Opinion
No. 5-988 / 05-0783
Filed April 12, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Brian L. Michaelson, Associate Juvenile Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal the State seeks review of a juvenile court order in a delinquency proceeding, which deferred a decision on whether the juvenile would be required to register as a sex offender. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and David A. Dawson and Marleen Loftus, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant.
John C. Polifka, Assistant Public Defender, Sioux City, for appellee minor child.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
The State appeals from a juvenile court ruling entered in the delinquency proceeding of C.B.J. It contends the court was without authority to defer its decision of whether C.B.J. would be required to register as a sex offender under Iowa Code chapter 692A (2005).
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, C.B.J. was adjudicated delinquent for committing sexual abuse in the second degree against a younger child. Following a combined dispositional/sex offender registry hearing, the court placed C.B.J.'s temporary care, custody, and control with his maternal grandmother. The court also placed C.B.J. on probation, ordered him to complete an outpatient treatment program for sexually abusive youth, and ordered him to have no contact with unsupervised children ten years of age or younger.
The juvenile court deferred its decision regarding whether C.B.J. would be required to register as a sex offender under chapter 692A until either "the eve of his completion of his treatment program or in the event he should be unsuccessfully discharged from his treatment program." After noting Iowa Code section 692A.2(4) allows for waiver or subsequent modification of the registration requirement in the case of juvenile offenders, the juvenile court concluded section 692A.2(4) also granted the court authority to defer the issue of registration so long as restrictions were placed on the delinquent child to protect the public.
At the hearing, C.B.J. asked that the registration determination be deferred until he had completed sex offender treatment. The State resisted deferral of the court's decision.
Our supreme court granted the State's application for interlocutory appeal and transferred the matter to this court for disposition. We review the juvenile court's interpretation of section 692A.2(4) for the correction of errors of law. In re S.M.D., 569 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Iowa 1997).
The supreme court did not stay any district court proceedings.
An individual convicted of a criminal offense against a minor must register with the sex offender registry for a period of ten years commencing from the date the individual is released from custody. Iowa Code § 692A.2(1). Section 692A.2(4) further provides, in relevant part:
A person is not required to register while incarcerated, in foster care, or in a residential treatment program. A person who is convicted . . . of a criminal offense against a minor . . . as a result of adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court shall be required to register as required in this chapter unless the juvenile court finds that the person should not be required to register under this chapter. If a juvenile is required to register and the court later modifies the order regarding the requirement to register, the court shall immediately notify the department [of public safety].
The juvenile court has no discretion to decide who initially falls within the requirements of the registration statutes; it is presumed all offenders, including juveniles, are required to register upon release. In re S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d 405, 406-07 (Iowa 1997). It is also clear that, at the time the juvenile court deferred its decision, C.B.J. had been "released" for the purpose of chapter 692A. See id. at 408 ("[W]hen a . . . dispositional order allows the juvenile to avoid physical confinement . . . he is "released". . . upon the entry of the dispositional order."). Thus, under section 692A.2(4), C.B.J. was required to register unless the juvenile court in its discretion determined the requirement should be waived. See also S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d at 406. The burden to prove exemption lies with C.B.J. Id.
The State points out that, while section 692A.2(4) grants the juvenile court discretion to waive the registration requirement, and to modify a prior decision to require registration, the statute does not contain a express grant of discretion to defer the registration decision. C.B.J. counters discretion to defer the decision is inherent in the discretion to waive or modify the registration requirement. He contends interpreting section 692A.2(4) to require a decision prior to completion of treatment would lead to impractical or absurd results, as it is the treatment and its outcome which best inform the waiver decision. C.B.J. also asserts requiring him to register now, then waiving the requirement should treatment prove successful, creates an unfair and unnecessary stigma.
C.B.J.'s position is not without appeal; however, when searching for legislative intent we are bound by what the legislature said, and not by what it should have or might have said. Krull v. Thermogas Co., 522 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1994). It is not our role to "speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute." In re T.S., 705 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). Thus, when the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, "[w]e do not search for legislative intent beyond the express terms of the statute." American Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted).
Here, the legislature has determined every offender should be required to register upon release. It has provided a clear and unambiguous, but limited, grant of discretion to waive or modify that requirement in cases involving juvenile offenders.
C.B.J. contends authority to defer the registration decision is implicit. We note, however, that when the legislature granted the district court discretion to delay or defer dispositional decisions regarding criminal offenders, it did so in express terms. See Iowa Code § 901.2 (granting discretion to "withhold execution of any judgment or sentence for such time as shall be reasonably necessary for an investigation with respect to deferment of judgment, deferment of sentence, or suspension of sentence and probation"); id. §§ 901.5, 907.3 (granting discretion, in certain circumstances, to defer judgment or sentence for an indefinite period in accordance with chapter 907). We conclude that if the legislature had intended to include the same type of discretion in section 692A.4(2), it would have done so more explicitly. See State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 1999).
Although C.B.J. asks us to remember that the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount in interpreting statutory delinquency provisions, see In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984), we must also remember the intent of chapter 692A is the protection of the public from sexual offenders, S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d at 408. See State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 2001) (noting legislative intent is determined by considering both the statue's language and its underlying purpose). Were we to adopt C.B.J.'s rationale and affirm the juvenile court, we would be expanding the legislature's grant of discretion and usurping the legislature's role. T.S., 705 N.W.2d at 503. This we cannot do. Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's dispositional order to the extent it deferred the determination of whether C.B.J. should be required to register pursuant to chapter 692A. We remand this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Miller, J., concurs; Hecht, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority correctly notes, the legislature has expressly granted to the juvenile court discretion to decide whether juveniles convicted of sex offenses should be required to register as a sex offenders. This discretion is broad indeed, as the legislature has prescribed no standard to be applied by the court when deciding whether to excuse registration pursuant to Iowa Code section 692A.2(4). I would affirm the juvenile court's decision for several reasons.
First, the juvenile court had at least two options: to require or excuse registration. I view the juvenile court's decision in this case as a decision that C.B.J. shall not be required to register. Although it must be acknowledged that the juvenile court left open the option of requiring C.B.J. to register at some future time after the outcome of his treatment was known, the order should in my view nonetheless be understood as a decision that C.B.J. was not required to register as of the time the notice of appeal was filed in this case.
The juvenile court found no evidence tending to prove C.B.J. is likely to reoffend, and stated, "I am not going to let a 12 year old register on a sex offender registry because there is nothing at this point that he has done that leads me to believe he needs to be on that registry right now." The court's decision was based in significant part on a finding that "it would be detrimental to this child's best interest to make him register as a sex offender."
Second, even if the challenged decision is not viewed as a determination that C.B.J. not be required to register, and instead is seen as a mere deferral of the court's decision on registration, I would affirm in this case. In interpreting a statute, "[w]e must not only examine the language of the statute, but also its underlying purpose and policies, as well as the consequences stemming from different interpretations." State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000). The underlying purpose of the legislative grant of broad discretion to excuse registration by juvenile offenders in section 692A.2(4) is clearly consistent with the notion that juvenile court decisions should serve the child's welfare. See Iowa Code § 232.1 (2005). And, while juvenile courts are also directed to consider the best interest of the State when making decisions, id., I conclude the decision challenged in this case complied with that directive. The dispositional and offender registration hearing was held on April 21, 2005, a mere six weeks after the delinquency petition was filed. Although the juvenile court clearly had discretion to refuse to order registration, even if the decision is couched as a deferral, the court's decision nonetheless advanced the State's best interest by deferring a final decision on registration until after the results of treatment are known. I believe the legislature intended the juvenile court's registration decision under section 692A.2(4) should be an informed decision. The court's choice to defer the decision for a reasonable time to collect important information should not be seen as antithetical to the relevant statutory scheme, but should instead be viewed as consistent with both the underlying purposes of section 692A.2(4) and the policy objectives of Iowa's juvenile law.
The court's assessment of C.B.J.'s welfare was affected by the court's understanding of the consequences of requiring this twelve-year-old child to register before such time as an informed decision could be rendered with the benefit of knowledge of the outcome of treatment. The court noted its experience with other child-registrants who were harassed at school or had their picture published in a newspaper.
It should be noted that the juvenile court further protected the best interest of the State by proscribing, pending the outcome of treatment, C.B.J.'s unsupervised contact with persons age twelve or younger.
Third, if the challenged decision is viewed as a deferral of the registration decision rather than a decision not to require registration, I would affirm it based on yet another rule of statutory interpretation. "In determining the intent of the legislature, we will not construe the language of a statute in a manner that will produce an absurd or impractical result." Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 542. It cannot be disputed that the legislature intended to permit juvenile courts to excuse registration for some and require registration for other juvenile offenders. Such decisions necessarily balance the opprobrium suffered by juvenile registrants (the child's welfare) against the public's need for protection from juvenile sex offenders (the best interest of the State). As noted above, I believe the legislature granted broad discretion to juvenile courts with the implicit expectation that they will make informed registration decisions. The majority's interpretation of section 692A.2(4) would, in my view, produce an impractical result requiring the juvenile court to render a decision on registration before that court, armed with meaningful evidence of the outcome of treatment and the corresponding risk of reoffense, is prepared to make an informed decision.
The State favors an interpretation that would require the juvenile court to require registration in this case at the time of discharge and later eliminate the requirement if the circumstances justify it. I reject this, however, because I believe it fails to account for the purposes and policies underlying the legislature's broad grant of discretion to require or not require registration, and ignores the important consideration of the child's welfare by encouraging the public" branding" of juvenile offenders before an informed assessment of the likelihood of reoffense may be undertaken.