In re Damiano D.

Full title: In re Damiano D. [1] In re Jo-Leigh D., In re Danea D.

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Feb 1, 2017

H14CP14011165A (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017)

Opinion

H14CP14011165A H14CP14011166A H14CP15011548A

02-01-2017

In re Damiano D. [1] In re Jo-Leigh D., In re Danea D.

Stephen F. Frazzini, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Stephen F. Frazzini, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

On April 7, 2016, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner) filed petitions under General Statutes § 17a-112 seeking to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Danea D. to the first two children named above. TPR petitions were also filed against the children's fathers, but one of them has since died and the parental rights of the other were terminated after he was defaulted on the petition for failing to appear. The mother appeared on the initial hearing date, was advised of her rights and appointed counsel, and she entered a denial to the allegations of the petition. A contested trial on the petition was held on three days in October and November of 2016, at which all parties appeared with counsel.² For the reasons discussed below, the TPR petitions are granted.

2 Prior to the commencement of trial, the court conducted the advisement and canvass of the mother mandated by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 794, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

For the third-named and youngest child, the matter pending is a motion for review of permanency plan (MRP) filed by the commissioner on September 16, 2016, to which the mother filed a timely objection. The MRP hearing occurred on November 16, 2016, after the conclusion that day of the TPR trial. For the reasons discussed below, the plan is approved.

During trial on the TPR petitions and for later consideration on the MRP, ³ the petitioner presented the following people as witnesses:

3 By agreement of the parties, the evidence presented on the TPR petitions regarding the two older children is also being considered for the MRP for the youngest child, but two additional pieces of evidence were also heard on the MRP--additional testimony from the DCF social worker, and the social study in support of the MRP dated September 4, 2016.

Dr. Stephanie Leite, Psy.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist who conducted court-ordered psychological evaluations of the mother, these three children, and the fathers of the two youngest children, and a court-ordered assessment of these parents' interactions with the children; ⁴ Albert Johnson, a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW) who has been providing the mother with a specialized form of therapy called " Eye Movement Desensitization Reprocessing" (EMDR), which Dr. Leite had recommended after the psychological evaluation and he described as " a type of treatment that is designed for victims of trauma" by helping them learn how to turn their emotional reactions to the trauma they had experienced into a more cognitive response;

Alison Sroka, a social worker employed by the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) who is currently assigned to the cases of these three children; and

Aneta Letniowska, a marriage and family therapist employed by Klingberg Outpatient Center who has been providing weekly therapy to the two children since May 2015.

4 The court recognizes that it is not bound by the testimony of any witness, or of any expert witness, and that it is the responsibility of the court here, as the trier of fact, to weigh and consider all the evidence and to determine how much credibility, if any, shall be assigned to the testimony of any witness. As this court has noted in other cases:

At the TPR trial, the court expressly advised the mother, before evidence had concluded, that no adverse inference would be drawn against her for not testifying, after which her attorney advised the court that the respondent was not offering any evidence on the petitions.

In addition, the petitioner offered various exhibits into evidence, including the TPR social study dated May 27, 2016; an addendum to the TPR social study dated August 11, 2016; another addendum to the TPR social study dated September 23, 2016; copies of the various specific steps ordered for the mother; excerpts from the Protection Order Registry showing several expired protective orders issued to protect the mother as well as one against her to protect Jo-Leigh's father; ⁵ copies of case incident reports from the Bristol Police Department dated December 13, 2010, ⁶ November 28, 2015, ⁷ and December 8, 2015; ⁸ a " Reunification Readiness Assessment" of the mother conducted by Wheeler Clinic in 2015; the written report dated February 10, 2016, prepared by Dr. Leite concerning the court-ordered psychological and interactional evaluations that she conducted; Dr. Leite's resume; and, for the MRP hearing only, the MRP social study.

5 This exhibit showed that protective orders were issued against Shawn D., who is the father of the mother's third child, Danea, to protect the mother on December 9, 2015; against Brandon C., who was Jo-Leigh's father, to protect the mother on November 13, 2007; May 19, 2008; August 29, 2008; January 5, 2009; and January 23, 2014. On January 5, 2009, a protective order was issued against the mother with Brandon C. as the protected person. Each protective order was issued in connection with the arrest of the person who was the subject of that order on family violence criminal charges.

6 The case incident report dated December 13, 2010, concerned an incident that had happened on July 24, 2010, at the mother's home when she was pregnant with Jo-Leigh. She told the police that Brandon C. was her boyfriend of five years and the father of her' unborn child, but did not live with her. She said he had showed up at her home intoxicated. She said she had allowed him into her home but then asked him to leave when he asked to hold seven-month-old Damiano, who was not his son. She told police that she had refused his request and he left, but returned 30 seconds later. She told him to leave, but he began kicking the storm door. When she opened the door, he entered the residence and again asked to hold Damiano. When she again refused and told him to leave, she told police that he struck her on the left side of her face with a brown leather " Timberland" boot, which he then took off and left there when he departed. Police observed redness to the left side of her face and ear and found a single Timberland boot at her home. They also saw damage to the housing authority storm door. They eventually met up with Brandon C. at his home, found a matching Timberland boot in a vehicle outside that home, and asked him if he had kicked the mother, to which he replied that " I may have accidentally hit her with the boot." The police report listed Damiano as a witness to the incident. Brandon C. was arrested on charges of assault on a pregnant female, breach of peace in the second degree, and criminal mischief in the third degree. See petitioner's exhibit 3.

7 The case incident report dated November 28, 2015, concerned an incident earlier that day. The police went to the mother's apartment, where she told them that she had a child in common with Shawn D., but that they had been separated for several months and that he did not live with her anymore. She said he had sent a text message to her saying he wanted to come to her house, and that after he arrived there, he " began to bang on the door, screaming at her to let him in." Eventually he began kicking the door, broke the door jam and dead bolt lock, and gained entry to the premises. She said he then began to strike her with closed fists on her head, neck, and chest while she was holding their child, 15-month-old Danea. She also said that he broke her mobile phone. Police officers observed injuries to the mother's neck and face. A neighbor reported to police that she had heard the mother yelling at someone to get out of the house and later saw her in the front yard crying and holding her child. The police report said that there was damage to the front door that was consistent with the mother's story and a table in the living room " which was flipped over and indicated there was an altercation in the house." The police report listed baby Danea, who was then only 14 months old, as a witness to the incident. It noted that an arrest warrant would be sought for Shawn D. for two counts of Home Invasion, risk of injury to a minor, assault in the third degree, breach of peace in the second degree, interfering with a police officer, and two count of criminal mischief in the second degree. See id.

8 The case incident report dated December 8, 2015, concerned the arrest that day of Shawn D. for the incident described in the previous footnote.

Before the TPR trial began, the court granted the petitioner's motion for judicial notice and in addition informed the parties that, pursuant to § 2-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, and with notice to the parties, the court would take judicial notice of the contents of the court files involving these two children and their sibling, with two exceptions: (i) factual assertions contained in pleadings, motions, or other documents filed by the parties would be taken as substantively true only if independent evidence thereof was introduced and found credible in this proceeding; and (ii) factual allegations contained in the affidavits filed on September 25, 2015, in support of an order of temporary custody for the mother's youngest child, Danea.

The court is not aware of proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of these children and has jurisdiction. As none of these children's parents has claimed native American heritage, the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act are not pertinent to these proceedings. The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence presented, and the information or materials judicially noticed according to the standards required by law. Uponsuch consideration, the court finds that the following facts were proven at trial by clear and convincing evidence.

I

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence showed that Ms. D. has a long history of mental health and substance abuse problems dating back to her early adolescence. Her mother also had a significant history of substance abuse and untreated mental illness, which directly affected Ms. D.'s early life. As a young child, she was exposed to rampant drug abuse on the part of numerous family members, including her mother, sister and brother, and many members of her paternal family died of drug abuse. There was extensive domestic violence between her parents, and her father also regularly beat her as well. Her mother would leave the home for days at a time to use drugs or come home only to sleep. When she was nine years old, her father broke her mother's jaw during an argument after Ms. D.'s mother returned from a many-day absence. Her mother then took the children with her to a shelter, and they hid from their father for three months. At some point, her mother was arrested and jailed for welfare fraud, and her father moved back into their home. Her mother returned to the home after release from incarceration, but her parents got divorced when she was in the fourth grade. She then lived with her mother and never saw her father again.

By the age of 12, Ms. D. was drinking, smoking marijuana and using prescription pills regularly, and her substance abuse led to conflict with her mother, who had stopped drinking or doing drugs after the divorce. Ms. D. was placed as a teen in various foster homes and residential treatment facilities because of her mental health and substance abuse problems and she also spent time in juvenile justice facilities " as an uncontrollable teen." Petitioner's exhibit 7, TPR social study dated May 27, 2016, p. 4. She did graduate from high school, however, and even attended one semester of college.

The domestic violence, substance abuse, and untreated mental illness to which Ms. D.'s parents exposed her have also characterized her own life as an adult. She has had three children, Damiano in 2009, Jo-Leigh in 2011, and Danea in 2014, and her relationships with all three fathers have been marked by substance abuse and domestic violence. As noted by Dr. Leite, " [b]eginning with her father, who beat her, continuing with three different boyfriends, Ms. [D.] has been battered by all of the men in her life. She has also spent very little time alone, moving from one man to another . . ." Petitioner's exhibit 6, Psychological Evaluation, p. 41. Damiano's father was the mother's drug dealer and regularly abused her sexually and physically. The mother told Dr. Leite that he would " [c]all me names and break me down . . ." Id., 31. Brandon C., Jo-Leigh's father, was arrested ten times for domestic violence against Ms. D. and incarcerated several times as a result. Both he and Shawn D., Danea's father, have physically beaten the mother while she was holding one of their children. Shawn D., like the mother, is a heroin addict and they often used drugs together or shared needles.

The substance abuse that began before Ms. D. was a teenager has continued throughout her adult life. She has regularly used marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, even coming inebriated to her meetings with Dr. Leite for the psychological evaluation. During the psychological evaluation, she admitted being a substance abuser. She has been in many treatment programs and facilities dating back to her teen years and had periods of sobriety, but never on a sustained basis.

The evidence introduced at trial showed that the mother's involvement with DCF as a parent began in 2010 because of the domestic violence and substance abuse in her life. DCF received a report then of the domestic violence incident with Brandon C. that is described above in footnote 6 on page 4 and learned that he had broken open the storm door to her apartment and kicked her on the face while she was holding seven-month-old Damiano. Brandon C. was arrested and incarcerated, and a protective order entered against him. She came to the department's attention again in October 2013, when DCF received a report that two-year-old Jo-Leigh was standing alone in the street without clothing, diapers, or adult supervision. Located by a housing authority official in her apartment, the mother said that she had been in the bathroom and the child must have opened the door and left her apartment. When DCF contacted the mother, the prior history of domestic violence was discussed and she told a DCF worker that she had been in domestic violence education training at Wheeler Clinic and had gained insight into how her children are affected by domestic violence, which she said she " would not let . . . happen again." ⁹

9 Testimony of Alison Sroka on October 17, 2016, recorded by FTR (" For The Record"), a software used by the court monitor that digitally records court proceedings and notes the hour, minute and second of each recorded statement) at 10:57:19 a.m. - 10:57:20 a.m.

Only three months later, however, in late December 2013, DCF received a report that Brandon C. was threatening to kill the mother, her two children, and himself. When she spoke to a DCF investigator, the mother admitted that her children had been witnessing domestic violence between the two adults. She also admitted that she had been using heroin and struggling with depression and anxiety, but she promised to seek help. DCF also learned that she was using drugs while caring for her children and sometimes left them with her sister for extended periods while she went out to use drugs. She agreed to place Damiano and Jo-Leigh with her sister, Randi, and the sister's boyfriend, Edward B., whom both children have known since their births. The department then referred her to Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse treatment, to Prudence Crandall for domestic violence assistance, and for an advanced behavioral health (ABH) evaluation to determine the level of care for mental health and substance abuse issues. As a result of the ABH evaluation, she was referred for substance abuse treatment at the Wheeler Life Line program and to the Women in Healing group. By mid-2014 those providers reported to DCF that she had completed successfully both. During this time period the mother also engaged in individual counseling at Wheeler Clinic.

On April 8, 2014, the commissioner filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129¹⁰ alleging that the two older children were neglected, within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b-120(6), by being denied proper care and attention and permitted to live under conditions injurious to their well-being.¹¹ For reasons not disclosed by the evidence, DCF had returned the children home to the mother a day earlier, and it referred the mother to the intensive family preservation program (IFP), which social worker Sroka described as follows at trial:

10 General Statutes § 46b-129 provides, in relevant part, as follows: " (a) [T]he Commissioner of Children and Families . . . may file with the Superior Court that has venue over such matter a verified petition plainly stating such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court as neglected, . . . within the meaning of section 46b-120 . . ."

11 General Statutes § 46b-120 provides, in relevant part, as follows: " (6) A child or youth may be found 'neglected' who, for reasons other than being impoverished, . . . (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth; . . ."

The intensive family preservation program is something the department puts in to help parents assist with re-assimilating to parenting. Usually it's to address behavioral issues that are going on in the home, help set up schedules, help develop disciplinary charts. It's really a support service for families. It's intensive . . . they're in there a couple of times a week.¹²

After she successfully completed IFP, DCF referred her for another intensive in-home program called Child First Program, which can last for a year.

12 FTR: 11/17/16, 12:05:11 p.m. - 12:05:33 p.m.

In July 2014, however, the mother admitted that she was again engaged in substance abuse, despite the fact that her providers had been reporting to DCF since January that she was sober. In July and August 2014, DCF offered to refer her to two treatment programs, a Women and Children's program and an inpatient treatment, both of which she refused. She told DCF that she would find services on her own. Instead, however, the mother continued to use drugs. When she gave birth to Danea two months prematurely on September 22, 2014, she told hospital staff that she had been using 20 to 30 bags of heroin a day. After learning that the mother had used heroin throughout her pregnancy with Danea, DCF sought and obtained orders of temporary custody (OTC) for Damiano and Jo-Leigh. These two children were placed with the maternal aunt after the OTCs, and are still there today.

Three days later, the department also sought and obtained an ex parte OTC for new baby Danea after another incident of domestic violence between Brandon C. and the mother in the presence of the baby. That OTC was vacated shortly afterward, however, after nolo contendere pleas by the mother and that child's father to allegations of neglect. Baby Danea was then adjudicated neglected and returned to her mother under an order of protective supervision. Soon after Danea had been born, the mother had agreed to enter Coventry House, a residential treatment program that allows mothers to live there with their children. At trial, DCF social worker Sroka described Coventry House as " a very encompassing program" that provides substance abuse and trauma treatment, and domestic violence, parenting and case management services. Danea joined her there in October 2014.

In March 2015, the mother was successfully discharged from Coventry House. While there, she had maintained her sobriety and participated in substance abuse treatment and Methadone maintenance at the Hartford Dispensary. She had also maintained her relationships with both Shawn D. and Brandon C., however, despite repeated statements of concerns to her about doing so by both her Coventry House clinician and department representatives. She was discharged in March 2015 with recommendations to continue Methadone maintenance, participate in more substance abuse treatment, and address her significant trauma history in individual therapy.

After a three-day trial on the neglect petitions, the two older children were adjudicated to be neglected on April 20, 2015, and committed to the commissioner. The court, Cohn, J.T.R., issued final specific steps for the mother, and they were provided to and signed by the mother that day. See petitioner's exhibit 1. For several months, it appeared that the mother was complying with the specific steps and the drug treatment discharge recommendations from Coventry House. She continued the Methadone program after discharge and participated and completed a six-week intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment program at the Bristol Counseling Center (BCC), attending three meetings a week there and providing random urine screens. BCC then stepped her down to a weekly outpatient Recovery Relapse Prevention group. By mid-August, the Methadone maintenance program regarded her as sufficiently sober and compliant with its program that she was allowed to start taking her doses home. On October 31, 2015, a BCC representative reported to the department that " she felt Ms. [D.] had been successfully addressing her substance abuse treatment and felt she was stable enough in her sobriety to begin addressing her trauma history." Petitioner's exhibit 7, at p. 14.

By end of April 2015, DCF believed it appropriate to assess the prospects for reunifying the mother with her two older children and referred her for a " Reunification Readiness Assessment" by Wheeler Clinic. That program provides supervised visitation and help with parenting skills and was intended to assess whether or not the family was ready to be reunified. After the assessment began, the mother told Wheeler Clinic staff that she had resumed her relationship with Brandon C. and wanted him to be part of the reunification assessment. Wheeler Clinic then began providing couples therapy to help them " address their domestic violence history and to support a healthy relationship to benefit the parenting of their children." Petitioner's exhibit 4, Reunification Readiness Assessment, p. 7.

The written report on the Reunification Assessment was introduced into evidence and contained many positive statements about the mother: she was engaged in substance abuse treatment; had " come back with negative tox reports"; was " engaged and interactive with all of her children, " was " interacting well with them during supervised visitations"; was " appropriate with boundaries, setting limits and parental expectations" of her children; was employed and had housing; " was receptive" to concerns; and " stated she would not be in a relationship with Mr. [C.] if it would risk her children's return." Id., 1-4. Yet, the report also commented that her " insight in engaging in relationship that has involved past domestic violence in an effort to keep her children safe and away from substance abuse and being a witness to domestic violence is in question." Id., 2. " Her inability to comprehend the significance of how their relationship [hers with Brandon C.] poses a threat to herself and her children is a concern . . . There is a significant history of domestic violence between [mother] and Mr. [C.] which has impacted the children and caused significant safety concerns within the family. Although client acknowledges these concerns verbally, it is speculated that she is unable to fully comprehend the overall risk this puts on herself and her children." Id., 4, 6. The report also noted that she " would benefit from ongoing treatment to address her past traumas, navigating healthy relationships with others and understanding the affects [sic] of continued relationships with unsafe and unhealthy individuals." Id., 3.

Initially, the Wheeler Readiness Assessment staff was prepared to recommend reunification, despite its concerns about the mother's ongoing relationship with Mr. C., perhaps because both of them had agreed to participate in the couples therapy. A notation dated September 9, 2015, stated that as the reunification process began, it would be necessary to " continue to assess the family's ability to sustain a safe environment for the children." Id., 7. The reunification process began to derail, however, at a " provider meeting" that month attended by DCF representatives, the Wheeler reunification staff, the children's therapist and the mother. At that meeting, the children's therapist

disclosed all the allegations of past domestic violence Damiano and Jo-Leigh . . . witnessed while residing with their mother, Mr. [C.] and Mr. Shawn [D.]. The disclosures were graphic and disturbing in their nature. [The therapist] also reported that the children's behaviors, during their sessions, decompensated when they were told they were going to reunify with their mother and that Mr. [C.] would be actively parenting them in the home.

Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 16.¹³ When presented with this information, the mother " simply minimized the children's trauma stating that [it] . . . was all old stuff. Ms. [D.] took no ownership of her part in exposing the children to substance abuse and domestic violence." Id. She did promise to end her relationship with Brandon C., however, if the providers " were so concerned" about it and said that she had no ongoing contact with Shawn D.

13 The Reunification Readiness Assessment report contains more detailed content about the therapist's report at that meeting: " Klingberg clinician reported the children have engaged in Trauma Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. Klingberg clinician reported that starting the end of August during sessions and reports from foster parents showed an increase in behaviors which clinician indicated may be due to triggers of past trauma. Clinician reported that in September sessions, client's eldest daughter displayed emotions such as hitting the glass window of the office, hitting the clinician and running out of the building towards the street. Clinic reported that client's daughter would dissociate during sessions and appeared to not connect at times with clinician. Klingberg clinician stated that she was completing a trauma narrative with the children and each drew several pictures of similar domestic violence incidents. Klingberg clinician reported that the children spoke about activities they wanted to engage in with client though would often change the subject when discussions began about father, Mr. [C.]." Petitioner's exhibit 4, p. 8.

Unfortunately, over the next two months domestic violence incidents occurred, both in the presence of baby Danea. The first incident was in mid-September with Brandon C., and shortly afterward DCF learned that, despite the mother's statements that she had ended her relationship with Shawn D. and would do so with Brandon C, both of them were living with her. Brandon C. and the mother had also stopped attending the couples therapy at Wheeler Clinic. Reunification efforts were then suspended. The second domestic violence incident occurred in late November, when Shawn D. assaulted the mother while she was holding Danea in an incident described more thoroughly in footnote 7 on page 4 above. This incident led to a second OTC for Danea in December 2015. DCF then referred the mother for Intimate Partners Violence (IPV) Treatment program through the Child Guidance Clinic, but she attended onlyone session, and that program was discontinued in April 2016 because the provider staff believed that the mother's mental health needs exceeded the program's ability to meet them.

In addition, after having been substance free (other than the Methadone) since entering Coventry House in September 2014, the mother told DCF in November 2015 that she had relapsed on drugs, which she continued to use until entering a detoxification program on January 16, 2016. She even skipped several visitations with the children because she told DCF that she " did not want her children to see her in such a bad state." ¹⁴ On December 17, 2015, the DCF social worker took her to the session for Dr. Leite to observe her interactions with the children, but the mother fell asleep during the car ride there and several times during actual interactional session with the children.¹⁵ Social worker Sroka also transported her to the interview with Dr. Leite on January 12, 2016, and that day " [s]he was very anxious, skittish, talking non-stop or she was very sleepy, nodding out, some slurred speech"; ¹⁶ and she admitted to Sroka afterward that she had used drugs the night before. She told Dr. Leite that she had been " doing a bundle of heroin and half an eight ball [of cocaine] a day" in the month before the evaluation. Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 38.

14 Testimony of Alison Sroka on November 17, 2016, recorded on FTR, 12:11:15 p.m. -- 12:11:29 p.m.

15 Dr. Leite reported that " [t]he interaction was marked by the disparity with the beginning of the interaction, when Ms. [D.] was very engaged with the children, and the end, when she was nodding off in a chair and they played amongst themselves." Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 40.

16 Id., FTR, October 17, 2016, 12:11:56 p.m. - 12:11:59 p.m.

After the January interview with Dr. Leite, the mother agreed to enter a detoxification program at ICRC in Hartford, where she stayed for approximately a month before going to an ICRC " recovery house" in Hartford for approximately two months while awaiting admission to ICRC's inpatient treatment program in Hartford. She was successfully discharged from the inpatient program after a three-month stay there on June 28, 2016. The original discharge plan was for her to attend a sober living facility in the Hartford or East Hartford area. Because Ms. D. does not have her own vehicle, DCF worked intensively with IRC and the mother's substance abuse counselor prior to the mother's discharge to arrange services and providers in that area so that she could continue in the treatment she had been receiving.

On June 16, the mother agreed to be placed for 90 days after discharge at the St. Elizabeth House, a residential program in Hartford for substance abuse clients, so that she could continue working on her sobriety, mental health treatment, and maintaining her employment at a warehouse in Windsor. Since there was a waiting list at St. Elizabeth House, ICRC recommended that she stay at the ICRC Recovery House after her discharge from inpatient treatment until there was a vacancy at St Elizabeth's. The mother said that she did not want to go back to the recovery house, however, because its requirement that new residents stay there for a week before going into the community would cause her to lose her job. Instead, on the date of her discharge, Ms. D. told DCF that she would stay at her mother's home in Southington. Without her own transportation, however, and there being no bus between Southington and Hartford, her decision to live in Southington made access or transportation difficult for getting to the Hartford-based providers that DCF and ICRC had arranged. Instead, she had to rely on friends or use a medicab. Within a few days, however, her stated justification for not returning to the Recovery House while waiting for St. Elizabeth's had vanished, since the mother told DCF on July 8 that she had quit her job in Windsor and was looking for work in the Southington area.

The evidence also shows that the mother has long-standing and deep-seated emotional and psychological problems dating back to the traumatic experiences of childhood. As a juvenile, she displayed behavioral problems both at school and in the community, leading to being expelled from high school for fighting at age 14. She was placed in numerous foster homes and residential facilities. She admitted to DCF that she has participated in a plethora of mental treatment for years, both inpatient and outpatient, for mental health needs that continue to impact her daily life. (For example, the inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment at the Bristol Counseling Center in 2015 also included mental health treatment, as did her work at the Wheeler Clinic.)

As the mother candidly admitted to Dr. Leite for the psychological evaluation, however, she has never trusted any of the clinicians with whom she has worked. Dr. Leite explained at trial that such trust, a willingness to be open to and vulnerable with a mental health clinician, " is necessary for therapeutic change." Transcript of testimony on October 18, 2016, at 19. Instead, the lesson that the mother has drawn from her childhood, when she was often left on her own by her mother and frequently beaten by her father, is that she has to take care of herself. She told Dr. Leite that she has felt that " I have been taking care of myself since I was 12 years old. Of course I have to be in control, it is all I have had to do since I was 12 years old." Petitioner's exhibit 6, at 32.

Yet, the mother acknowledges that her diagnosis of PTSD comes from " her father and ex-boyfriend beating her up, " and she told Dr. Leite that " she cannot stop thinking about the abuse and she cannot sleep because she has nightmares about it." Id. At trial, Dr. Leite credibly explained that the mother's history of early trauma significantly affected the mother's adult life, particularly in her choice of intimate partners. According to Dr. Leite, " early childhood onset of substance abuse is a big risk factor" in adult substance abuse. Transcript of testimony, p. 17. In addition, " when people use substances from an early age, they don't learn how to interact with other human beings in an adolescent or a young adult, or in an adult way. That developmental progression of interpersonal skills isn't learned as effectively, because it's masked behind substances, and the substance abuse can serve as a, a blocker or a coping mechanism, or a way of interacting with other people, or a way of not interacting with other people." Id. Thus, Dr. Leite explained, the mother's ability to develop healthy relationships or to determine whether a relationship is healthy was damaged by the early trauma and substance abuse. Her choice of violent adult partners has, in turn, been a trigger for her substance abuse. In the interview for her psychological evaluation with Dr. Leite, the mother admitted that " though drugs were the problem in the forefront, her main problem was men. She had been in programs where she worked on staying clean, but she needed to work on why she allows men to abused [sic] her and ruin her life." Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 37. Yet, while undergoing the substance abuse treatment in 2015 recounted above, she maintained her relationships with the violent fathers of her two youngest children; and while undergoing substance abuse treatment again last year, she was sexually intimate with and became pregnant by another man with a history of domestic violence.

II

ADJUDICATORY PHASE OF TPR PROCEEDING

In the adjudicatory phase of a proceeding under § 17a-112(j), the court must determine whether the Commissioner of Children and Families has proven by clear and convincing evidence both a statutory ground for termination of parental rights, and, except in certain instances not applicable here, that the department complied with its reasonable efforts obligations. See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998); In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775, 801, 127 A.3d 948 (2015).

Under Practice Book § 35a-7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, " the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights." See also In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008). " In the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003). There have been no amendments to the TPR petitions regarding the claims against the mother since the petitions were filed on April 7, 2016; and that day is therefore the adjudicatory date on the petitions seeking termination of her parental rights.

A

Reasonable Efforts Findings

In TPR proceedings brought under § 17a-112(j), the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the children with him or her, unless the court finds that the parent wasunable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.¹⁷ " When making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . ." In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 483, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013).

17 General Statutes § 17a-112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, . . ."

1. Reasonable Efforts to Locate

The evidence proved clearly and convincingly that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent mother, who was served with the TPR and underlying neglect petitions and has appeared and participated in both proceedings.

2. Reasonable Efforts to Reunify

Although requiring DCF to make " reasonable efforts" to reunify the child with the parent, the statute does not, as has been frequently observed, define either the term " reasonable" or the term " efforts." See, e.g., In re Eden F., 48 Conn.App. 290, 311, 710 A.2d 771 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 250 Conn. 674, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Absent any statutory definition, our courts have instead used the commonly understood meanings of both terms. Id., 311-12. As Judge Foley has aptly observed, " providing services to rehabilitate the deficient parent is the crucial ingredient to reasonable efforts." In re Jessica H., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session at Middletown, (April 20, 1998, Foley, J.); see also In re Destiny Q., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Child Protection Session at Middletown, Docket No. U06-CP98-002230-A, (November 19, 2001, Levin, J.) (" [r]eunification efforts generally consist of visitation and, where appropriate, other rehabilitative services such as, evaluations, testing, counseling, therapy, education, medical care, parenting classes and housing assistance").

Efforts to reunify a parent with a child should begin with identifying any barriers to the parent being willing or able to meet the child's needs and to provide the child with stable and competent care appropriate for the child's age and needs, identifying services or programs that are appropriate for addressing those barriers and helping the parent assume a responsible position in the child's life, informing the parent of the steps they need to take to get their child back, and then referring a parent to those services and programs while at the same time providing the parent ongoing visitation with the child to help maintain their relationship. Moreover, " [t]he reasonableness of the department's efforts must be assessed in the context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 182-83, 104 A.3d 805 (2014), aff'd, 319 Conn. 775, 127 A.3d 948 (2015).

The petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that, as of the adjudicatory date when the TPR petitions were filed, DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with these two children. The department had referred the mother to programs and services to address the substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health issues that had led to removal of her children, as well as providing visitation with the children to help her maintain her relationship with them. After Damiano and Jo-Leigh entered DCF custody on September 22, 2014, the department supported her decision to enter Coventry House and the aftercare recommendations for her to continue Methadone treatment, attend the intensive outpatient program, and then participate in the follow-up relapse prevention treatment at BCC. When it appeared that her efforts to address her substance abuse were producing success, DCF referred her for reunification assessment services through Wheeler Clinic. When the mother notified the Wheeler Clinic reunification reassessment team that she intended to resume her relationship with Brandon C., Wheeler Clinic then began providing couples counseling to them to address their history of domestic violence and help them have a health relationship. After the two domestic violence incidents in late 2015 halted reunification efforts, DCF referred her to the Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) at the Child Guidance Clinic. Upon her relapse on drugs in the late fall of 2015, DCF referred her for detox treatment at ICRC, and then for placement at the ICRC recovery house, the ICRC inpatient program, and the St. Elizabeth's residential treatment program. Throughout the time that the children have been in DCF custody, the department has also provided the mother with regular supervised visits with the children.

Since 2013, DCF has referred the mother to Wheeler Clinic several times for individual treatment to help her address her trauma history. After Dr. Leite recommended a specific form of therapy to help the mother address the underlying trauma¹⁸ that Dr. Leite concluded was a significant factor in the mother's continued drug use and repeating pattern of choosing abusivepartners, DCF referred her to a licensed clinical social worker who specializes in that type of therapy, which began weekly beginning on March 3, 2016.

18 Page 68 of the Dr. Leite's written psychological evaluation states as follows: " When Ms. [D.] goes into treatment, she should have trauma focused treatment such as eye movement desensitization." Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 68.

Under these circumstances, the evidence proved clearly and convincingly that as of the adjudicatory date DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate the mother and to reunify her with these two children by referring her for treatment and services to address her substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence issues that led to the children's removal from her custody, by also providing her with regular visitation with the children and, when she appeared to be benefitting from those services, by then seriously considering and assessing the prospects for reunification in 2015.

B

Statutory Grounds for Termination--Failure to Rehabilitate After Finding of Neglect and Provision of Specific Steps, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)

As statutory grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights to these two children, the TPR petitions allege, pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), ¹⁹ that the children have previously been found neglected or uncared for, that the mother was provided specific steps to facilitate return of the children to her custody, and that she has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of each child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. " Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). " [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is . . . whether [the parent] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 840, 724 A.2d 546 (1999). The crux of the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate is whether a parent has sufficiently addressed the problems and deficiencies in parenting that led to state intervention so that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child's life, or will be able to do so within a reasonable time in the future. " What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis, " depending on the age and needs of the particular child. In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Supp. 145, 154, 562 A.2d 79, aff'd, 19 Conn.App. 20, 560 A.2d 993 (1989).

19 General Statutes § 17a-112(j) provides, in relevant part, that " The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; . . ."

Subsection (B)(i) further requires proof that the child was previously found to have been neglected or uncared for. In In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 503, 78 A.3d 797 (2013), the court held that this subsection also requires proof that a parent had been issued an order of specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child in question to that parent. Both of these statutory elements were proven by clear and convincing evidence. As noted above, on April 20, 2015, both of these children were found to have been neglected. The court that day issued specific steps to the mother, as it had previously when OTCs were initially ordered ex parte a year earlier and then when those OTCs were sustained a few days later. Copies of the orders of specific steps ordered at these various times were introduced into evidence as petitioner's exhibit one.

1. The Ages and Needs of the Minor Children

The failure to rehabilitate ground for termination of parental rights requires the court to assess the rehabilitative status of a parent in relationship to the ages and needs of the particular children in question, who in this case are eight and almost six years old and have been in DCF custody since September 2014. The evidence shows that both of these children have been significantly affected by their neglect, the mother's substance abuse, and their exposure to the domestic violence between their mother and her adult partners.²⁰ Both children have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of their exposure to domestic violence.

20 The court has several sources for this finding--the testimony of their therapist, the testimony and report of Dr. Leite, who conducted psychological evaluations of both children, and also assessed their interactions with their mother, the testimony of DCF social worker Alison Sroka, and DCF social studies, and the records from the Wheeler Clinic Reunification Readiness team.

Both children have resided in the foster home of their aunt Randi, and her partner, whom the children refer to as " Uncle Eddie, " since the OTCs. The older child, Damiano, has been diagnosed with PTSD and ADHD, and is on medication for the latter. His PTSD symptoms include intrusive thoughts, trauma feelings, problems with impulsivity, hypervigilance and hyperactivity, and difficulty sitting still and keeping his body movements under control. He has been participating in therapy since May 2015 at Klingberg Family Centers. Based on the records provided by his clinician, Dr. Leite observed that, as of the date of the psychological evaluation, his progress in therapy initially " seems to have been slow"; petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 24; but, nine months later, his clinician told DCF that he was responding well to therapy. Psychological testing administered by Dr. Leite showed that overall he is " developmentally on target"; id., 28; but that his cognitive development was in the 32nd percentile, " which makes this a less strong area for him"; id., 27-28; and is consistent with the fact that he had to repeat kindergarten.

Damiano also feels like he needs to be the protector in the family and wants to take care of his mother and sister. Although only nine years old, he worries about his mother and has made statements several times about his fears for her. He has said, for example, that he wants to return home when he is 16 or 18 to care for his mother.²¹ As the oldest child in a household where he witnessed domestic violence and his mother and any father-figure in the home were often under the influence of drugs, he felt that he had responsibilities that properly belonged to the adults. When asked by Dr. Leite " what he would change about his family if he had a magic wand, he said, 'they stop fighting.'" Id., 27. Dr. Leite concluded that " [i]t is important he be in a place where he can feel secure, feel like a child, and grow in the self-centered manner he needs." Id., 28.

21 When asked what adoption means, for example, he has said " That means I can live with Uncle Eddie and Auntie Randi until I am 18." Petitioner's exhibit 9, Addendum to TPR social study dated September 23, 2016, p. 6. Then he wants to go home and take care of his mother. Id.

As a result of some of these problems, Damiano had to repeat kindergarten. In the fall of his second year in kindergarten, his teacher had reported that he had still made no progress academically because of " his inability to remain on task." Petitioner's exhibit 8, Addendum to TPR social study dated August 11, 2016, p. 5. In November 2015, he was then prescribed medication that made him feel better and helped to reduce his impulsivity and pay more attention in school. The August 2016 addendum to the TPR social study noted that after he started on the mediation his " academic success in school skyrocketed, and he was promoted to the first grade." Id.

In the two years that Damiano has been placed with his aunt Randi and uncle Eddie, he has settled down, is now doing well in school, and exhibits normal childhood desires, like playing sports in the community. The August 2016 addendum to the social study noted that " his behaviors have stabilized due in part to the safety and stability his relative foster home has provided him." Id., 5. A recent report from the foster mother, however, warrants some concern and shows his continuing need for safety, security, and stability, the September 23, 2016, addendum to the TPR social study stating that

since the beginning of September 2016, Damiano has been lying to his relatives more than usual . . . Damiano has been talking about living with his mother again, despite being told differently. [The foster mother] is concerned also with Damiano talking about his paternal relatives, specifically his brothers. Damiano has stated that when he grows up he wants to be in jail like his brothers.

Petitioner's exhibit 9, p. 5.

The younger child, Jo-Leigh has more challenging behaviors. She is very strong-willed and has long and severe temper tantrums, which can last up to an hour and include kicking and biting. These may occur at home or when she is visiting with her parents but usually not in school. The TPR social study reported that " [s]he is often angry and upset and is unable to tell the adults in her life why she is upset so she physically acts out." Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 22. In September 2015, while the reunification readiness assessment was occurring, her behaviors " began to escalate when she was told reunification was the plan for herself and her brother . . . Jo-Leigh struggled in her therapy sessions starting in September and would display unsafe behaviors such at attempting to shatter as [sic] glass windows with her fist, running out of sessions and running out of the building." Petitioner's exhibit 8, p. 6. During a short period when the mother was not visiting, however, the temper tantrums decreased, and Jo-Leigh had some very productive therapy sessions.

Like her brother, Jo-Leigh has been diagnosed with PTSD " as a result of ongoing exposure to trauma in her mother's home." Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 12. Her therapist says that her " tantrums are related to her trauma history, her fear of attachment, and her lack of verbal skills." Petitioner's exhibit 8, p. 6. The therapist has been working with her on expressing her feelings when she is angry instead of acting out in an angry manner, but explosive temper tantrums remain a problem although her aunt Randi is usually able to calm her down. She has said to her aunt that she is angry because " she feels as if her parents abandoned her like they would a pet they did not want." Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 22. After being told by her aunt that her mother is pregnant with a fourth child, Jo-Leigh gave the aunt a disgusted look and when asked how she felt said " Terrible, how do you think I feel." Petitioner's exhibit 9, p. 6. She has made progress in her therapy, however, and her therapist testified that she used to try to run out of the therapy room a lot, but is now able to tell the therapist when she is feeling that she needs more space and is able to accept the therapist's response without a temper tantrum. Overall, her " behaviors require a significant level of safety and structure in order to keep her safe." Id. Fortunately for Jo-Leigh, her therapist reports she believes that the foster parents are doing a good job with managing Jo-Leigh's behaviors.²² Petitioner's exhibit 8, p. 6.

22 An example of the foster parents' success in helping Jo-Leigh control her behaviors was contained in the August 8, 2016, addendum to the social study:

The developmental assessment conducted by Dr. Leite found Jo-Leigh to be in the average range for children her age, but with certain significant strengths and weaknesses. She displayed a very high and advanced score on her ability to engage in meaningful social interactions with others; a good ability to act in a developmentally appropriate manner; a " somewhat low" score on her ability to express her emotions, cope with aggression and teasing, and understand the difference between " males and females"; and " true weakness" in her cognitive skills (although Dr. Leite's testing did not determine whether her " general cognitive skills [were] . . . lagging behind because of lack of exposure to intellectual stimuli, or because of a deeper processing problem"). Petitioner's exhibit 6, pp. 20-23. Dr. Leite's conclusion about Jo-Leigh's cognitive abilities seemingly conflicts with the DCF social worker's assessment contained in the social study that Jo-Leigh has a large vocabulary for a child her age, but may be explained by Dr. Leite's statement that Jo-Leigh's " perky demeanor may mask problems learning and acquiring information." Id., 23.

The evidence was clear and persuasive that both of these children were traumatized by their years in their mother's home, but have benefitted significantly from their placement in the safe, secure, and stable home of their maternal aunt (and her partner, " Uncle Eddie"), with whom they have lived for much of the last three years. In view of the damage and trauma they suffered from their earlier exposure to domestic violence, parental neglect, and parental substance abuse in their mother's household and the ongoing but sometimes still slow progress in their recovery from that damage, their normal childhood needs for permanency and stability are now paramount; and delay in obtaining either is contrary to their best interest and well-being.

2. The Mother's Rehabilitative Status

The failure to rehabilitate ground for TPR requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent parent was not ready, as of the adjudicatory date and at the time of trial, to assume a responsible position in the child's life, in view of that child's age and needs, within a reasonable time. The evidence here meets that standard.

As of the adjudicatory date on April 7, 2016, the mother was still a resident at the ICRC inpatient substance abuse treatment program necessitated by her relapse on heroin between November 2015 and January 2016. She had experienced two recent domestic violence incidents in the fall of 2015. As of that point, it was completely uncertain and unforeseeable whether she would ever stop using drugs or extricate herself from violent interpersonal relationships, both of which are necessary for her to assume a responsible position in the lives of these two children.

By the time of the TPR trial in October and November of 2016, the mother had completed inpatient drug treatment, was participating regularly in suboxone treatment, had produced no toxicology screens for illegal drugs, was attending weekly relapse prevention groups, and was reporting regular attendance at AA meetings. The last TPR social study addendum filed by DCF, dated September 23, 2016, reported that " [t]here are no concerns with regards to Ms. [D.]'s participation with substance abuse treatment at this time." Petitioner's exhibit 9, p. 3.

In addition, since March 2016, she had been regularly attending the weekly EMDR therapy recommended by Dr. Leite and being provided by LCSW Albert Johnson. The purpose of that therapy is to eliminate the effects of her trauma on her daily functioning. Johnson explained at trial that its goals were to minimize and eliminate the triggers that bring on negative self-thoughts and to eliminate feelings of not being worthy, both of which, he said, had precipitated her drug use in the past. The evidence does show that the mother's trauma history, substance abuse history, and domestic violence history are all connected. For example, although she was sober for many months after entering Coventry House, during that same time she maintained her relationships with Brandon C. and Swawn D., despite the fact that both had physically abused her in the past. When there was renewed domestic violence in the fall of 2015, she relapsed on heroin. As Dr. Leite explained at trial, the mother's " core problem" is her " unprocessed trauma from her childhood, which then led to substance abuse." Transcript of testimony, p. 34. The mother not yet having successfully addressed the effects of her trauma history, her continued selection of violent partners was, as Dr. Leite explained, " re-traumatizing for her." Id. Her history shows that the trauma of renewed domestic violence would thus lead ineluctably to renewed substance abuse.

Treatment providers to whom the mother was referred in the past to address her continuing involvement in violent intimate relationships said that such treatment would first require her to address her trauma history. Mr. Johnson said at trial that, although he would talk to her about her choice in men and about issues of power and violence in her relationships, he was not providing domestic violence treatment, which he said should be provided by someone else. He testified that he had originally believed that the mother was not currently involved in any intimate relationships and under that assumption had also believed that " the trauma would be . . . the best place to start." FTR: 11/17/2016, 11:33:01 a.m. - 11:33:08 a.m. When he learned in the late summer of 2016 that she had been intimate with and become pregnant by a man she had met at one of her substance abuse treatment groups, however, he changed his mind and decided to refer her to Interval House for domestic violence services concurrent with his therapy.

The mother's choice of new intimate partner, however, repeats many of the decisions in her life that have led to her present straits and those of these two children. This man is someone with an extensive history of domestic violence. She has now become pregnant by him, and is expecting her fourth child with him. Just as she has tried in the past to conceal her involvement with other violent partners, she also tried to conceal her involvement with him from DCF and her therapist. When the DCF social worker asked the mother during a July 8, 2016, home visit how she had gotten a " hickey" on her neck that the social worker observed that day, Ms. D. told the social worker that it was none of her business. Her clinician also noticed a hickey on her neck, and when he asked her about it, she told him that she had " a friend, " but Johnson testified at trial that she " totally minimized who it was" and " flatly denied" him being a boyfriend. Id., 10:38:24 a.m. - 10:38:59 a.m. Johnson asked her if she knew anything about him, and the mother told him that, she did not inquire, see the importance of knowing such information, or believe she had the right to ask those questions about his history. Johnson testified at trial that, as of the date of his testimony, the mother still had not provided him with any information about this person other than that he was a " professional guy" who owned his own business and was stable, but nothing about any history of domestic violence.

In late August 2016, DCF also learned that the mother was pregnant with this man's child. After the mother had a visit with Damiano on August 20, he told his aunt Randi that his mother had told him she was pregnant but not to tell anyone. The foster mother reported this conversation to the DCF social worker, but the mother denied having any such conversation with Damiano when asked about it by social worker Sroka during a home visit five days later. The mother did admit being 5-6 weeks pregnant, however, told Sroka it was " an accident, " and asked if DCF wanted her to get an abortion. She denied having an ongoing relationship with the father of the unborn child. At social worker Sroka's home visit with the mother on October 6, 2016, the mother provided Sroka with his name and birth date. When Sroka asked her if she knew anything about his criminal or DCF history, the mother said she had no such information. Sroka has since learned that he has an extensive history of domestic violence and substance abuse and a pending TPR petition in this state for a son in DCF care.

It is thus evident that as of the time of trial the mother has not yet broken the pattern shown by her history of involvement with and pregnancy by men with histories of domestic violence. Her statements that she is not in an ongoing relationship with the father of her unborn fourth child cannot be trusted, for in the past she has repeatedly lied about and concealed ongoing relationships with abusive partners. Her lack of interest in whether the father of her unborn child has a history of domestic violence shows an unwillingness on her part to take the actions necessary to protect herself from ongoing domestic violence. Her chosen intimate partners in the past had been people who abused her, and a reasonable and prudent effort to avoid repeating such a choice would have included ascertaining whether new prospective intimate partners were likely to be violent to her. Her recent sobriety, her compliance with substance abuse treatment since her discharge from the inpatient ICRC program, and her EMDR therapy mean little for her " rehabilitative status" unless and until she also extricates herself from violent intimate relationships, which historically have disrupted seemingly successful treatment.

The evidence established that Damiano and Jo-Leigh suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and numerous behavioral symptoms in large part because of their repeated exposure to domestic violence while living with their mother. Until the mother ends her own cycle of choosing violent partners, treatment for her substance abuse or mental health issues, no matter how seemingly successful, provides no assurance about her willingness or ability to prevent or protect her children from being further exposed to domestic violence and the trauma they themselves suffer as a result. As recently as last July, moreover, Ms. D. told social worker Sroka that the children's behavioral issues and mental health needs were the result of their not living with her. This statement exhibits a complete lack of understanding and acknowledgment of the damaging effect on these children of their having been exposed to domestic violence, despite the fact that such impact has been repeatedly explained to the mother by the DCF social worker, her clinician, and probably many others.

After two years in a stable home with their aunt, the children's emotional and behavioral issues have improved, though for Jo-Leigh they still remain substantial, and, as mentioned above, there have been some worrying signs about Damiano recently. Their mother, on the other hand, cannot now offer them the safety, security, and stability that they need. During periods when their mother has not been visiting, their behaviors tend to stabilize and improve. Her statement to DCF and Mr. Johnson that she does not intend to have a relationship with the father of her unborn child does not provide any reassurance that she can or will accomplish that end. While undergoing the reunification readiness assessment in 2015, for example, she told Wheeler Clinic that she would not resume a relationship with Brandon C. if that would jeopardize the children's return to her custody, but in fact she resumed her relationship not only with him but with another abusive partner, Shawn D.

Dr. Leite explained at trial that the mother's statement that she has always had " to take care of herself" reflects an attitude that makes it difficult for her to trust her therapists or to benefit from therapy or other services. That statement by the mother, however, also contradicts her own recurring decision to live and have intimate relationships with abusive partners. Dr. Leite testified that to end the cycle of violent partners, the mother needs " to learn to stand on her, to be self-reliant." Transcript of testimony, p. 17. Since the partners she has chosen and the violence she experienced with those partners have been a trigger to her substance abuse, Dr. Leite opined that the mother needs to learn to live on her own:

Ms. [D.] has a solid base of child care knowledge. She knows how to care for her children and what they need to succeed. The reason she has lost the children is because of her chronic drugs use and her attraction to men who are violent. At this time, the data indicates she is still heavily addicted to heroin and does not have the internal relationship blueprint to determine what is or is not a healthy relationship. More importantly, when following her heart, she could be induced to use more heavily. The only way she will be ready to parent is if she is sober and self-reliant.

Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 67.²³

23 At trial, Dr. Leite was asked on direct examination to explain this conclusion:

As Dr. Leite testified, " recovery from heroin is a very difficult and long road." Transcript of testimony, p. 49. The mother's own history shows just how hard--she had a period of sobriety for 14 months, from the time she entered Coventry House in September 2014 until approximately November 2015, before her most recent known relapse. The evidence does not disclose whether the domestic violence or drug relapse in November 2015 occurred first, but the recurrence of both in the same month confirms their interrelationship for Ms. D. At the time of trial in October and November 2016, the mother had again been sober for a period of time, but for less time than before her last relapse, and the numerous programs and services in which she has recently participated and her current sobriety do show a desire on her part to overcome her drug habit. As of the end of trial, however, she was still choosing intimate partners with abusive histories and thereby subjecting herself to further risk of such abuse and a new relapse.²⁴

24 Dr. Leite testified at trial that " the core feature of her personalty functioning is her trauma history and of her re-traumatization." Transcript of testimony, p. 40. She then explained that One of the--one of the hallmarks of trauma, especially this sort of interpersonal and relationally-based trauma is that it tends to repeat. People, who have experienced this--for example, Mrs. [D]--then choose to place themselves in situations over and over and over again, which are re-traumatizing in which there are aspects of that original trauma in their current and ongoing relationships. So, for example, being in an abusive relationship with a father, and then choosing partners who are abusive, that is an echo of the original trauma, which is then re-traumatizing for the individual. Id., 41.

The court thus finds it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date and the time of trial the mother had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of each child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of either child. This adjudicatory ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

III

DISPOSITIONAL PHASE OF TPR PROCEEDING

Having concluded that clear and convincing evidence proved a statutory ground for termination of the mother's parental rights to Damiano and Jo-Leigh, the court must next proceed to the dispositional phase, in which " there must be a showing by clear and convincing evidence whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citations omitted.) In Re Brian T., 134 Conn.App. 1, 11, 38 A.3d 114 (2012). On disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.

A

Statutory Factors

In making the dispositional decision in a nonconsensual TPR proceeding, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors specified in General Statutes § 17a-112(k).²⁵ See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 362, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). " The . . . factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered . . . There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.' (Citation omitted.) In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regardto the Commissioner's petitions to terminate the mother's parental rights to these two children, and the court has considered these findings in determining that terminating her parental rights is in the children's best interests.

25 General Statutes § 17a-112 provides in pertinent part as follows: " (k) Except in the case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."

1. The Timeliness, Nature and Extent of Services Offered, Provided and Made Available to the Parent and the Child by an Agency to Facilitate the Reunion of the Child With the Parent--§ 17a-112(k)(1)

The department offered timely and appropriate services to the mother and children to facilitate her reunion with them, as more fully described elsewhere in this decision.

2. Whether DCF Has Made Reasonable Efforts to Reunite the Family Pursuant to the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as Amended--§ 17a-112(k)(2)

As is more fully explained above and in the discussion of the specific steps below, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family as required by federal law by offering the mother referrals to programs and services reasonably tailored to help her address her history of substance abuse, untreated mental illness and domestic violence, by referring the children to mental health clinicians to help them address the trauma they had experienced while simultaneously placing them in a safe and stable relative foster home, and by offering the mother reasonable visitation with the children.

3. The Terms of Any Applicable Court Order Entered Into and Agreed Upon by Any Individual or Agency and the Parent, and the Extent to Which All Parties Have Fulfilled Their Obligations Under Such Order--§ 17a-112(k)(3)

The following specific steps were ordered on April 20, 2015, and agreed to by the mother that day, to facilitate the return of Damiano and Jo-Leigh to the mother's care and custody:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. No evidence offered.

Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem . No evidence offered.

Keep whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and child's attorney . There was no evidence that mother did not comply.

Take part in counseling to and make progress toward the identified treatment goals:

Practice safe and nurturing parenting . Since the children have not been returned to her, the mother did not have significant opportunities to show whether she has achieved this goal. In visitations, she is usually appropriate when not under the influence of drugs, but, unlike the foster parents, whom the children's clinician concludes can successfully manage and defuse Jo-Leigh's temper tantrums, the mother " struggles with addressing these tantrums and often needs the assistance of whoever is supervising the visits." Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 17. In addition, there have been at least two recent instances when the mother did not act in a nurturing manner toward the children and exercised poor judgment during a parenting session. The first was telling Damiano not to tell anyone that she was pregnant because DCF would take her new baby if it found out. Dr. Leite explained at trial that such a statement encouraged Damiano's parentification, his acting as a parental caretaker when instead he needs to feel like a child; asking a young child to keep such a secret also discourages efforts to free him from the cycle of abuse.²⁶ The second was her invitation to Damiano at a September 2016 visit for him to sleep over with her and a friend at a local hotel. Damiano got very excited about that invitation, begged to be able to go, and began packing after returning to his aunt's home. Then, neither the mother nor the friend showed up to take him for the sleep-over or called to tell him they were not coming. Damiano had waited by the door to be picked up, and the September 23, 2016, addendum to the TPR social study comments, credibly, that he was " devastated" when his aunt told him there would be no sleep-over. Petitioner's exhibit 9, p. 4. In addition, that both of these incidents had the potential to undermine Damiano's sense of security and stability in his foster home by allying Damiano with his mother and against his aunt and DCF--the first by asking him to have a secret with his mother that he would not share with his aunt or DCF, the second by requiring his aunt to deliver the " devastating" news to Damiano that he would not be able to spend the night with his mother.

Participate in substance abuse treatment to gain insight into what her triggers are and how her substance abuse has impacted her children . The mother has participated in extensive substance abuse treatment, and she can verbalize that her history of trauma and abuse from her intimate partners is a trigger for her drug use, but she has shown no recognition of how substance abuse affected her children.

26 The following question and answer occurred during direct examination of Dr. Leite:

Maintain sobriety . Mother complied for 14 months, then relapsed, and has complied since January 2016.

Gain insight into how domestic violence impacted the children's lives: Mother has not gained this insight.

Cooperate with recommended service providers: Bristol Counseling, Hartford Dispensary, Wheeler Clinic (for children's therapy); Wheeler Clinic (for family reunification assessment and family therapy time); IFP services (with either Klingberg or Wheeler Clinic) . As more thoroughly discussed above, the mother cooperated with service providers, to the extent that she attended the various services to which she was referred; but she did not cooperate, in the sense that she relapsed and has continued to participate in intimate partner relationships that expose her to the risk of domestic violence.

Submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations; submit to random drug testing; do not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine . Mother was compliant with this provision except for the period when she relapsed between November 2015 and January 2016.

Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with the providers and your child's attorney to review your child's records . No evidence of noncompliance.

Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations . The mother attended her two sessions with Dr. Leite for the psychological evaluation while under the influence of heroin.

Get and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income . The mother has only partially complied with this requirement. She does not have her own housing and lives with her mother. Dr. Leite expressed two concerns about the mother living with her mother. The first was " living with someone who was of one of the perpetrators" of the earlier trauma could interfere with her ability " to process that trauma." Transcript of testimony, p. 16. On the other hand, LCSW Johnson, who is the clinician currently treating the mother for that trauma, testified that he had no concerns about Ms. D. living with her mother, as she had " found peace with her mother and being around her mother. She felt like she was the one supportive adult she could be around." ²⁷ Dr. Leite's second concern about this decision was one that the court finds to have more merit: " it would be important for Mrs. [D.] to learn to stand on her, to be self-reliant, and living with her maternal grandmother would not be an example of being on her own or self-reliant." Transcript of testimony, p. 16-17. On balance, the court concludes that the mother's decision to live with her mother may not directly interfere with her ability to address her trauma but nonetheless be a stumbling block toward becoming self-reliant and thereby developing the tools to avoid entanglement with abusive partners. The mother has applied for housing subsidy programs. She had a job for a while but the evidence does not show whether she has maintained employment.

27 FTR, October 17, 2016, 10:37:41 a.m. - 10:37:47 a.m.

Identify changes in household composition . No evidence of noncompliance.

Take care of children's various needs and make all necessary child care arrangements: Not applicable since the children were never returned to her care.

No involvement in the criminal justice system. Comply with probation or parole . Mother has complied with this requirement.

Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits . Mother did not comply. There was one period of several months while she was in relapse that she did not visit the children.

Supply names and addresses of grandparents and of persons the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement resource . No evidence of noncompliance.

4. The Feelings and Emotional Ties of the Child With Respect to His Parents, Any Guardian of His Person and Any Person Who Has Exercised Physical Care, Custody or Control of the Child for at Least One Year and With Whom the Child Has Developed Significant Emotional Ties--§ 17a-112(k)(4)

The children enjoy and look forward to their visits with their mother. During the period when she stopped visiting with them during her relapse year, however, they initially asked about her but then stopped doing so. They still have strong feelings for her, Damiano in particular, who feels very protective of her and that he needs to take care of her. Both children have said, however, that they do not feel safe with her. Damiano and Jo-Leigh also had a loving and bonded relationship with Brandon C. until his demise. Damiano and Jo-Leigh are very bonded with their maternal aunt, Randi and her partner, " uncle Eddie, " who cared for them for several months by family arrangement before the OTCs and have been their foster parents since the OTCs. They feel comfortable and safe and have positive interactions with the foster parents.

5. The Age of the Child--§ 17a-112(k)(5)

Damiano was born on December 5, 2009, and has just turned seven years old. Jo-Leigh was born on March 16, 2011, is now four years old, and is two months short of being five years old.

6. The Efforts the Parent Has Made to Adjust His Circumstances, Conduct, or Conditions to Make it in the Best Interest of the Child to Return Him to His Home in the Foreseeable Future, Including, But Not Limited to, (A) The Extent to Which the Parent Has Maintained Contact With the Child as Part of an Effort to Reunite the Child With the Parent, Provided the Court May Give Weight to Incidental Visitations, Communications or Contributions and (B) The Maintenance of Regular Contact or Communication With the Guardian or Other Custodian of the Child--§ 17a-112(k)(6)

Except for the period of her relapse, which lasted for approximately three months, the mother generally maintained regular visitation with the children. There was also a period last year, however, when DCF briefly stopped visitations because the mother had brought an unapproved visitor to the visits, which were then occurring in the community and being supervised by an agency. DCF reasonably decided to bring visits back to an agency location with supervision by DCF employees.

The mother's relapse on drugs from November 2015 through January 2016, her continued involvement with Brandon C. and Shawn D. before that relapse that led to the resumption of physical violence against her by each of them, and her decision last year to be sexually intimate with another man with a history of domestic violence all show that she had not yet, as of the end of the TPR trial, sufficiently adjusted her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of either of these children to return to her home now or in the foreseeable future.

7. The Extent to Which a Parent Has Been Prevented From Maintaining a Meaningful Relationship With the Child by the Unreasonable Act or Conduct of the Other Parent of the Child, or the Unreasonable Act of Any Other Person or by the Economic Circumstances of the Parent--§ 17a-112(k)(7)

The acts of domestic violence at the end of 2015 by Brandon C. and Shawn D. played a significant part in halting reunification then being considered, and were, by their very nature, " unreasonable" acts or conduct. The mother's financial straits have prevented her from obtaining her own apartment or vehicle, both of which would have been assets in her hopes of regaining custody and a more meaningful custodial relationship with her children, but her economic circumstances have not been the reason limiting her relationships with her children, which instead been limited primarily by the impact of her untreated mental illness, her longtime substance abuse, and ongoing domestic violence with her male partners.

B

Best Interest of the Children

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find " by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child . . ." The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare. In determining that terminating the respondent parents' parental rights is in the best interest of these two children, the court has considered various factors, including their interests " in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [their] environment"; Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); each one's age and needs; the length and nature of their stay in foster care; the contact and lack thereof that each one has had with the father and mother; the potential benefit or detriment of their retaining a connection with their biological parents; their genetic bond to each birth parent; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999); and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon. The court has also balanced each child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with the biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity), abrogated on other grounds by Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).

In consideration of all these factors and after weighing all of the evidence, the court finds that clear and convincing evidence established that it is in the best interests of both of these children to terminate the parental rights of their mother. The mother is not ready to assume a responsible position in the lives of these children either now or in the reasonable future, and both children need permanency and stability now. Meeting those needs now is in each of their best interest.

The interaction that Dr. Leite observed between the mother and her children is probably a paradigm for the history of her relationship with them. As Dr. Leite commented, she " has a solid base of child care knowledge" and " knows how to care for her children and what they need to succeed." Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 67. When they entered the visiting room where the interaction occurred, " they clung to and talked to their mother." Id., 40. During the interaction, " they turned to her for help" and Dr. Leite observed that she " spread her attention between the three of them easily." Id. She was initially " very engaged with the children, " but then the effects of her drug habit took over and she fell asleep. Although the TPR social study does not mention the mother attending visitations while under the influence of drugs, it does comment that the mother's interactions with the children " vary from week to week, depending on her mood, " just as her interactions with them varied during the interactional session depending on her alertness:

Ms. [D.] is able to engage with her children when she is in a good space. She will play with the children and is able to set limits with the children when needed. Other times Ms. D. can be moody and struggle when her children refuse to listen to her.

Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 17. These children have probably had times with their mother where she was very engaged with and supportive of them. As often as she has used drugs while caring for them, however, there have probably been other times when they have had to fend for themselves, as they would have had to do during the interactional session after their mother nodded off if Dr. Leite had not been there.

What the court finds extremely significant about the children's relationship with their mother, however, is the comment of the DCF social study that they do not feel safe with her. Neither the study nor the testimony of its author, DCF social worker Sroka, explained the origin of this remark, but it is credible and understandable. Damiano lived with his mother for a little more than half his life and Jo-Leigh for a little less than half her life. During that time there was domestic violence and drug abuse in their home. They have lived the other portion of their life with their aunt and uncle without exposure to domestic violence and drug abuse. Both children, tellingly, say that they feel safe with their aunt Randi and uncle Ed. Children of these ages should not feel unsafe. Their safety should be assumed, unquestioned, and without need of comment. These children need to feel that they are safe, and they also do not need to feel that they are responsible for the safety of others.

Although the mother and foster mother are siblings, their relationship has become fractured over the course of the two children's time in foster care with their aunt. Recently DCF had encouraged the mother and sister to participate in family therapy, which could have had the benefit, if the mother's parental rights were terminated and the sister became the children's adoptive mother, of potentially allowing continuation of ongoing contact between these two children and the respondent mother. In view of the children's close bond with their mother, such ongoing contact could have softened the impact of her losing her legal rights. Disparaging and derogatory remarks that the mother recently made on social media about the sister's ability to care for the children, however, have chilled the sister's willingness, at least as of the end of evidence, to participate in family therapy with the mother.

In view of the children's affection for and bond with their mother, permanent severance of their contact with her will probably be difficult for them, but the court finds credible Dr. Leite's conclusion that the " long-term gains . . . outweigh that potential loss and the formation of the--the solidification of the currently existing bonds with the permanency caretakers would be the thing that would enable them to understand that loss." Transcript of testimony, p. 59. " If they are able to development [sic] a strong-attachment bond within a permanent situation, when they grow up, they will understand how to make friends, how to pick partners, how to engage in a romantic relationship in a healthy non-abusive manner. It also means that they have a decreased chance of the negatives like the depression, the anxiety, and the substance abuse in their future . . . [T]he permanency would afford them the ability to recuperate from the traumas, which they have experienced, through the formation of the strong bond with a solid, present caretaker. So instead of repeating the cycle of abuse and ruptured relational trauma over and over again, it helps to stop that cycle." Id., 60.

These children's mother fell asleep on them during a meeting when a psychologist was assessing her fitness to maintain her parental role. The relapse that led to her nodding off that day had occurred after sobriety for 14 months. At trial's end, a little less than a year from that day, the mother has again had a period of apparent²⁸ sobriety, but for a shorter period. These children need a parent who will not fall asleep when she is caring for them, someone who can be counted on to provide them with continuing safety, security, and stability. In view of their serious emotional and behavioral needs, they need that person now, and cannot wait any longer. Their mother cannot provide a reasonable assurance that she is now, or will be within a reasonable time, such a person. On the facts proven here, only a termination of her parentalrights can secure their interests in permanency and stability, and is found by clear and convincing evidence to be in their best interests.

28 Although there have been no recent reports of continued marijuana, cocaine, or heroin usage, the mother did have two drugs tests in 2016 that showed the presence of prescribed medications. She had not told the practitioners who prescribed those medications that she was in treatment for drug addiction. While perhaps not counting as a relapse, her use of prescription drugs without full disclosure was, as Dr. Leite testified, a serious lapse of judgment and not in full compliance with the terms of her treatment. See transcript of testimony, pp. 48-49.

IV

ORDERS ON TPR PETITIONS

The court having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of the respondent's mother's parental rights to Damiano and Jo-Leigh and having further determined and found by clear and convincing evidence, upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in each of these two children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother, it is therefore HEREBY ORDERED:

The parental rights of Danea D. to Damiano and Jo-Leigh are hereby terminated. Since the biological father of Jo-Leigh is deceased and the parental rights of Damiano's biological father were previously terminated, the Commissioner of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for both children pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(m) so that they may be placed for adoption. In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parents.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o) and Practice Book § 35a-14(g), the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan, the permanency plan, and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain on or before March 1, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. and every three months thereafter on implementation of the plan.

V

PERMANENCY PLAN FOR DANEA

The department's motion for approval of permanency plan before the court was filed on September 16, 2016. The plan proposed by the department is for termination of the parental rights of the mother and father and adoption. The mother filed a timely objection, necessitating an evidentiary hearing. The motion is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129(k)²⁹ and Practice Book § 35a-14.³⁰ Under each provision, the commissioner has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the proposed permanency plan in the best interests of the child or youth. The plan was approved for the father on the day of the MRP hearing. As discussed herein, the proposed permanency plan is found to be in the child's best interest and approved.

29 General Statutes § 46b-129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (k)(1) . . . The commissioner shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child or youth . . . (2) At a permanency hearing held in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child or youth and takes into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan."

30 Practice Book § 35a-14 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (d) Whether to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made are dispositional questions, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the child or youth to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. The commissioner of the department of children and families shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child or youth and that it has made reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan. (e) At each hearing on a motion for review of permanency plan, the judicial authority shall review the status of the child, the progress being made to implement the permanency plan, determine a timetable for attaining the permanency plan, determine the services to be provided to the parent if the court approves a permanency plan of reunification and the timetable for such services, and determine whether the commissioner of the department of children and families has made reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing permanency plan. The judicial authority shall also determine whether the proposed goal of the permanency plan as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2) is in the best interests of the child or youth by a fair preponderance of the evidence, taking into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan. If a permanency plan is not approved by the judicial authority, it shall order the filing of a revised plan and set a hearing to review said revised plan within sixty days."

Under the statute, " [a]t a permanency hearing held in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child or youth and takes into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2). The practice book makes clear that a permanency plan is a dispositional issue:

Whether to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made are dispositional questions, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the child or youth to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. The commissioner of the department of children and families shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child or youth and that it has made reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan.

Practice Book § 35a-14(d). Under both the statute and practice book, the department has the burden of proof. See § 46b-129(k)(1)(A).

Danea had just turned two years old at the time of the MRP hearing. The psychological evaluation of her and of her interactions with her father and mother conducted by Dr. Leite in December 2015 and January 2016, when the child was approximately fifteen months old, had been introduced into evidence as part of the TPR proceeding; but, as noted above, by agreement of the parties, the written evaluation report and Dr. Leite's testimony were also considered as evidence on the MRP. As Dr. Leite noted in the written evaluation, Danea " was born early, so her true developmental age is lower than her actual age. In addition, she may have been in an environment with less stimulation, when her mother was pre-occupied with substance use." Petitioner's exhibit 6, p. 17. In Dr. Leite's assessment, she " demonstrated poorer communication skills than would be developmentally appropriate and much lower cognitive skills than would be seen as usual." Id., 18. At the time of the psychological evaluation, she had been in her mother's custody for much of her short life. An OTC had removed her from the mother for a short period after her premature birth, but she was then returned to her mother between October 2014 and December 2015, when she was again removed from parental care on the second OTC. By the time of the MRP hearing, she had been in foster care in the same household as her two older siblings for approximately eleven months.

As of the time of the MRP hearing, the mother was not ready to assume care for Danea now or in the reasonable future. The mother is still in the early stages of substance abuse recovery, and until she has extricated herself from involvement with abusive intimate partners that recovery is uncertain, as was demonstrated by her relapse in late 2015 during a much longer period of sobriety. The evidence proved that as of the time of the MRP hearing a permanency plan for termination of parental rights and adoption is in this young child's best interest. On the date of the hearing, the court found that the department had made reasonable efforts to achieve this plan. The plan is therefore approved. The clerk shall establish dates for the department to file the next permanency plan and for hearing on that plan and notify the parties thereof.

In evaluating and weighing expert testimony, the trier of fact is never bound by the opinions and conclusions of the expert merely because of that individual's background, experience or expertise. In Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 789 A.2d 1104 (2002), for example, the Appellate Court expressly upheld the trial court's decision to reject the recommendations of the guardian ad litem and court-appointed psychologist: " a trial court is not bound to accept the expert opinion of a family relations officer . . . [and] is free to rely on whatever parts of an expert's opinion the court finds probative and helpful." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 190, citing Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 281, 440 A.2d 899 (1981). " It is in the sole province of the trier of fact to evaluate expert testimony, to assess its credibility, and to assign it a proper weight." State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 706, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 1017, 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988). " It is the quintessential function of the finder of fact to reject or accept evidence and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert." (Citation omitted.) Tartaglino v. Dept. of Correction, 55 Conn.App. 190, 195, 737 A.2d 993, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). Ultimately, the court is responsible for sifting through and evaluating all the evidence and then rendering its own findings and conclusions. In the present case, with such a stark contrast between the conclusions and opinions of the different experts, it is the court's role to decide which, if any, of those opinions and conclusions to adopt or reject.

In Re Matthew M., Superior Court for juvenile matters at New Britain, Docket No. F04-CP-11-009363-A, (August 12, 2013, Frazzini, J.). After thoroughly considering and weighing all of the evidence in this particular case and the arguments of the parties, the court finds the report, testimony, and conclusions of Dr. Leite about the mother, the children, and their fathers to be insightful, valuable, and credible. Her report, testimony, and conclusions are consistent with the other evidence provided about the mother and the children and help explain how the mother's background and history have affected her adult life, her child rearing practices, and her relationships with men. Her testimony and reports provide a credible explanation for the mother's recurring substance abuse, the relapses, and her repeated choices of violent intimate partners. Her assessment of the children and their needs is consistent with the other evidence about the children, helps explain why the children have had such emotional and behavioral problems, and elucidates the court's findings about the children's best interests. The court thus finds Dr. Leite's observations, conclusions, and opinions referred to herein to be reliable, credible and proven to be true.

Her current therapist, Ms. Letniowska reported on 08/02/16 that . . . she has experienced Jo-Leigh's temper tantrums during sessions and that she has been unable to control Jo-Leigh without the help of her uncle, Mr. Eddie [B.] Ms. Letniowska reported Mr. [B.] is able to identify when Jo-Leigh's behaviors are escalating and he is able to calm her at times before she gets upset. He is also able to keep Jo-Leigh safe during her temper tantrums. Ms. Letniowska reported that's she feels Mr. [B.] is consistent with his discipline of Jo-Leigh and that this helps Jo-Leigh feel safe when she cannot keep herself safe.

Petitioner's exhibit 8, p. 6.

Q. Okay. Now throughout your evaluation, you opine regarding the importance of Ms. [D.] becoming, quote, self-reliant, and at other times you've used the language " independent." Can you explain why that is so important? A. It's important on a couple levels: One is that, as she identified, it is often her choice of partner which leads--is a trigger for substance use. So, as far as her sobriety goes, it is important for that. As far as her growth as a human being, and her ability to stand on her own is important, because she must be able to take care of herself in order to also then expand the circle and take care of her children. Q. Okay. But many people raise children with a partner. So I'm trying to understand why it's important for Ms. [D.] to, to exercise or demonstrate self-reliance and independence. A. One facet of that is, what I discussed earlier, in the fact that she didn't develop that sense of an independent person with agency when she was adolescent. So she needs to do that work now, when she is working in a stronger way toward sobriety. And the other facet is that she has a historical and consistent and continuing poor ability to choose the people with whom she lives . . . So there--it's just a long, long timeline of poor partner choices; so for her, it seems to be better to be by herself.

Transcript of testimony, p. 37-38.

Q. What concerns, if any, do you have with respect to Damiano's report that Ms. [D.] told him she was pregnant during the August 20th visit and asked him to keep it a secret because if DCF found out, they would take the baby? A. That statement triggers multiple concerns for me, one of which is the continuation of the placement in Damiano, as in a parentified role, an attempt to ally him with her and against DCF. Also, when we are talking about cycles and attempting to break the cycle of abuse, having a parent figure tell a child not to report something is a hallmark of priming someone for more abuse because that is what abusers say to their children. So it, it sets a bad precedent for him if we are working--if, if the goal is to teach him a good interpersonal blueprint and how to engage with other people in a safe way.

Transcript of testimony, p. 53.