Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK69273 Stephen Marpet, Referee.
Kate M. Chandler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Byron G. Shibata, Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KITCHING, J.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court found a nine-year-old boy a person within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c). The court then immediately issued a dispositional order declaring the boy a dependent of the court and detaining him from his presumed father. The father appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. We affirm.
All subsequent section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the facts in the record by presenting them in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)
Appellant Fernando R. is the presumed father of Christian R. Silvia S. is Christian’s mother. When Christian was about two and one-half years old, mother commenced divorce proceedings against father. In October 2005, mother and father were given joint custody of Christian. At first, Christian stayed with father on weekends. Later, visits were reduced to overnight on Thursdays and phone calls on Mondays and Wednesdays.
The family law proceedings between Christian’s parents continued for many years and were acrimonious. Mother obtained a restraining order against father in June 2005. Mother claims that father repeatedly violated the restraining order and parked outside of her home to intimidate her. According to the Alhambra police, between January 2007 and September 2007, father was a reporting party or other party to over 19 complaints regarding child custody and related matters.
In an effort to mitigate conflicts between the parents, the superior court presiding over the divorce proceedings ordered that the transfer of Christian from one parent to the other take place at an Alhambra police station. At each transfer, however, father engaged in confrontational and abusive conduct towards mother and other family members who assisted her. On one occasion, father held Christian and told him not to talk to mother. On another, he pushed mother’s husband, Marvin Q., who walked away to avoid a conflict. Father also called mother, Marvin and mother’s father demeaning and derogatory names in front of Christian. For instance, father called Marvin “dick,” “pussy” and “bitch.” Father did not let mother leave the police station with Christian until a police officer escorted her out.
While Christian stayed with father, father expressed great anger and contempt towards mother to Christian. Father repeatedly told Christian that he wanted to hurt mother and sometimes feels like killing mother. Father told Christian that mother was evil and the enemy, and that “you must eliminate and kill evil and the enemies.” He further told Christian that he (father) would eliminate evil even if he had to spend his whole life in jail. Father also repeatedly referred to mother and her family in demeaning and derogatory terms. He once told Christian “fuck your mother, brothers and Marvin.” Father also told Christian that his mother did not love him and only wants him for the money.
Father instructed Christian to be hard on his mother and stepfather and not to listen to them. In particular, father urged Christian to make a scene at the police station during transfers and to force mother to physically push him into the car. If Christian did not make a scene at the police station or otherwise follow father’s instructions, father told Christian that he was a disappointment to him. Father also punished Christian by making him kneel and carry heavy books on his hands and over his head, or by forcing him to stand outside of mother’s home when she was not there wearing only his underwear.
In July 2007, father instructed Christian to falsely state to the police that mother and Marvin were physically abusing Christian. Christian complied and lied to the police. Shortly afterwards, however, Christian confessed to the police that he lied at his father’s request. Christian was 9 years old at the time.
The Alhambra police reported the incident to Los Angeles County Department of Family Services (DCFS). Within three days of Christian’s initial report to the police, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (c).
In October 2007, after a trial, the juvenile court granted the petition. The court then immediately entered an order declaring Christian a dependent of the court and placing Christian with mother under DCFS’s supervision. The order also limited father’s visitation of Christian to visits with a DCFS-approved monitor in a DCFS-approved setting. Father filed a timely appeal from the order.
CONTENTIONS
Father contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (c). He further contends that the juvenile court’s removal of Christian from father’s custody was “unauthorized” and “legally impossible.” Finally, father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in declaring Christian a dependent.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Finding
The juvenile court made a jurisdictional finding that Christian was a person that fell within the definition of section 300, subdivision (c). The standard of review is whether substantial evidence supports this finding. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) We hold that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.
Section 300 provides that any minor who comes within the descriptions set forth in subdivisions (a) through (j) is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section 300, subdivision (c) provides the following description: “The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care.”
DCFS was required to prove three elements in order for the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c): “ ‘(1) the offending parental conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk thereof, as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior.’ ” (In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 329.) Father does not dispute element one was satisfied. He contends, however, that there was insufficient evidence supporting elements two and three. We disagree.
The evidence in the record shows that father engaged in a course and pattern of conduct over an extended period of time designed to use Christian to attack his former wife. He went so far as to pressure his nine-year-old son to lie to the police. Father’s conduct was egregious and, at a minimum, placed Christian in grave danger of suffering serious emotional harm.
The evidence indicated, moreover, that unless the juvenile court intervened, father would continue to use Christian to attack mother. Father falsely denied his abusive conduct towards Christian and had no interest setting aside his differences with mother for Christian’s sake. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence that father’s conduct caused Christian to suffer at least the risk of serious emotional harm at the time of trial. That is all that is needed to satisfy section 300, subdivision (c). (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [section 300, subdivision (c) jurisdiction even though children had not yet suffered harm].)
DCFS also presented ample evidence that at the time of the trial, Christian actually suffered serious emotional harm as a result of father’s conduct. DCFS’s evidence consisted of statements by mother, Christian and Marvin to DCFS and mother’s and Christian’s testimony at trial. This evidence showed that Christian was constantly nervous and anxious, and emotionally fragile. Christian clearly did not want to engage in aggressive behavior toward his mother and was very upset that his father pressured him to do so. Christian was also very upset about his parents’ fighting. At one point, Christian wanted to kill himself because he felt that father was not going to stop attacking mother.
Although he cares for father, Christian is frightened of him. He is afraid that father will be upset with him and he is scared for mother’s safety. Father’s constant attacks on mother and Christian’s anxiety about those attacks make it difficult for Christian to concentrate on his school work, and cause Christian to act more aggressively towards others.
After observing Christian at trial, the juvenile court found that he was “a switchy, nervous little kid,” “an emotional wreck” and “freaked out.” We must give deference to the juvenile court’s factual assessment of Christian’s emotional condition.
Father relies heavily on In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373 (Brison) to support his position. In Brison, the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (FDCFS) petitioned to detain a minor on the grounds that his parents’ conduct caused the minor serious emotional harm. The primary evidence relied upon by FDCFS, however, was “years out of date.” (Id. at 1380.) Thus, there was insufficient evidence that the minor child suffered serious emotional distress at the time of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Further, by the time of the hearing, both parents had recognized the inappropriateness of their behavior and made good faith efforts to alleviate the problem. (Id. at 1376.) As a result, there was a lack of substantial evidence showing that the minor was in significant danger of suffering serious emotional damage if jurisdiction was not assumed. (Id. at 1381.)
Here, by contrast, all of the evidence in the record was gathered within three months of the trial or presented at the trial itself. Further, unlike the parents in Brison, father did not recognize the inappropriateness of his behavior and did not make good faith efforts to alleviate the problem. Rather, in his statements to DCFS, he denied calling mother names in front of Christian, denied that he wanted to hurt mother or Marvin, and denied asking Christian to make a false police report, despite Christian’s testimony to the contrary. Father also denied that Christian would ever express suicidal thoughts and falsely claimed that mother fabricated a story about Christian’s statements about suicide.
At trial, mother testified that father repeatedly rebuffed her efforts at reaching some sort of truce for Christian’s sake. Father did not present any evidence to the contrary. Only after the juvenile court announced that it was going to sustain DCFS’s petition, did father state: “The only thing I want to say, your honor, I’m willing to do anything to rectify any problems that we might have.” This statement was far too little and too late, and did not amount to the contrition shown by the parents in Brison. Accordingly, unlike Brison, there was substantial evidence here that at time of the trial Christian suffered from serious emotional harm or the risk thereof.
2. The Juvenile Court Had Authority to Remove Christian From Father’s Custody
Father argues that the juvenile court’s order removing Christian from father’s custody was “unauthorized” and “legally impossible” because at the time the case started, Christian was not residing with father. The premise of father’s argument is incorrect. When DCFS filed its petition, father had joint custody of Christian and physical custody of Christian one day a week. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), the juvenile court could remove Christian from father’s physical custody if it made the factual findings specified in the statute.
Father perfunctorily claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s removal of Christian from father’s custody. He does not, however, present any meaningful argument or discussion of facts in connection with this claim. We thus decline to consider the claim. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 611, fn. 7.)
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declaring Christian a Dependent
Father argues that “[t]his is a matter for family law” and that it “does not serve the ends of justice to declare dependency in this case.” He contends that the court abused its discretion by declaring Christian a dependent pursuant to section 360, subdivision (d), which provides: “If the court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may order and adjudge the child to be a dependent child of the court.” (§ 360, subd. (d).)
“Section 360 is a disposition statute and sets forth several of the options available to the court at the disposition hearing.” (In re Summer H. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1324.) After finding Christian was a person described by section 300, the court could have issued a dispositional order without declaring the minor a dependent. (See § 360, subds. (a) & (b).) However, the court declined to do so.
We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to declare Christian a dependent under section 360, subdivision (d). There was substantial evidence showing that father’s conduct was causing serious emotional harm to Christian and that unless the court intervened, father would continue to cause such harm.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s October 22, 2007 jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.