Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VJ31850, Steff Padilla and Mitchel Harris, Temporary Judges. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Jonathan J. Kline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
VOGEL, Acting P.J.
Christopher B. was charged by petition with vandalism resulting in less than $400 in damages. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) The petition was sustained, his maximum period of confinement was set at one year, and he was placed at home on probation. Christopher appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the term of confinement. We agree that no term of confinement should have been set, modify the judgment accordingly, and otherwise affirm.
DISCUSSION
I.
Christopher contends there is insufficient evidence to prove vandalism. We disagree.
A.
Christopher was a student at La Mirada High School. At the end of his first period class, his teacher (Irma Priest) saw him lingering at the door of the classroom, his back to Priest, his hands raised. Priest, who could not see whether there was anything in Christopher’s hands, asked him what he was doing. Without responding, Christopher quickly walked out of the classroom. Priest looked at the door and saw “Base K” written on it in ink. There had been no writing on the door that morning (it had recently been cleaned by the custodians).
B.
To support a sustained petition alleging a violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), the evidence must show that Christopher maliciously defaced property belonging to another, thereby damaging or destroying the property. Christopher concedes the door was maliciously damaged and defaced but contends there is insufficient evidence to show that he was the perpetrator. We disagree. The door was not defaced when the class started. Christopher was the last to leave when the class ended, and his teacher saw him standing at the door with his hands raised. When Priest asked him what he was doing, he did not respond. When he left, the door was defaced. No more was required. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088; People v. Mason (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1199.)
Christopher’s reliance on In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735 is misplaced. In Leanna, a minor who should not have been in the house at all had a party at her grandmother’s house and the property was damaged. The Court of Appeal reversed a finding that the minor was vicariously liable for the damage caused by her friends because the “evidence [did] not support a reasonable inference that Leanna damaged or destroyed her grandmother’s property, and, hence, [did] not support a finding of vandalism.” (Id. at p. 744.) In Leanna, no one testified about the minor’s activities or connected her to the damage. Here, the teacher placed Christopher, and only Christopher, in a position to write on the door. Leanna is inaposite.
II.
Christopher contends no maximum term of confinement should have been set because he was placed on probation. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 571.) The Attorney General concedes the point but contends there is no need to correct the record because Christopher is not prejudiced by the mistake. We agree there was error and agree with Christopher that it ought to be corrected. He is entitled to a record reflecting his correct punishment, no more and no less.
DISPOSITION
The order is modified by striking the term of maximum confinement and, as modified, affirmed and remanded to the juvenile court with directions to correct its orders accordingly.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., JACKSON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.