Opinion
W.C. No. 4-715-899.
January 8, 2008.
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Friend (ALJ) dated June 29, 2007, that found the claim compensable and ordered the respondents to pay temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits. We affirm.
The ALJ's findings of fact are summarized as follows. The claimant installed automatic door systems. He sustained injuries to his neck and back in 1996 and 1999, for which he reached maximum medical improvement. However, the claimant was seeing a chiropractor for neck pain at the time of the incident that was the basis for his claim in this matter. The claimant's supervisor counseled the claimant several times concerning his substandard job performance. On January 25, 2006, the claimant reached out with his left arm from a kneeling position in an attempt to prevent a door frame from falling. As he grabbed the frame it pulled his arm and shoulder. The claimant heard a pop and felt pain in his left shoulder and mid-back. The employer referred the claimant for medical treatment the same day. The claimant advised the doctor that he tried catching a header when it fell and injured his mid-back and shoulder. An employee of another contractor testified that he saw the claimant standing when the frame fell, but that he did not see the claimant make any motion to stop its fall. However, the ALJ credited the claimant's testimony concerning the door frame and his efforts to arrest its fall. The claimant was given work restrictions, but was terminated on January 29, 2007. The claimant earned no wages at any other job from January 26, 2007, through February 28, 2007. The ALJ determined that the claimant met his burden to establish a compensable injury and awarded temporary total benefits from January 26, 2007, to February 28, 2007. He also ordered the respondent insurer to pay for specific medical services rendered to the claimant.
The respondents assert on appeal that the overall evidence in the record supports a determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. In support of their argument the respondents refer to the testimony of the employee who saw the door frame fall, evidence regarding the claimant's previous and ongoing physical problems and corresponding medical treatment, and the claimant's well-founded concerns about his job security in light of his performance issues. As the respondents indicate, the record contains evidence that could support a determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury. However, the question of whether the claimant met his burden to prove a compensable injury is one of fact for determination by the ALJ. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 989 P.2d 251 (Colo.App. 1999).
Accordingly, we must uphold the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2007. The substantial evidence standard requires that we view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Substantial evidence is that quantum of probative evidence which a rational fact finder would accept as adequate to support a conclusion without regard to the existence of conflicting evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo.App. 1995). Thus, the scope of our review is "exceedingly narrow." Id.
Furthermore, proof of causation regarding an accidental injury and resulting disability is not limited to credible medical evidence, but may be established by lay testimony. Savio House v. Dennis, 665 P.2d 141, 142-43 (Colo.App. 1983). The ALJ credited the claimant's testimony that he was injured at work. The claimant's testimony supports the ALJ's finding of a compensable injury. Tr. at 13-14, 30-31, 44-46. Furthermore, lay testimony, if credited, is sufficient to establish that the injury was the cause of the claimant's disability and consequent wage loss. See Lymburn v. Symbios Logic, 952 P.2d 831, 833-34 (Colo.App. 1997) (award of temporary total disability benefits not dependent on medical evidence of work restrictions; claimant's testimony and physician's notes supported corresponding award). We are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. See City of Loveland Police Dep't v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 141 P.3d 943, 950 (Colo.App. 2006), citing Bodaghi v. Department of Natural Resources, 995 P.2d 288, 303 (Colo. 2000) (reciting standard of review and supreme court's admonishment against reviewing court "parsing through the record and testimony . . . and making . . . own findings of fact").
We note that in their brief in support of the petition to review the respondents directed their arguments to the ALJ, principally contending that he erred in finding the claimant credible. Hence, the respondents sought from the ALJ a supplemental order on reconsideration of the weight and probative value of the evidence. In the "green sheet" transmitting the record to the Panel the ALJ acknowledged the respondents' request for another order and characterized the question of compensability as a "close question." However, he adhered to his decision and submitted the matter for review by the Panel. We presume that because the respondents have not sought to withdraw the petition to review it was not directed solely to the ALJ, and that the respondents contemplated that we would review the order if the ALJ transmitted it to us. However, for the reasons stated above, we are not persuaded to disturb the ALJ's decision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated June 29, 2007 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
_______________________ John D. Baird
_______________________ Curt Kriksciun
JEFFREY B DAVIS, COLO SPGS, CO, (Claimant).
STANLEY AUTOMATIC ENTRANCE, NEW BRITAIN, CT, (Employer).
THE HARTFORD, Attn: MYRA L. JELINEK, C/O: SPECIALTY RISK SERVICES, DENVER, CO, (Insurer).
HEUSER HEUSER, Attn: BARKLEY HEUSER, ESQ., COLO SPGS, CO, (For Claimant).
BLACKMAN LEVINE, L.L.C., Attn: LAWRENCE BLACKMAN, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
THE HARTFORD, Attn: MYRNA JELINSKI, DENVER, CO, (Other Party).