Opinion
A123713.
6-25-2009
In re C.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.P., Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be published in Official Reports
Appellant C.P. (minor) appeals from the juvenile courts dispositional order sustaining charges against him for, among other offenses, recklessly causing fire to the property of another, a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 452, subdivision (d). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2008, a juvenile petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), charging minor, age 13, with: battery on school property in violation of section 243.2, subdivision (a) (count one); receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a) (count two); and recklessly causing fire to the property of another in violation of section 452, subdivision (d) (counts three and four). On September 19, 2008, the petition was amended to add charges of petty theft in violation of sections 484 and 488 (count five), and battery in violation of sections 242 and 243, subdivision (a) (count six).
We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
On December 4, 2008, a contested hearing was held before the juvenile court. The evidence presented at the hearing established that, on May 8, 2008, at approximately 8:45 p.m., police officers in the City of San Ramon were dispatched to the Mill Creek Apartments to respond to a report of arson. Earlier that evening, an employee of the apartment complex had noticed smoke coming from several rooms in the apartment complexs clubhouse, and had called the fire department. When Officer Joseph Hinkston arrived at the scene, he observed smoke and fire damage to the walls where paper towel dispensers had been hanging in the mens and womens bathrooms. Officer Hinkston also observed the paper towel dispensers on the floor in each bathroom filled with burned paper towels. Officer Hinkston was advised that firemen had arrived at the clubhouse to find fires burning in the paper towel dispensers in the bathrooms, and had pulled them off the walls to extinguish the fires.
Officer Hinkston also inspected the clubhouses computer room, where a fire had been set in a waste basket filled with paper. The computer room, less than five feet from the bathrooms, had sustained fire and smoke damage.
Officer Hinkston found no evidence of forced entry into the clubhouse. Apartment complex residents use access cards to enter the building. The apartment complex also maintains a video surveillance system inside the clubhouse that continuously records video footage.
On May 14, 2008, Officer Todd Santiago reviewed the video footage from the day of the fires. The footage, admitted into evidence, showed minor and another individual entering the clubhouse at about 6:20 p.m. The footage showed the two individuals in the computer room around 7:01 p.m., standing over the waste basket that later caught fire. The footage also showed the two individuals in the mens and womens bathroom several times between 7:01 p.m. and 7:14 p.m., and showed minor thereafter leaving one of the bathrooms as smoke emanated from the door. No other people were recorded in the clubhouse at the time the smoke became visible.
On May 20, 2008, Officer Santiago executed a warrant to search minors residence, an apartment complex located about two miles from the Mill Creek Apartments where the fires were set. Inside minors residence, Officer Santiago found a white t-shirt and black sneakers similar to the apparel minor was seen wearing in the video footage.
At the contested hearing, minors attorney rested on the evidence, acknowledging the undisputed evidence that minor was present in the clubhouse when the fires occurred. Minors attorney argued, however, that minor, only 13 years old at the time, could not be held responsible for setting the fires because, pursuant to section 26, he did not know the wrongfulness of his conduct. Minors attorney further argued the evidence was insufficient to prove minor was the person who set the fires.
Section 26 provides in relevant part: "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] . . . Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness."
On December 18, 2008, the juvenile court issued a dispositional order, sustaining the charges against minor for battery at school (count one), recklessly causing fire to property of another (counts three and four), and petty theft (count five). The juvenile court dismissed the charges for receiving stolen property (count two) and for battery (count six). The juvenile court thereafter adjudged minor a ward of the court, set a maximum custody time of one year and six months, committed him to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for a six-month program plus an additional 90-day conditional release/parole period, ordered restitution of $710 and imposed a restitution fine of $100. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, minor contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile courts finding that he recklessly caused a fire to property. Minor further contends the juvenile court erroneously failed to calculate his credits for time spent in confinement before the dispositional hearing. We address each contention in turn.
I. Recklessly Causing Fire to Property (§ 452).
Minor was found in counts three and four to have recklessly caused fire to the property of another, a misdemeanor violation of section 452. (§ 452, subd. (d).) Section 452 provides: "A person is guilty of unlawfully causing a fire when he recklessly sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, any structure, forest land or property." A person acts "recklessly" for purposes of the statute when he "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his . . . act will set fire to, burn, or cause to burn a structure, forest land, or property." (§ 450, subd. (f).)
Minor claims the evidence was insufficient to prove he violated section 452 by recklessly causing the fires in the apartment complex clubhouse because the juvenile court, when sustaining the charges, found he intentionally set the fires. According to minor, "[a] person cannot recklessly cause a fire that is intentionally set, just as recklessness is incompatible with sophistication."
Where a conviction is challenged on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, we "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In doing so, we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) This same rule applies to juvenile proceedings. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)
In finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the charges against minor for recklessly causing fire to the property of another (§ 452), the juvenile court stated as follows: "I do find Count Three and Four to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. In looking at the video pictures and hearing the testimony, it is totally inconceivable to this Court that the minor did not know what was wrong since the way he did it, by setting fire to the papers, to make sure that everything burned would be flammable, that he not only went in one bathroom, he went in another bathroom and then went in the computer room and followed the same trajectory as shown on the video pictures and as testified by — I think it was Corporal Santiago, the Court finds that the minor definitely knew that what he did was wrong at the time he did it and by the way he did it and the sophistication by the way he did it. And the Court finds the [section] 26 issue is satisfied, minor knew what he did was wrong at the time he did it. And that those counts are true beyond a reasonable doubt."
We agree with the juvenile court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charges against minor for recklessly causing fire to the property of another. In particular, video footage from a surveillance camera, reviewed by Officer Santiago, showed minor and another individual entering the apartment complex clubhouse shortly before the fires occurred on the evening of May 8, 2008. The footage also showed minor leaving one of the bathrooms where a fire occurred as smoke poured through the door, and one of the two individuals standing over the waste basket in the computer room where another of the fires occurred. No other person was observed inside the bathrooms or the computer room during the time that smoke could be seen on the video footage. In addition, items of clothing that police later found in minors residence were similar to clothing minor was seen wearing in the video footage.
In reaching this conclusion, we disagree with minor that, notwithstanding the evidence presented at the hearing, he cannot be held liable for violating section 452 because the juvenile court found that he intentionally set the fires. As minor points out, the juvenile court stated on the record that minor "knew that what he did was wrong at the time he did it and by the way he did it and the sophistication by the way he did it." However, the juvenile court went on to state: "And the Court finds the [section] 26 issue is satisfied, minor knew what he did was wrong at the time he did it. And that those counts are true beyond a reasonable doubt."
When the juvenile courts statements are considered in context, it is clear the juvenile court was addressing the argument made by minors attorney that, pursuant to section 26, minor was not capable of committing the charged offense because he was too young to know the wrongfulness of his conduct. As set forth above, under section 26, children under the age of 14 are deemed incapable of committing crimes "in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." (§ 26.) The juvenile court was not, as minor contends, addressing the issue of whether he had the specific intent to set fire to anothers property. (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644 [a reviewing court presumes the trial court applied the correct statutory law in reaching a decision].)
In any event, we do not believe the juvenile courts finding with respect to minors knowledge of his wrongfulness is inconsistent with its finding beyond a reasonable doubt that minor recklessly caused a fire to the property of another (§ 452). Minor cites In re Kent W. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 721, 723-724, for the proposition that "a violator of section 452 must not intend to cause the burning of property . . . . [I]t is a logical impossibility to intend an unintentional result." Minor also points out that the People could have charged him with attempted arson or arson (§ 451), which requires a finding that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously, rather than the lesser included offense of recklessly causing a fire (§ 452). The People did not do so.
Minor goes on to argue that section 654 bars the People from bringing new charges against him for arson given that the new charges would arise out of the same incident that has already been charged. We address this argument below.
Minor is of course correct that arson (§ 451) and recklessly or unlawfully causing a fire (§ 452) require evidence of different states of mind. As the California Supreme Court explains, "[Arsons] willful and malice requirement ensures that the setting of the fire must be a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an accidental or unintentional ignition or act of setting a fire; ` "in short, a fire of incendiary origin." [Citations.] . . . [T]here must be a general intent to willfully commit the act of setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences would be the burning of the relevant structure or property. (Citations.) On the other hand, the offense of unlawfully causing a fire covers reckless accidents or unintentional fires, which, by definition, is committed by a person who is `aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will set fire to, burn, or cause to burn a structure, forest land, or property. (§§ 450, subd. (f), 452.) For example, such reckless accidents or unintentional fires may include those caused by a person who recklessly lights a match near highly combustible materials." (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 88-89.)
Here, as we explained, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer that minor set fire to the papers in the paper towel dispensers in the bathrooms and in the waste basket in the computer room. In making that inference, a reasonable trier of fact could also have inferred that minor did not intend to burn the property, i.e., the apartment complex, but nonetheless was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that setting fire to the papers would cause the apartment complex to burn. (§§ 450, subd. (f), 452.) These reasonable inferences were sufficient to support the juvenile courts decision to sustain the section 452 charges. (See People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 89.)
It is perhaps also true that a reasonable trier of fact could have inferred that minor set fire to papers in the bathrooms and in the computer room with the intent to burn the apartment complex. However, even if such inference is reasonable, there nonetheless is no basis for reversing the juvenile courts decision. "Where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, reversal is not warranted because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding." (People v. Schwartz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324. See also People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206 [the reviewing court must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence].)
People v. Fry (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1334, while factually distinct, is nonetheless helpful. There, a defendant set fire to four cars, one of which resulted in fire damage to the carport under which the car was parked. The defendant was thereafter convicted of four counts of arson of a vehicle and one count of arson of a structure. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction for arson of a structure based on a finding by the trial court that he did not intend to set fire to the carport. According to the defendant, because he did not intend to start the fire to the carport, he could at most be found guilty of the lesser included offense of unlawfully causing fire to a structure (§ 452), but not of arson (§ 451). (Id. at p. 1337.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that arson required proof that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously in setting fire to a structure, but did not require proof that the defendant had a specific intent to burn a particular piece of property. (Id. at pp. 1338-1339.) In doing so, the court explained: "Here, it is undisputed that defendants conduct actually and proximately caused the carport, i.e., a structure, to be burned: setting fire to the car created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the carport would burn, the carport did in fact burn, and its burning, as the trial court found, was the natural and probable consequence of his conduct. Consequently, whether defendant committed arson of a structure or unlawful burning of a structure depends only on whether he willfully and maliciously performed the acts that caused the carport to burn, in which case the offense is arson, or recklessly, in which case the offense is unlawful burning." (Id. at p. 1339, fn. omitted.) According to the court, however, it was for the trier of fact to decide which of these circumstances was more likely. (Ibid. Compare People v. Schwartz, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325 [concluding that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of unlawfully causing a fire (§ 452), in addition to arson (§ 451), where "the evidence as developed by the prosecution and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence would support a conclusion that [the defendant] only intended to set fire to the cars," but did not intend to set fire to the structure that housed them].)
Here, unlike in People v. Fry, minor challenges a finding that he recklessly caused a fire to property, rather than a finding of arson. Nonetheless, consistent with People v. Fry and People v. Schwartz, whether minor committed arson of the property or recklessly burned the property depended on whether he willfully and maliciously performed the acts of setting fire to the papers that caused the walls of the apartment complex to burn, in which case the offense could have been labeled arson (§ 451), or recklessly did such acts, in which case the offense was properly labeled recklessly causing a fire (§ 452). The People brought charges only with respect to the latter, recklessly causing a fire, and the juvenile court, acting as a reasonable trier of fact, sustained those charges. As we have already concluded, the evidence supported the juvenile courts decision in this regard, and thus there is no basis for reversing it on appeal.
Because we affirm the juvenile courts decision to sustain counts three and four, we need not address minors argument that, upon a reversal of that decision, the prosecution is barred pursuant to section 654 from charging him with a new offense arising out of the same incident.
II. Custody Credits.
Minor contends, and the People agree, that, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court failed to calculate the custody credits to which he was entitled. The record supports this contention.
The information set forth in the probation report indicates that minor served 101 days in juvenile hall prior to disposition. However, the juvenile court failed to credit minor with any time spent in confinement in reaching the disposition. This was erroneous. " `[A] minor is entitled to credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody before the disposition hearing. [Citations.] It is the juvenile courts duty to calculate the number of days earned, and the court may not delegate that duty. [Citations.] (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067 .)" (In re Lorenzo L. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1079.)
Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to calculate the number of days minor earned in custody credits prior to disposition, and to credit minor with that number of days in setting his maximum term of confinement. (In re Lorenzo L., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079.)
DISPOSITION
We remand this matter to the juvenile court with instructions to calculate the amount of minors predisposition custody credits and to credit minor accordingly. In all other regards, we affirm the juvenile courts dispositional order.
We concur:
Pollak, Acting P. J.
Siggins, J.