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In re Amendment of Rule 29 1.d of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Feb 24, 1986
288 Ark. 644 (Ark. 1986)

Opinion


704 S.W.2d 625 (Ark. 1986) 288 Ark. 644 In re AMENDMENT OF RULE 29 1.d. OF the SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS. Supreme Court of Arkansas. February 24, 1986.

        PER CURIAM.

        By Act 231 of 1985 the General Assembly substituted the Court of Appeals for the Circuit Court as the first court to review a decision of the Public Service Commission.

        It might seem this act conflicts with Amendment 58 to the Arkansas Constitution, which created the Court of Appeals, and Rule 29 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court which sets the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. We decide the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, not the legislature. In Rule 29 1.d. we provided that we retain jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the Public Service Commission:

        [The Supreme Court shall hear] [c]ases appealed from orders of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, the Arkansas Transportation Commission, and the Arkansas Pollution Control Commission, and cases involving rates for public utilities fixed by municipal authorities; ....

        In Ward School Bus Mfg. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977), we held that the General Assembly could not provide for direct appeals to this court from an order of the Workers Compensation Commission because we only have appellate jurisdiction under Article 7, section 4 of the Arkansas Constitution, with certain exceptions not relevant here. But we determined in Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, 271 Ark. 455, 609 S.W.2d 895 (1980), that an act of the General Assembly providing for a direct appeal of an order of the Workers Compensation Commission to the Court of Appeals did not violate Amendment 58 to the Constitution because it was not an act determining appellate jurisdiction. We held Amendment 58 did not limit the Court of Appeals to appellate jurisdiction as Article 7, section 4 does this court. We found that the Court of Appeals was merely substituted for the Circuit Court as the first court to review an administrative order.

        In Moose v. Gregory, 267 Ark. 86, 590 S.W.2d 662 (1979), we laid out the ground rules for our review of decisions by the Court of Appeals. Moose involved a petition for review of a decision from Chancery Court. The criterion we described in Moose to determine review does not necessarily apply in cases in which the Court of Appeals acts as the first court to review an order of an administrative agency. In Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, supra, we noted that we cannot accept review of appeals from the Workers Compensation Commission until the Court of Appeals first makes a decision. The same is true of appeals of decisions of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Division. Act 252 of 1979. We have not hesitated to grant review of the Court of Appeals' decisions in Workers Compensation or Employment Security cases when, in our judgment, the matter was of major legal importance or significant public interest.

        Utility rate decisions of the Public Service Commission are generally matters of significant public interest. We will therefore review by petition, or otherwise, decisions of the Court of Appeals with this in mind.

        While we respect the General Assembly's concern to expedite decisions of an administrative agency, we will not overlook the intent of Amendment 58 and our duty as an appellate court to see that any decision is fairly and completely reviewed once. With that observation we amend Rule 29 1.c. and d. of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to read:

        c. Cases, other than appeals from the Workers Compensation Commission, the Public Service Commission or the Board of Review created by the Employment Security Law, in which the validity, interpretation, construction or constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly, an ordinance of a municipality or county, or a rule or regulation of any court, administrative agency or regulatory body is in question; declaratory judgment actions pertaining to the validity or applicability of a rule of an agency subject to the Administrative Procedure Act under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 5-705 (Repl.1976);

        d. Cases appealed from orders of the Arkansas Transportation Commission, the Arkansas pollution Control Commission and cases involving rates for public utilities fixed by municipal authorities.

        The last sentence in the second paragraph of Rule 29 6. shall read:

         Except in cases appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Workers Compensation Commission, the Employment Security Board of Review or the Public Service Commission, no petition for review on the ground that the case involves an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance, as specified in subparagraph 4 (b) of this Rule, will be considered unless the party petitioning for review filed in the Court of Appeals, before the submission of the case to that court, a motion asking that the case be certified to the Supreme Court on that ground, with a certificate of counsel that the motion is filed in good faith belief that the case should be so certified.

        PURTLE, J., not participating.


Summaries of

In re Amendment of Rule 29 1.d of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

Supreme Court of Arkansas
Feb 24, 1986
288 Ark. 644 (Ark. 1986)
Case details for

In re Amendment of Rule 29 1.d of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

Case Details

Full title:In re AMENDMENT OF RULE 29 1.d. OF the SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS.

Court:Supreme Court of Arkansas

Date published: Feb 24, 1986

Citations

288 Ark. 644 (Ark. 1986)
288 Ark. 644

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