Opinion
2006-2296/A
03-31-2015
In the Matter of the Application of Carmen Rivera, As Administratrix, D.B.N. of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of DAVID MALDONADO, JR., For leave to allocate and distribute the settlement proceeds of a cause of action for conscious pain and suffering of the Decedent.
Liam J. McLaughlin, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner McLaughlin & Zerafa, LLP 1 North Lexington Avenue, 11th Floor White Plains, New York 10601 Theodore J. Brundage, Esq. Attorney for Respondent 500 Mamaroneck Avenue, Suite 320 Harrison, New York 10528 Jeffrey M. Binder, P.C. & Associates Guardian ad litem 68 East Post Road — Suite 200 White Plains, New York 10601
Liam J. McLaughlin, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
McLaughlin & Zerafa, LLP
1 North Lexington Avenue, 11th Floor
White Plains, New York 10601
Theodore J. Brundage, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
500 Mamaroneck Avenue, Suite 320
Harrison, New York 10528
Jeffrey M. Binder, P.C. & Associates
Guardian ad litem
68 East Post Road — Suite 200
White Plains, New York 10601
David F. Everett, J.
In this miscellaneous proceeding, Carmen Rivera ("petitioner") as administratrix of the estate of David Maldonado Jr. ("decedent"), seeks an order: (i) granting her motion for summary judgment dismissing the answer of David Maldonado Sr. ("respondent"), decedent's father, on the basis that respondent should be barred from inheriting from decedent's estate due to respondent's having pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter with regard to decedent's death; and, pursuant to EPTL 4-1.4, for respondent's having abandoned decedent; and (ii) finding that Brandon Lee Rentas ("Brandon") and Jaliyah Armani Arroyo ("Jaliyah"), decedent's half siblings, are decedent's sole distributees. The motion is granted, as more fully set forth herein.
FACTS
Decedent was two years old when he died. Decedent has four statutory distributees: (i) respondent; (ii) Luz Arroyo ("Luz"), his mother; (iii) Brandon, a half-brother; and (iv) Jaliyah, a half-sister.
The incident that resulted in decedent's death occurred on July 29, 2005. Petitioner states that at the time of decedent's death, respondent had punished decedent and Elijah Lowe Santana ("Elijah"), decedent's half-brother, by placing them in the bathroom, turning on the hot water faucet, and closing the door behind him with the toddlers still in the bathroom. According to petitioner, Luz was in a drug-induced stupor at the time. After leaving the toddlers in the bathroom, respondent then joined Luz on the couch and passed out in an illegal drug-induced stupor as well. Both decedent and Elijah died. Decedent's death certificate reflects that decedent died of hyperthermia and scalding burns to his body.
Respondent pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter (CPL 125.15-01) with regard to the death of decedent and Elijah. Luz pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide. On or about April 11, 2006, respondent was sentenced to two indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 5 to 15 years on the manslaughter convictions, to run concurrently with each other.
A person is guilty of manslaughter when he recklessly causes the death of another person (CPL 125.15 [01]).
Petitioner retained counsel to prosecute a wrongful death action against the County of Westchester, its Department of Child Protective Services and Social Services, and Cromwell Tower Redevelopment ("Cromwell") - the landlord of the building where the decedent and Elijah lived - to recover for the pain, suffering, and death of decedent and Elijah.
Temporary letters of administration were issued to the Public Administrator on September 21, 2006 in connection with the estate of both decedent and Elijah. Thereafter, the Public Administrator commenced an action against the County of Westchester, and Cromwell for the pain, suffering, and death of decedent and Elijah. On May 21, 2007, petitioner was appointed administratrix of the respective estates of decedent and Elijah. On January 2, 2007, petitioner was granted letters of guardianship over the purported then-infant distributees of decedent's estate — Jaliyah and Brandon. Petitioner subsequently assumed the authority to prosecute the wrongful death actions.
Pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), filed on September 8, 2011, the actions were settled as against Cromwell for a combined amount of $400,000, to be equally divided beteween decedent's and Elijah's estate. Counsel fees were fixed in the sum of $69,243.38. The order referred determination of all issues pertaining to allocation and distribution of the net proceeds to this court. On October 6, 2011, the wrongful death action was settled against the County of Westchester in the sum of $200,000, to be equally divided between decedent's and Elijah's estate. The Supreme Court, Westchester County (Giacomo, J.) approved the settlement, and legal fees were fixed into the sum of $37,237.70. The order referred the determination of all issues pertaining to allocation and distribution of the net proceeds to this Court.
On or about July 16, 2014, petitioner filed the instant motion for an order seeking disqualification of respondent and Luz as distributees, allocating the settlement to the cause of action for wrongful death, distributing the proceeds to purported distributees Brandon and Jaliyah according to a payment schedule, and related relief. Luz has consented to the relief sought in the petition, in essence, consenting to her disqualification as a distributee of decedent. Respondent, however, asserts that he is decedent's father and is entitled to receive his intestate share as a distributee.
Petitioner's Contentions
Petitioner asserts that by reason of his plea of guilty to second degree manslaughter, respondent should be disqualified and deprived of any interest in the estate, pursuant to the Court of Appeals' holding in Riggs v Palmer (115 NY 506, 51 5 [1889]). According to petitioner, the facts underlying decedent's death reveal that respondent had put decedent and his half-brother Elijah in the bathroom, turned the hot water on while the children were inside, exited the bathroom and closed the door behind him, causing the children's deaths. Respondent then passed out in a drug-induced stupor with Luz. In addition, according to petitioner, experts who were to testify at trial found that decedent died from hyperthermia, and that both Luz and respondent were too "high" on drugs to hear decedent's screams as the heat rose to unbearable temperatures in the bathroom.
Furthermore, petitioner asserts that respondent should be disqualified from sharing in the estate pursuant to EPTL 4-1.4, as respondent neglected decedent. Petitioner notes that the officers investigating the crime found the apartment to be filthy, roach infested, and horrendous, and that the apartment had a "wet damp suffocating sauna-like heat emanating from it." According to petitioner, piles of dirty, food-encrusted plates and dishes were in the sink, there was no food in the refrigerator, piles of clothes were strewn about the apartment, and there was a filthy mattress on the floor in the middle of the apartment. In addition, petitioner asserts that the apartment smelled and there was dirt and dust on the floor (Petition ¶¶ 47-52).
Respondent's Contentions
Respondent asserts that whether he is actually responsible for decedent's death is an issue of fact, irrespective of his plea of guilty for second-degree manslaughter. In addition, respondent claims that he did not abandon decedent and that he actually safeguarded decedent from his mother. Further, respondent alleges it is a question of fact whether it was the landlord, or respondent, who is responsible for decedent's death. Finally, respondent contends that the deplorable conditions of the apartment raise an issue of fact regarding neglect and abandonment.
A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the interests of Jaliyah and Brandon. Brandon reached the age of majority during the pendency of these proceedings. The guardian ad litem has rendered a report in which he does not object to the relief requested in the petition with regard to Jaliyah.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any genuine material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Such evidence generally consists of affidavits from persons having personal knowledge of the facts and/or documentary exhibits in admissible form which provide evidentiary proof that no genuine issues of fact exist, requiring a trial ( see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562). Failure to make such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 NY2d at 853).
Upon this showing, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce admissible evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of genuine material issues of fact which require a trial (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562). The court's role is issue finding, not issue determination (Dyckman v Barrett, 187 AD2d 553 [1992]), and while the court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 [1997]; Russell v A. Barton Hepburn Hosp., 154 AD2d 796 [1989]), mere conclusions, unsubstantiated allegations, or expressions of hope are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562).
In Riggs v Palmer (115 NY at 511), the Court of Appeals articulated the long-accepted principle that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own inequity, or to acquire property by his own crime." The rule in Riggs v Palmer is generally applied in cases where one intentionally murders another person or causes the death of another person by some felonious or other intentional or reckless criminal conduct, and as a result the perpetrator is not entitled to share in the decedent's estate.
The rule set forth in Riggs v Palmer has been expanded to those instances where the party seeking to inherit has been convicted of manslaughter with regard to the decedent's death (see e.g., Matter of Mazzella, NYLJ, Oct. 27, 2006, at 21, col 5 [respondent forfeited any rights to share in decedent's estate as a result of his conviction of manslaughter of decedent]). In Matter of Timpano (40 Misc 3d 1237[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51472[U], *8 [Sur Ct, Oneida County]), the court recognized that the "forfeiture doctrine" set forth in Riggs v Palmer has been expanded to apply to a party who sought to benefit from decedent's estate but recklessly caused said death, citing Matter of Sparks (172 Misc. 642 [1939] [first-degree manslaughter]) and Matter of Wells (76 Misc 2d 458 [1973] [second-degree manslaughter]).
Here, respondent was convicted upon his plea of second-degree manslaughter, which is defined as "recklessly causing the death of another person" (CPL 125.15[01]). Therefore, the court finds that respondent is disqualified from inheriting from decedent's estate pursuant the "forfeiture doctrine" set forth to Riggs v Palmer and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that respondent is disqualified as a distributee of decedent , the court need not consider whether respondent should be disqualified pursuant to EPTL 4-1.4. In addition, in view of Luz's concession to her disqualification as a distributee of decedent, the court finds that Brandon and Jaliyah are decedent's sole distributees (EPTL 4-1-1[a][5]).
Accordingly, petitioner's motion is granted, and the proceeding is hereby restored to the Court's calendar of Wednesday, April 22, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. for a conference with respect to the issues remaining for determination.
THIS IS THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
The following papers were considered:
(i) Amended Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, affirmation of Liam J. McLaughlin, Esq., with all exhibits;
(ii) Affirmation of Theodore J. Brundage, Esq., in opposition to motion for summary judgment;
(iii) Reply Affirmation of Jeffrey M. Binder, Esq.
Dated:White Plains, NY
March 31, 2015
__________________________________
HON. DAVID F. EVERETT