Opinion
No. B165921.
11-19-2003
In re ARTURO A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTURO A., Defendant and Appellant.
Meghan B. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Arturo A. was continued as a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) after he admitted a subsequent wardship petition alleging that he had committed the felony offense of street terrorism under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 777.) He argues that his admission was ineffective and the court abused its discretion in committing him to CYA rather than a less restrictive placement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In December of 2001, 14-year-old Arturo and three other teenagers drove a stolen car from Ventura to Santa Barbara. They tried to take another car from its owners possession, but when that attempt failed, they drove to a public park, took a rangers vehicle, and led police on a high speed chase that ended in an accident. Arturo was declared a ward of the Santa Barbara juvenile court after he admitted he had taken a car without its owners permission in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. Allegations of attempted carjacking and attempted second degree robbery were dismissed.
The case was transferred to Ventura County for disposition. Another juvenile court petition was filed alleging that about a week before the events in Santa Barbara, Arturo and other teenagers had burglarized a home. Arturo admitted the burglary allegation and was placed in the Colston Youth Center for a 120-day term for the Santa Barbara and Ventura offenses.
Arturo was released on an early furlough from Colston on May 29, 2002. On October 21, 2002, he admitted allegations that he had violated the terms of his release by failing to report to the probation officer or submit to testing for controlled substances, failing to pay restitution as ordered by the court, failing to attend school and associating with a gang member. Arturo (who was now 15 years old) was committed to the Clifton Tatum Center for 60 days on the probation violation.
On January 10, 2003, Arturo and several members or associates of the Ventura Avenue Gangsters (VAG) drove to Oxnard looking for rival gang members. They saw two teenage boys walking down the road and stopped to confront them. One of Arturos companions beat one of the boys severely with a baseball bat. Arturo admitted a subsequent petition alleging that he had committed a felony violation of street terrorism under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). He requested a local placement, but the court committed him to CYA for a maximum term of seven years and four months.
DISCUSSION
Validity of Admission
Arturo argues that the true finding on the subsequent petition must be reversed because he did not explicitly admit the street terrorism allegation. We disagree.
At the commencement of the hearing on the subsequent petition, the district attorney advised the court that she believed there was going to be a change in plea. With the courts permission, she engaged in the following colloquy about the charges: "[District Attorney]: Have you talked about the amended complaint thats made against you with your attorney yet? [¶] [Arturo]: Yes. [& para;] [District Attorney]: Okay. In Count 1, youre charged with violation of Section 186.22 [subdivision] (a), which is being involved in street terrorism and a criminal street gang known as the Avenue. [¶] Do you understand that charge? [& para;] [Arturo]: Yes. [¶] [District Attorney]: And is it true that you want to admit that charge? [Arturo]: Yes."
After Arturo stated that he wanted to admit the charge, the district attorney advised him of his constitutional rights to confrontation, to a trial, and against self-incrimination, as required by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. (See In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 897-898, 903.) She informed him he would face a maximum term of seven years and four months in custody and would be ordered to pay victim restitution and register as a gang member. Arturo specifically stated that he waived his constitutional rights and understood the consequences of which he had been advised. The juvenile court found that Arturo had entered a voluntary admission to the subsequent petition, and the defense did not dispute this characterization of the record.
Arturo now complains that while he affirmatively indicated that he wanted to admit the petition, he did not actually do so. His admission was somewhat less than ideal in its form, but there is no deficiency in its substance. Arturo was fully advised of his constitutional rights and the consequences of an admission. He affirmatively stated that he wanted to admit the charge. While he did not additionally state that he "admitted" the charge, his intention to do so was unequivocal.
The record in this case is similar to that in People v. Moore (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 411. In Moore, the prosecutor told the defendant that it was his "understanding that you are going to admit" a prior conviction enhancement allegation. The defendant answered "yes." The prosecutor then went through the constitutional admonitions and waivers, but did not obtain an express admission of the conviction. (Id . at pp. 415-416, 422.) The court of appeal rejected an argument that the enhancement should be reversed. "[A]lthough the record does not reflect a model admission, appellant unequivocally expressed his intention to admit the second prior." (Id. at p. 422; see also People v. Williams (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 507, 515-516.)
Arturos citations to People v. Van Buren (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 875 and In re M.G.S. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 329 are inapposite. In Van Buren, this court reversed a finding on a prior conviction when there had been no explicit admission by the defendant and no advisement or waiver of his constitutional rights. (Van Buren, supra, at pp. 883-884.) Here, by contrast, Arturo affirmatively stated that he wanted to admit the charge against him and explicitly waived his constitutional rights after a full advisement of those rights. In M.G.S., the appellate court concluded that an admission in a wardship case must be personally entered by the minor and reversed a finding that was based solely on defense counsels representation that his client would admit the charge. (In re M.G.S., supra, at pp. 339-340.) Arturo personally waived his constitutional rights and personally stated that he wanted to admit the allegations in the petition.
It is apparent from the record that under the totality of the circumstances, Arturo entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary admission of the street terrorism allegation. (See People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175.) He is not entitled to a reversal of the true finding on that allegation.
Commitment to CYA
Arturo argues that the trial court erred by committing him to CYA. We review this dispositional order for abuse of discretion, indulging in all reasonable inferences to support the courts decision. (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) There was no abuse of discretion in this case.
The goals of the juvenile court are protection of the public and rehabilitation of the minor. (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 711.) Punishment, including a commitment to CYA, is appropriate when used as a rehabilitative tool. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (b); In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396.) A CYA commitment is not an abuse of discretion when the commitment will be of probable benefit to the minor and less restrictive alternatives would be inappropriate or ineffectual. (In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.)
Arturo was committed to CYA after he pled guilty to a street terrorism allegation that arose from a brutal group assault by VAG members on a victim perceived to be a rival gang member. Although Arturo did not strike the actual blows, the probation report states that he had agreed to "put in work" for VAG, but "froze" when the time came to commit the actual assault. Arturo had violated probation in his earlier cases and commitments to local custody had not persuaded him to refrain from criminal activity. He was associating with gang members and participating in increasingly serious conduct. His mother reported that she could no longer control him and favored a CYA commitment if that was the best program for him.
Based on this record, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Arturo would benefit from the structure of a CYA commitment and that a less restrictive placement would be ineffectual. The court acted well within its discretion when it committed Arturo to CYA.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, Acting P.J., PERREN, J.