Summary
analyzing cases determining whether habeas corpus or mandamus is the appropriate remedy and construing relator's mandamus petition as petition for writ of habeas corpus
Summary of this case from In re Honermann-GaringerOpinion
No. 10-03-00037-CV
Opinion Delivered and Filed July 21, 2004.
Original Proceeding.
Writ conditionally granted.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA, (Chief Justice Gray dissenting).
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Respondent, the Honorable F.B. McGregor, Jr., Judge of the 66th District Court of Hill County, held Petitioner Larry Clark in contempt for failure to pay child support. Clark seeks a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent to set aside the contempt order because Real Party in Interest Anna Marie Troxel did not file the motion to enforce until more than six months after the child support obligation had terminated.
BACKGROUND
Troxel and Clark divorced in August 1984. The divorce decree named Troxel the managing conservator of their daughter B.A.C. Clark was ordered to pay child support of $38 per week for the remainder of 1984, then $50 per week until B.A.C. turned 18.
The court held Clark in contempt in March 1985 for failure to pay child support. Clark was $386 in arrears at that time. Thereafter, in January 1991, the court rendered an order confirming that Clark was $3,228 in arrears.
Troxel's father Royce Daily has had actual custody of B.A.C. since 1988 or 1989. In September 1998, Daily filed a motion to modify the divorce decree by designating him as managing conservator and by ordering Clark to pay child support to Daily. The court granted Daily's motion one month later. The order designates Daily as B.A.C.'s managing conservator and orders Clark to pay him child support of $203 per month.
The Attorney General filed a motion to enforce the October 1998 child support order in September 2001. The Attorney General agreed not to seek a contempt order, and the court rendered a judgment for the arrearages of $2,316 in December 2001.
Troxel filed a motion to enforce the child support provisions of the divorce decree in March 2002. The court granted her motion. The order recites the pertinent child support provisions of the divorce decree and references the 1991 arrearages judgment. The court found that Clark was "in arrears in the amount of $23,358 for the period January 25, 1991 through October 30, 1998." Based on this finding, the court held Clark in contempt and sentenced him to the county jail for 150 days. The court suspended his commitment to jail and placed him on community supervision for ten years. The court ordered Clark to pay Troxel $150 per month to satisfy the arrearages. The court also granted Troxel a cumulative money judgment for the arrearages.
Clark sought review of the contempt order in this mandamus proceeding and by direct appeal. We have determined that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the contempt order by direct appeal. In re B.A.C., No. 10-02-00243-CV, slip op. at 2, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3018, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 31, 2004, no pet. h.).
ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY
To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the respondent committed a clear abuse of discretion or acted in violation of a duty imposed by law; and (2) the petitioner has no adequate legal remedy. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003). Troxel contends that Clark's adequate remedy in this case is by application for writ of habeas corpus. We agree, but rather than requiring Clark to file a third proceeding to seek review of the contempt order, we shall construe his mandamus petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
According to the Supreme Court, "Contempt orders that do not involve confinement cannot be reviewed by writ of habeas corpus, and the only possible relief is a writ of mandamus." In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). Our research has disclosed only one decision of the Supreme Court in which habeas relief was granted a contemnor like Clark whose commitment was suspended. In Ex parte Brister, the contemnor was held in contempt, her commitment was suspended, and she was ordered to 60 days' house arrest among other terms and conditions of the suspension. 801 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
Several courts of appeals have held that contempt orders in which the trial court has suspended the commitment and placed the respondent on community supervision may or may not be reviewable by habeas depending on whether the conditions of community supervision include some form of "tangible restraint." E.g., In re Ragland, 973 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, orig. proceeding). Thus in Ragland, the Tyler Court held that the requirement that the contemnor perform community service each week for a year was a sufficiently tangible restraint to justify habeas relief. Id. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See In re Pierre, 50 S.W.3d 554, 558-59 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (report monthly to community supervision officer, remain in county, etc.); Ex parte Duncan, 796 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (same). Clark's contempt order is similar to these because it places him on community supervision and imposes numerous terms and conditions similar to those in the cases cited.
The Tyler Court has concluded that a contemnor's liberty was not sufficiently restrained by a community supervision order which merely required him to pay child support and attorney's fee arrearages and otherwise comply with the court's orders. See Ex parte Hughey, 932 S.W.2d 308, 310-11 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, orig. proceeding). Other courts have agreed. See In re Zenergy, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, orig. proceeding) (suspended contempt order can be reviewed by habeas "when and if Judge Evins enforces the judgment"); Ex parte Sealy, 870 S.W.2d 663, 665-66 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (suspended contempt order which required contemnor only to pay attorney's fees and costs and otherwise comply with visitation orders did not impose sufficient restraint for habeas relief).
The First Court of Appeals has concluded that contempt orders in this latter category are not reviewable by mandamus or by habeas. See In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding); Sealy, 870 S.W.2d at 666. Thus, the First Court believes that in some circumstances litigants have no remedy.
Litigants should not have to navigate this morass to obtain relief. Texas courts have not clearly stated the appropriate standard for determining when habeas relief is appropriate and when mandamus relief is appropriate in such cases. Accordingly, we shall.
We hold that when a contemnor is actually confined or when the contemnor's commitment has been suspended and the contemnor has been placed on community supervision, habeas is the appropriate remedy. If the commitment has been suspended without supervision or if the contempt order does not involve confinement ( e.g., contempt by fine only), mandamus is the appropriate remedy.
Thus, we agree with Troxel's argument that habeas is the appropriate remedy in this case. However, rather than requiring Clark to replead this case as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we shall construe his mandamus petition as one seeking habeas relief. See Ex parte Casillas, 25 S.W.3d 296, 297 n. 1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding); see also Motor Veh. Bd. v. El Paso Indep. Auto Dealers Assn., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. 1999) ("Our policy has been to construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberally, so that decisions turn on substance rather than procedural technicality.").
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A trial court commits a clear abuse of discretion if it issues an order beyond its jurisdiction. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). Clark argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a contempt order against him in this case because Troxel's enforcement motion was untimely. The basis of his argument rests on the fact that the court's October 1998 order, which appointed Daily as B.A.C.'s managing conservator, modified the child support provisions of the divorce decree such that Clark was ordered to pay child support thereafter to Daily rather than Troxel. He contends that under section 157.005 of the Family Code Troxel had only six months after October 1998 to file a motion to enforce the support provisions of the divorce decree by contempt. See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 157.005(a)(2) (Vernon 2002).
Troxel counters that the trial court had jurisdiction to hold Clark in contempt because: (1) Clark's support obligation is a continuing obligation which ends only when B.A.C. becomes an adult and graduates from high school (and thus the motion to enforce was timely); and (2) Clark's interpretation of section 157.005 conflicts with other provisions of the Family Code.
Section 157.005 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The court retains jurisdiction to render a contempt order for failure to comply with the child support order if the motion for enforcement is filed not later than the sixth month after the date:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) on which the child support obligation terminates under the order or by operation of law.
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 157.005(a).
Section 151.001 describes a parent's duty to support his or her child in pertinent part as follows:
(a)(3) [a parent has] the duty to support the child, including providing the child with clothing, food, shelter, medical and dental care, and education;
. . . .
(b) The duty of a parent to support his or her child exists while the child is an unemancipated minor and continues as long as the child is fully enrolled in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma until the end of the school year in which the child graduates.
(c) A parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is owed.
Id. § 151.001(a)(3), (b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Section 151.001(d) provides that the rights and duties of a parent are subject to any court order affecting them. Id. § 151.001(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Clark argues that the modification order terminated his obligation to pay support to Troxel by operation of law. See id. § 157.005(a)(2). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals seemingly reached the opposite conclusion in a similar case. Ex parte Tanner, 904 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ). That court observed:
Under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon 1993), a parent has an ongoing obligation to support his or her child while the child is a minor. We interpret the child support obligation referred to in Section 14.40(b)(2) to be this ongoing obligation, rather than the more specific obligation to pay a particular amount, such as under the divorce decree here. Thus, we construe Section 14.40(b)(2) to refer to the time at which the ongoing obligation to support a child ceases, as contrasted from merely being modified.
The former section 4.02 provided in pertinent part:
Each parent has the duty to support his or her child during the period that the child is a minor, and thereafter so long as the child is fully enrolled in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma until the end of the school year in which the child graduates.
Act of May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 369, § 4, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1458, 1460 (amended 1995) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 151.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
The former section 14.40(b) provided in pertinent part:
(b) Time Limitations. The court retains jurisdiction to enter a contempt order if a motion for contempt for failure to comply with a court's child support order is filed within six months after:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) the date on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by operation of law.
Act of May 27, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 232, § 9, sec. 14.40(b), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1158, 1162 (repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 157.005(a) (Vernon 2002)).
Id. (footnotes added) (citation omitted).
However, the Code Construction Act requires a court to give effect to every term used in a legislative enactment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1998). The Supreme Court has recently described a court's obligation in this regard as follows:
Generally, we will accept the words used according to their ordinary meaning, unless given a specific statutory definition; we will not give them an exaggerated, forced, or constrained meaning. Also, we will presume that the Legislature used every word of a statute for a purpose. Finally, we will try to avoid construing a statutory provision in isolation from the rest of the statute; we should consider the act as a whole, and not just single phrases, clauses, or sentences.
City of Austin v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
It appears that the Fourteenth Court in Tanner failed to see any distinction between the terms "duty" and "obligation." Section 157.005(a) vests a trial court with jurisdiction to hold an obligor in contempt for failure to pay child support if the enforcement motion is filed within six months after the child support "obligation" terminates. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 157.005(a). Conversely, section 151.001(b) defines in general terms the extent of a parent's "duty" to support his or her child. Id. § 151.001(b). Section 151.001(c) expressly recognizes that a parent's "duty" to support a child can be modified by court order. Id. § 151.001(c). Because the Legislature used these two terms in the child support statutes, we must presume that it did so for a particular purpose. Sw. Bell Tel., 92 S.W.3d at 442.
Certainly, the terms "duty" and "obligation" can be synonyms in ordinary meaning. The New American Roget's College Thesaurus 370 (Philip D. Morehead ed., rev. ed., Signet 1985) (listing "duty" as first synonym of "obligation"). In the child support context however, the term "obligation" assumes a more unique meaning. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(b) (Vernon 1998) ("Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly."). Title 5 contains numerous provisions which reference a child support "obligation." Virtually all of these provisions reflect that an "obligation" to pay child support is established by court order.
The following are some examples:
• "'Child support services' means . . . court actions to . . . establish, modify, or enforce child support . . . obligations"; TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 101.006 (Vernon 2002);
• "'Title IV-D case' means an action in which services are provided by the Title IV-D agency . . . relating to the . . . establishment, modification, or enforcement of a child support . . . obligation"; Id. § 101.034 (Vernon 2002);
• child support order shall require each party to inform the other and the court, etc. of changes in address, etc. "as long as any person, as a result of the order, is under an obligation to pay child support"; Id. § 105.006(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004);
• "A child support obligation does not terminate on the death of the obligee but continues as an obligation to the child named in the support order, as required by this section"; Id. § 154.013(a) (Vernon 2002);
• "A support order may be modified only as to obligations accruing after the earlier of: (1) the date of service of citation; or (2) an appearance in the suit to modify"; Id. § 156.401(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
These statutes lead us to the conclusion that the "duty" to support a child is a general responsibility imposed by statute while an "obligation" to pay child support is a responsibility imposed by a specific court order.
Applying this interpretation, we must determine if and when Clark's court-ordered "obligation" to pay child support to Troxel terminated. Two statutes address when a child support obligation terminates. Section 154.006 provides:
§ 154.006. Termination of Duty of Support
The Legislature's use of the term "duty" in the heading appears to run counter to our discussion of the distinction between the terms "duty" and "obligation." Nevertheless, "[t]he heading of a title, subtitle, chapter, subchapter, or section does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.024 (Vernon 1998). The body of the statute describes the circumstances under which a "child support order terminates." Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 556, § 9, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3058, 3060 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 154.006 (Vernon Supp. 2004)). Accordingly, we conclude that the language used in the body of the statute supports our construction of the term "obligation" and controls over the terminology used in the heading.
(a) Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the order or as provided by Subsection (b), the child support order terminates on the marriage of the child, removal of the child's disabilities for general purposes, or death of the child or a parent ordered to pay child support.
(b) Unless a nonparent or agency has been appointed conservator of the child under Chapter 153, the order for current child support, and any provision relating to conservatorship, possession, or access terminates on the marriage or remarriage of the obligor and obligee to each other.
Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 556, § 9, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3058, 3060 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 154.006 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
Section 154.013 provides in pertinent part:
§ 154.013. Continuation of Duty to Pay Support After Death of Obligee
See note 7, supra.
(a) A child support obligation does not terminate on the death of the obligee but continues as an obligation to the child named in the support order, as required by this section.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.013(a).
The Beaumont Court of Appeals has held that a court order modifying a prior custody order by designating the obligor parent as the child's managing conservator "ends the child support obligation from [the obligor parent and former possessory conservator] to [the obligee parent and former managing conservator]." Comeaux v. Comeaux, 767 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ); accord In re Doe, 917 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied); cf. Tanner, 904 S.W.2d at 204 (modification order increasing amount of child support to be paid did not terminate child support obligation imposed by original divorce decree).
We must decide whether the Comeaux holding should extend to a situation in which the court designates a non-parent as managing conservator of the child. We conclude that it does. An order modifying a prior child custody or support order necessarily supercedes the prior order to the extent a modification is ordered. Thus, an order modifying a prior child support order may or may not "terminate" the obligation imposed by the prior order, depending on the circumstances.
The modification order in Tanner did not "terminate" the obligor's obligation to pay child support to his former wife on behalf of their child. See 904 S.W.2d at 204. Rather, it increased the amount of his obligation. Id. at 203-04. Conversely in Comeaux, the modification order "terminated" the obligor's obligation to pay child support to his former wife because the modification order designated the obligor as the managing conservator. See 767 S.W.2d at 502.
Here, the modification order "terminated" Clark's obligation to pay child support to Troxel and replaced it with an obligation to pay child support to Daily. Id. Under the terms of section 154.006(a), we hold that his obligation to Troxel terminated as "expressly provided in the [modification] order." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.006(a). Thus, Clark's obligation to pay child support to Troxel terminated on October 28, 1998, when the court signed the modification order.
Section 157.005(a) defines the length of time a court retains jurisdiction to hold an obligor in contempt for failure to pay child support. In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d 244, 248-49 (Tex. 2002). Under subsection (a)(2), a court's jurisdiction to hold an obligor in contempt expires if an enforcement motion is not filed within six months after the obligation terminates. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005(a)(2). Troxel did not file her enforcement motion within that six-month period. Thus, the court did not have jurisdiction to hold Clark in contempt for non-payment of the child support owed to Troxel.
Because the court did not have jurisdiction, Clark has met his burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion. See Sw. Bell Tel., 35 S.W.3d at 605.
We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus and direct Respondent to withdraw the contempt order entered on May 29, 2002 in cause number 28,034 and notify this Court in writing that he has done so. The writ will issue only if Respondent fails to comply within 20 days after the date of this opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION ON REHEARING
I respectfully dissent to the majority's opinion on rehearing of Clark's petition for writ of mandamus. I briefly note some grounds of dissent.
I refer to the parties by their proper names rather than party designations. The majority, though purporting to treat Clark's petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than as a petition for writ of mandamus, refers to Judge McGregor as "Respondent," as though the petition were a petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 3.1(h)(2), 52.2. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, there is no respondent. Cf. id. 52.2. The majority also refers to Clark as "Petitioner." Petitioner is not a proper party designation in either a petition for writ of mandamus or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Cf. id. 3.1(e)-(f), (h)(2), 52.2.
First, although stating that "[l]itigants should not have to navigate [a] morass to obtain relief" from contempt for failure to pay child support, ( see slip op. at 5), the majority's dicta only deepens the morass, and so I cannot join it. In this connection, I note only one inconsistency. The majority states that "when the contemnor's commitment has been suspended and the contemnor has been placed on community supervision, habeas is the appropriate remedy," but that "if the commitment has been suspended . . ., mandamus is the appropriate remedy." ( See id.). But the Texas Family Code authorizes the trial court to suspend commitment only if the court places the contemnor on community supervision. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 157.165, 157.211 (Vernon 2002).
Next, I dissent from the majority's treating Clark's petition for writ of mandamus as a petition for writ of habeas corpus without complying with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure for petitions for writs of habeas corpus. I am not necessarily opposed to treating the petition as one for a writ of habeas corpus rather than for a writ of mandamus. Clark specifically requests this relief in the alternative. The standards of review for mandamus and for habeas corpus differ. If we treat a relator's petition for writ of mandamus as one for a writ of habeas corpus and, as a result, the relator does not meet the habeas standards, then so be it.
I note that the case that the majority cites as authority for the proposition, "we shall construe [Clark's] mandamus petition as one seeking habeas relief," is no authority for construing a pleading as seeking anything other than what it does expressly seek. ( See slip op. at 5 (citing Ex parte Casillas, 25 S.W.3d 296, 297 n. 1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding).). In Casillas, the relator "styled her document a 'petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or writ of mandamus,'" and the court treated it as the former. Casillas, 25 S.W.3d at 297 n. 1.
I note that Clark originally filed a "Brief for Appellant, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Motion for Writ of Mandamus." In re B.A.C., No. 10-02-00243-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.-Waco July 21, 2004, no pet. h.) (No. 10-02-00243-CV). We instructed Clark, "If appellant desires to request" mandamus or habeas "relief, appellant must file an original proceeding in this Court under Rule of Appellate Procedure 52." See TEX. R. APP. P. 52. Clark chose to file the instant Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
But the majority has not complied with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and thus has not given Troxel a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The majority recasts Clark's petition and grants relief, without giving Troxel an opportunity to respond to the petition as recast by the majority. As in all original proceedings, "[i]f the court is of the opinion that" the relator in a petition for writ of habeas corpus "is entitled to the relief sought or that a serious question concerning the relief requires further consideration," then "the court must request a response if one has not been filed." TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b) (1) (emphasis added). "The court must not grant relief — other than temporary relief — before a response has been filed or requested by the court." Id. 52.4. Among the temporary relief "in a habeas corpus proceeding, the court may order that the relator be discharged on execution and filing of a bond in an amount set by the court." Id. 52.8(b)(3). Although Troxel has filed a response to Clark's petition for writ of mandamus, she has not filed, and the Court has not requested, a response to a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the majority may not summarily grant the writ.
Next, it is bewildering that, after the majority's lengthy if unenlightening analysis that arrives at the conclusions that Clark must seek relief by a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and that the majority will treat Clark's petition as one for a writ of habeas corpus, the majority nonetheless analyzes the case exclusively in mandamus terms. I dissent to the majority's doing so. In its substantive analysis, the majority cites only mandamus cases, and holds, under the mandamus standard, that the trial court abused its discretion. ( See slip op. at 5-6, 12 (citing In re S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (mandamus)).) The majority then concludes by granting the writ of mandamus. ( Id. at 12.) If the majority intends to treat Clark's petition as one for a writ of habeas corpus, then the majority must analyze it under habeas standards, and if it grants relief, grant habeas relief.
I further dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court's commitment order was void (under the habeas standard) or that the trial court clearly abused its discretion (under the mandamus standard). The majority's holding turns on a tortured analysis of the distinction between "obligation" and "duty." ( See slip op. at 6-11.) I cannot agree with this lengthy analysis. The canons of statutory construction should be used to remove, not to create, ambiguity. See Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999) (certified question). Likewise, courts must construe statutory language so as to harmonize all relevant laws, where possible, and not to create conflicts between them. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984) (op. on orig. submission). Because the statutory language is not consistent with the distinction that the majority believes that the statutes should observe, the majority disregards the statutory language. ( See slip op. at 6-9.) In particular, the majority disregards the statutory captions, even though the Code Construction Act provides that a court may consider captions in interpreting a statute. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(7) (Vernon 1998); In re A.M., 101 S.W.3d 480, 484 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (child support); Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
I assume that the majority interprets the correct version of Family Code Section 157.005 and the 2002 versions of statutes generally. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005 (Vernon 2002). The act enacting Section 157.005 provides: "The change in law made by this Act does not affect a proceeding under the Family Code pending on the effective date of this Act. A proceeding pending on the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect at the time the proceeding was commenced, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose." Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 3(a), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 282; see id. § 1, sec. 157.005, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws at 177 (amended 1999) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005). Former law provided:
The court retains jurisdiction to enter a contempt order if a motion for contempt for failure to comply with a court's child support order is filed within six months after:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) the date on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by operation of law.
Act of May 27, 1995, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 232, § 9, sec. 14.40(b), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1158, 1162 (repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005(a)). That former law took effect on September 1, 1985. Id. § 16, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1172. Clark and Troxel were divorced, and Clark's child-support obligation under the divorce decree began, in 1984.
That analysis is, at any rate, irrelevant to the case. The majority assumes that the period for enforcing Clark's court-ordered child-support obligation to Troxel by contempt ended when, according to the majority's analysis, that ongoing obligation to her ended. I cannot concur in the majority's conclusion that a modification of the child-support order so as to require payments to Daily terminated Clark's obligation to Troxel as a matter of law. ( Cf. slip op. at 10-11.) But even if it did, the court-ordered child-support obligation continues uninterrupted in his court-ordered obligation to Daily. And the plain language of Section 157.005 extends the court's contempt jurisdiction to six months after the date "on which the child support obligation terminates." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.005(a)(2) (Vernon 2002).
Clark has not made the original divorce decree part of the record in this original proceeding. Cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(1); In re Taylor, 28 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, orig. proceeding). If we were to consider it in the clerk's record in the companion appeal, it provides that Clark's child-support obligation to Troxel continues "until the child reaches the age of 18 or is otherwise emancipated." Decree of Divorce at 3, B.A.C. (No. 10-02-00243-CV).
Moreover, it is clear that the modification order did not, as the majority holds it did, expressly terminate Clark's court-ordered child-support obligation to Troxel. The majority states that the trial court's modification order "'expressly provided'" that Clark's child support obligation to Troxel terminated. (Slip op. at 11 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.006(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).) The majority so concludes only by confusing "express" with "implied." That which is "[e]xpress . . . is that which is affirmatively stated." Russell v. Ramirez, 949 S.W.2d 480, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). The majority does not, and cannot, point to any affirmative statement in the modification order which would expressly terminate the child-support obligation to Troxel. Indeed, the majority as much as acknowledges this fact when it states that "the modification order 'terminated' Clark's obligation." ( See slip op. at 11.) This use of quotation marks, not to indicate a quotation, but to indicate that the majority is speaking loosely, itself suggests that any termination of obligation is, at most, implied. See BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE § 1.31 (2002). In any case, under former Family Code Section 14.006, on which the majority relies, a "child support order terminates" as "expressly provided in the order." See Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 556, § 9, sec. 14.006(a), 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3058, 3060 (amended 2003) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.006(a)). Under the plain language of this statute, a child-support order may terminate under its own terms, not under the terms of another order. See id.
Indeed, Clark has not made the modification order part of the record of this original proceeding. Cf. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(1).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the majority's opinion on rehearing.
DISSENTING OPINION ON ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
I respectfully dissent to the Court's order on Larry Clark's motion for rehearing.
I dissent to transferring Clark's motion for rehearing to the instant cause from Cause No. 10-02-00243-CV, styled In the Interest of B.A.C. "[T]he plaintiff is 'the master of the complaint[.]'" Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987)); accord Heard v. Moore, 101 S.W.3d 726, 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). "Of course the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (quoting Fair v. Kohler Die Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)); accord Heard at 728. "Plaintiffs are masters of their complaints and remain so at the appellate state of a litigation." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989). Clark chose to file a motion for rehearing in B.A.C., but not in the instant cause.
The cases that the Court cites are distinguishable. Both concern appellate jurisdiction. See Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. 1992) ("attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction"); Motor Vehicle Bd. v. El Paso Indep. Auto Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex. 1999) (misnomer (Motor Vehicle Div. for Motor Vehicle Bd.) does not affect standing). The Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over any appeal in which the appellant files an instrument in a bona fide attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction." Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997). This court's jurisdiction over Clark's motion for rehearing is not disputed. Apart from this rare exception for the invocation of appellate jurisdiction, a filing is effective only in the cause in which it is filed. See Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also Stone v. State, 931 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref'd); but see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. 1994) ("clerical error").
The Court should not transfer Clark's motion for rehearing to the instant cause. Because the Court does so, I respectfully dissent.
Since I believe that we were correct originally, the Court's opinion that is being withdrawn is attached as an appendix to this opinion.