Opinion
G055370
11-15-2017
In re ALFRED ROLDAN on Habeas Corpus.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant. Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. RIC1705610) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Mac R. Fisher, Judge. Reversed and Remanded. Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant. Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
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Before O'Leary, P.J., Fybel, J., and Ikola, J. --------
The Riverside District Attorney appeals the superior court's order granting Alfred Roldan the relief he sought in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district attorney contends the superior court order granting the relief requested in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is invalid because the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief without first issuing an order to show cause and permitting the People to file a return. Roldan agrees. We accept the well-taken concession and reverse. (In re Campbell (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 742, 745.)
Roldan was convicted of a number of offenses committed when he was 15-years old, including two robberies. Additionally, a personal firearm-discharge enhancement was found true. He was sentenced to more than 35 years to life in state prison. (People v. Roldan (Sept. 2, 2011, G043654) [nonpub. opn.].) Roldan subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking a "resentencing" under Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284 [juvenile sentenced as an adult to an indeterminate term is entitled to a "sufficient opportunity [at sentencing] to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing"].) The superior court issued an order requesting an informal response from the district attorney, and appointed the public defender to represent Roldan.
After considering the district attorney's informal response opposing the petition and the public defender's reply, the superior court issued an order granting the relief requested in Roldan's petition, without having first issued an order to show cause. The order directed Roldan and the district attorney "to file a statement of their views, as described in Penal Code section 1203.01(a)," and ordered "the clerk . . . to transmit any such statements to" the prison where Roldan is confined. The district attorney filed a timely appeal.
Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution bestows on judges of the superior court, as well as justices of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal, original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed on behalf of an individual who alleges his imprisonment is unlawful. The factual allegations must be verified by the party making the application. (Pen. Code, § 1474.) The procedures to be followed in a habeas corpus proceedings are set forth in Penal Code sections 1473 through 1509.1. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737 (Romero).)
Upon receipt of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court first determines whether the petition states facts which, if true, state a prima facie cause for relief. (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 737.) If the court determines the petition states a prima facie case and the petition is not procedurally barred, the court may grant the petition. Granting the petition, however, does not mean the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought. Rather, issuing the writ, or issuing an order to show cause, compels the person having custody of the petitioner to file a return to the petition. (Id. at p. 738, citing Pen. Code, §§ 1477, 1480.)
The purpose of the return is to set forth facts "establishing the legality of the petitioner's custody." (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738.) The return "is 'analogous to the complaint in a civil proceeding' [citations]." (Id. at p. 739.) Moreover, "[t]he return 'is an essential part of the scheme' by which relief is granted in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) The petitioner's traverse to the return is analogous to an answer in a civil matter. (Ibid.) Thus, "issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause is an intermediate but nonetheless vital step in the process of determining whether the court should grant the affirmative relief that the petitioner has requested." (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 740.)
The district attorney was entitled to file a return setting forth his position on the facts and the law. (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 740.) Of course, the right to file a return may be waived by a respondent by stipulating to the facts alleged in the petition and to the relief requested. (In re Olson (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 790, 801-802.) However, as there was no such stipulation here, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought without first issuing an order to show cause. (Id. at p. 802; In re Campbell, supra, 11 CalApp.5th at p. 745 ["trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an [order to show cause]"].)
The court's order granting the relief requested in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter remanded. In the interest of justice, the opinion in this matter is deemed final forthwith.