Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Super. Ct. No. JW112140-00 Jon E. Stuebbe, Judge.
Alison E. Kaylor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Charles A. French, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Hill, J. and Kane, J.
OPINION
The juvenile court found Danielle D. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because she had committed a battery resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d). Danielle argues the evidence was insufficient to support the serious bodily injury finding, and the juvenile court erred in concluding the crime was a felony instead of a misdemeanor. We disagree and affirm the order.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The facts in this matter are not in significant dispute. The victim, Vanessa, got into an argument with one of Danielle’s friends while in the cafeteria. Danielle and her friends followed Vanessa into the restroom, where the argument continued. Danielle appears to have been an observer to this point. Danielle, however, decided to throw a yogurt container at Vanessa, hitting her in the back of the head, starting a physical altercation between the two, into which Danielle’s friends may have joined. Danielle struck Vanessa in the eye during the fight. As a result of this blow, Vanessa suffered damage to her eye. The eye became swollen to the point that Vanessa could not see out of the eye for two days, and her vision was blurred for approximately two weeks. At the time of the trial, almost three months after the fight, some bruising could still be seen under Vanessa’s eye.
A petition was filed alleging that Danielle was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 as a result of her violating Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), battery, resulting in serious bodily injury. After a contested hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations true. Danielle’s motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor was denied, and the juvenile court specifically found the crime was a felony. Danielle was placed on probation, returned to the custody of her father, and ordered to complete 80 hours in the juvenile court work program.
DISCUSSION
I. The Serious Bodily Injury Finding
Danielle argues there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Vanessa sustained serious bodily injury as a result of the altercation. Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is deferential. We “‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could [make the required finding].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Superior Court (Jones)(1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) We focus on the whole record, not isolated bits of evidence. (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1203.) We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence that supports the finding. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We will not substitute our evaluations of a witness’s credibility for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1078.)
The evidence describing the injury was provided by Vanessa and was not disputed. In addition, a picture taken shortly after the altercation showing Vanessa with her eye swollen to the point that appears she could not see out of it was introduced into evidence.
Section 243 defines “serious bodily injury” as “a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.” (Id., subd. (f)(4). The prosecutor argued that because Vanessa had difficulty seeing out of her eye for approximately two weeks, she suffered protracted impairment of her eyesight within the meaning of the statute.
Danielle cites People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740 (Escobar) to support her position. We find Escobar relevant, but not for the reasons cited by Danielle. Escobar addressed the question of whether there was substantial evidence that the victim of a rape had suffered great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). We find Escobar relevant because the Supreme Court emphasized that the question of whether the victim suffered great bodily injury was a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. (Escobar, at p. 750.)
The Supreme Court described the victim’s injuries as “extensive bruises and abrasions over the victim’s legs, knees and elbows, injury to her neck and soreness in her vaginal area of such severity that it significantly impaired her ability to walk.” (Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 750.) This evidence was deemed sufficient to support the great bodily injury enhancement. (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited several cases that had found sufficient evidence of great bodily injury. “[N]umerous decisions interpreting and applying [People v.] Caudillo [(1978) 21 Cal.3d 562] have upheld findings of great bodily injury based on injuries of a degree and severity similar to those inflicted on [the victim]. (See, e.g., People v. Jaramillo [(1979)]98 Cal.App.3d 830 [great bodily injury finding upheld where battered child suffered multiple contusions and swelling of her hands, arms and buttocks]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718 [multiple abrasions and lacerations to the victim’s back and bruising of the eye and cheek found to be great bodily injury]; People v. Brown [(1985)] 174 Cal.App.3d 762 [one-inch long laceration of victim’s vagina supports finding of great bodily injury]; People v. Corona (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 589 [swollen jaw, bruises to head and neck and sore ribs support finding of great bodily injury].)” (Id., at p. 752.) Danielle argues that since Vanessa’s injuries were not as severe as those described in Escobar and the cases cited therein, the serious bodily injury finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
The parties agree that serious bodily injury and great bodily injury as used in section 12022.7 have similar meanings (People v. Kent (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 130, 136-137) and, therefore, the cases addressing great bodily injury are analogous to the issue presented here. The problem with Danielle’s argument is that Escobar did not attempt to set a minimum threshold for a great bodily injury finding. The Supreme Court merely cited a few decisions it felt were analogous and, therefore, supported its decision that the section 12022.7 sentence enhancement properly was imposed.
Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides that a consecutive three-year term of imprisonment must be imposed whenever a defendant “inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony .…” “Great bodily injury” is defined as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” (Id., subd. (f).)
In an effort to be thorough, we have reviewed several cases that address the question of the types of injuries that will, or will not, support a great bodily injury enhancement. In People v. Martinez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 727, the appellate court upheld a great bodily injury finding where the victim suffered a laceration to her hand that severed two tendons, resulting in a permanent reduction in the use of the hand. The same court reversed the enhancement for a second victim where that victim received a minor laceration that did not require any treatment. In People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, the appellate court upheld a great bodily injury enhancement where the victim was choked with a scarf to the point she nearly passed out, her eye started swelling and her nose started bleeding, she was struck on the head, producing a large bump, and she suffered momentary loss of consciousness and excruciating pain. In People v. Johnson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 598, the appellate court upheld the great bodily injury enhancement where the victim was hit in the face, suffering multiple contusions and a fractured jaw. In People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, the appellate court held that as a matter of law multiple fractures to the nasal bones constituted serious bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7. In People v. Harvey (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 823, the appellate court upheld a serious bodily injury enhancement where the defendant threw hot grease in the victim’s face, causing blistering second degree burns resulting in numerous hospital visits and discoloration and disfigurement for at least a month. The appellate court noted that the serious bodily injury finding did not require the injuries be permanent. (Id. at p. 827.)
One reason that courts look to section 12022.7 to aid in defining serious bodily injury may be that few cases discuss the necessary severity for an injury to be considered a serious bodily injury.
Danielle also cites People v. Nava (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490. We find Nava in apposite. Nava can be read only as stating that it is improper to instruct a jury that any bone fracture is a serious injury as a matter of law. We are not dealing here with a fracture, nor are jury instructions an issue.
Although this is a close call, our conclusion is compelled by the limited standard of review by which we are bound. We are not prepared to state that as a matter of law the type of injury suffered by Vanessa can never constitute serious bodily injury. There is undisputed evidence that Vanessa suffered diminished vision in her eye for at least two weeks. While the juvenile court could have concluded the injury was not serious within the meaning of section 243, a finding we would have upheld, this evidence also was sufficient to support the finding that the injury was serious within the meaning of the statute. We reject Danielle’s argument to the contrary.
I. Finding the Crime Was a Felony
Section 243, subdivision (d) provides that a battery resulting in serious bodily injury can be punished as either a misdemeanor (imprisonment in county jail for a period not exceeding one year), or a felony (imprisonment in state prison for two, three, or four years). The juvenile court was required to determine whether the crime in this case should be treated as either a felony or misdemeanor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702.) Danielle attempted to assist the juvenile court in this regard by making a motion to have the crime declared a misdemeanor. The juvenile court denied the motion and found the crime was a felony. Danielle argues the juvenile court erred in making this determination.
Danielle acknowledges that a juvenile court has discretion to determine whether a “wobbler” is a felony or a misdemeanor (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1209-1210), and that a juvenile court abuses its discretion only when its action falls outside the bounds of reason (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226). She argues the factors that a trial court sentencing an adult may consider and rules of court applicable to adult offenders should guide our analysis. We disagree.
First, Danielle’s analysis ignores the different goals and procedures between the two systems. “‘[I]t is important to keep in mind that the primary goal behind maintaining separate courts and procedures for adults and minors is to ensure that juvenile offenders who have not yet become hardened criminals receive treatment and rehabilitation. “The juvenile court system and the adult criminal courts serve fundamentally different goals. The punishment for serious crimes tried in the criminal courts is imprisonment, and ‘the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.’ [Citation.] … [¶] In contrast, the juvenile court system seeks not only to protect the public safety, but also the youthful offender.… [E]ven for the most serious offenders—those who will be committed to the [Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice]—‘community restoration, victim restoration, and offender training and treatment shall be substituted for retributive punishment and shall be directed toward the correction and rehabilitation of young persons who have committed public offenses.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1542.)
Second, established case law disagrees with Danielle’s argument. In re Jacob M. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1178 held the juvenile court was not required to state its reasons for concluding a crime should be a felony or misdemeanor, but instead was required only to make the requisite finding. (Id. at pp. 1180-1182.) It naturally follows that failure to consider certain factors cannot constitute an abuse of discretion if the juvenile court is not required to state any factors it found persuasive.
In this case, on the other hand, the juvenile court stated its reasons for finding the battery to be a felony.
“The only issue before me, really, is the issue of whether or not to make it a misdemeanor as requested by [defense counsel]. [¶] … [¶] Okay. I’m going to go ahead and accept the recommendation. It was really a close call, I’ll be perfectly blunt with [defense counsel]. I really seriously considered your request. [¶] The thing that weighed in her favor was the fact that she does appear to be doing her schooling --”
After interruption by defense counsel, the juvenile court continued.
“You don’t get to parse the fight as to who did what at the precise moment. This lady started it; she threw the yogurt, and everybody agrees with that. That is a provacative [sic] act, she splattered it all over [the victim] and [the victim] was cornered in the bathroom. I was pretty unhappy at the end of this trial and I said so, because I thought it was pretty cowardly, because you don’t grab a bunch of people and trap somebody in an enclosed space where they can’t get out and then start something like that and then claim it’s sort of like self-defense, oh, golly, because at that precise moment she grabbed my hair. It doesn’t work that way. [¶] You know, the thing that was going for her is she’s doing her school work. She’s behind somewhat in credits, but she’s passed her tests. She’s got a passing GPA, it’s not wonderful but at least it’s passing, and I credit that. [¶] The other thing I’m looking at is this is the first offense, although there was one previous prior referral, but nothing of this nature, so those are the things going in her favor. [¶] The things not going in her favor, frankly, are the facts of this [altercation], and I still think that that kind of action is simply unacceptable.”
We have no grounds for criticizing the juvenile court’s analysis, much less finding an abuse of discretion. The juvenile court considered relevant factors and reached a decision that clearly was not outside the bounds of reason. The issue is not what we would have done had we been conducting the disposition; the issue is whether the juvenile court acted so unreasonably that its decision constituted an abuse of discretion. In this case, the juvenile court’s decision was well thought out and reasonable. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.