Opinion
20-P-199
07-06-2021
Paul R. BREEN'S CASE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport), appeals from a decision of the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (reviewing board) affirming the award of disability and medical benefits to Paul R. Breen (employee). Massport claims that the administrative judge did not adequately analyze the effect of the employee's preexisting conditions under G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), and mischaracterized the deposition testimony of the impartial medical examiner. We affirm.
Background. At the time of the 2016 administrative hearing, the employee was sixty-two years old. He began working for Massport in 1982, first as a toll collector for about one year, and then as a skilled laborer. As a skilled laborer, his duties included operating heavy equipment, filling potholes, mowing grass, collecting trash, plowing runways, shoveling taxiways, and lifting various heavy items. While working on February 15, 2007, the employee slipped on a sheet of ice and sustained an injury to his left knee. As a result of that injury, he stopped working, collected weekly indemnity benefits from February 21, 2007 through December 8, 2007, and underwent knee surgery in September 2007. He eventually returned to work, but his left knee was "very sore," and he "tried to work through it." When the pain became so great that he could not perform his duties, he stopped working again and collected indemnity benefits from May 19, 2009 through January 27, 2010. He returned to work on January 28, 2010, although his left knee was "very sore" and his symptoms continued to worsen from that date until March 30, 2014.
Liability is not at issue with respect to his injury.
At work on March 30, 2014, the employee was emptying rubbish barrels on a taxiway. When he tried to "swing" a heavy duty plastic garbage bag containing rubbish and water onto the back of a truck, his left knee "gave out" and his right knee "buckled." The employee immediately reported the incident to his supervisor, but continued to work for several weeks, during which he experienced pain in both knees and felt "like a cripple." Between April 24, 2014 and August 15, 2014, he was out of work, and then returned to work performing heavy duty equipment jobs including snowplowing, shoveling, and rubbish removal. The administrative judge credited the employee's testimony that his left knee pain was "terrible," that his symptoms in both knees worsened until he finally left work on April 1, 2015, and that he would have kept working but the pain "was so bad ... [he] basically had to leave."
After hearing, the administrative judge credited the opinions of doctors that the March 30, 2014 work injury caused the employee's knee problems, and it, in combination with the February 15, 2007 injury, "resulted in [the employee]’s permanent and total disability from [April 15, 2015] through the present." At the hearing, Massport contended that the employee's knee problems were caused by his obesity, not the March 30, 2014 work injury, noting that the employee had complained to his primary care doctor about right knee pain as early as 2004. The administrative judge found that the March 30, 2014 work injury was "a major contributing cause" of the employee's "disability and need for treatment" for both knees. The administrative judge ordered Massport to pay the employee temporary total disability benefits, G. L. c. 152, § 34, temporary partial disability benefits, G. L. c. 152, § 35, and medical benefits, G. L. c. 152, § 30. Massport appealed, and the reviewing board affirmed the hearing decision. Massport then timely appealed the reviewing board's decision.
Discussion. Massport argues that the administrative judge did not adequately analyze its defense that the employee's obesity was a preexisting condition that rendered his knee injuries not compensable under G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), and that the lack of analysis rendered the administrative judge's decision "arbitrary and capricious." We disagree.
"Under G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2) ... a decision of the board is reviewed in accordance with the standards expressed in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (a)-(d),(f), and (g)." Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 257-258 (1994). "We will not disturb the judge's findings that are ‘reasonably deduced from the evidence and the rational inferences of which it was susceptible.’ " Pilon's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 169 (2007), quoting Chapman's Case, 321 Mass. 705, 707 (1947). We "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14.
General Laws c. 152, § 1 (7A), provides: "If a compensable injury or disease combines with a pre-existing condition, which resulted from an injury or disease not compensable under this chapter, to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition shall be compensable only to the extent such compensable injury or disease remains a major but not necessarily predominant cause of disability or need for treatment" (emphasis added). "[T]here may be more than one major cause," and "a major cause need not be the superior or greatest cause." Goodwin's Case, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 647 (2012).
In his decision, the administrative judge noted that Massport "raise[d] § 1 (7A) as a defense in this case," and then quoted the appropriate standard from the statute and found, crediting two doctors’ opinions, that "the March 30, 2014 work injury is a major contributing cause of the employee's disability and need for treatment for the left and right knees." The administrative judge credited the doctors’ opinions that the employee suffered from degenerative arthritis, which was "traumatic[ally] aggravat[ed]" by the March 30, 2014 work injury. See Stewart's Case, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 919, 920 (2009) (ruling based on medical opinion addressing "the relative degree to which compensable and noncompensable causes have brought about the employee's disability"). We conclude that the administrative judge's thorough findings satisfied the requirements of § 1 (7A). It was within his discretion to credit the medical opinions presented by the employee, and to reject those presented by Massport. See Goodwin's Case, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 645 ; Pilon's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 169. "Where there are conflicts in medical opinions, the resolution of those conflicts is for the administrative judge." Ingalls's Case, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2005).
Lastly, Massport argues that the administrative judge mischaracterized the deposition testimony of the impartial medical examiner, G. L. c. 152, § 11A. From our review of the record, we conclude that the administrative judge accurately characterized that testimony; he simply chose not to credit all of it, as was his prerogative. See Stewart's Case, 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 920.
Conclusion. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the administrative judge properly assessed Massport's G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), defense and did not mischaracterize the evidence.
We allow the employee's request for appellate attorney's fees, G. L. c. 152, § 12A. See Daly's Case, 405 Mass. 33, 41 (1989). Within fourteen days of the date on which this memorandum and order is issued, the employee shall file with this court and serve on Massport a motion for determination of appellate attorney's fees and costs, supported by an affidavit detailing such fees and costs. Within fourteen days thereafter, Massport may file with this court and serve on the employee any opposition.
Decision of the reviewing board affirmed.