Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. JV16176
Kline, P.J.
Brenda H. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, terminating her parental rights with respect to her son Blake C. (now almost six years old). Appellant contends (1) the juvenile court’s adoptability finding was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the court’s finding that the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2009, the Napa County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed an original petition alleging that Blake C. (then four years old) came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), in that appellant had been arrested on September 9, 2009 on two outstanding felony warrants for child endangerment, as well as for being under the influence of a controlled substance. The Napa Police Department reported that appellant and Blake were found roaming around the backyard of a residence in Napa. When police arrived, appellant yelled and screamed, and grabbed and squeezed Blake until he began to cry. Appellant smelled strongly of alcohol and was not coherent. Blake was not wearing shoes or socks, his clothes were too big and were dirty, and he could not state the last time he had eaten.
The juvenile court ordered Blake detained on September 18, 2009.
In the jurisdiction report filed on October 6, 2009, the social worker reported that appellant had a “significant history with child welfare.” She had failed to reunify with her daughter, Rachel B., and Rachel was placed in a permanent plan of legal guardianship with her maternal grandmother in November 1996. There had been seven prior referrals involving Blake, and appellant also had had an open family reunification case with him previously, from March 2007 to September 2008. She had succeeded in reunifying with Blake and the case was dismissed. Appellant’s criminal history included 10 felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions. The convictions were for, inter alia, possession and being under the influence of controlled substances, grand theft, burglary, inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant, disorderly conduct, and cruelty to a child.
Blake’s presumed father, Paul C., was incarcerated in county jail.
The juvenile court ultimately terminated the parental rights of the “presumed father, alleged father, and all known and unknown alleged fathers.” This appeal involves only appellant.
On October 6, 2009, appellant submitted to jurisdiction and the juvenile court sustained the petition, finding Blake to be a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g).
In the disposition report, filed on December 22, 2009, the social worker reported that, in addition to appellant’s criminal history of more than 20 years, which included seven convictions for possession of controlled substances, she “also has a long history of drug abuse and, by self-report, is addicted to alcohol. [Appellant] has three other children (Rachel, age 15, Shane, age 13 and [D.], age 7), none of whom are in her custody. Rachel and Shane are both in legal guardianship with the maternal grandmother, while [D.] lives with her father.”
Appellant was awaiting a jury trial for an April 2009 arrest for driving under the influence, possession of a controlled substance, child endangerment, and being under the influence of a controlled substance. Blake was in the vehicle appellant was driving at the time of her arrest.
The social worker also reported that appellant “expresses a strong love for Blake.” In addition, she had completed inpatient drug treatment and outpatient aftercare during the previous dependency involving Blake, and also had completed a 90-day treatment program in 1996 during her dependency case with Blake’s half-sister, Rachel.
The social worker noted that Blake had “an extensive history of medical and dental neglect.” During the 2007 dependency, it was found that two-year-old Blake had severe “bottle decay” and needed six “baby root canal therapies with crowns” and two tooth restorations. After his return to appellant’s care in 2008, he did not see a doctor or dentist again until he was again placed in foster care in September 2009, at which time it was found that Blake had several new cavities.
The social worker further reported that Blake was “a bright, active four-year-old little boy.” He had some difficulty getting along with children his age and would become physical when frustrated. He displayed a constant awareness of his surroundings in order to know how his needs would be met, and he also was hypervigilant about the police. Of concern was Blake’s “demonstrated aggressiveness and aggravation, ” in that he frequently “talked back” to his foster mother, called people names, used foul language, and discussed sex and violence.
Blake’s maternal grandmother, who was the legal guardian of two of his half-siblings, said she would not be able care for Blake, due to poor health. There were no other relatives to consider for placement.
Blake was having one supervised visit per week at the Napa County Department of Corrections, where appellant was incarcerated. He was required to talk to his mother through a screen, with no physical contact. Initially, Blake cried during visits but, more recently, he had exhibited some aggressive behavior. Appellant frequently had to be redirected during visits because she would make promises to Blake about the future and make negative comments about his current care. Blake talked about two of his half-siblings, Rachel and Shane, and the social worker was working with the foster mother to arrange for telephonic contact between them.
The social worker concluded that, “[a]lthough the Department does not question [appellant’s] love for Blake, she has been unable to show that she can provide the safe and stable life for him that he so desperately needs. It is clear, through [appellant’s] lengthy drug history, criminal history and CWS [child welfare services] history, that she has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of Blake’s half-siblings, that led to Blake’s initial removal and has not made sustainable changes that would indicate that she can provide a permanent, stable life for Blake.” The Department therefore recommended that the court deny reunification services to appellant, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).
Subdivision (b)(10) of section 361.5 provides that reunification services need not be provided if a parent has failed to reunify with a sibling or half-sibling after the provision of services, and the parent has not subsequently made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half-sibling.
A contested dispositional hearing took place on January 13 and 14, 2010. The juvenile court found that it was undisputed that “Blake loves his mom, and his mom loves Blake, ” but further found that it was “undisputed that Blake’s best interests lie with depriving his mother of services.” The court then found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services should be denied to appellant, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
In her report for the section 366.26 hearing, which was filed on June 29, 2010, the social worker reported that, despite his history of medical and dental neglect, Blake was a healthy child and was within the normal range for development. He had transitioned “beautifully” into his new preschool. The social worker described Blake as “a smart, active, outgoing, clever five year old boy. Blake is often preoccupied with traumatic content and/or past events....”
He had transitioned into a foster-adoptive placement on March 12, 2010 and continued to visit with appellant, which had “caused Blake some confusion and loyalty conflict. Prior to Blake’s mother’s release from jail he appeared to understand that he could not live with his mother because she was in jail. Now that his mother is out of jail, the prospective adoptive parent reports that Blake frequently asks why he cannot live with his mother.” Blake also appeared to have a fascination with teenagers and stated that he was a teenager. He had trouble focusing and remaining still, but responded well to redirection. In addition, Blake “does very well with consistency, repetition and structure.” His prospective adoptive parent described him as “smart and kind.”
Blake’s former therapist reported that he had worked with Blake “in trying to gain understanding as to why his mother is in jail.... [The therapist] states that Blake is open to his feelings and does not appear to be in turmoil around his mother. Blake is able to state that his mother did something wrong and he is not going to live with her.”
Blake had had ongoing visitation with appellant since September 2009, initially on a weekly basis for half an hour while appellant was incarcerated. In February 2010, the visits were reduced to twice a month and, in April 2010, they were reduced to once a month. Blake had had telephone contact with his maternal grandmother and his half-siblings who live with the maternal grandmother.
The Department had referred Blake to the California Department of Social Services, State Adoptions for an assessment, and State Adoptions had “indicated that Blake is likely to be adopted and recommends that parental rights be terminated and a plan of adoption ordered.” The prospective adoptive parent was a 49-year-old single mother who had been employed as a hospital charge nurse for 18 years. She had received criminal and CWS clearances and had an approved home study. Blake was “developing a strong and loving relationship with the prospective adoptive parent” and had “transitioned nicely into the home. Blake continues to adjust and is showing the benefits of the love, nurturing and consistency the prospective adoptive parent is providing.” The prospective adoptive parent had demonstrated good parenting practices and the capability to meet Blake’s needs. She also recognized his “need for predictability, consistency, and stability and is able to provide that to him.”
The social worker had interviewed Blake in April 2010, and he said he understood that he would be living with the prospective adoptive parent for a very long time and that he “liked” living with her.
With respect to siblings, Blake had a relationship with his two older half-siblings and had had periodic telephone contact with Rachel and Shane during the present dependency, most recently in February 2010. According to the social worker, Blake “idolizes his older siblings and frequently talks about them and the activities they do.”
The Department recommended that adoption be ordered as the permanent plan for Blake.
In his April 7, 2010 report, the state adoptions specialist stated that Blake was healthy and within normal developmental limits, although he appeared “to show a typical pattern for children who have significant turmoil in their lives; he is above age level in some areas, and below in other areas....” Blake’s mental and emotional health seemed within normal limits, although he requires close supervision and tends to be “quite impulsive.”
The state adoptions specialist had interviewed Blake regarding “his attitude toward placement and adoption, ” and concluded “[h]e does not have sufficient understanding of the adoption process to comment on that. However, he enthusiastically endorsed the idea of remaining in his current placement ‘forever.’ He appears to be comfortable with the possible adoptive mother, and they appear to be developing a strong relationship.” The state adoptions specialist described the prospective adoptive parent as “very committed to” Blake, and a preliminary assessment indicated that she appeared suitable for adopting Blake, appeared to be demonstrating good parenting practices, and had the capability to meet his needs. In addition, she is an African-American female who was raised in a Caucasian adoptive family and understands “having roots in more than one culture. As a bi-racial child, Blake will benefit from her experiences.”
The state adoptions specialist concluded that it was likely that Blake would be adopted if parental rights were terminated. He recommended that the juvenile court terminate parental rights and order a permanent plan of adoption for Blake.
In another report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, Blake’s court appointed special advocate (CASA) recommended that the permanent plan of adoption be ordered for Blake and that parental rights be terminated. He further stated: “Blake has told me that he loves his half sister and brother, who are currently placed with his maternal grandmother under a legal guardianship. It is important to Blake that he maintain contact with his siblings and grandmother. CASA supports contact as long as it is appropriate and remains in Blake’s best interest.”
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, which began on June 21, 2010, the state adoptions specialist, John Duringer, testified that when he asked Blake about his older half-siblings, Blake could recall their names but did not have much more to say about them. Duringer believed that Blake would be confused and sad for some period of time if he no longer had contact with appellant, but he also believed that Blake would continue to bond with the prospective adoptive parent and would “get on with his life as most of our children do.” He believed that if the relationship with appellant were allowed to continue, it would have a negative impact on Blake because of appellant’s attitude that the adoption would be temporary. As an example of this, Duringer read from a letter appellant had sent to Blake via the prospective adoptive mother, in which she wrote, “ ‘Mommy will wait awhile for you to get older and I will be waiting for you.’ ” Duringer did not believe that Blake’s relationship with appellant was good for him or that it should continue into the future.
Duringer testified that, during a June 7, 2010 visit with Blake and the prospective adoptive mother, he had found Blake to be more willing to listen to the prospective adoptive mother and more understanding of her requests than he had been previously. At that visit, the prospective adoptive mother told Duringer that Blake asked about his mother periodically and said he missed her. He seemed confused about why he was not living with his mother again now that she was out of jail “because his expectation [as a five-year-old] was simply... that when his mother went to jail, he lives with other people. When his mother isn’t in jail, he lives with his mother.”
Duringer believed that Blake may be hyperactive but, “in general, he is a child who is able to very strongly enjoy life and enjoy the people around him and to understand what is expected of him.” He also seemed to be “a child who is able to bond to other people. [¶] He certainly is making a bond with his prospective adoptive parent and he is a child who, with, I think, appropriate services over the course of his childhood, should be expected to do quite well developmentally and academically.” Blake is also a child “who, more than most, needs a structured environment and, yet, can respond to it.” Duringer had noticed changes in Blake since he was placed with the prospective adoptive mother “in terms of his overall demeanor, his overall ability to respond to people and I think what-overall what I think I have noticed is that he seems to be more grounded where he is and beginning to make... not only a positive bond but a real change in his outlook on the world. [¶] So, for instance, he gets along better with children in the daycare than he was able to get along with children in his previous foster home. I see that as a huge change that he has been able to make since he has been placed in his current placement.”
The fact that Blake had been able to bond with his mother was a hopeful sign about his ability to bond with others.
Social worker, Christy Grattan, testified that Blake seemed ambivalent about his relationship with appellant. She did not consider their relationship to be a healthy one that meets Blake’s needs. She believed that Blake needed predictability, consistency, and guidelines to help him make the rights choices.
On June 29, 2010, at the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that Blake’s relationship with his mother and siblings “had to exceed that which has been shown to exist” in the present case for it to invoke the statutory exceptions to adoption. The court further found “by clear and convincing evidence that Blake is adoptable and... will be adopted.” The court therefore terminated appellant’s parental rights.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 30, 2010.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence that Blake Is Likely to Be Adopted
Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence that Blake is likely to be adopted.
The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) On appeal, we must review the record to determine whether the juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561-1562.)
“The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.]” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) Because the focus in an adoptability finding is on the child, it is not essential to have a proposed adoptive parent already lined up. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) “ ‘Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics omitted; accord, In re Gregory A., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1562.)
In the present case, appellant argues that the court’s adoptability finding was not supported by substantial evidence because Blake’s placement with his prospective adoptive parent was still new and untested and was likely to fail, given Blake’s behavioral issues and his continuing attachment to appellant. In addition, she asserts that Blake’s wishes were not appropriately considered.
Appellant acknowledges that she did not object in the juvenile court on the ground that the adoption assessment was inadequate because it failed to take Blake’s wishes into account. (See In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886-887 [failure to challenge adequacy of adoption assessment at section 366.26 hearing waives issue when raised for first time on appeal].) She claims, however, that this failure to consider Blake’s wishes provides additional evidence that the court’s adoptability finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
While the record shows that Blake has had some ongoing behavior and attention issues, they are not extreme and are counterbalanced by his being, as the social worker described him, “ a smart, active, outgoing, clever five year old boy, ” who is within the normal range for development. Moreover, as the state adoptions worker testified at the June 2010 section 366.26 hearing, Blake is a child who is able to enjoy life and bond to other people, and who is able to understand what is expected of him. In the three months since he had moved in with the prospective adoptive parent, the adoptions specialist had noticed changes in Blake in terms of his ability to respond to other people and get along with other children. Indeed, he was already bonding with the prospective adoptive mother and had benefitted from the structure and care she had provided. The adoptions specialist believed that, with services, Blake could be expected to do “quite well developmentally and academically.” In addition, although an adoptive placement is not necessary to an adoptability finding, the fact that Blake is already living with a fully qualified prospective adoptive parent who is meeting his needs and is committed to adopting him certainly demonstrates that he is likely to be adopted within a reasonable amount of time. (See In re Lukas B., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.)
With respect to whether the court adequately considered Blake’s wishes regarding adoption, subdivision (h) of section 366.26 requires that, at termination proceedings, the juvenile court “ ‘consider the child’s wishes to the extent ascertainable’ prior to entering an order terminating parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c). [Citation.]” (In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591.) A child may be too young to understand or express his or her wishes regarding adoption. (In re Juan H. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 169, 173.)
Here, the state adoptions specialist testified that when a child is too young to have an understanding of the adoption process or to comment on it, “we look at the development of comfort that they appear to be feeling in their current placement.” Blake, at five years old, seemed “enthusiastic about being in his current placement.” In his report, the state adoptions specialist had written that, while Blake did “not have sufficient understanding of the adoption process to comment on that, ” he had “enthusiastically endorsed the idea of remaining in his current placement ‘forever.’ ” Blake also indicated to the social worker that he understood he would be living with the prospective adoptive mother for a “very long time” and that he “liked” living with her. Although, after appellant was released from jail, Blake had expressed confusion about why he was not living with her, as well as concern for her well-being, those feelings are not sufficient to undermine the evidence showing both Blake’s expression of positive feelings about living with the prospective adoptive mother “forever” and his general adoptability.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court’s adoptability finding is supported by substantial evidence. (See In re Lukas B., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.)
II. Applicability of the Parent-Child and Sibling Relationship Exceptions to Adoption
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s findings that the parent-child and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply were not supported by substantial evidence.
Although adoption is the preferred plan of care once reunification services have been terminated, the Legislature has provided various exceptions to the general rule of adoption, which apply only if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence “compelling reason[s] for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The parent has the burden of proving the applicability of any of these exceptions. (In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469 (Scott B.).) We review the juvenile court’s determination regarding whether an exception applies to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; but see In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [finding abuse of discretion standard of review appropriate, but noting that practical differences between abuse of discretion and substantial evidence standards of review “are not significant”].)
Here, the juvenile court concluded that the parent-child and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption were not applicable. The court stated that it had “[not] been argued that Blake has no relationship with his mother or that Blake has no relationship with his siblings. The relationship though has to exceed that which has been shown to exist between Blake and his mother, and Blake and [his] siblings for [the] court to continue the parental rights of [appellant].” The court further found that the detriment to Blake from termination of appellant’s parental rights “is far outweighed by the opportunities for a new life with new parents.”
A. Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the juvenile court will not terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
Both parties acknowledge that appellant has satisfied the first prong of the exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), in that she has maintained regular visitation with Blake.
In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, the appellate court discussed the parent-child relationship exception to adoption: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.
“Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (Id. at p. 575; see also In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.)
“Application of this exception is decided on [a] case-by-case basis and a court takes into account such factors as the minor’s age, the portion of the minor’s life spent in the parent’s custody, whether interaction between parent and child is positive or negative, and the child’s particular needs.” (Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.)
In In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 299 (S.B.), the appellate court rejected the proposition that the parent-child relationship exception does not apply if the child does not have a “ ‘primary attachment’ ” to the parent, explaining that the exception “may apply if the child has a ‘substantial, positive emotional attachment’ to the parent.” (Quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) In S.B., the father’s devotion to his daughter was constant, as demonstrated by his full compliance with his case plan over several years and his ongoing efforts to regain his physical and psychological health. (S.B., at p. 300.) The record also showed that S.B. loved her father, wanted the relationship to continue, and benefitted from his visits. (Id. at pp. 300-301.) The appellate court concluded that, based on that record, the only reasonable inference was “that S.B. would be greatly harmed by the loss of her significant, positive relationship with [her father].” (Id. at p. 301.)
In a subsequent case, the same appellate court that had decided S.B. explained that “[t]he S.B. opinion must be viewed in light of its particular facts. It does not, of course, stand for the proposition that a termination order is subject to reversal whenever there is ‘some measure of benefit’ in continued contact between parent and child.” (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937.)
In Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 455, 471, Scott was an autistic child who had spent most of his 11 years living with his mother. The mother had had consistent weekly visits with Scott, and his CASA had repeatedly stated that they had a very close relationship and that it would be detrimental to Scott for the relationship to be disrupted. (Id. at p. 471.) The evidence in the record showed that Scott’s ability to handle adoption by the foster mother was “fragilely based on his belief that being adopted means he and Mother and the foster family will all ‘go somewhere fun’....” (Ibid.) The court also found that it was clear that “Scott’s emotional make up will not enable him to endure interruption of his long-time frequent visits with Mother.” (Ibid.) The court found that Scott’s mother provided stability in Scott’s life, while adoption might not do so, given his strong emotional attachment to his mother and his continued precarious emotional state. (Id. at p. 472.) The court also found that termination of parental rights was unnecessary given that a legal guardianship with the foster mother would provide Scott with stability. (Ibid.) The court concluded that the “mother-child relationship in the instant case, coupled with Scott’s continued emotional instability and his repeated insistence that his preference would be to live with Mother, presents a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights is detrimental to the minor.” (Id. at p. 471.)
In the present case, appellant asserts that, pursuant to the reasoning of the appellate courts in S.B. and Scott B., the juvenile court should have found that the benefit to Blake from continuing his relationship with appellant would outweigh the well-being he would gain from being adopted. According to appellant, as in S.B., Blake “shared a positive significant and irreplaceable relationship with his mother and derived much benefit from that relationship.” She further avers that, as in Scott B., Blake’s “strong relationship with mother, coupled with his continued emotional instability and his repeated insistence that his preference would be to live with his mother, presented a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights was detrimental” to Blake. We disagree.
In light of the evidence presented at the hearing and other evidence in the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. First, Blake lived the first two years of his life with appellant, until his first detention by the Department in March 2007. He then spent approximately one year in foster care, and was returned to appellant in March 2008. He was again detained by the Department in September 2009, and has remained in foster care since then. He has thus spent some 40 percent of his young life outside of appellant’s custody. (Compare Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 455-456 [child had lived with mother for over eight years before removal].)
In addition, during the supervised visitation that appellant has had with Blake since his second detention in September 2009, the record shows that, over time, Blake became less excited about seeing appellant, had become indifferent about ending visits, and had seemed consistently ambivalent about appellant during visitation. Moreover, Blake’s former therapist stated that Blake did not “appear to be in turmoil” about his mother. (Compare Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456, 471-472 [child looked forward to and enjoyed visiting with mother and there was a danger that he would have a meltdown if their usual frequent visitation did not continue].)
The record reflects that, given his young age and his past experience, Blake was understandably confused about why he was not living with appellant once she got out of jail. It also reflects that Blake loves appellant, just as she loves him. However, these facts alone are not sufficient to overcome the preference for adoption at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the state adoptions specialist did not believe that Blake’s relationship with appellant was good for him or that it should continue into the future. The social worker believed that appellant’s relationship with Blake was not healthy and seemed to be more about meeting appellant’s needs than Blake’s. She did not believe termination of appellant’s parental rights would be detrimental to Blake. Blake’s CASA also believed that appellant’s parental rights should be terminated. (Compare Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 472 [child’s mother provided stability in his life and without continued visitation an emotional and developmental setback was likely]; S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 301 [child “would be greatly harmed by the loss of her significant, positive relationship with [her father]”].)
Thus, unlike in the two cases cited by appellant, the record does not support appellant’s claim that Blake benefitted from visits with appellant or that his relationship with her was so significant and positive that he would be greatly harmed by its loss. (See S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 301; see also Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 471 [courts must take into account various factors, including whether interaction between parent and child is positive or negative, as well as child’s particular needs].) Furthermore, as the state adoptions specialist, the social worker, and the CASA all stated, Blake is a child with a particular need for consistency, stability and structure. He had made huge gains since he had been placed in a stable, supportive environment with the prospective adoptive parent. (See Scott B., at p. 471.)
In conclusion, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the benefit of Blake’s relationship with his mother does not outweigh the well-being he would gain in a permanent adoptive home. (See In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [only if “severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed [is] the preference for adoption... overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated”].)
B. Sibling Relationship Exception
Appellant also contends the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence.
Pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), the juvenile court will not terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
In In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952, the appellate court explained the two-step process for deciding whether the sibling exception applies: “Under [former] section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) [now subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), ] the court is directed first to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. [Citation.] If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. [Citation.] [¶] To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (Fn. omitted.) If the court finds that a sibling relationship exists that is so strong that its severance would cause the child detriment, the court then weighs the benefit to the child continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide. (In re L.Y.L., at pp. 952-953.)
In the present case, according to appellant, Blake lived with both of his half-siblings, Rachel and Shane, from his birth in January 2005 until his first detention in March 2007, and then again lived with and/or had close contact with them between March 2008 and the second detention in September 2009. He also had periodic telephone contact with them during the present dependency. Appellant testified that Shane taught Blake how to ride a skateboard and scooter and that they were extremely close. She also testified that Rachel read to Blake, and helped to feed and bathe him.
The social worker wrote in the section 366.26 report that Blake “idolizes his older siblings and frequently talks about them and the activities they do.” At the section 366.26 hearing, she clarified that he talks about them while he is with appellant, “but not out of the blue.” She also testified that, during phone calls with his siblings, the siblings seem fond of Blake, but he wants to say goodbye. In her opinion, it would be better for Blake to be adopted than to maintain a relationship with his siblings.
The state adoptions specialist did not believe that the relationship between Blake and his older siblings rose to the level specified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), in that he did not think that adoption would be “contraindicated on the basis of an exceptional relationship that Blake had with any of his siblings.” Blake’s CASA believed that it was “important to Blake that he maintain contact with his siblings and grandmother. CASA supports contact as long as it is appropriate and remains in Blake’s best interest.” The CASA went on to recommend that parental rights be terminated and that the permanent plan of adoption be ordered for Blake.
Appellant asserts that the prospective adoptive parent did not wish for Blake to continue contact with his siblings. However, the CASA actually noted that the prospective adoptive mother had said “she would like Blake to adjust to her home before she starts contact with his half siblings.”
In light of all of the evidence in the record regarding Blake’s relationship with his half-siblings, it is clear that Blake has a positive and loving relationship with Rachel and Shane, but it is also apparent that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that those sibling relationships are not so significant that their severance would cause Blake detriment. (See In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952 [affirming finding of no detriment even though a fairly strong sibling bond existed].) Moreover, even were we to assume a “substantial interference” with significant sibling relationships such as to cause detriment (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)), we further conclude that, given the evidence of Blake’s need for stability and permanence, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the benefits of an adoptive placement plainly outweigh any interest he may have in continuing contact with his half-siblings. (See In re L.Y.L., at pp. 952-953.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights with respect to Blake C. is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J.Richman, J.