Opinion
No. 07-1099.
Filed April 15, 2008.
Alamance County No. 01JT126.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 5 July 2007 by Judge James K. Roberson in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 January 2008.
Jamie L. Hamlett for petitioner-appellee. Lisa Skinner Lefler for respondent-appellant. Parker, Poe, Adams Bernstein L.L.P., by Benjamin Sullivan and Benn A. Brewington, III, for guardian ad litem.
Respondent mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child C.M.T. ("Cathy"). On appeal, respondent primarily disputes the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Because respondent failed to make any showing that the trial court's findings were not supported by competent evidence, our review is limited to deciding whether those findings of fact support the court's conclusions of law. Because we conclude that the findings properly support the determination that respondent neglected Cathy, we uphold the trial court's conclusion that there were grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights. We further hold that respondent has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Cathy's best interest. Accordingly, we affirm.
The pseudonym "Cathy" will be used throughout this opinion to protect the child's privacy and for ease of reading.
Facts
On 14 September 2001, the Alamance County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging that Cathy, who was approximately seven years old, and her younger sister, who was four years old, were abused, neglected, and dependent, while her one-year-old brother was neglected and dependent. On 23 August 2002, the court entered an adjudication and disposition order adjudicating all three of the children neglected and dependent. The court found, based on admissions by the parents, that Cathy and her sister had reported sexual abuse by respondent's husband. Respondent nonetheless continued to allow her husband to have contact with the children and spend the night in the same home despite knowledge of the sexual abuse and despite signing a Protection Plan stating the children would have no further contact with her husband. The court also found that the children were exposed to an injurious environment — including domestic violence and excessive drinking — and that respondent had inappropriately disciplined Cathy by hitting her several times on her bare back, leaving significant bruising.
In the termination of parental rights order that is the subject of this appeal, the trial court found the following facts. From 14 September 2001 until May 2004, Cathy was placed in two relative placements, a foster home, and a therapeutic group home. During that time, Cathy was hospitalized on several occasions due to psychological and behavioral issues. On 28 May 2004, Cathy was returned to respondent's home for a trial home visit. On 15 June 2004, however, due to behavioral problems, Cathy was placed in a second foster home. Cathy returned to respondent's home on 23 July 2004 for another trial visit; she stayed with her mother until 11 October 2004 with the exception of a brief hospitalization.
During the home visits, respondent communicated with DSS regarding her inability to control Cathy. Cathy did not, however, receive her mental health medications as prescribed, and, on occasion, she was left to administer the medications herself without guidance from respondent. In addition, during the trial home visits, respondent's home was "filthy, including cat feces, piles of clothing and trash, and other unsanitary conditions." (Emphasis omitted.)
The trial court also found that respondent had substantial doubts that her husband had sexually abused Cathy even though the husband pled guilty and was deported. According to the trial court, respondent "continued to make comments that there was no physical evidence, she was confused and other statements that evidenced disbelief the abuse occurred." On one occasion during a trial home visit, respondent directed Cathy to speak on the phone to her stepfather, who had abused her, saying, "He cannot hurt you over the telephone." Respondent regained custody of Cathy's two siblings in 2003. Respondent was, however, unable to demonstrate an ability to maintain a clean and safe house for those two children. She relied on others to provide care and could not attend to daily life tasks, such as getting her daughter to school. She began leaving her son in a daycare arrangement with the child's former foster mother that ultimately evolved into the foster mother's providing all the care for the boy except for occasional visits by respondent. In April 2005, respondent lost custody of both children in civil custody actions.
In the fall of 2004, DSS received three reports relating to respondent and the children, alleging a lack of supervision, an injurious environment, and inappropriate sexual activity. DSS informed respondent of concerns that her live-in boyfriend was wearing Cathy's clothing, had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with another child, and had engaged in sexual contact with respondent without taking steps to prevent the children from observing. Respondent continued to allow her boyfriend to have contact with the children despite these concerns and despite the fact that the boyfriend subjected respondent to domestic violence and engaged in excessive drinking. When, in 2004, DSS gave respondent a letter describing the boyfriend's conduct, respondent tore up the letter and defended her boyfriend even though he had admitted the inappropriate acts.
During the six years prior to the termination of parental rights hearing, respondent, on a number of occasions, was unable to control her behaviors and anger when dealing with DSS. Further, respondent continued to fail to take responsibility for her situation. Respondent also did not regularly allow announced or unannounced home visits. Overall, respondent's contact with DSS was sporadic.
With respect to visitation, the court found that there had been "issues with consistency and timeliness," as well as instances in which respondent behaved inappropriately, requiring monitors to intervene. In one visit, Cathy asked respondent why she did not believe Cathy about the sexual abuse. Respondent told Cathy that it was because there was no evidence. During another visit, respondent accused the social worker of poisoning candy the social worker was offering to the child. Respondent would often discuss adult issues with Cathy such as the custody cases involving her other children.
On 27 April 2005, a DSS social worker sent respondent a letter specifically outlining DSS' concerns regarding visitation and discussing how the visits could be improved. In May 2005, visitation between respondent and Cathy was suspended because of the inappropriateness of the visits. Respondent still had the ability to communicate with Cathy through cards and letters, and respondent did send some cards. On one occasion, however, she sent a letter containing wording that DSS was concerned might have an adverse impact on Cathy. Respondent chose not to re-write the letter. According to the trial court, respondent failed to take reasonable advantage of her opportunities to communicate with her daughter.
At times, respondent discouraged Cathy from trusting her social worker or therapist, leading to Cathy's having difficulty in therapy. Respondent had two scheduled appointments to meet with Cathy's therapist — she did not confirm her ability to attend the first appointment, causing it to be cancelled, and arrived almost an hour late for the second appointment, after the therapist had already left. Respondent claimed that she and her boyfriend had fallen asleep in the car.
With respect to respondent's case plans, the trial court found that respondent had "done some things such as attending parenting classes and maintaining employment," but that "she has generally failed — on a consistent basis — to resolve issues affecting the safety and welfare of" Cathy. Although the court noted that one "very positive aspect" of respondent's efforts had been her dedication to employment, the court found that respondent "consistently prioritizes her work over the needs of the juvenile." In addition, respondent spent money she earned on items that were not necessities, such as a $400 cell phone, while not providing minimal items for her children.
Contrary to her plans with DSS, respondent failed to follow through with mental health treatment for herself, lived in places that were not appropriate for children, and "continued to place blame on the juvenile for adult issues." On 28 October 2004, DSS social workers helped respondent pack up her household belongings and move them to a storage facility because respondent had lost her mobile home due to financial difficulties. Respondent then stayed with various friends and at a motel until she obtained another residence. After moving into the new home, respondent still left her belongings in the storage unit, and her home was sparse and unkempt. She had essentially no bedding or other furniture. Following a court hearing in August 2005, however, social workers found that the home was furnished and clean.
On 20 May 2005, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. A hearing on the petition was delayed because of Cathy's therapy, and DSS filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of that petition on 21 November 2006. DSS then filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights on 29 November 2006. The court held hearings on 23-25 May 2007 and 30 May 2007. On 5 July 2007, the court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate parental rights with respect to Cathy because (1) respondent had neglected the child, as set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2007); and (2) respondent had willfully left the child in foster care for more than 12 months without showing reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to removal, as set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The court further concluded that it was in Cathy's best interests for respondent's rights to be terminated. Respondent timely appealed from this order.
Discussion
A termination of parental rights proceeding is conducted in two phases: (1) an adjudication phase that is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2007) and (2) a disposition phase that is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2007). In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). During the adjudication stage, DSS has the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exist. The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).
If DSS meets its burden of proving that grounds for termination exist, the trial court moves to the disposition phase and must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001).
I
Respondent first challenges the trial court's conclusion that the ground of neglect, N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), existed justifying termination of respondent's parental rights. When, as here, the child was removed from the parent's home pursuant to a prior adjudication of neglect, "[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect." In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984). In such cases, although "there is no evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding . . . parental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to her parents." In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000).
Respondent argues that the evidence did not establish a probability of repetition of neglect. We note first that although respondent has assigned error to several of the court's findings of fact, she has failed to specifically argue in her brief that there was insufficient evidence to support those findings. "Assignments of error not set out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned." N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (emphasis added); see also In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 424, 610 S.E.2d 403, 404-05 (2005) (concluding respondent had abandoned factual assignments of error when she "failed to specifically argue in her brief that they were unsupported by evidence"). Accordingly, our review in this case is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law.
Respondent has simply recited evidence the would support contrary findings. Such a contention is beside the point. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (holding that "the trial court's findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings").
Among the trial court's 141 findings of fact were findings regarding respondent's disbelief that Cathy had been sexually abused by her husband even though he had pled guilty and been deported; respondent's disbelief that her subsequent boyfriend had engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct towards Cathy and another child despite his admission of the conduct; respondent's decision to allow continued conduct between her children and the boyfriend regardless of the sexual misconduct and his acts of domestic violence and excessive drinking; respondent's inability to appropriately and safely parent Cathy during two trial home visits; respondent's failure to provide proper care for her other two children after custody was restored to her, resulting in a second loss of custody; respondent's difficulties in maintaining proper housing; respondent's decisions to buy non-necessary items for herself, while not buying minimal items for her children; and respondent's decision to give priority to her employment over her children. These findings are sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate determination that there was a reasonable probability of a repetition of neglect if Cathy were returned to her mother.
Respondent argues, nonetheless, that "[t]he improvements [respondent] has made in her circumstances make the probability of repetition of neglect an insufficient ground on which to take the drastic action of terminating her parental rights." Although she points to the fact that she is no longer involved with her husband or boyfriend and asserts that "[t]he alcohol abuse and domestic violence which marked both of these relationships is not a part of her life now," respondent does not address the trial court's findings — and the supporting evidence — that respondent's disbelief that these two men had engaged in sexual misconduct with her children gives rise to a probability that she will not protect Cathy in the future from such conduct.
Although respondent also points to the fact that she now has a clean, appropriately furnished home, the trial court was entitled to give little weight to that fact given that respondent waited until the petition for termination of parental rights had been filed to obtain appropriate housing. The trial court noted that when given an opportunity to explain her "very inappropriate behavior, she would simply say that is the old [respondent] and this is the new [respondent]." The court reasonably found: "The child has been in care for over five years and the Court should have begun to see the new [respondent] much sooner."
Finally, respondent urges that her positive employment history was inconsistent with a termination of parental rights. In making this argument, respondent overlooks the fact that employment was only one aspect of caring for her children. The court found, and respondent does not specifically dispute, that "[a]lthough the Court acknowledges that the Respondent Mother has done some things such as attending parenting classes and maintaining employment, she has generally failed — on a consistent basis — to resolve issues affecting the safety and welfare of the juvenile." In expressly addressing the mother's employment history, the court found: "One very positive aspect of the Respondent Mother's efforts has been her dedication to employment. On the other side of the positive, the Respondent Mother consistently prioritizes her work over the needs of the juvenile." In short, the court concluded that the positive employment history did not — given the other facts — negate the probability of future neglect.
Based on our review of the order, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact amply support its determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights to Cathy on the basis of neglect. Although respondent also challenges the trial court's conclusion that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to Cathy's removal, we need not address that issue. "Having concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground . . . found by the trial court." In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004).
II
Respondent also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that it was in the best interests of Cathy to terminate her parental rights. Respondent does not dispute that the trial court made appropriate findings under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a), which specifies the factors to be considered in deciding the best interests of a child following a termination of parental rights proceeding. Rather, respondent asserts only:
Although [Cathy] was not in a position to be returned to [respondent's] home at the time of the termination hearing, the drastic step of terminating [respondent's] parental rights was premature. [Cathy's] therapist testified that it is in [Cathy's] best interest to know that her mother believes her regarding the sexual abuse she suffered. Since [respondent] now believes [Cathy] about the abuse, it is important for [respondent] to be able to participate in [Cathy's] therapy. Throughout most of the case, [respondent] has given [Cathy] gifts. [Cathy] testified that she knows her mother still loves her.
This argument ignores the fact that the trial court did not find credible respondent's claim that she now believes Cathy regarding the sexual abuse. The court instead found that respondent's statements and conduct still "indicate a lack of belief that the sexual abuse occurred. . . ." In connection with Cathy's therapy, the court specifically found that respondent's doubts had "prevented the Respondent Mother from being productive in therapy with [Cathy]." Further, the court found that respondent did not take advantage of two opportunities to meet with Cathy's therapist.
The court based its determination that termination of parental rights was in Cathy's best interests on the following findings:
2. The juvenile is now 13 years old and with the exception of two brief trial home visits, she has consistently been in the custody of the Alamance County Department of Social Services and out-of-home placement since she was 7 years old.
3. There is a strong likelihood of adoption by her current foster parent with whom she has a strong bond should [Cathy] become free for adoption.
4. The foster parents are currently in the adoption process for another child in their home and have an understanding of the process and commitment.
5. The juvenile refers to her foster parents as Momma and Papa.
6. The juvenile has a sibling relationship with her foster brother.
7. The foster parents can and are willing to provide for the juvenile's needs, including increased supervision and monitoring of mental health issues.
8. The foster parents have taken part in extensive therapy with the juvenile and implemented the recommendations of the therapist.
9. The termination of parental rights would aid in the implementation of the permanent plan for the juvenile, which is adoption.
10. There is and has been a substantial relationship between the Respondent Mother and [Cathy] as expressed by both and reflected in the juvenile's desire to have her mother's support.
11. The juvenile still has great needs and the likelihood of those needs being met are greater with the foster family than with the Respondent Mother.
12. The Respondent Mother continues to demonstrate a lack of understanding of her contribution to the juvenile's continuing time in foster care.
In light of these findings, we cannot conclude that the trial court's "`ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 747, 751, 616 S.E.2d 385, 387 (quoting In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737-38, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002)), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 165, 622 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).