Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 18-0443
03-28-2019
IN RE ANDREW L.
COUNSEL Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem By Florence M. Bruemmer Counsel for Appellant Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Prescott By Danalyn Savage Counsel for Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300JV201800092
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant
Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Prescott
By Danalyn Savage
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Vice Chief Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
MORSE, Judge:
¶1 Appellant Andrew L. ("Andrew") appeals his adjudication of delinquency by the juvenile court. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's judgment. Because there was sufficient evidence, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Andrew was adjudicated delinquent for molesting M.S. Andrew is M.S.'s great-aunt's stepson. He and M.S. have known each other since they were five or six, and they have often spent time with each other and Andrew's sister Stephanie. When M.S. was 12, Andrew was staying the night at her house. M.S. slept on the bottom of a bunkbed while Andrew slept on the top. M.S. testified that when she woke up in the morning, Andrew had his hands in her underwear.
¶3 A couple days afterward, M.S. talked to Stephanie about what Andrew had done. M.S. testified that she specifically told Stephanie that Andrew had touched her vagina. However, Stephanie testified that M.S. did not tell her that Andrew had touched her genitals. Stephanie encouraged M.S. to tell her great-aunt, so she did. M.S. did not tell her mother at that time.
¶4 Fifteen months later, M.S.'s mother confronted her about some unrelated inappropriate behavior. During this conversation, M.S. told her mother what Andrew had done. Her mother, in turn, told the assistant principal at M.S.'s school, but did not call the police. The assistant principal reported the incident to the police.
¶5 At the end of the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found that M.S. was "a very credible witness," and noted that the only time her story varied was through the testimony of Stephanie, who "couldn't remember the testimony herself," and "changed her story of who she told what." The court found that the State had met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt and adjudicated Andrew delinquent on the charge of molestation of a child as a class 2 felony. Andrew timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-235(A).
DISCUSSION
¶6 On an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a delinquency adjudication, we determine whether a rational factfinder could find the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Dayvid S., 199 Ariz. 169, 170, ¶ 4 (App. 2000). "[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the adjudication." In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, 426, ¶ 7 (App. 2001).
¶7 Andrew argues that M.S.'s testimony was not credible for three reasons: she did not tell her mother until over a year after the incident, she only told her mother when she was in trouble for other things she had done, and Stephanie did not corroborate her testimony that she told Stephanie of the molestation. Andrew made the same arguments before the juvenile court, but after acknowledging the inconsistencies, and considering all of the testimony, the court explicitly found M.S. to be a "very credible witness," noting that her testimony did not vary. On reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder. See In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, 425, ¶ 25 (App. 2007) ("In this case, the judge made a specific finding on the record that he found [the victim]'s testimony credible and we are not in a position to second-guess that finding.").
¶8 Andrew also argues that there was a lack of corroborating evidence and the police officers should have done a better job of investigating by measuring or taking pictures of the bunkbed or doing a confrontation call with Andrew. Witness testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See State v. Merryman, 79 Ariz. 73, 75 (1955) (rejecting argument that uncorroborated victim testimony was insufficient to sustain a verdict); State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 226 (1989) ("[C]redibility is an issue to be resolved by the jury upon a proper record. Clearly, if a jury believes [a witness]'s testimony, that testimony alone is sufficient to sustain the verdict."); see also United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 1076 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Even in the face of inconsistent evidence, a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict."). Thus, Andrew's arguments that more could have been done in this case are unavailing.
CONCLUSION
¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Andrew's adjudication of delinquency.