was agreed and not appealed, we, like the trial court, are unable to review it despite our misgivings as to its propriety under the facts of this case.').
Relying on RAP 2.5(a), Priestman nevertheless argues that she may raise this issue for the first time on appeal because it involves a manifest constitutional error and a failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted. But this rule is inapplicable. A party must actually file an appeal for us to reach the issue raised. Because Priestman never appealed the dependency and dispositional orders, we will not evaluate the claimed error under RAP 2.5(a).
RAP 2.5(a) states, in pertinent part, that `a party may raise the following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: (1) lack of trial court jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and (3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right.'
Priestman's reliance on State v. Marking for the proposition that this court should review the dependency order despite her failure to appeal it is similarly misplaced. In Marking, this court reversed a conviction for violation of a domestic violence no-contact order on the ground that the underlying no-contact order was invalid. This court reviewed the validity of the no-contact order despite the defendant's failure to challenge the order when issued. Because a valid no-contact order was an element of the offense, this court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
100 Wn. App. 506, 997 P.2d 461, review denied, 141 Wn.2d 1026 (2000).
Marking, 100 Wn. App. at 507.
Marking, 100 Wn. App. at 509-511.
Marking, 100 Wn. App. at 512.
Marking is distinguishable. There is nothing in that opinion to show whether the defendant stipulated to the no-contact order. Here, in contrast, Priestman expressly stipulated to entry of the dependency order. That order became a final judgment appealable under RAP 2.2(a) upon entry of the dispositional order. Because she did not appeal it, we will not review it.
In her supplemental brief, Priestman also argues that the underlying dependency order is invalid in light of a recent amendment to RCW 13.34.110 — the statute governing hearings in dependency proceedings. The amendment requires the juvenile court to make certain additional inquiries on the record before entering a stipulated or agreed order of dependency. Priestman argues that the amendment was remedial in nature, and therefore applies retroactively to her case. She notes that the court did not make certain inquiries required by the amendment, and maintains that the dependency order is thus invalid.
But because Priestman never appealed the agreed dependency order, we need not determine whether the statutory amendment applies retroactively. In her opening brief and at oral argument, Priestman similarly argued that the trial court had violated former RCW 13.34.110 because its findings of fact were insufficient to support its dependency determination. She thus disputed the court's compliance with that statute even before the recent amendment. The fact that she now argues that the court also failed to comply with the statute as recently amended does not alter the fact that she never appealed the underlying dependency judgment. We decline to address Priestman's new arguments.
Provision of Services
Priestman argues that the State failed to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that it `expressly and understandably' offered or provided `all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.' She maintains that the State failed to meet this burden because it did not tailor the services it offered to meet her needs as a parent disabled by mental illness. We disagree.
RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) (requiring the State to prove: `That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided;'). See also RCW 13.34.231(4) (requiring that, in a guardianship proceeding, the State prove by a preponderance of the evidence that `[t]he services ordered under RCW 13.34.130 and 13.34.136 have been offered or provided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been offered or provided;.').
Both RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) and RCW 13.34.231(4) obligate the State to offer or provide services that are capable of correcting parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future. To meet its statutory burden, the State must tailor the services it offers to meet each individual parent's needs. This includes tailoring services to a parent's disability. But a parent who is unwilling or unable to take advantage of the services provided relieves the State of any obligation to provide additional services. The State satisfies its statutory burden when the offer of services would have been futile.
In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 161.
See In re Dependency of A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229-30, 896 P.2d 1298, review denied, 127 Wn.2d 1025 (1995) (upholding termination of parental rights where the State `provided services which were modified to accommodate the [parents'] specific disabilities); In re H.W., 92 Wn. App. at 428 (reversing termination of parental rights where the State failed to offer services tailored to the mother's developmental disability).
In re Dependency of Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. 854, 861, 765 P.2d 30 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1006 (1989); In re Dependency of P.D., 58 Wn. App. 18, 26, 792 P.2d 159, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1019 (1990).
In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 699 n. 6, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980) (offering services would have been futile where `[t]he evidence was that the mother was unwilling to move from Portland, and thus the department could not effectively offer her services.').
It is undisputed that Priestman suffers from schizoaffective disorder and resulting paranoia, which lie at the root of her parental deficiencies. Her mental illness has caused her to become `manic and delusional and psychotic paranoid' and to perceive reality differently. She has experienced persistent and considerable paranoia, as evidenced by her longstanding belief that members of her family are stalking her. She testified, for example, that her mother was spying on her and sending people to rape her. She similarly testified that Child Protective Services employees were stalking her.
In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered services to address the parental deficiencies caused by her mental illness. The court mandated that Priestman complete parenting classes, allow weekly visitation by a public health nurse, receive individual mental health counseling, and engage in medication management if recommended.
Priestman argues that the State failed to tailor the services it offered to accommodate her disability because it did not offer to let her meet with a public health nurse outside of her home. As a result of her paranoia, Priestman was reluctant to allow service providers into her home. For example, social worker Corliss Nystrom and Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Elizabeth Twiss both testified that Priestman was unwilling to meet with them at her home. In light of her reluctance to allow others into her home, she maintains that the State should have considered of the option of allowing her to meet with a public health nurse outside of her home. But the record indicates that it would have been futile for the State to do so. Priestman consistently refused to even discuss the possibility of participating in virtually all court-ordered services, including those offered outside of her home. For example, Nystrom testified that Priestman declined services, not only because she did not want a public health nurse visiting her home, but also because she `didn't think that she had any mental health problems, so she wasn't willing to cooperate with any mental health services.' She stated that Priestman had made it very `clear that she wasn't interested in services that the Department had to offer.'
Social worker Jeanne Kimble testified that she was unable to have any meaningful discussions regarding services with Priestman, who continued to deny that she had any mental health problems. She stated that Priestman refused `to receive services,' and refused `to participate in medication case management.'
Psychiatric nurse practitioner Susanna Hegstrom testified that she met with Priestman in August 1999 to conduct a psychiatric evaluation, but that Priestman refused to cooperate. Priestman refused to answer any questions, kept interrupting her, and refused antipsychotic as well as anticonvulsant medications. As a result of Priestman's refusal to cooperate, Hegstrom made no additional referrals.
Priestman herself testified that she did not complete any of the court ordered services because she `felt that they were not necessary.' She stated that she did not want to participate `because somebody ordered me to.' She repeatedly reiterated her belief that she was not in need of any services.
Priestman points out that she did attend several monthly meetings with Carol Harbin, a case manager at West Seattle Mental Health Center during 1997. But by the time the court issued the dispositional order in December 1998, she had long since stopped participating in those meetings and her file had been closed. Priestman reappeared for counseling in the summer of 1999, but went to only three meetings.
Priestman mistakenly relies on In re Dependency of H.W. for the proposition that the State failed to prove that it had provided all necessary services.
In H.W., DSHS did not refer a developmentally disabled mother to its Division of Developmental Disabilities. This court accordingly held that DSHS had failed to prove it had provided all necessary services likely to correct parental deficiencies. But, unlike Priestman, the mother in H.W. was `responsive to the training and was, in fact, eager for more services.' DSHS did not argue that the mother was `unwilling to attend classes or receive services.' Priestman, in contrast, was unwilling to accept any services.
In re H.W., 92 Wn. App. at 428.
In re H.W., 92 Wn. App. at 428.
Priestman also relies on In re A.J.R., in which this court upheld an order terminating the parental rights of two developmentally disabled parents. This Court held that the State had tailored services to meet the parents' individual needs by doing such things as giving them simple, illustrated, step-by-step instructions on nutrition, health care, cleanliness, and child-care. The parents also attended parenting classes tailored to meet their needs.
In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 223-24.
In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 224-25.
In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 227.
But unlike Priestman, the parents in A.J.R. were willing and cooperative participants in the offered services. Here, Priestman's unwillingness to receive services, or to even discuss them meaningfully, relieved the State of any obligation to provide additional services. Because Priestman consistently denied that she was mentally ill or in need of services, it would have been futile for the State to suggest that she meet with a public health nurse outside of her home.
Priestman also argues that the State failed to assign people to her case who were familiar with her disorder or who had experience working `with people like her.' But social workers Nystrom and Kimble both had experience in working with mentally ill adults. And before becoming a social worker with the Division of Children and Family Services (DCFS), Nystrom had worked with the chronically mentally ill for four years as a case manager at Seattle Mental Health and Eastside Mental Health. Priestman fails to show why anything more was required of the State under the circumstances.
Finally, Priestman maintains that the State failed to consider other options, such as therapeutic day care or family visitation, which could have put A.P. in contact with other people. But, as discussed above, Priestman was unwilling to participate in any services whatsoever, even services outside of her home. Because it would have been futile for the State to suggest these other alternatives, nothing more was required of the State.
See In re Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. at 861 (`a parent's unwillingness or inability to make use of the services provided excuses the State from offering extra services that might have been helpful'); In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d at 699 n. 6 (State met its burden where offering services would have been futile).
Moreover, RCW 13.34.180(4) does not require the State to exhaust every possible resource, or offer every possible service before terminating the parent-child relationship. It simply requires that it provide available and reasonably necessary services. The State met its burden of doing so.
The record contains ample evidence that the State provided Priestman with all reasonably available and necessary services, as required by RCW 13.34.180(4).
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
In a related argument, Priestman maintains that the termination of her parental rights violated the ADA because the State failed to reasonably tailor the services it offered to accommodate her disability. We reject her claim.
42 U.S.CA. § 12132 (1990).
In In re A.J.R., this court recognized that the ADA requires that the State make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to receive services or to participate in its programs. But it did not directly reach the question of whether a parent may raise the ADA as a defense to the termination of parental rights. It instead found on the facts presented that the State, by providing services designed to meet the parent's special needs, had met any obligations that the ADA might impose.
In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 230 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 230.
Here, as in A.J.R., we reject Priestman's ADA claim for the same reasons we reject her challenge under RCW 13.34.180(4). As discussed above, it would have been futile for the State to suggest that she meet with a public health nurse outside her home in light of her insistence that she did not need any services whatsoever, either inside or outside her home. Priestman's ADA claim accordingly fails for the same reason that her challenge under RCW 13.34.180(4) fails.
See In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. at 229 (concluding that the State had complied with RCW 13.34.180(4) by providing services that were modified to accommodate the parents' specific disabilities, and rejecting the parents' ADA claim for the same reasons).
Moreover, although Priestman urges us to hold that the termination of her parental rights violated the ADA, she cites no case, from Washington or any other jurisdiction, in which a court has overturned a termination of parental rights on that basis. In fact, those courts that have directly addressed the applicability of the ADA in termination proceedings have almost unanimously held that a parent may not raise alleged violations of the ADA as a defense to termination of parental rights proceedings. In doing so, they have determined that termination proceedings are not `services, programs or activities' under the ADA.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 122, 747 N.E.2d 120, 124-25 (2001); In re Terry, 240 Mich. App. 14, 25, 610 N.W.2d 563 (2000); In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 472, 735 A.2d 893 (1999); State ex rel B.K.F., 704 So.2d 314, La.Ct.App. (1997); In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 350-55, 693 A.2d 716 (1997); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 829-31, Ind.Ct.App. (1995); In re Torrance P., 187 Wis.2d 10, 15-16, 522 N.W.2d 243 Wis. App. (1994). Cf., In re C.M., 996 S.W.2d 269 Tex. Ct. App. (1999) (holding ADA may be an affirmative defense to a termination proceeding, but the parent had waived the defense in that case by failing to plead it).
See, e.g., In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. at 470; In re B.S., 166 Vt. at 351-52.
RCW 26.44.015(3)
Priestman also argues that the termination and guardianship violated RCW 26.44.015(3), which states that `[n]o parent or guardian may be deemed abusive or neglectful solely by reason of the parent's handicap.' But because Priestman was never `deemed abusive or neglectful,' this statute does not apply here.
By agreed order, the trial court found Priestman's children dependent because they had `no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for [them], such that [they were] in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development.' It did not find that the children were `abused or neglected,' which is an alternative statutory basis for dependency.
RCW 13.34.030(5)(b) (dependent child means one who `[i]s abused or neglected as defined in chapter 26.44 RCW by a person legally responsible for the care of the child;').
Because the court never deemed Priestman `abusive or neglectful,' she fails to show how RCW 26.44.015(3) applies.
Likelihood that Conditions Would be Remedied
Priestman also argues that the State failed to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there was little likelihood that conditions would be remedied so that the children could be returned to her in the near future. We disagree.
RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) (requiring the State to prove that: `there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.'). See also RCW 13.34.231(5) (requiring that, in a guardianship proceeding, the State prove by a preponderance of the evidence that `[t]here is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future;').
Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), if the State meets its burden of proving that it offered or provided all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future, and the parental deficiencies are not substantially improved within 12 months of the dependency order, a rebuttable presumption arises that this factor is established. In determining whether the State has met its burden of showing that there is little likelihood the conditions would be remedied, the court may consider `[p]sychological incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent that is so severe and chronic as to render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time, and documented unwillingness of the parent to receive and complete treatment.' The court may also consider the parent's past history in weighing his or her current fitness.
In re Dependency of J.C., 130 Wn.2d 418, 428, 924 P.2d 21 (1996).
Here, the record establishes that Priestman has a long history of mental illness and resulting paranoia, which have persisted since before the birth of her first child. As a result, Priestman's two older children lived primarily with relatives for the four years preceding the termination and guardianship proceedings. A.P. had been out of her mother's care for more than a year by the time of trial. Dr. McConnell diagnosed Priestman with schizoaffective disorder in 1997, a diagnosis that was consistent with prior diagnoses. Dr. McConnell testified that, without treatment, this disorder often leads to recurring psychotic episodes and mood swings. She explained that treatment typically consists of medication, counseling, and case management.
The record clearly shows that, apart from temporary participation in the Women, Infants and Children Program (WIC) and sporadic meetings with a case manager, Priestman consistently denied her illness and any need for treatment or court ordered services. Although that case manager testified that Priestman seemed more stable during those meetings due to her attendance at church, the overwhelming weight of evidence established that little likelihood existed that Priestman would be able to remedy conditions in what constituted the `near future' to her young children. Her longstanding inability to acknowledge her illness and her need for services and treatment supports the court's conclusion that conditions would not be remedied in the near future.
In re Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 851, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983) (eight months not in foreseeable future of four-year-old child); In re P.D., 58 Wn. App. at 27 (six months not in the near future of fifteen-month-old child); In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 31-32 (one year not in the foreseeable future of three-year-old child).
Effect of Continuing Relationship on Prospects for Early Integration
Priestman next argues that the State failed to prove that continuation of the parental relationship would clearly diminish A.P.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). There is no equivalent element in the guardianship statute.
But this finding "necessarily follows from an adequate showing" that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. Because the State met its burden of proving that there is little likelihood that Priestman's parental deficiencies will be remedied in the near future, it necessarily follows that her parental relationship interferes with A.P.'s integration into a stable home.
In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166 (quoting In re J.C., 130 Wn.2d at 427).
Priestman nevertheless argues that continuation of the parental relationship would not diminish A.P.'s integration into a stable and permanent home because A.P. would simply continue living with her aunt and uncle after termination. For support, she relies on In re Welfare of S.V.B., in which this Court held that, because the child at issue was already in a stable home and unlikely to move, the evidence did not establish that terminating parental rights was necessary to help the child integrate into a stable home. But unlike A.P., the child in In re S.V.B. was already in a dependency guardianship, and the termination of parental rights would not have caused that legal arrangement to change.
75 Wn. App. 762, 775, 880 P.2d 80 (1994).
In re S.V.B., 75 Wn. App. at 775.
Here, A.P.'s aunt and uncle want to adopt her, but continuation of the parental relationship would prevent that from occurring. A.P. cannot be adopted or given permanent placement so long as Priestman retains her parental rights. CASA Twiss testified that continuation of the parental relationship would deprive A.P. of the stability that comes with adoption, and would hamper her integration into the stable home of the relatives who wanted to adopt her. For these reasons, the State met its burden of proving that continuation of Priestman's parental rights interferes with A.P.'s integration into a stable home.
Best Interests of the Child
Priestman also argues that the State failed to prove that terminating her parental rights to A.P. and establishing a dependency guardianship for M.P. and C.P. were in the best interests of each child. We disagree. To successfully terminate the parent child relationship, the State must not only prove the six statutory allegations under RCW 13.34.180(1), but it must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Under RCW 13.34.231, the State must similarly prove by a preponderance of the evidence that establishing a guardianship is in the child's best interests.
The trial court has broad discretion to determine the best interests of the child, and we give its decision great deference. The court must decide each case based on its own facts and circumstances.
In re Welfare of Young, 24 Wn. App. 392, 395, 600 P.2d 1312 (1979), review denied, 93 Wn.2d 1005 (1980).
In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572.
Here, the evidence established that Priestman has suffered from schizoaffective disorder, with resulting paranoia, since before A.P.'s birth. But she continues to deny her illness, and any need for treatment. Dr. Mc'Connell's testimony indicated that, without treatment, an individual with this disorder who does not receive treatment is at risk for recurring psychoses and mood problems.
The CASA expressly stated that it was in A.P.'s best interest for the court to terminate Priestman's parental rights. At the time of the termination hearing, A.P., who was then almost two years old, had been living with her aunt and uncle for more than a year. The CASA stated that A.P. deserves the stability that comes with adoption, and should not have to grow up with the worry that her mother could come in and remove her at any time. Clear, cogent and convincing evidence supports the trial court's determination that it would be in A.P.'s best interests to remain permanently in the home of her maternal aunt and uncle. A preponderance of the evidence similarly supports the trial court's determination that it was in M.P. and C.P.'s best interests to establish a dependency guardianship.
Other Challenged Factual Findings
Priestman argues that several of the trial court's remaining factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, and asks us to strike them.
In re Dependency of C.T., 59 Wn. App. 490, 496, 798 P.2d 1170 (1990), review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1015 (1991) (in a dependency proceeding, challenged findings must be supported by substantial evidence).
Priestman first argues that the following finding of fact is unsupported by substantial evidence:
This case is redolent with epic irony that the salvation of the children has been, for the mother, her damnation. It is a function of her mental illness that she exaggerates the role her family has played in her life and yet neither she nor the children could have survived without the assistance of her family. This is an irony that eludes the mother.
Finding of Fact 1.10 in order establishing guardianship, and Finding of Fact 1.8 in order terminating parental rights.
She argues that she `survived' with her older children for several years, and did so with A.P. for ten months. We need not extensively discuss the trial court's function of making findings based on conflicting evidence.
The significant point here is that even if we assume that this finding is unsupported by substantial evidence, there is no showing of prejudice. In short, the finding has no bearing on the statutory factors under RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.230.
Priestman also challenges the following factual finding:
The services provided to the mother have been comprehensive. At Highline Mental Health Clinic, these services have included group and individual counseling, psychiatric assessment, case management services, clothing and referrals to a variety of other resources in the community. In addition, the mother has supportive social workers, the assistance of public health nurse services and the persistent offer of a family group conference. In fact, this services element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finding of Fact 1.13 in order establishing guardianship, and Finding of Fact 1.11 in order terminating parental rights.
This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Priestman did receive limited case management services, attending three meetings with Carol Harbin at Highline Mental Health Clinic before dropping out. Susanna Hegstrom attempted to conduct a psychiatric assessment, but could not complete it due to Priestman's lack of cooperation. The record indicates that Priestman received a WIC referral. Priestman did have the support of social workers Kimble and Nystrom, and they offered her the assistance of a public health nurse. The record also supports the finding that she could have participated in a family group conference had she so wished.
Priestman next argues that the trial court erred by repeatedly finding that she failed to attend a family group conference, because the finding is irrelevant. She is correct. The court did not order that she attend a family group conference, and her failure to do so is not relevant. We hereby strike that finding.
Priestman also maintains that the trial court erred by repeatedly finding that she could not follow any court order or treatment. There is ample evidence that Priestman was unwilling to receive treatment, and failed to comply with the court's disposition order. That she allowed Twiss into her home on one occasion in response to a court order does not negate the fact that she did not follow any other court orders or treatment.
Priestman next asserts that the trial court erred in finding that she `testified that she would not participate in court ordered services.' But she clearly testified that she did not complete any of the court ordered services because she `felt that they were not necessary.' She stated that she did not want to participate `because somebody ordered me to.' She repeatedly reiterated her belief that she was not in need of any services whatsoever. This testimony is sufficient to support the court's finding. Priestman also argues that the court erred in finding that her `reality' was `completely egocentric.' Even assuming she is correct, she has not shown how this finding prejudiced her.
Finally, she maintains that the court erred in finding that:
No child should have to live under the threat of being given up. [Priestman] has said `I'll give [A.P.] away, maybe even to someone outside the family and go to Alaska.' [Priestman's] attitude is not only destabilizing for the child, but destabilizing for the extended maternal family as well. It is of great concern to this court that if the mother does not get her way, there will be significant consequences.
Finding of Fact 1.20 in order terminating parental rights.
Priestman points out that she never uttered the precise words quoted in this finding, and maintains that the finding takes the remarks that she did make out of context.
She is correct that the court erred by placing in quotations words she never spoke. But the testimony of several witnesses supports the court's finding that A.P. was under the threat of being given up, and that that attitude was destabilizing for the child. Nystrom testified that Priestman said `that she would rather give [A.P.] up than have anyone come to her home to see her.' Twiss testified that Priestman said `she was not willing to meet with me, and if I insisted on coming to see her, she was going to give me [A.P.], and she would leave; she would move to Alaska, where she could start a family in peace.' Twiss also expressed her fear that Priestman was getting ready to run, taking A.P. with her.
We affirm the termination and guardianship orders.
WE CONCUR: KENNEDY, J., BAKER, J.