Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 64272
BUTZ, J.After two petitions were filed in juvenile court charging him with unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, purchasing or receiving a stolen vehicle, and driving without a valid license, Alvin T., then a minor, filed a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that a police officer’s stop of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The juvenile court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the petitions.
The People appeal, contending that the stop of the minor’s car was justified because of his suspected truancy violation. We agree with the People and shall reverse the order dismissing the petitions.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2006, the prosecutor filed a petition seeking to have the minor declared a ward of the court and alleging that he committed the following offenses: unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), purchasing or receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and driving a motor vehicle without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). On January 18, 2007, the prosecutor filed another petition adding 12 counts each of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)).
A second petition was filed December 15, 2006, charging the minor with robbery (Pen. Code, § 487c), battery on school property (id., § 243.2, subd. (a)), and conspiracy to commit a crime (id., § 182, subd. (a)(1)). That petition stems from a separate incident that is not at issue here.
The minor filed a motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1. He requested that all evidence obtained as a result of the police officer’s stop of his vehicle be suppressed on the ground that the detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The juvenile court heard evidence on the suppression motion, granted the motion to suppress, and dismissed the two petitions filed against the minor.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing
On November 16, 2006, at 8:30 a. m., Stockton Police Department Officer Eric Azarvand observed a 1993 four-door red Honda Civic parked in front of a home that he determined was the minor’s residence. The officer believed the car had not been parked there very long because there was no morning dew on it. He noticed two individuals who appeared to be minors walking down the street where the Honda was parked, but lost sight of them when he “ran” the car’s license plate and discovered that it was stolen.
As Officer Azarvand drove down the street looking for the two minors he had seen, he saw the minor driving another 1993 four-door red Honda Civic, carrying three passengers. Based on his training and experience, the officer knew that auto thieves often steal cars of the same make and model of the car that they drive, to use them for parts.
All four occupants of the red Honda appeared to be minors of high school age. The car was traveling away from the direction of Bear Creek High, the local high school. Classes at Bear Creek started at 7:30 a.m., an hour earlier. Officer Azarvand was aware that the local curfew ordinance prohibited unaccompanied minors from being on public streets during the time when they are supposed to be in school.
Officer Azarvand followed the Honda for about a mile and a half. He stopped the car and asked the occupants their ages. They all identified themselves as minors, under the age of 18. He did not issue any citation for Vehicle Code violations, but turned all the minors over to the local high school’s resource police officer for a truancy violation.
B. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
Following Officer Azarvand’s testimony at the suppression hearing, the juvenile court judge heard arguments from both sides. The prosecutor argued that the officer had “an articulable suspicion of two crimes being committed”--first, that the minor was connected to a car theft because he was driving a car that looked identical to the stolen car in front of his home; and second, that the minor was possibly in violation of the local curfew ordinance by being out on the street during school hours. Defense counsel countered that the officer did not know where the minor attended school when he stopped the car and contended that the officer’s real motivation for the stop was simply a “hunch,” not reasonable suspicion, that the minor was somehow involved in a car theft.
The juvenile court ruled that the Stockton curfew ordinance did not “even apply here at all” because it was only applicable “between the hours [of] . . . 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.”; that while Officer Azarvand did have cause to arrest the minor for a truancy violation based on the state Education Code, that reason was nothing more than a “sham to question the minor about the unsolved crime of auto theft,” which did not meet “the requirements for a probable cause arrest.” The court thus granted the motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the first and third petitions.
DISCUSSION
The People argue that the officer was justified in stopping the minor’s car based on his suspicion that there was a truancy violation of Stockton Municipal Code section 5-131.1 and Education Code section 48264 and that the juvenile court erred in rejecting this justification for the stop. The minor replies that the court properly found the true basis for the officer’s stop was an impermissible “hunch” and that its ruling should be upheld.
I. Fourth Amendment Principles
An ordinary traffic stop does not require a showing of probable cause to arrest. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures dictates that traffic stops must be supported by articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) In evaluating whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred, we “‘first undertake[] an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.’” (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 334, italics added.) The validity of a stop does not turn on the officer’s actual motivation for the detention. (Ibid.)
When we review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the factual findings of the trial court. (People v. Snead (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 380, 383-384.) However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and apply our independent judgment to measure the facts determined by the trial court against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 597.)
II. Wilder Objection
Citing Wilder v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 90, the minor claims that the People should be barred from challenging the suppression ruling by virtue of their failure to file a written justification for the warrantless search prior to the hearing. In dictum, the Wilder court noted that, to avoid confusion and unnecessary litigation, after the defendant “moved to suppress . . . evidence [citation] upon the ground such evidence was seized without a warrant[,] . . . [t]he prosecutor should have pleaded his justification . . . .” (Id. at p. 96.) Then, the defendant “should have been allowed an opportunity to file a written response to the attempted justification . . . .” (Id. at p. 97.) The California Supreme Court approved of the Wilder procedure in People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 134 (Williams).
While the Wilder dicta suggests that such a procedure be followed, the minor cites no authority holding that the People’s failure to file a justification pleading in the trial court bars them from pursuing an appeal of an erroneous suppression ruling. Moreover, although defense counsel did raise a Wilder objection at the outset of the suppression hearing, she did not object to the prosecutor’s evidence based upon noncompliance with Wilder, nor did she ever press for a ruling on her objection. Under these circumstances, the point is forfeited. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 195-196, disapproved on a different ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1; People v. Obie (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 744, 750, disapproved on another ground in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, fn. 4.)
III. Analysis
The juvenile court granted the motion to suppress because, while the minor may have been guilty of a truancy violation, that reason was a “sham” to conceal Officer Azarvand’s actual desire to question the minor about the auto theft. The court’s analysis was faulty because it focused on the officer’s subjective intent rather than the objective facts known to him.
While pre-Proposition 8 California decisions established the lack of subjectively held suspicion may render a detention unlawful, requiring the suppression of evidence flowing from the detention (see People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 647), this is no longer the law.
In 1982, Proposition 8 was passed which enacted article I, section 28, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution, mandating that all questions regarding the exclusion of evidence be resolved under federal law. (See People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733.) Under federal law, a subjective suspicion is not required. (Ibid.) The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a detention is measured solely by an objective standard. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813 [135 L.Ed.2d. 89, 98] [“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment analysis”].)
In People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668 (Woods), the California Supreme Court followed Whren and held that the subjective intent of a police officer is irrelevant in evaluating the legality of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Woods, at pp. 678-679.) Thus, it is no longer proper to inquire into the officer’s “actual” or “true” intent; rather, we look to the record as a whole to determine (1) what facts were known to the officer and (2) whether a reasonable officer in possession of those facts would have had a reasonable suspicion that the minor was connected to some criminal activity. (People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148; People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 641.)
The Stockton Municipal Code, of which the juvenile court took judicial notice, makes it a misdemeanor for a minor to be on a public street or public place during school hours. As the court observed, the Education Code allows a peace officer to take temporary custody, “during school hours, of any minor subject to compulsory full-time education or to compulsory continuation education found away from his or her home and who is absent from school.” (Ed. Code, § 48264.)
In pertinent part, the Stockton Municipal Code section 5-131.1.2 provides: “It shall be unlawful and a misdemeanor for any minor under the age of eighteen (18) years to remain in or upon any public street, sidewalk, park or other public place within the City of Stockton during curfew hours.” “Curfew Hours” are defined in section 5-131.1.1 as “after the hour of 11:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. on the following day; and, for those juveniles who are subject to the compulsory education laws of the state, including continuing education, during those hours during the day when school is actually in session.” (Stockton Mun. Code, § 5-131.1.1, subd. 3, italics added.)
Officer Azarvand was familiar with the local curfew ordinance and knew that its violation was a misdemeanor. He saw the minor driving a car at 8:30 a.m., and carrying three other persons, all of whom appeared to be of high school age. They were traveling in the opposite directionfrom the local high school, which commenced classes at 7:30 a.m. After the stop was made, all the passengers admitted they were minors and were turned over to high school authorities for a truancy violation. Because he had reason to believe the minor was violating the local curfew ordinance by driving on a public street when school was in session, the officer was justified in detaining the minor’s car to investigate.
The minor’s reliance on language from In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903 (James D.) that truancy arrests “‘may not be used as a pretext for investigating criminal matters’” (id. at p. 915) is misplaced. The quote is found in the court’s discussion of police-citizen encounters that trigger Fourth Amendment analysis, and does not relate to the court’s holding that the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to believe James D. was a truant. (James D., at p. 917.)
Moreover, the quotation from James D. no longer accurately reflects the current state of the law. The court’s dictum was based on two cases--In re Miguel G. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 345 and In re Jorge S. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 852--that relied on the old “subjective” standard. (See Miguel G., at p. 349; Jorge S., at p. 857.) As noted, the California Supreme Court has since declared that the subjective intent of the officer is no longer relevant to the legality of a detention. (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 678-679.) Contrary to the juvenile court’s conclusion, Officer Azarvand’s subjective suspicion that the minor may have been involved with a stolen car did not invalidate the stop, since the objective facts supported a reasonable belief the minor was violating truancy laws by being on a public street during school hours.
Finally, we reject the minor’s argument that, if we find there was a justification for the initial stop, we should remand the case to determine whether the length of the detention exceeded its permissible scope. The minor has forfeited this issue on appeal by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 130-131 [once the People have offered justification for a search or seizure, it is the minor’s burden to offer all arguments that negate it, and he cannot “remain[] completely silent until the appeal about issues the prosecution may have overlooked”].)
DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the juvenile court petitions is reversed. The cause is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to enter a new order denying the minor’s suppression motion and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur: HULL, Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
In concluding that the ordinance applied only between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., the juvenile court judge overlooked the italicized clause quoted above.