Opinion
F041385.
7-25-2003
In re CHRISTOPHER S., A Person Coming Under The Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER S., Defendant and Appellant.
Donal M. Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew L. Cate and John A. Thawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The court readjudged appellant, Christopher S., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code § 602) after Christopher admitted allegations charging him with assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and resisting arrest (Pen Code, 148). On appeal, Christopher contends the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the California Youth Authority (CYA). We will affirm.
FACTS
On April 27, 2002, 68-year-old Manuel Ramos was at a party in Modesto when Christopher, who appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, began arguing with him over $ 4 Ramos allegedly owed him. Ramos walked home to avoid a confrontation, but Christopher followed him. As Ramos entered his house, Christopher threw a beer bottle that broke on the doorjamb. Christopher followed Ramos into the house and pushed him. He then grabbed a chair and swung it at Ramos. The chair struck Ramoss left arm as Ramos raised it to protect himself. Christopher put the chair down, picked up a plate, and threw it in the sink, breaking it. He then walked out of the house to the backyard and continued to yell at Ramos. Before leaving, Christopher threw an object at Ramoss house and broke a window.
Modesto police officers soon arrived on the scene and located Christopher. After the officers returned Christopher to Ramoss house, Ramos identified him as the person who assaulted him. Christopher was then placed in a patrol car and began banging his head against the rear window. He also began yelling, "Fuck you mother fucker, I want to die" and "Fuck you cops just shoot me." Christopher continued to act out and he was eventually placed in a protective wrap and taken to the hospital where he was given a sedative.
Christophers probation report indicated that he was born in March 1985 and was 17 years old when he assaulted Ramos. Although he had been estranged from his mother most of his life, he was living with her at that time.
In a probation department interview, Christopher stated that he began drinking the night he was arrested after his mother embarrassed him in front of his friends by yelling at him and telling him not to come back. In addition to alcohol, Christopher admitted experimenting with marijuana, cocaine, and "acid."
In 1990, he was removed from his mothers custody because of neglect and physical abuse and placed with his stepfather. However, he was subsequently removed from his stepfathers custody because of physical abuse. Child Protective Services then placed him in a succession of foster homes and group homes until January 2001 when he was placed on formal probation for the assault offense discussed below. Christopher denied ever being sexually abused.
In April 2000, Christopher assaulted another minor at school. This incident resulted in Christopher admitting a charge of battery and the matter was closed at intake.
Christophers next contact with the juvenile justice system occurred after he fired a BB gun at a city vehicle, breaking a window and causing a piece of broken glass to strike a city worker.
On January 18, 2001, the court terminated dependency proceedings and declared Christopher a ward of the court after it sustained allegations charging Christopher with assault with a deadly weapon. Christopher was subsequently placed at three different group homes and ran away from each of them. Additionally, in each of these commitments, he was difficult to manage and his conduct was often out of control.
The probation report noted that Christopher had a history of mental health issues, suicide attempts, use of psychotropic medications, and psychiatric hospitalizations. While committed to one group home, Christopher was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with mood congruent psychotic features.
The report further noted that Christopher had been in custody in juvenile hall since the date of his arrest and that during that time, he had been seen on a regular basis by Rachael Acosta, a mental health clinician. Additionally, during his stay at juvenile hall, Christopher attempted suicide and reported having demonic dreams and hearing voices. His overall behavior at juvenile hall had been unsatisfactory in that he had been disrespectful to staff. He had been placed in handcuff restraints and the restraint chair for out of control behavior. Christopher was taking a number of medications to help control his behavior and moods.
The report noted that Christopher had a long history with social services because of neglect and physical abuse by his mother and stepfather and he experienced overwhelming feelings of mistrust of others and loss of self-worth. Although, he had been afforded many opportunities while in foster care to work through these issues in therapy, he emotionally blocked any attempts to do so.
The report also noted that Christopher continued his destructive behavior and thwarted all attempts by the department to rehabilitate and emotionally stabilize him. It further concluded that given the years of services provided by social services and the lack of any suitable stable relatives, all local and placement-related therapeutic options were not appropriate. It further concluded that Christopher needed intense mental health services and psychiatric stabilization in a secure rehabilitative setting capable of properly caring for his needs. Thus, the report recommended a commitment to the CYA so Christopher could receive the treatment he needed and the community would be protected from his behavior.
In a letter to the court dated June 12, 2002, Mental Health Clinician Acosta stated they were working with various medicines to get Christophers symptoms under control and their objective was to eventually transition him to the adult services program, which also provided alcohol treatment.
On June 14, 2002, at Christophers disposition hearing, the court continued the hearing pursuant to defense counsels request.
At the continued hearing on June 20, 2002, the prosecutor stated she agreed with the probation departments recommendation because Christopher needed the structure, psychiatric counseling, medication, anger management and alcohol counseling that could best be provided by the CYA. The prosecutor also noted that a CYA commitment would be appropriate to protect the community and for Christophers own well-being. Defense counsel argued for a commitment to juvenile hall until he was 18 with a suspended CYA commitment. The court took the matter under submission and continued the matter.
Subsequently, the court was provided with several documents relating to Christopher. In a letter to the court dated July 3, 2002, Mental Health Clinician Roger Loff stated that the juvenile hall mental health team was optimistic that they could provide for Christophers treatment needs. Loff spoke to the coordinator for the Hutton House and she gave him a verbal commitment that the program would accept Christopher 60 days prior to Christophers 18th birthday. Loff also stated that their goal at juvenile hall was to transition Christopher to the Pathways Transitional Living Program and Adult Mental Health Services.
A memo from April Saldana, a juvenile hall staff member, dated July 23, 2002, detailed disturbances by Christopher on July 17, and 21, 2002, and a suicide attempt on July 18, 2002.
In a memo to the court dated July 23, 2002, Mental Health Clinician Acosta indicated that Christopher had been tried on new medications beginning May 30, 2002, and was responding well. However, due to side-effects from one medicine, which was discontinued on July 15, 2002, all other medicines were discontinued on July 22, 2002, as a precautionary measure. The report also noted that Christopher had three episodes that week.
On July 25, 2002, at Christophers continued disposition hearing, the court was advised that Christopher was involved in some recent disturbances that were apparently precipitated by his medication. Defense counsel advised the court that he spoke with Mental Health Clinician Loff and he stated that the incidents with Christopher were unfortunate, that it seemed to be a medication problem, and that it did not change the mental health teams belief that they could work with Christopher at juvenile hall. Defense counsel also requested a continuance of two months in order to stabilize Christopher on his medication. The court, however, continued the matter until August 6, 2002, and requested that someone from juvenile hall be present in order to address some of the courts concerns regarding housing Christopher there including the security and protection of the staff and other wards and the training of staff to deal with Christopher.
In a letter dated August 6, 2002, Dr. Charles Edwards stated that Christophers probable diagnosis was bipolar disorder. He noted that Christophers treatment would probably require treatment for the rest of his life. In addition to finding an effective treatment, another goal was to transition Christopher to the adult system of care when he turned 18.
On August 6, 2002, at the continued disposition hearing, Mary Merrill, the staff supervisor for Christophers juvenile hall unit, testified that she had to intervene during some of the incidents involving Christopher. According to Merrill, she had seen Christopher be verbally aggressive but never physically aggressive. Although he fought back when he was placed in the restraint chair, he did not fight to the point where he could not be controlled. During the last incident, which occurred the previous night, Christopher attempted to spit on the staff. Merrill further testified that Christopher gets physical with himself, the walls, and doors, but not with the staff.
During cross-examination, Merrill testified that she had to contact Christopher at least once every shift because of an outburst. The previous night, he told them that he was going to punch them in the head and he was verbally abusive towards her for the first time. Merrill further testified that Christopher usually is not abusive toward other minors. Instead, he tries to get them to participate in the disturbance he creates. Further, he monopolizes an inordinate amount of staff time when they have to calm him down because, although he eventually cooperates, sometimes it takes hours and his disturbances last anywhere from 45 minutes to 8 hours. The attempts to calm Christopher down usually started with a regular line worker and eventually required Merrill to intervene. If that did not work, they would call a senior probation officer and it just continued from there.
Merrill worked in the high security unit. This unit contained wards with mental issues and wards adjudicated for serious or violent offenses. Her unit contains two staff members for 134 wards. The staff at juvenile hall did not have any special training to deal with juveniles with mental health issues.
Merrill further testified that not all disturbances are documented. Christopher caused disturbances on July 18 and 21, 2002, and on August 1, 4, and 5, 2002, that were documented.
After Merrill testified, the court asked the probation officer whether the additional testimony changed her recommendation and she said it did not. The prosecutor concurred with the probation departments recommendation and stated that it was apparent from all the documentation that Christophers mental health required dedicated, constant supervision and care and that the appropriate place for him to receive these services would be at the CYA and its mental health treatment facilities with their various resources that would be available to treat him.
Defense counsel argued that one difference in the treatment Christopher would receive at the CYA and the treatment he would receive at juvenile hall until just before his 18th birthday was that at juvenile hall, he had a group of people who were very dedicated in trying to help him and prepare him for his eventual release.
After hearing counsels arguments, the court committed Christopher to the CYA. In so doing, the court noted that because of Christophers mental health needs, he had to be committed either to juvenile hall or the CYA. However, the court felt that Christopher required more attention than the staff at the juvenile hall could provide him and that juvenile hall staff did not have the training and the time to deal with him in light of the other wards they had to tend to.
DISCUSSION
Christopher cites a myriad of circumstances he contends show that the record does not support the courts finding he would benefit from a CYA commitment or that a commitment to juvenile hall was inappropriate. We will discuss his specific contentions seriatim and reject his contention that the court abused its discretion in committing him to the CYA.
"To support a CYA commitment, it is required that there be evidence in the record demonstrating probable benefit to the minor, and evidence supporting a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate." (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 571, 576, 258 Cal. Rptr. 540.) On appeal, " The decision of the juvenile court may be reversed . . . only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing a minor to CYA. [Citations.] An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. " (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 49, 53, 260 Cal. Rptr. 258.) " In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented to support the commitment in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law. ( § 200 et seq. . . .) " (In re Lorenza M., supra, 212 Cal. App. 3d at p. 53.) "In 1984, the Legislature amended the statement of purpose found in section 202 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It now recognizes punishment as a rehabilitative tool and emphasizes the protection and safety of the public. [Citation.] The significance of this change in emphasis is that when we assess the record in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law [citation] we evaluate the exercise of discretion with punishment and public safety and protection in mind." (Id. at pp. 57-58; accord, In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal. App. 3d 1392, 1396, 234 Cal. Rptr. 103; In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473 ["The 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the public."].)
It is clear from the record that Christopher required intensive therapeutic intervention and appropriate medication to deal with his severe mental illness. Further, his acting out behavior and his actions in running away from several placements demonstrated that Christopher needed to be in a secure placement. Thus, as noted by the court, the only two viable placement options for Christopher were a commitment to juvenile hall or a commitment to the CYA. However, juvenile hall staff were not trained to deal with wards with mental health issues and Christopher continued to act out and monopolize the time of the two staff members in his unit who were responsible for supervising as many as 134 wards who either had severe mental health issues or had committed serious or violent offenses. Christopher was also a danger to himself, having attempted suicide several times. And, although he had not yet been physically aggressive with the staff or other wards, Christophers physical aggression towards inanimate objects, his verbal aggression towards juvenile hall staff, and his two assault offenses demonstrated that the potential for such aggression lay just below the surface. Additionally, the court could reasonably have found from the severity of Christophers mental problems and their longevity, that a seven-month commitment to juvenile hall until he turned 18 would be inadequate to rehabilitate him, especially since the juvenile hall mental health staff had not been able to stabilize his condition in the approximately three months he had already been there.
Moreover, in light of Christophers history of mental illness, violence, and verbal aggression, his commitment to the CYA was consistent with the juvenile court laws goal of protecting the public. Accordingly, we find that the record contains substantial evidence that supports the courts order committing Christopher to the CYA.
Christopher contends there was no evidence before the court that he would receive the necessary medical and therapeutic intervention at the CYA. We disagree. Defense counsel did not introduce any evidence to contradict the assertion by the probation department and the prosecutor that Christopher would receive the medication and treatment he needed at the CYA. Further, as noted by respondent, California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 4611 provides that "A newly committed ward, . . . shall receive complete medical diagnostic services. Other wards may receive either complete or partial diagnostic services. Such services shall include: [P] (a) Referral to appropriate specialists as needed (medical specialist, psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.), and the administering of clinical laboratory, x-ray, and other tests as indicated." (See also Cal. Code Regs., title 15, §§ 4730 & 4742.)
California Code of Regulations, title 15 section 1430 provides that "A ward requiring extensive or long term . . . psychiatric treatment shall, when possible, be considered for return to the committing county of home environment for such care." Christopher suggests that this language favored a commitment to the juvenile hall rather than the CYA. Christopher is wrong. The regulation at issue is not a mandatory directive. Further, as discussed previously, a local commitment to the juvenile hall was inappropriate primarily because of Christophers disruptive acting out behavior, which required an inordinate amount of staff time.
Christopher cites Morris v Harper (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 52 to contend that simply because there are regulations requiring the CYA to provide appropriate mental health treatment to wards does not mean it actually provides these services. Christophers reliance on Morris is misplaced. In Morris, the court found that the director of the CYA missed the 1994 deadline for complying with certain statutory licensing requirements for its 11 treatment centers and it ordered him to comply with these requirements. (Id. at pp. 56-58, 63.) Morris does not help Christopher because the court did not find that the CYA was not providing these services at all. Instead, it found only that it had not complied with certain statutory licensing requirements.
Christopher contends that the courts findings that juvenile hall staff did not have the time or manpower to deal with his continuous acting out behavior and that he posed a danger to staff and other wards at the hall were each based on speculation. Christopher is wrong. As noted above, staff supervisor Merrill testified that in her unit, which housed wards with mental problems or who had committed serious or violent felonies, there were only two line staff members for up to 134 wards. She further testified that Christopher monopolized an inordinate amount of staff time because he was involved in disturbances on a daily basis and each disturbance lasted from 45 minutes to eight hours and progressively involved higher level supervisors. The court could reasonably find from these circumstances that with so many wards and so few staff, the staff did not have the manpower to safely deal with the disturbances involving Christopher on a continuous basis. Further, the court could reasonably find for the reasons noted above that there existed a very real potential for Christopher to become physically aggressive with the staff and other wards.
Christopher also contends there is no evidence to support the courts finding that the juvenile hall lacked a strong structured mental health program to deal with him. Christopher misread the courts comments. Our review of the pages cited by Christopher for this proposition disclosed that what the court actually said was that Christopher needed a strong structured program but that the juvenile hall program was not the program he needed. Further, the record supports the courts conclusion because despite the mental health staffs optimism that they could control Christophers symptoms, his lengthy stay at juvenile hall, and changes to his medication, Christopher continued to act out up until the day before his disposition hearing, even though he knew that the court was considering committing him to the CYA.
Christopher also contends that because of his mental condition, punishment was not an appropriate consideration in placing him. However, it is clear from the record that punishment was not a consideration in the courts decision to commit him to the CYA. Nevertheless, the court was entitled to consider the danger Christopher posed to the community. Further, on this record it could reasonably find that the safety of the community required a longer commitment than the approximately seven months Christopher would serve in juvenile hall before he was transitioned to the adult mental health services program. Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it committed Christopher to the CYA.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.