Opinion
A22-0654
02-13-2023
In the MATTER OF the WELFARE OF: D. J. F.-D., Child.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.J.F.-D.) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.J.F.-D.)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge During court proceedings on a charge of gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, the district court found appellant D.J.F.-D., a child, incompetent and suspended the proceedings pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 5(B). The district court found appellant incompetent in five consecutive review hearings over a span of nearly two years. Within one year of the district court's initial finding of incompetency, respondent State of Minnesota filed a written notice of its intention to prosecute D.J.F.-D. after his restoration to competency, which notice extended suspension of the proceedings for an additional one-year period from the state's filing as provided by Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A)(2).
Shortly before the one-year extension expired, appellant moved the district court to dismiss the case, arguing that further extensions were unavailable under the rule. The district court denied appellant's motion to dismiss, determining that Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A), permits the state to file additional notices of intention to prosecute until either appellant is found competent and the proceedings resume or appellant ages out of juvenile jurisdiction. Because subdivision 7(A) does not limit the number of notices of intention to prosecute the state may file to extend suspension of the proceedings, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2020, the state charged D.J.F.-D. with one count of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct for lewd exhibition in the presence of a minor under age 16, a gross misdemeanor, and two misdemeanor counts of disorderly conduct for offensive, abusive, boisterous, noisy, or obscene behavior. The petition alleged that in April 2019, while D.J.F.-D. was riding a school bus, D.J.F.-D. kissed several preschool-aged children on the mouth and exposed his genitals to one of the children. D.J.F.-D. was 13 years old at the time of the alleged incidents, and he had been diagnosed with several disorders and found to have borderline to average cognitive functioning.
Because D.J.F.-D. did not have a prior criminal record, the disorderly-conduct offenses were charged as "juvenile petty offenses" under Minn. Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 16 (2018), rather than as misdemeanors.
The district court ordered an examination to determine D.J.F.-D.’s competency pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01. On June 12, 2020, the district court found D.J.F.-D. incompetent to assist with his defense and suspended the proceedings. As rule 20.01, subdivision 6, requires, the district court continued to supervise the case and held regular hearings to review D.J.F.-D.’s competency. At the first review hearing in November 2020, the district court again found D.J.F.-D. incompetent, and as rule 20.01, subdivision 5(B), requires, it dismissed the two misdemeanor counts at that time. In May 2021, the district court found D.J.F.-D. incompetent a third time.
This finding and each of the district court's subsequent incompetency findings were based on updated evaluations of D.J.F.-D.
On June 1, 2021, within one year of the court's initial finding that D.J.F.-D. was incompetent, the state—in accordance with subdivision 7(A)(2)—filed a notice of intention to prosecute D.J.F.-D. for the gross-misdemeanor offense in the suspended proceedings upon his restoration to competency. That notice automatically extended the suspension of the proceedings for an additional year from the date of filing of the notice. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7(A)(2).
The district court found D.J.F.-D. incompetent again in November 2021 and April 2022. Prior to the April review hearing, D.J.F.-D. filed a motion to dismiss the case, noting that he had at that point been found incompetent four times, and nearly three years had elapsed since the alleged incidents occurred. D.J.F.-D. argued that (1) subdivision 7(A)(2) does not allow the state to file a notice to extend the suspension of the proceedings more than once; (2) because the state had exhausted this one-time option, the one-year extension of the suspension would lapse on June 1, 2022; and (3) the rule should not be interpreted to permit indefinite suspension of his case. Accordingly, D.J.F.-D. asserted that the district court was required to dismiss his case.
D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss requested alternatively that the district court use its inherent authority to dismiss the case in the interests of justice pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 631.21 (2022). The district court declined to dismiss the case on that basis, and D.J.F.-D. does not challenge that portion of the district court's decision on appeal.
At the hearing on the motion, the state opposed discretionary dismissal, reasoning that if the case were dismissed, D.J.F.-D. would lose access to voluntary services appropriate to his needs and consistent with public safety during the pendency of the proceeding.
The state opposed D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss, arguing that subdivision 7(A)(2) does not include language restricting the state from filing more than one notice of intention to prosecute and that the state may continue to file notices of intention to prosecute within one year of the most recent finding of incompetency until a child "ages out" of the proceedings pursuant to subdivision 7(A)(1).
Subdivision 7(A)(1) provides that delinquency and extended-jurisdiction-juvenile proceedings must be dismissed on the child's 19th birthday in a delinquency case or 21st birthday in an extended-jurisdiction-juvenile case. References to a child "aging out" of juvenile jurisdiction are based on Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(a)-(b) (2022), which provides that juvenile jurisdiction continues until the child becomes 19 years of age, or 21 years of age in the case of an offense for which the individual was convicted as an extended-jurisdiction juvenile, unless the court terminates its jurisdiction under its inherent authority prior to that time.
The district court denied D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss. In its order denying D.J.F.-D.’s motion, the district court determined that subdivision 7(A) is ambiguous and resolved the ambiguity in favor of the state's interpretation of the rule. The district court determined that because rule 20.01 is silent on the issue, "nothing in [the rule] suggests that [the state] cannot file additional extensions," and it determined that the state may file additional notices of intention to prosecute until jurisdiction terminates pursuant to subdivision 7(A).
Because no procedural rule allows an appeal as of right from the district court's order denying the motion, D.J.F.-D. filed a petition for discretionary review as permitted by Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 21.03, subdivision 1, and Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.02, subdivision 3. Although the state agreed that the issue is appropriate for discretionary review, it opposed D.J.F.-D.’s argument on the merits. We exercised our discretionary appellate jurisdiction to grant the petition and allowed this appeal to proceed.
ISSUE
Following the expiration of the one-year extension of the suspended proceedings based on the state's filing pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A)(2), did the district court err by denying D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss the delinquency petition when the state had filed a second notice of intention to prosecute?
ANALYSIS
We begin by identifying the standard of review and providing an overall interpretive framework for the rule. With this understanding of the interpretive framework in mind, we turn to the arguments D.J.F.-D. advances on appeal—first, we address the plain language of the rule and apply grammatical rules; second, we consider commentary from advisory-committee comments to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20 and then from the Minnesota Practice Series entry on subdivision 7(A)(2).
D.J.F.-D. argues that the district court erred by denying D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss his case upon the expiration of a one-year extension because (1) the plain language of subdivision 7(A) allows the state to file only one notice of intention to prosecute following a finding of incompetency, which notice extends the suspension of the proceedings by one year, and (2) even if the rule is ambiguous, canons of construction make clear the state may not file more than one notice of intention to prosecute. We disagree because the rule is unambiguous and does not limit the number of notices of intention to prosecute that the state may file prior to the child's 19th birthday or, in an extended-jurisdiction-juvenile case, 21st birthday.
A. Standard of Review and Interpretive Framework
We interpret procedural rules de novo. In re Welfare of C.J.H. , 878 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. 2016). "When construing procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose." Id. (quoting In re Welfare of S.M.E. , 725 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 2007) ). We first determine whether the language is ambiguous on its face, and we may apply the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity only after determining that the language is ambiguous. See State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017) (interpreting a statute); State v. Tomlinson , 938 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn. App. 2019) (rules of statutory interpretation are applied to interpret procedural rules). Ambiguity exists only if the rule's language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014) (citing State v. Dahlin , 753 N.W.2d 300, 305-06 (Minn. 2008) ). And when a rule's language is plain and unambiguous, we must apply the rule's plain meaning. C.J.H. , 878 N.W.2d at 21.
When determining whether the language of a rule is ambiguous, we may, however, consider the canons of interpretation listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2022). See State v. Riggs , 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015) (determining whether statutory language is ambiguous). One such canon of interpretation requires that words and phrases are to be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common usage. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). And, when the words in a procedural rule are plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to the language's meaning. Stoebe v. Merastar Ins. Co. , 541 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. App. 1995), aff'd , 554 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1996) ; see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022) (stating that plain-language interpretation and construction require that every law is construed to give effect to all its provisions).
Thus, we consider the entirety of subdivision 7(A) and its place within the structure of rule 20.01. We also look to the common usage of the rule's words, phrases, and grammar. On the basis of that review, we conclude that subdivision 7(A) is unambiguous, and the only reasonable interpretation of the rule's language is that it allows for multiple extensions of the suspension of the proceedings via the state filing a notice of intention to prosecute subsequent to the district court finding that the child is incompetent, which finding the district court may make more than once during a juvenile proceeding.
B. Plain Language
1. Structure and Effect of Rule 20.01 ’s Language
Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01 governs juvenile delinquency cases in which a child may be incompetent to proceed. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01. Subdivision 5(B) of rule 20.01 sets forth the district court's options when it determines that a child is incompetent. If the offense charged is a misdemeanor, petty offense, or traffic offense, the rule provides that "the matter shall be dismissed." Id. , subd. 5(B). However, when the offense in question is a gross misdemeanor, as here, "the court has the discretion to dismiss or suspend the proceedings against the child except as provided by Rule 20.01, subdivision 7. " Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 5(B) (emphasis added).
A determination of incompetency for purposes of rule 20.01 is based on the level of competency required for the child to participate in a juvenile court proceeding—a child is incompetent if they lack sufficient ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or to understand the proceedings or participate in the defense due to mental illness or deficiency. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 1 ; see also In re Welfare of D.D.N. , 582 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 1998) (applying definition of incompetency in a juvenile delinquency proceeding).
Subdivision 7 requires dismissal of delinquency proceedings upon the occurrence of specific events:
Subd. 7. Dismissal of Proceedings
(A) Delinquency and extended jurisdiction juvenile proceedings shall be dismissed upon the earlier of the following:
(1) the child's nineteenth (19th) birthday in the case of a delinquency, or twenty-first (21st) birthday if a designation or motion for extended jurisdiction juvenile proceedings is pending;
(2) for all cases except murder, the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the finding of the child's incompetency to proceed unless the prosecuting attorney, before the expiration of the one (1) year period, files a written notice of intention to prosecute the child when the child has been restored to competency. Such a notice shall extend the suspension of proceeding for one (1) year from the date of filing subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A).
(B) For all cases pending certification except murder, proceedings shall be dismissed upon the expiration of three (3) years from the date of the finding of the child's incompetency unless the prosecuting attorney, before the expiration of the three (3) year period, files a written notice of intention to prosecute the child
when the child has been restored to competency. Murder charges shall not be dismissed based upon a finding of incompetency.
Id. , subd. 7 (emphasis added). Thus, rule 20.01, subdivision 5(B), grants the district court discretion to suspend a gross-misdemeanor proceeding when it determines that a child is incompetent until such time as subdivision 7(A) requires mandatory dismissal.
Subdivisions 6 and 7 of the rule impose certain procedural requirements while the proceedings are suspended. Subdivision 6 requires "the person charged with the child's supervision" to regularly report to the district court about the child's competency at six-month intervals. Id. , subd. 6. Subdivision 7(A) then provides that the proceedings must be dismissed upon the earlier of the child aging out of juvenile jurisdiction under subparagraph 1 or, under subparagraph 2, within a year of the finding of the child's incompetency; but if the state files a notice of intention to prosecute, the suspension of the proceedings is extended for one year "subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A). " Id. , subd. 7(A) (emphasis added).
The phrase "subject to" at the end of the provision directs the district court back to the beginning of subdivision 7(A) to repeat the same steps to determine whether dismissal is mandatory at the time the extended suspension is due to expire. The structure of the rule creates a loop that guides the district court's actions in a variety of circumstances—namely, additional findings that a child is incompetent, a finding that a child has regained competency, or a child aging out of juvenile jurisdiction.
We have acknowledged that an individual may have periods of time when they are competent to assist with their defense interspersed with periods of time when they are incompetent to do so. See State v. Coughlin, 731 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2007) (discussing an adult criminal defendant who was determined to be incompetent, then restored to competency, and again determined to be incompetent during pendency of the case), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007). Thus, findings of incompetency can occur on a continuous basis, during which the individual is not restored to competency, and alternatively, on an intermittent basis.
D.J.F.-D. argues that the plain language of subdivision 7(A) is unambiguous and allows for a single one-year extension of the suspension of the proceedings when the state files a notice of intention to prosecute following a finding of incompetency. In making this argument, D.J.F.-D. recites the same language of the rule, standard of review, and interpretive framework that we have just set forth, including citing to many of the same cases. He then states that "the court was wrong" and that "subdivision 7(A)(1) simply makes clear that the petition must be dismissed when the child turns nineteen." To support his argument, he points out that the rule does not toll the timeline or allow for adjudication after the child's 19th birthday. With the exception of "the court was wrong," each of these statements from D.J.F.-D.’s argument is consistent with our interpretation of the rule. In his primary argument, D.J.F.-D. also asserts that the Minnesota Practice Series reached the conclusion that the plain language of the rule does not include a provision for additional extensions. However, D.J.F.-D. admits that the Minnesota Practice Series is not binding, and he does not provide binding precedent or persuasive authority to support his assertion that the plain language of the rule required the district court to dismiss his delinquency petition.
If, as D.J.F.-D. argues, the rule meant to require dismissal after a single one-year extension or when the child reaches the age when juvenile jurisdiction terminates, whichever comes first, it would be unnecessary to make the one-year extension "subject to" both subdivisions 7(A)(1) and 7(A)(2)—the extension would merely expire at the end of one year or on the child's 19th or 21st birthday. Rather, making the extension "subject to" both subdivisions 7(A)(1) and 7(A)(2) means that within a year of any finding of the child's incompetency, the prosecutor may file a notice of intention to prosecute, extending the suspension of the proceedings for one additional year from the date of that filing—all of which may occur again in the future on a serial basis until the child ages out of juvenile jurisdiction and the proceedings must be dismissed.
Subdivision 7(A) does not prohibit the district court from exercising its discretion to dismiss the proceedings in the interests of justice pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 631.21 earlier than the language of subdivision 7 mandates dismissal.
The plain language of the rule accounts for the district court's ongoing discretion to suspend or dismiss the proceedings when the child is found incompetent as well as for situations in which no updated competency evaluation has been performed. This explains the rule's inclusion of the requirement that the state file a notice of intention to prosecute. If a child is found incompetent and the district court suspends the proceedings, subdivision 7(A) as written ensures that the proceedings are not suspended indefinitely until an updated competency report is made available to the court; rather, the district court must dismiss the proceedings on the child's 19th or 21st birthday or after one year from the most recent incompetency finding—unless the period of suspension is extended by the state filing notice of intention to prosecute. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subds. 5(B), 7(A).
Our plain-language interpretation recognizes the importance of filing what might be characterized as "serial" notices of intention to prosecute following subsequent findings of incompetency. Rule 20.01 mandates that "the person charged with the child's supervision, such as the head of the institution to which the child is committed," will make regular reports to the district court on the child's competency during the suspended proceeding. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 6. If repeat notices of intention to prosecute are not permitted, a child's case risks falling through the cracks and may linger without adequate review. We perceive the requirement of filing notices of intention to prosecute to be a prudent safeguard to provide for meaningful review of suspended cases that may otherwise go unnoticed and unresolved. We further acknowledge that in lieu of serial filings to extend a juvenile proceeding, the state may pursue alternative options, such as filing a petition for a child in need of protection or services. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9) (defining a "child in need of protection or services" to mean "a child who is in need of protection or services because the child ... is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others"), (15) (defining a "child in need of protection or services" to mean "a child who is in need of protection or services because the child ... has been found incompetent to proceed ... in connection with a delinquency proceeding") (2022).
Although it found the rule to be ambiguous, the district court observed that if it were to adopt D.J.F.-D.’s reading of the rule, the clause making the one-year extension of the suspended proceedings "subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A)," becomes superfluous. We agree. The rule already provides for dismissal when a child ages out of juvenile jurisdiction based on the language stating that the "proceedings shall be dismissed upon the earlier of the following," and therefore, D.J.F.-D.’s proposed reading renders the phrase "subject to" in subdivision 7(A)(2) duplicative. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (stating plain-language interpretation and construction require that every law is construed to give effect to all its provisions). Neither the phrase "subject to" nor the rest of the language in subdivision 7(A)(2) nullifies the rule's mandate for dismissal of the proceedings when a child ages out of juvenile jurisdiction. If it did, we might be persuaded by D.J.F.-D.’s argument. Indeed, our interpretation permitting more than one filing of a notice of intention to prosecute is the only interpretation that gives effect to the entirety of the rule as written.
In particular, the district court stated that if it adopted D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation of the rule, "the language ‘subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A),’ becomes superfluous as jurisdiction would never extend to a child's 19th birthday." On appeal, D.J.F.-D. challenges this analysis, asserting that "there are scenarios where the jurisdiction would ‘extend to a child's 19th birthday’ with just one extension." While we agree that it is possible for juvenile jurisdiction to extend to a child's 19th birthday with just one extension depending on the age of the child at the time of the initial finding of incompetency, we conclude that such a situation is consistent with our reading of the rule because dismissal would still be required upon the child's reaching age 19 for juvenile proceedings or age 21 for extended-jurisdiction-juvenile proceedings.
2. Applying Grammatical Rules to Subdivision 7(A)
At oral argument, D.J.F.-D. proposed that the use of singular articles in subdivision 7(A)(2) supports the interpretation that the rule permits only a single one-year extension of the suspended proceedings. The rule provides that "unless the prosecuting attorney, before the expiration of the one (1) year period, files a written notice of intention to prosecute the child when the child has been restored to competency," the proceedings shall be dismissed. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7(A)(2) (emphasis added). The use of the articles "the" and "a" merely indicate a reference to a specific event or action—here, that a written notice must be filed within a year of the incompetency finding it follows. See State v. Hohenwald , 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the definite article "the" is a word of limitation indicating reference to a specific object). And the language of the rule specifying that the notice extends the suspension of proceedings for "one (1) year" is a temporal limitation establishing the duration of the extension, not a quantitative limitation establishing how many extensions are available.
Our application of the rules of grammar to the language of subdivision 7(A) further supports interpreting the rule to allow for multiple filings of notices of intention to prosecute. The semicolon between subdivisions 7(A)(1) and 7(A)(2) is key to the interpretation of the rule because it joins two independent clauses rather than making one dependent on the other. See Schroeder v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. , 865 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn. 2015) (noting that semicolons join two clauses that are related but nevertheless independent of one another); see also William Strunk, Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 5-6 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that the proper use of semicolons is to join two independent but related clauses). The district court therefore faces two eventualities that are distinct from each other, either of which requires dismissal of the proceedings: (1) when the child reaches the age of 19 or 21, and juvenile jurisdiction terminates, and (2) when the suspension of the proceedings expires—whether it is one year after the date of a finding of the child's incompetency if the state does not file a notice of intention to prosecute or one year after the date the state filed a notice of intention to prosecute—whichever occurs first. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7(A).
In sum, we read the plain language of subdivision 7(A) to provide that when a district court finds a child incompetent, the suspension of the proceeding continues when the state files a notice of intention to prosecute unless the child regains competency, the child ages out of juvenile jurisdiction, or the court exercises its discretion to dismiss the proceeding. Based on the language and structure of the rule, we further conclude that the only reasonable reading of the rule is that subdivision 7(A) permits the state to file a notice of intention to prosecute the child upon any finding of incompetency in the proceeding, which may occur more than once.
B. Evaluating Comments to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20 and Minnesota Practice Series
1. Advisory-Committee Comments on Rule 20.01
The parties point us to the advisory-committee comments to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20 in support of their differing interpretations of the plain language of subdivision 7(A). See State v. Sargent , 968 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Minn. 2021) (considering the advisory-committee comments in ascertaining the meaning of a rule of criminal procedure); State v. Ross , 732 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Minn. 2007) (same). The comments to rule 20 state that "Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 20 is based upon Minn. R. Crim. P. 20." Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20 cmt.
The corresponding criminal rule reads as follows:
(1) Felonies. Except when the defendant is charged with murder, the criminal charges must be dismissed three years after the date of finding the defendant incompetent to proceed unless the prosecutor, before the expiration of the three-year period, files a written notice of intent to prosecute when the defendant regains competency.
(2) Gross Misdemeanors. The criminal charges must be dismissed 30 days after the date of finding the defendant incompetent to proceed unless before that date the prosecutor files a written notice of intent to prosecute when the defendant regains competency. If a notice has been filed, the charges must be dismissed when the defendant would be entitled under these rules to custody credit of at least one year if convicted.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 8.
If Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20 is based on Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, it stands to reason that the delinquency rule should be interpreted in the same way as the adult criminal rule. And we have rejected similar arguments that the reference to the time following a finding of incompetency in the adult rule should be read to refer to the time period following only the initial finding of incompetency , as D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation of the juvenile rule would require. See Coughlin, 731 N.W.2d at 865 (rejecting the argument that the criminal rule's reference to " ‘three years from the date of the finding of the defendant's incompetency to proceed’ should be read as ‘three years from the date of the initial finding of the defendant's incompetency to proceed,’ " and observing that "the purpose of [the criminal rule requiring dismissal] is to ensure that defendants who remain incompetent for three years or longer, after the initial or subsequent finding of incompetency, realize that they are still subject to prosecution" (emphasis added)).
D.J.F.-D. contends that because Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01, subdivision 8, places no time limitation on suspensions of prosecution, the fact that the juvenile rule in subdivision 7(A) limits the duration of the suspension to one year indicates that the juvenile rule does not intend to allow proceedings to be suspended "indefinitely." If it did, D.J.F.-D. argues, it would have been "open ended like the adult rule." But this argument fails to account for the fact that the juvenile rule does not actually permit a juvenile case to be suspended indefinitely, regardless of the number of extensions, because the case must be dismissed when the child reaches the age of 19 or 21. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7(A)(1).
We next consider that both the adult criminal rule and the juvenile delinquency rule approach dismissal of proceedings differently depending on the seriousness of the offense(s) charged in the proceeding. The criminal rule requires immediate dismissal of misdemeanor charges on a finding of incompetency but requires suspension of the proceedings for three years in the case of a felony or 30 days for a gross misdemeanor. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 6(b), 8(2). If the state files a notice of intention to prosecute within the applicable time period under the adult rule, a gross-misdemeanor charge must be dismissed when the defendant would be entitled to custody credit of one year if convicted, but no such provision is included for felonies. Id. , subd. 8. Similarly, the juvenile delinquency rule requires immediate dismissal of a misdemeanor on a finding of incompetency, permits dismissal or suspension subject to subdivision 7 at the district court's discretion for gross-misdemeanor offenses, and requires suspension subject to subdivision 7 for felonies. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 5(B).
Thus, on a finding of incompetency, both the adult and juvenile rules (1) mandate the dismissal of misdemeanors and other minor charges; (2) provide for suspension or dismissal with respect to gross misdemeanors; and (3) require suspension of the proceedings for felonies. This parallelism demonstrates that both rules are designed to allow a court to maintain jurisdiction and supervision when it makes a finding of incompetency and the crime is of a more serious nature. We agree with the state that the inclusion of a time frame—the one-year extension of the suspension in subdivision 7(A)(2)—does not equate to the rule providing for a one-time extension and does not limit extensions only after the first finding of incompetency. Further, we note that both the adult rule for gross misdemeanors and the juvenile rule for gross misdemeanors and felonies have an eventual hard stop for suspension of the proceedings corresponding with the termination of the court's jurisdiction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.03(2) (2022) (a person convicted of a gross misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year).
2. Minnesota Practice Series Commentary on Subdivision 7(A)(2)
Both parties argue that a comment in the Minnesota Practice Series entry on subdivision 7(A)(2) advances the plain-language argument for their respective interpretation of the rule. Although it does not bind them, appellate courts have looked to the Minnesota Practice Series for aid in interpreting the plain language of statutes and rules. See, e.g. , State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) ; State v. Valtierra , 718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006). The comment in question states: "The notice extends the case one year from the date of the filing of the notice with no provisions for additional extensions." 12 Robert Scott & John O. Sonsteng, Minnesota Practice R. 20.01 authors’ cmt. (4th ed. 2013).
As the district court observed, however, the lack of a provision for additional extensions only "highlights the rule's silence" on the issue of whether additional extensions are allowed. It does not require that we interpret the rule to mean that additional filings of notice of intention to prosecute are prohibited. We agree with the district court that the Minnesota Practice comment does not clearly support D.J.F.-D.’s plain-language reading of the rule.
In fact, a further reading of the Minnesota Practice authors’ comment highlights the practical difficulty posed by D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation of subdivision 7(A). The same comment goes on to note that "dismissal may be without prejudice, and the petition or indictment may be refiled." Id. Thus, if the district court must dismiss the petition after the expiration of a single one-year extension, and the state still intends to prosecute, the state may refile the petition—starting the process over from square one, possibly before a different judicial officer and with a potential loss of efficiency, familiarity, and continuity. If the rule intended that juvenile proceedings in which the child was found incompetent must be dismissed after a single one-year extension but before the child's 19th birthday, as D.J.F.-D. argues, this interpretation does not advance that objective.
The Minnesota Practice authors’ comment does not indicate where it finds authority for the proposition that the dismissal may be without prejudice, and the petition may be refiled.
Finally, both D.J.F.-D. and the state advance arguments that, should we determine that the language of subdivision 7(A) is ambiguous, application of the canons of construction supports their differing interpretations of the rule's meaning. See Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d at 435 (appellate courts apply the canons of construction to discern a statute's meaning if the statute is determined to be ambiguous); see also Tomlinson , 938 N.W.2d at 285 (rules of statutory interpretation are applied to interpret procedural rules). Because we conclude that subdivision 7(A) is unambiguous, we need not reach these arguments.
We conclude that subdivision 7(A) does not limit the number of notices of intention to prosecute the state may file to extend suspension of the proceedings following a finding of incompetency.
DECISION
The plain language of Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A), allows the state to file more than one notice of intention to prosecute a child following a district court's finding that the child is incompetent, thereby allowing for serial one-year extensions of the suspension of the proceedings, except that the case must be dismissed when juvenile jurisdiction terminates. Because (1) appellant was not yet 19 years old, (2) the state filed a notice of intention to prosecute that extended the suspension of the proceedings for one year, and (3) the district court found appellant incompetent again before that additional year expired, the district court did not err in determining that the state may file another notice of intention to prosecute under subdivision 7(A)(2) and by denying D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss upon expiration of the first one-year extension. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to deny D.J.F.-D.’s motion to dismiss the gross-misdemeanor charge.
Affirmed.
Dissenting, Smith, Tracy M., Judge
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. I agree with appellant D.J.F.-D. that, applying the plain language of Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7, because D.J.F.-D. was not restored to competency, the district court was required to dismiss the gross-misdemeanor proceeding against him one year after respondent State of Minnesota filed a written notice of intention to prosecute. I disagree with the majority that the rule permits the state to file serial notices of intention to prosecute to keep gross-misdemeanor proceedings pending until a child determined to be incompetent ages out of juvenile jurisdiction.
Rule 20.01, subdivision 7, reads in its entirety as follows:
Subd. 7. Dismissal of Proceedings
(A) Delinquency and extended jurisdiction juvenile proceedings shall be dismissed upon the earlier of the following:
(1) the child's nineteenth (19th) birthday in the case of a delinquency, or twenty-first (21st) birthday if a designation or motion for extended jurisdiction juvenile proceeding is pending;
(2) for all cases except murder, the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the finding of the child's incompetency to proceed unless the prosecuting attorney, before the expiration of the one (1) year period, files a written notice of intention to prosecute the child when the child has been restored to competency. Such a notice shall extend the suspension of the proceeding for one (1) year from the date of filing subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A).
(B) For all cases pending certification except murder, proceedings shall be dismissed upon the expiration of three (3) years from the date of the finding of the child's incompetency unless the prosecuting attorney, before the expiration of the three (3) year period, files a written notice of intention to prosecute the child when the child has been restored to competency. Murder charges shall not be dismissed based upon a finding of incompetency.
(Emphasis added.)
The gross-misdemeanor proceeding against D.J.F.-D. is governed by subdivision 7(A). Under that subdivision, a proceeding "shall be dismissed upon the earlier of" the child aging out of juvenile jurisdiction under subparagraph (1) or the expiration of the suspension of proceedings under subparagraph (2). Subparagraph (2) provides for a one-year suspension of proceedings following a determination of incompetency unless the state files a notice of intention to prosecute when the child is restored to competency; if the state files a notice of intention to prosecute, the suspension is extended one year from the date of the filing, "subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A)." Subdivision 7(A), as explained above, provides that a proceeding "shall be dismissed upon the earlier of" the child aging out under subparagraph (1) or the suspension expiring under subparagraph (2). Under the plain language of the rule, if a child determined to be incompetent has not yet aged out of juvenile jurisdiction, dismissal is required at the expiration of the one-year extension of the suspension of proceedings following the state's filing of a notice of intention to prosecute. I see no other reasonable reading of the rule.
The majority concludes that the rule unambiguously provides that, throughout the time that a child remains incompetent, the state can file serial notices of intention to prosecute, repeatedly extending the suspension of proceedings. In coming to that conclusion, the majority focuses on the phrase in subparagraph (2) "subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A)." I agree that this phrase is critical to understanding the rule. But I disagree as to its meaning.
Subparagraph (2) authorizes a one-year extension of the suspension of proceedings following the state's notice of intention to prosecute "subject to Rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A)." The "subject to" phrase places a limitation on the otherwise one-year length of the extension. It does so by returning the reader to the beginning of subdivision 7(A). It is there—at the beginning of subdivision 7(A)—that the rule states that a case "shall be dismissed upon the earlier of" the child aging out of juvenile jurisdiction under subparagraph (1) or the suspension expiring under subparagraph (2). Thus, if the state files a notice of intention to prosecute and the child ages out before the one-year extension under subparagraph (2) expires, the proceeding must be dismissed when the child ages out. The majority states that D.J.F.-D.’s reading of the rule renders the "subject to" phrase superfluous. On the contrary, the phrase is necessary to return the reader to the "dismissal upon the earlier of" language that is fundamental to the rule's operation. In sum, the plain language of the rule supports only D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation.
I address two other points raised by the majority. First, the majority suggests that periodic reports about a child's incompetency following an initial determination of incompetency somehow play a role in the operation of this rule. I disagree. I believe that the rule operates as just described even if, as contemplated by the juvenile rules, the district court properly receives periodic reports indicating that the child is still incompetent. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 6 (requiring that, if proceedings have been suspended, the person charged with the child's supervision "report to the district court on the child's mental condition and competency to proceed at least every six (6) months unless otherwise ordered").
The state's interpretation of rule 20.01, subdivision 7(A), is that the one-year suspension period following an initial determination of incompetency restarts every time that the child is confirmed to still be incompetent and that, absent a notice of intention to prosecute, dismissal is required only if no additional competency evaluations are performed within the first one-year suspension. Applying this theory, it argues that, because D.J.F.-D. received 6-month reviews finding him still incompetent, the one-year suspension period kept restarting and never expired and the state never needed to file a notice of intention to prosecute but did so just "[t]o be safe." The majority does not appear to adopt this interpretation, and I reject it.
The majority cites State v. Coughlin , 731 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007). That case only confirms my view. Coughlin involved an adult criminal defendant who was determined to be incompetent, was restored to competency, and was then found incompetent again. Id. at 865. Under the rule governing adults, non-murder charges had to be dismissed upon the expiration of three years from the date of the finding of the defendant's incompetency unless the state filed a written notice of intention to prosecute. See id. (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 ). Both of Coughlin's periods of incompetency were shorter than three years. Nevertheless, when three years had passed since Coughlin's initial finding of incompetency and the state had not filed a notice of intention to prosecute, the district court dismissed the charges against Coughlin. Id. We reversed. We held that, under the plain language of the rule, the three-year period during which a notice of intention to prosecute was required to extend the suspension meant "three uninterrupted years of incompetence." Id. at 863, 865.
As we observed in Coughlin , once a defendant is restored to competency, the suspension ends and proceedings resume. Id. at 864. If the defendant again becomes incompetent, another suspension begins and the timeline under the dismissal rule starts anew. Id. at 864-65. If, on the other hand, the defendant has "uninterrupted" incompetency from the initial determination of incompetency, that initial determination remains the start of the suspension period. Id. at 863.
Here, D.J.F.-D. has had uninterrupted incompetency since the initial determination. That initial determination started the suspension of proceedings under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A). The suspension lasted until the state filed its notice of intention to prosecute nearly one year later, at which time the suspension was extended for one year from the date of the filing. D.J.F.-D. was not restored to competency, and the extension expired. The case then should have been dismissed, even though intervening reports confirmed D.J.F.-D.’s continued incompetency.
Second, the majority also finds support for its position in the comparison of the juvenile competency rules to the adult rules. I think the comparison favors D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation. Under the juvenile rules, misdemeanor and other minor charges are dismissed upon a finding of incompetency. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 5(B). Murder charges are an exception to the dismissal rule, and cases where certification as an adult is pending have a different, and longer, suspension period. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 20.01, subd. 7. Other charges, like D.J.F.-D.’s gross-misdemeanor charge, have a maximum suspension period of two years—one year following a determination of incompetency and a second year following a notice of intention to prosecute. See id. Under the adult rules, misdemeanor and other minor charges are dismissed upon a finding of incompetency. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6(b). Murder charges are an exception to the dismissal rule, and felony charges must be dismissed within three years of a finding of incompetency unless the state files a notice of intention to prosecute, in which case the suspension continues. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 8(1). Gross-misdemeanor charges must be dismissed within 30 days after a finding of incompetency unless the prosecutor files a notice of intention to prosecute, in which case the charges must be dismissed when the defendant would be entitled to custody credit of at least one year if convicted. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 8(2). The juvenile and adult rules thus follow a similar, albeit not identical, pattern, with each having different suspension and dismissal provisions depending on the severity of the alleged offenses. For this reason, I think comparison with the adult rules only supports D.J.F.-D.’s interpretation.
In sum, applying the plain language of Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 20.01, subdivision 7(A), because D.J.F.-D. was not restored to competency within one year after the state filed its notice of its intention to prosecute, the delinquency proceeding against him should have been dismissed. The district court's decision should be reversed and the case remanded for dismissal.