GRIFFIN, J.

This matter is before us as the result of an executive message of Governor John M. Engler dated May 6, 1994, in which he requested this Court, pursuant to MCR 7.305(A), to address and resolve the question:

Is that portion of 1993 PA 198; i.e. MCL 418.701a; MSA 17.237(701a), which makes that consideration for the sale of the State Accident Fund the property of the state, constitutional and in conformance with the law?

Having granted the request, 446 Mich. 1201 (1994), we now answer that the challenged portion of the statute is constitutional.

I

Underlying the certified question presented in the instant case is a lawsuit, Fun 'N Sun RV, Inc v Michigan, filed September 21, 1993, in the Court of Claims by two Accident Fund policyholders. They allege, inter alia, that they and other similarly situated policyholders are owners of any surplus accumulated by the fund in excess of the amount needed to cover liabilities, that the fund's assets are held by the state in trust for the policy-holders, and that the policyholders are entitled to distribution of any surplus or profit of a potential sale of the fund by the state.

While this suit and a motion for summary disposition filed by the defendants were pending, the Legislature passed, and on October 19, 1993, the Governor signed, a series of bills that became effective April 1, 1994, as 1993 PA 195-200. Of particular significance for purposes of the matter before us is 1993 PA 198, now § 701a of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq., which declares in part:

(1) The state administrative board . . . may authorize the executive director of the state accident fund to enter into and consummate, under terms and conditions approved by the state administrative board, an agreement in the name of the state of Michigan for the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the state accident fund to a permitted transferee, and assumption of all or substantially all of the liabilities of the state accident fund by the permitted transferee subject to the following conditions:

* * *

(2) The consideration in the transaction . . . shall be the property of the state of Michigan.

On March 9, 1994, the Court of Claims issued an opinion denying defendants' motion for summary disposition. Relying primarily on Comm'r of Ins v Advisory Bd of the Michigan State Accident Fund, 173 Mich. App. 566; 434 N.W.2d 433 (1988), the court concluded that "the policyholders of the Accident Fund have a vested right to the assets, monies and surpluses of the Accident Fund. . . ."

On June 15, 1994, the State Administrative Board announced its approval of an agreement for the sale and transfer of the fund's assets and liabilities to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan for consideration in the sum of $291,000,000.

One provision of the legislation authorizing such a sale, § 701a(2), provides that except for one percent to be used for winding up the affairs of the Accident Fund, the consideration received by the state is to go into the "rainy day fund" established pursuant to § 351 of 1984 PA 431. Another provision indicates that any agreement for sale of the Accident Fund, § 701a(3)(a), is to be consummated by December 31, 1994, 1993 PA 198, § 3(1).

Before turning to the arguments presented in support of plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of 1993 PA 198, MCL 418.701a; MSA 17.237(701a), an overview of the historical context preceding this dispute is provided to aid our analysis.

II

In 1912, worker's disability compensation was first adopted and implemented in this state. The original legislation included provisions to establish the Accident Fund as an optional source from which employers could obtain liability insurance. The Accident Fund was to be administered by the Commissioner of Insurance under a statutory directive that the fund be "neither more nor less than self-supporting. . . ." Id. In 1917, an advisory board nominated by the policyholders was established to "advise with the Commissioner of Insurance as to the means and methods of administering the affairs of said accident fund. . . ." 1917 PA 206, § 13.

In 1969, the original legislation, as amended, was repealed and replaced by MCL 418.701 et seq.; MSA 17.237(701) et seq. as part of a general revision of worker's compensation law. The basic statutory framework relating to the fund remained intact, including the mandate that its purpose was not profit making, but to be neither more nor less than self-supporting.

In 1976, the Attorney General issued an opinion, stating that the Accident Fund is a state agency and that the fund's employees are subject to civil service classification. Instead of settling a dispute, the opinion seemed to revitalize a continuing controversy between the Commissioner of Insurance and the Advisory Board over who had control of the Accident Fund.

In 1981, the Advisory Board filed a suit in federal district court against the Commissioner of Insurance, seeking a ruling that the fund was not a state agency. Accident Fund v Baerwaldt, WD Mich, Case No. G81-224 (1982). The board did not prevail on this issue; however, several policyholders who joined in the suit as plaintiffs enjoyed more success with their claim that the assets of the fund were held in trust and could not be taken by the state for general purposes. In a consent judgment, the commissioner agreed that under the then-existing statutory scheme the "assets, monies and funds held for or by the Michigan State Accident Fund" could not be borrowed, taken, or placed in the general fund by the state, or "used for purposes inconsistent with the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969 and its amendments . . . ."

More litigation followed in 1983, when the Commissioner of Insurance filed a suit, which, among other things, challenged the authority of the Advisory Board to increase rates without his approval. However, the central issue presented for review to the Court of Appeals in Comm'r of Ins, supra, was whether the Accident Fund is a state agency.

The Court of Appeals held that the fund is a state agency and that it is not a mutual insurance company. The Court determined that the fund was subject to the supervisory and administrative control of the Commissioner of Insurance and that its employees were entitled to civil service classification. The Court also addressed a counterclaim of the Advisory Board that the state has no equity interest, or interest other than as trustee, in the fund's monies, reserves, or surplus. Referring to two statutory provisions in the WDCA, §§ 705 and 711, the Court of Appeals stated:

Clearly, under the statute, the Commissioner of Insurance, acting in concert with the State Treasurer, has the authority to hold the funds of the Accident Fund and to invest those funds. MCL 418.705; MSA 17.237(705); see also McAvoy [ v H B Sherman Co, 401 Mich. 419, 450; 258 N.W.2d 414 (1977)] (state control over Second Injury Fund). However, it must also be noted that MCL 418.711; MSA 17.237(711) provides that the Accident Fund shall be neither more nor less than self-supporting. We interpret this provision to mean that just as the state does not subsidize the Accident Fund, neither can it receive any "profits" from the fund to expend for other purposes. Thus, while the State of Michigan holds the assets of the Accident Fund in trust and, through the Commissioner of Insurance and the State Treasurer, has control over those funds and the authority to invest the funds, it can withdraw no money from the fund to use for any other state expenditures and those funds may only be expended to further the purpose of the Accident Fund. [ 173 Mich. App. 588. Emphasis added.]

At the time the fund was created, and until as recently as 1990, § 711 provided direction that the Accident Fund was to be "neither more nor less than self-supporting. . . ." However, in 1990, comprehensive changes were made by enactment of legislation, the described purpose of which was to put "the Fund on an equal footing with private insurers in the marketplace and ensure that it did not compete unfairly with them."

In addition to repealing § 711 (which required the fund "to be neither more nor less than self-supporting"), enactment of 1990 PA 157 effected a number of fundamental changes in the structure and operation of the Accident Fund. The act, inter alia, (1) made the Accident Fund an "autonomous entity in the department of commerce"; (2) provided for an executive director to be appointed by the Governor for a four-year term; (3) added § 711a, which substituted for § 711 a provision that rates were to be as low as possible consistent with sound actuarial standards; (4) included a new § 712, providing for a one-time distribution of excess surplus to holders of policies during the period 1986 through 1989; and (5) required payment to the state and local governments of certain fees in lieu of taxes.

III

The arguments of plaintiffs in Fun 'N Sun can be grouped under two constitutional headings: impairment of an obligation of contract, and deprivation of property without compensation. While these are separate theories, each requires that plaintiffs demonstrate ownership of specific contract rights or property rights. Without such a demonstration, there can be no impairment or deprivation. We hold that plaintiffs have no such contract or property rights. We first consider the impairment of contract claim.

IV

Plaintiffs assert that they have a contractual right to the accumulated surplus reserves. Further, they claim that this "right" will be unconstitutionally impaired if the state is permitted to retain the proceeds obtained from the proposed sale by operation of § 701a(2). It is plaintiffs' position that implicit in statutory provisions in effect when the policies in question were purchased was a contractual promise that premiums would remain as low as possible. It would then follow that there should not have been any accumulation of surplus reserves. According to plaintiffs' interpretation, surplus reserves should have been returned to the policyholders either in the form of reduced premiums or dividends. Plaintiffs rely on specific sections of the WDCA, §§ 711a, 712, 746, and 751, which shall be addressed seriatim, after we provide a brief summary of the law on impairment of contract and contract rights arising from statutes.

A

Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the enactment of state law that impairs existing contractual obligations. US Const, art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10. The language contained in our state constitution, virtually identical to that used in the federal constitution, provides: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted."

It has been said that the purpose of the Contract Clause is to protect bargains reached by parties by prohibiting states from enacting laws that interfere with preexisting contractual arrangements. Allied Structural Steel Co v Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242; 98 S Ct 2716; 57 L Ed 2d 727 (1978).

In examining a claim that a state law impairs an existing contract, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a three-pronged test, with the first prong being a determination "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." Id., p 244; Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich. 515; 462 N.W.2d 555 (1990). The second prong requires that the legislative disruption of contract expectancies be necessary to the public good, and the third prong requires that the means chosen by the Legislature to address the public need are reasonable. Allied, supra, p 247, citing United States Trust Co v New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23; 97 S Ct 1505; 52 L Ed 2d 92 (1977); Romein, supra, pp 535-536.

Because plaintiffs claim that the state law regarding the sale of the fund impairs the contract they had by operation of previously enacted legislation, we must address the first prong of the test for impairment of contract and determine what contractual rights, if any, the previous legislation established.

"Courts usually have concluded that a state contractual obligation arises from legislation only if the legislature has unambiguously expressed an intention to create the obligation. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge, 36 US (11 Pet) 420, 544; 9 L Ed 773 (1837); United States Trust Co v New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17, n 14; 97 S Ct 1505; 52 L Ed 2d 92 (1977). . . ." Eckles v State, 306 Or. 380, 390-391; 760 P.2d 846 (1988). In order to prove that a statutory provision has formed the basis of a contract, the language employed in the statute must be "plain and susceptible of no other reasonable construction" than that the Legislature intended to be bound to a contract. Stanislaus Co v San Joaquin King's River Canal Irrigation Co, 192 U.S. 201, 208; 24 S Ct 241; 48 L Ed 406 (1904). As a general rule, vested rights are not created by a statute that is later revoked or modified by the Legislature if "the Legislature did not covenant not to amend the legislation." Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich. 636, 654; 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985). Yet, a statute can create a contract if the language and circumstances demonstrate a clear expression of legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the state. United States Trust v New Jersey, supra, p 17, n 14; Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan v Governor, 422 Mich. 1; 367 N.W.2d 1 (1985).

Pertinent examples of statutory provisions that do, and do not, rise to the level of contractual obligations are found in the Oregon Supreme Court case of Eckles, supra. That case involved Oregon's Industrial Accident Fund (IAF), which is much like Michigan's Accident Fund. In 1982, the Oregon Legislative Assembly declared that the IAF had a surplus of $168 million and passed a "Transfer Act" to appropriate $81 million of that to the Oregon general fund. 306 Or. 382. An employer insured by the fund brought suit to declare the legislation void on a number of grounds, including impairment of contract. Like this case, the employer did not rely on the actual contract of insurance, but a claim that certain portions of the Oregon worker's compensation statute were a contractual obligation.

Among provisions in the Oregon statute was Or Rev Stat 656.634(1), which indicated, in part, "The Industrial Accident Fund is a trust fund exclusively for the uses and purposes declared in [Or Rev Stat 656.001 to 656.794, the Oregon worker's compensation statute]. . . ." The Oregon Supreme Court stated, "[I]f the Legislative Assembly had simply provided in Or Rev Stat 656.634 that the IAF was to be used for the purposes stated in Or Rev Stat 656.001 to 656.794, a contractual obligation probably could not have been inferred from the provision because it would have contained nothing indicative of a legislative commitment not to repeal or amend the statute in the future." 306 Or. 391, citing Methodist Hosp of Brooklyn v State Ins Fund, 64 N.Y.2d 365, 377-378; 476 N.E.2d 304 (1985) (the statutory directives regarding proper uses of an insurance fund did not create a contractual obligation).

However, given the existence at the time the plaintiffs purchased their policies of a statute specifically disclaiming Oregon's proprietary interest in the fund, Or Rev Stat 656.634(2), the Eckles court had "little doubt" that the provision "expressed a contractual promise of the state to employers who insured with SAIF that the state would not transfer IAF funds to the General Fund." 306 Or. 393.

The former provision disclaiming Oregon's interest in the fund, Or Rev Stat 656.634, had declared in part that the state "has no proprietary interest in the Industrial Accident Fund" and denied "any right of reclamation it may have had in that fund." The subsequent Transfer Act included language repealing the disclaimer of interest. Insofar as the transfer provision retroactively amended preexisting contracts as established by the disclaimer, the court ruled the transfer provision violated the contract clause of Oregon's constitution. 306 Or. 399.

However, the subsequent repeal of the disclaimer meant employers who purchased policies after the repeal could not claim their contracts were impaired by operation of the provisions to transfer funds from the IAF to the general fund. Id.

We now turn to the specific statutory provisions relied on by plaintiffs.

B

Beginning with § 711a of the 1990 amendments, plaintiffs claim that their policies were purchased with the understanding that surplus would be distributed to policyholders either in the form of reduced premiums or dividends. Section 711a provides that "premiums . . . shall be at the lowest level possible, consistent with sound insurance actuarial standards." This provision was enacted at the time the break-even provisions of § 711 were repealed. Section 711a was in effect when the policyholders in question purchased their policies. Plaintiffs assert, in effect, that § 711a's requirement to keep premiums low amounted to a promise not to pass § 701a(2), which gave rise to the certified question before us.

There is no mention in § 711a of a possible sale of the Accident Fund. Nor is there any suggestion who would own the proceeds of such a sale. Thus, there is no clear expression of legislative intent in § 711a regarding ownership of the assets of the Accident Fund. As was true in Eckles, supra, there is no contract on this point between the policyholders and the state.

While we agree with plaintiffs in their assertion that the terms of contract in this case are not necessarily limited to the face of the policy, we do not find in § 711a any express promise by the Legislature not to change the policy terms for future purchasers.

Another reason we cannot accept plaintiffs' argument that § 711a created an implied contractual right of the policyholders to excess surplus is because in the same 1990 act that adopted § 711a, the Legislature created a limited right to excess surplus in § 712. We now turn to plaintiffs' next argument based on § 712.

C

Plaintiffs maintain that the enactment of § 712 in 1990 meant the fund was obliged to maintain excess reserves at a ratio of 3.5 to 1, net written premium to surplus, and to distribute any excess surplus to policyholders. We disagree.

Section 712(1) provides:

The insurance commissioner shall make a determination of the amount of surplus of the accident fund existing at the end of the calendar quarter in which the effective date of the amendatory act that added this section occurs. After the determination is made, the commissioner shall require a reduction in surplus not later than 60 days after the date of this determination so that the state accident fund will have a net written premium to surplus ratio of 3.5 to 1. The amount of premium shall be determined at the end of the first quarter of 1990 based on the previous 12 months.

We interpret the 1990 legislation as a provision for a one-time payment to 1986-89 policyholders of the balance left after surplus was reduced to a "net written premium to surplus ratio of 3.5 to 1" at the end of the calendar quarter in which the amendment went into effect. There was, and is, no provision in the act requiring future adjustment of surplus reserves. Section 712(1) obliged the state only to set the ratio of net written premium to surplus at 3.5 to 1. Future determinations of the surplus to premium ratio after the funds were placed in escrow were left to the discretion of the Commissioner of Insurance.

D

Plaintiffs interpret § 746 of the WDCA as implicitly granting policyholders ownership rights in surplus reserves. However, there is no language in this section to vest any policyholder with the right to a dividend or reduced premium. Section 746 merely provides that the executive director shall maintain a revolving fund derived from premiums, and that the fund is to be used only for nine enumerated purposes. The purposes include refunding premiums and issuing dividends.

Section 746 establishes the mechanism for the disbursement of funds. Should a dividend be declared by the executive director, § 746 allows disbursement without an appropriation from the Legislature. However, whether dividends are declared remains discretionary under § 715.

Section 746 will not be violated by the sale and transfer of the fund. Plaintiffs have not alleged any misuse of premiums by the executive director. The premiums collected to date will be transferred intact by the terms of the sale. See MCL 418.701a; MSA 17.237(701a). All liabilities will be assumed by the purchaser. 1993 PA 200, i.e., MCL 500.5106; MSA 24.15106. All surplus will remain in reserve.

We find the rationale of the highest court in New York State to be persuasive when it ruled on the constitutionality of the transfer of $190 million from the State Insurance Fund to the state's general fund. Methodist Hosp, supra. Presented with a claim that the reserves of the state insurance fund were held in trust for the benefit of policyholders by operation of a low premium statute similar to our § 711a, the Methodist Hosp court concluded that there was no impairment of contract.

In Methodist Hosp, the plaintiff relied in part on the last sentence of the New York Workers' Compensation Law, § 76(1), which provided, "Such fund shall be applicable to the payment of losses sustained on account of insurance, to the payment of expenses in the manner provided in this chapter and to the payment of premiums for reinsurance in any insurance corporation of the whole or any part of any policy obligations." As here, the policyholder argued that the limited list of permissible use of fund monies implied "a legislative intent that policyholders have a property interest in its surplus." 64 N.Y.2d 376. The New York Court of Appeals answered that the provisions "simply do not deal with what is to be done with surplus. . . ." 64 N.Y.2d 376-377. The court concluded that the language used by its legislature evidenced legislative policy, not legislative intent to be bound in a contract. As such, the statute did not support plaintiffs' interpretation that a contract was intended. Methodist Hosp, supra, p 377, citing Methodist Hosp of Brooklyn v State Ins Fund, 102 A.D.2d 367, 378-379; 479 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1984).

Absent an explicit expression of the Legislature's intention that premiums collected and not used to pay liabilities either would earn interest or be refunded, we cannot read §§ 711a(1), 712, and 746, either separately or together, as so promising. The language of § 746 is an expression of general policy. It is not a covenant between the state and policyholders for a specific premium.

E

Plaintiffs likewise assert that § 751 of the WDCA creates contractual rights that control the disposition of fund assets. Section 751 provides that the Ingham Circuit Court will dispose of Accident Fund monies if chapter 7 of the WDCA is repealed or the commissioner deems it necessary to dissolve the fund. We reject this argument for three reasons. First, there is no indication in the section of a promise by the Legislature not to amend it. Second, § 751 makes no mention of distribution to, or preference of, the policyholders regarding the disposition of fund assets. Third, neither contingency has occurred, and the section is not applicable. The chapter has not been repealed, nor has the Commissioner of Insurance decided it is necessary to dissolve the fund.

Because we do not interpret the contractual promises inherent in the statutory scheme when the policies in question were purchased, §§ 711a, 712, 746 and 751, to be those urged by plaintiffs, we need not proceed to the second or third prong of the impairment of contract analysis. The policy in effect when premiums were paid by plaintiffs provided that, in return for the premium, the fund promised to pay benefits required by the worker's compensation law. Therefore, policyholders do have a vested contractual right to liability coverage for the period in question for which premiums have been paid. But they have not demonstrated that the contract thus established has, or will be, impaired by operation of § 701a. Plaintiffs' impairment of contract claim must therefore fail.

V

Having found no violation of the Contract Clause, we next address the policyholders' contention that the legislation in question constitutes a taking of private property without compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Relying on the Court of Appeals decision in Comm'r of Ins, supra, plaintiffs claim that § 701a is unconstitutional because the policyholders "own" the assets being transferred to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan. They argue that the assets of the fund are held by the state in trust for the benefit of the policyholders.

A

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Michigan provide that private property shall not be taken without due process or just compensation. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 10, § 2, and art 1, § 17.

The United States Supreme Court has often repeated that the purpose of the constitutional prohibition against the government's taking private property without providing just compensation is "'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US ___, ___; 114 S Ct 2309; 129 L Ed 2d 304, 316 (1994), quoting Armstrong v United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49; 80 S Ct 1563; 4 L Ed 2d 1554 (1960); see also Hodel v Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714; 107 S Ct 2076; 95 L Ed 2d 668 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175; 100 S Ct 383; 62 L Ed 2d 332 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124; 98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978).

One who asserts an uncompensated taking claim must first establish that a vested property right is affected. Minty v Bd of State Auditors, 336 Mich. 370, 390; 58 N.W.2d 106 (1953). To constitute a vested right, the interest must be "'something more than such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property. . . .'" Id., quoting 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 749. Without a property right, a plaintiff has no basis for challenging a statute on the ground that it constitutes a confiscatory taking without due process of law. McAvoy v H B Sherman Co, supra at 451.

As policyholders, plaintiffs have not pointed to any language in the insurance policies issued by the fund that expressly confers a right of participation in any surplus that might have accumulated in the fund.

Nor has attention been called to any other provision of the policy that expressly grants or recognizes an ownership interest on the part of policyholders in the assets of the fund. In asserting their claim, plaintiffs rely on the statutory scheme in place when they purchased their insurance and interpretations given to statutory provisions by the courts. However, the only express references in the statute to surplus distribution are found in § 712 (the one-time distribution to 1986-89 policyholders, which is not the subject of this appeal), and in § 746, which gives the executive director discretion to pay dividends to policyholders. Because § 746 makes no promise that dividends will ever be paid, it does not create a vested right.

B

Against that background, we look at the "trust" language used by the Court of Appeals in Comm'r of Ins and consider its significance today. As noted earlier, the Court focused on former § 711 and said: "We interpret this provision to mean that just as the state does not subsidize the Accident Fund, neither can it receive any 'profits' from the fund to expend for other purposes."

The Court continued:

Thus, while the State of Michigan holds the assets of the Accident Fund in trust and . . . has control over those funds . . ., it can withdraw no money from the fund to use for any other state expenditures and those funds may only be expended to further the purpose of the Accident Fund. [ 173 Mich. App. 588. Emphasis added.]

We note that the "trust" language then employed by the Court did not speak in terms of an ownership interest on the part of policyholders. Indeed, the Court did not expressly identify any beneficiary of the "trust" to which it referred.

We are convinced that the Court of Appeals used the words "in trust" in an informal, descriptive sense, rather than as declaration of a formal trust relationship. The Court did not review any law on the creation of trusts, for instance, on express trusts. The Court did not make any findings regarding the type of inequitable conduct that would lead to the imposition of a constructive trust. The better inference is that the Court of Appeals used the words "in trust" in the sense that the state's receipt of the policyholders' premiums resulted in an obligation to manage those premiums to assure the intended benefit, insurance coverage.

Plaintiffs argue that the supposed recognition of a trust in Comm'r of Ins is supported by similarities between their situation and the members of a mutual insurance company because in both instances the policyholder/member is subject to assessment if premiums are insufficient to pay claims. We disagree. Unlike members of a mutual insurance company, those who purchase insurance from the Accident Fund have no effective voice in the operation or management of the enterprise. Their only role is to participate in the selection of an advisory board, whose authority is limited to providing advice to the commissioner. See § 755. As noted in 6 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 34:119, p 970: "A policyholder in a mutual life insurance company has a property interest in the surplus of the company. . . . In contrast, under a nonparticipating policy the insured is not entitled to any portion on division of surplus by the insurer."

In Methodist Hosp, supra, the New York Court of Appeals considered and rejected an argument that the New York State Accident Fund was a mutual fund. Citing 2 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 19.14, p. 679, the court responded:

Nothing in article 6 of the Workers' Compensation Law expressly establishes the SIF [State Insurance Fund] as a mutual insurance organization. A mutual insurance company is organized and operated for the benefit of its policyholders who are by virtue of their policies members of the company . . . with the possible exception of companies whose annual dividends are mandated by statute, the right to receive a dividend when declared creates no trust or property interest of the policyholder in the surplus. . . . [ 64 N.Y.2d 374-375. Citations omitted.]

The "trust" language used by the Comm'r of Ins panel did not establish an ownership interest in the policyholders, but recognized only a responsibility on the part of the state to assure that assets of the fund were to be held and expended in accordance with the provisions of existing law. Of course, the principal beneficiaries of the proper exercise of such a responsibility are the employees who may be injured, as well as the employers who are insured. We conclude, however, that recognition of such a relationship conferred no property right or ownership interest in the assets of the fund.

As McAvoy instructed, in the absence of a property right, there can be no taking that violates due process. In McAvoy, this Court considered a claim of confiscatory taking involving the Second Injury Fund (SIF). Like the Accident Fund, the SIF was created by the Legislature as part of the WDCA. It insures "carriers and self-insured employers against certain losses occurring due to worker's compensation claims." Id., p 450. Because carriers are required by law to pay into the SIF, the McAvoy plaintiff, a carrier, complained that any reimbursement it received from the fund was "self-reimbursement," which constituted a confiscatory taking. In rejecting this contention, Justice MOODY, speaking for the Court, explained:

The Second Injury Fund does not belong to the carriers. No employer or carrier has a direct or vested interest in the fund.

* * *

Since the Second Injury Fund is a creature of the state, no property right would inure to the employers or carriers. Without a corresponding property right, it could not be maintained that the instant reimbursement provision constitutes a confiscatory taking without due process of law. [ Id., pp 450-451.]

In its Fun 'N Sun opinion, the Court of Claims distinguished McAvoy on the ground that SIF insureds "are required by law to pay into the fund," whereas one who becomes an Accident Fund policyholder does so voluntarily.

It is true that employers who purchase insurance from the Accident Fund do so voluntarily. Indeed, they make a decision each year whether to choose the Accident Fund from among more than two hundred carriers offering similar coverage in Michigan. However, the fact that an employer is free to purchase insurance from any of a number of sources does not affect the character of the Accident Fund; it is a state agency. Moreover, the voluntary nature of an employer's decision to purchase insurance from the Accident Fund does not, by itself, establish any property right in the fund.

Cases cited by the Court of Claims in which other state courts had employed similar trust language focused primarily on the protection of insurance funds from appropriations that would undermine protection otherwise provided for injured workers. There is no suggestion here that Michigan workers will have less protection if the proposed sale is consummated. Rather, there is reason to believe that worker protection would be enhanced.

Plaintiffs have not contended that there is any aspect of the proposed sale of the fund pursuant to 1993 PA 198 that is inconsistent with the purposes of the WDCA. Under the authorizing legislation, the assets and liabilities of the fund will transfer to the buyer. The surplus is not being retained by the state. It will remain as surplus under the terms of the sale.

None of the cases cited by plaintiffs as authority for policyholder ownership of fund assets involved the sale of a business with the buyer purchasing all assets and assuming all liabilities.

We find nothing, explicit or implicit, in the policy contract or the governing statutes that gives rise to the vested property interest asserted by plaintiffs. In the absence of such a vested property interest, their claim of confiscatory taking must fail.

VI

Accordingly, our answer to the certified question is that the portion of § 701a that declares the consideration for the sale of the Accident Fund to be the property of the State of Michigan does not violate either the state or the federal constitution.

BRICKLEY, BOYLE, and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with GRIFFIN, J.