In re Allison B.

Full title: IN RE ALLISON B. ET AL., PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Aug 1, 2003

2003 Ct. Sup. 9163 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

Opinion

Nos. CP99-002673-A, CP99-002674-A

August 1, 2003

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RUBINOW, JUDGE.

This memorandum of decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Lynette O. and Ericson B., the biological parents of Allison B., born August 19, 1997 and Addison B., born September 3, 1999. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed the TPR petition at issue on August 22, 2001, alleging against each respondent the grounds of failure to achieve rehabilitation, and failure to achieve rehabilitation in a case where parental rights to another child have already been terminated. For the reasons stated below, the court finds these matters in favor of the petitioner.

Trial of this highly-contested matter took place on November 18 and 20, 2002, and on January 27 and 29, 2003. The post-trial brief was filed with the court on April 4, 2003. The petitioner and the respondent parents were vigorously represented throughout the proceedings, as were the children.² The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of these children.

2 The respondent mother attended each day of trial. Without adequate explanation, the respondent father failed to attend the third day of trial.

I. FACTUAL FINDINGS

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions, the TPR social study,³ and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence which included court records; reports from substance abuse treatment providers; psychiatrist's records; psychologist's report; records of the Department of Public Safety; laboratory reports; hospital records; CT Page 9163-b program certificates; DCF records, reports and correspondence.⁴ The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses,⁵ who included DCF social workers, a domestic violence worker, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a Department of Corrections (DOC) program case manager, a treatment worker, and the respondent mother.⁶ Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.⁷

3 The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 5. Practice Book § 33-5.

4 In reaching its determination in this matter, the court has not relied upon the summary of information provided through Exhibits 19 and 20.

5 "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is CT Page 9163-aj they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). It is within the court's province to determine which expert testimony, if any, is more credible than other expert opinion evidence provided for review. Keans v. Bocciarelli, 35 Conn.App. 239, 241-42, 645 A.2d 1029, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 934, 650 A.2d 172 (1994).

6 As was his right, the respondent father did not personally testify before the court. See Practice Book § 34-1.

7 Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.

I.A. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Lynette O. and Ericson B. commenced their relationship in the early 1990s. DCF has been involved with their family since 1996. Their first daughter was born on February 16, 1996.⁸ Both parents were then identified as having problems involving substance abuse and inability to provide proper care for their first daughter. Allison and Addison, the children at issue, came into DCF custody as the result of a 96-hour hold executed by DCF on December 6, 1999. On August 23, 2000, the court (Lopez, J.) accepted the voluntary consents tendered by Lynette O. and Ericson B., and terminated their parental rights to their first daughter.⁹ (Exhibits 5, 25.)

8 This child was named Allison B. at birth. Herein, she shall be referenced as the "first daughter" to distinguish her from the identically named female child who is the subject of the pending TPR petition. Lynette O. explained that she named her second daughter "Allison" because she misses her first daughter, and wished to replace her. (Testimony of Lynette O.)

9 It is uncontroverted that the first daughter now lives with and has been adopted by Lynette O.'s psychological mother. (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Maria A.)

I.B. LYNETTE O., THE MOTHER

Lynette O. was born on October 6, 1973. She has worked in factories, cleaning, filing in an office, as a seamstress, and has also had long periods of unemployment which left her without lawful income. (Exhibits 5, 9, 11, 16.) Lynette O. has a history of physical, sexual and emotional abuse by her father and her brother.¹⁰ (Testimony of Lynette O., Vanessa S.) In 1993, Lynette O. attempted suicide and was hospitalized to address this situation. (Exhibit 9.) She has been addicted to heroin since the mid-1990s, and presents with a compelling history of failed efforts to control her opiate dependence.

10 Lynette O. was abandoned by her biological mother when she was ten days old; she did not meet her birth mother until she was fourteen. Lynette O. explained that all of her brothers use drugs, and that they are all currently incarcerated. (Testimony of Lynette O.)

On October 19, 1995, Lynette O. was arrested and charged with sale of narcotics.¹¹ (Exhibit 3.) Several days later, she began methadone treatment at a local drug treatment facility (CCC).¹² Lynette O. was able to remain abstinent from illegal drugs only from December 11, 1995 through February 26, 1996; she used cocaine on at least two other occasions notwithstanding the CCC treatment, the status of her pregnancy with her first daughter, and her conviction on January 23, 1996 for the substitute offense of possession of narcotics.¹³ After the birth of the first daughter on February 16, 1996, Lynette O. missed an unacceptable number of consecutive methadone treatment sessions at CCC. She was therefore discharged from the program on March 11, 1996. (Exhibit CT Page 9163-c 6.)

11 In a child protection matter, evidence of a parent's arrests may be considered by the trial court because "even though those arrests did not result in conviction; that evidence was relevant to establish that the respondent's habits and acts of misconduct [were competent to deny the] child the care, guidance or control necessary for [his or her] physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being." In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 819, 719 A.2d 907 (1998).

12 Lynette O.'s history includes several previous attempts at substance abuse treatment and methadone maintenance through another local drug treatment agency, the MF. (Testimony of Maria A.)

13 Lynette O. received a sentence of eighteen months in jail, suspended, with two years of probation. (Exhibit 3.)

Lynette O. returned to CCC on March 14, 1996, and reported "snorting 1-2 bags of heroin a day" despite her past methadone treatment and despite the conditions of her probation which prohibited use of illegal drugs. After performing a psychosocial evaluation and assessment under the supervision of a physician, CCC staff recommended that Lynette O. enter a 180-day detox program. (Exhibit 9.)

Lynette O. again received methadone treatment from CCC from May 23 through June 12, 1996. Thereafter, pursuant to the court's order and DCF's referral, she entered a detox program at a local hospital. Reporting that her heroin use had then increased to six bags per nasum per day, Lynette O. received individual psychotherapy at the hospital, and was discharged on June 15, 1996. She then entered an in-patient program for additional treatment. (Exhibits 7, 10.)

From October 10, 1996 through February 24, 1997, Lynette O. again received methadone treatment at CCC. During this period, she received one-on-one counseling from CCC staff, but nonetheless failed to comply with the program rules. Lynette O. was discharged from CCC services on April 30, 1997 after a two-month hiatus in drug treatment. (Exhibit 7.)

Lynette O. continued her drug use despite the services that had been extended to her. On April 24, 1997, Lynette O. was convicted of two counts of sale of narcotics in connection with offenses that had occurred on April 7, 1997.¹⁴ The January 1996 probation was terminated and she received a total effective sentence of five years in jail, suspended after she had served ninety days of incarceration, with five years of probation. (Exhibit 3.)

14 As found in Part I.C., Ericson B. was convicted on the same day for narcotics charges arising from the same offense. (Exhibit 2.)

When Allison was born on August 19, 1997, DCF received a referral concerning the child due to the hospital's concerns about Lynette O.'s ability to care for the baby given her past drug abuse. (Testimony of Maria A.) Commencing on November 10, 1997, Lynette O. was again provided with methadone treatment services at CCC; she then cooperated with the program's services. (Exhibit 8.) Also in November 1997, upon DCF's referral, Lynette O. received two visits from a parent aide sponsored by a local hospital program (SMH-PAP). This service was discontinued as it was duplicative of other family unification services already being rendered to Lynette O. (Exhibit 15.)

At DCF's referral, SMH-PAP services were reinstated for Lynette O. commencing on March 6, 1998. The parent aide's ability to conduct home visits was hampered by Lynette O.'s changes in housing, and lack of CT Page 9163-d availability. While the parent-aide found Lynette O. to be caring for the children in an appropriate manner, her discordant relationship with Ericson B. led to housing problems for the family. After multiple failed attempts to render home visits in August, SMH-PAP closed Lynette O.'s case due to her non-compliance with the parent aide program. (Exhibit 15.)

In 1998, DCF referred Lynette O. and Ericson B. for domestic violence counseling at a local counseling center, FSGW-WYS. Initially, the couple indicated they would attend, but they failed to follow through; Lynette O. advised DCF that because she was no longer in a relationship with Ericson B., she had no need of domestic violence counseling. (Testimony of Maria A.)

In the spring of 1999, Lynette O. underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation performed by Bruce Freedman, Ph.D.¹⁵ (Exhibit 22.)

15 Dr. Freedman's psychological report of June 1, 1999 was not submitted in evidence at this TPR trial. However, Dr. Grenier had the opportunity to review this report in the course of performing her court-ordered psychological evaluation of Ericson B. (Exhibit 22.)

Addison was born on September 3, 1999. Ericson B. had been arrested and incarcerated on August 8, 1999, so that Lynette O. then served as the sole caretaker for both this infant and two-year old Allison. (Exhibit 5.)

DCF next referred Lynette O. to SMH-NBP, a hospital-affiliated child care program that would provide her with general parenting instruction services and one-on-one instruction in high-risk infant care. Lynette O. participated in SMH-NBP's intake-assessment on October 27, 1999. However, she thereafter failed to cooperate with services, so that the SMH-NBP case worker was able to effectuate home visits only once out of five scheduled attempts. On November 1, 1999, SMH-NBP referred Lynette O. to services through a local visiting nurse program, in a further effort to assist her in learning effective parenting skills. However, Lynette O. did not attend the visiting nurse program's intake session scheduled to take place on November 3, 1999. Due to Lynette O.'s noted non-compliance with services, the SMH-NBP program terminated the provision of parenting education services and child-care assistance, and closed Lynette O.'s case on November 15, 1999. (Exhibits 5, 15.)

On December 6, 1999, Lynette O. was arrested and charged with Risk of Injury to a Minor as the result of a fire that was started when she disposed of a lit cigarette into a wastepaper basket. (Exhibit 3; Testimony of Lynette O.) At the time, when Allison was not yet two and Addison was three months old; Lynette O. was ostensibly participating in the CCC methadone program; and she was subject to the conditions of probation related to her 1997 sale of narcotics conviction. Lynette O. was CT Page 9163-e returned to incarceration and was therefore unable to provide a home for her children. (Exhibit 3.)

DCF executed a 96-hour hold upon Allison and Addison. On December 10, 1999, the court (Lopez, J.) issued an ex parte OTC for the children and imposed specific steps upon Lynette O.; these steps were reiterated when the OTC was sustained (Moore, J.) on December 17, 1999. Among other things, the steps required Lynette O. to refrain from substance abuse; to submit to substance abuse testing, evaluation and treatment; to participate in parenting and individual counseling; to avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system; and to comply with her conditions of probation. (Exhibit 4.) Lynette O. was again discharged from CCC's drug treatment services, as she was not available to receive outpatient treatment due to her incarceration. (Exhibits 3, 8.)

On February 29, 2000, based on her recent arrest, Lynette O. was convicted of violating her probation and the substitute offense of felony Criminal Mischief. Lynette O. was sentenced to serve a total effective period of two years in jail for these convictions. (Exhibit 3.) On May 2, 2000, Allison and Addison were found to be uncared for (Lopez, J.) and were committed to the custody of DCF. At the time of commitment, the court (Lopez, J.) reiterated the majority of the December 1999 steps, and imposed additional specific steps requiring Lynette O. to participate in parenting, individual and anger management counseling; to participate in substance abuse assessment and treatment; and to engage in all services available in prison. (Exhibit 4.)

Lynette O. spent approximately twenty-four months incarcerated at York Correctional Institution while her children languished in DCF foster care. On December 5, 2001, Lynette O. was released from prison with the expectation that she would fully comply with the conditions set by the DOC's Women Offender's Program (CWF-WOP), which delivered services through a family-oriented regional treatment center.¹⁶ The CWF-WOP program was prepared to assist Lynette O. in preventing homelessness, promoting self-reliance and avoiding relapse into offensive behaviors though a wide array of available, relevant services.¹⁷ However, Lynette O. did not fully comply with CWF-WOP's program conditions. Lynette O. did not consistently attend weekly interviews with the staff; she claimed to have been absent because she had moved, yet she failed to timely advise the staff of her new address following a change of residence. She only sporadically attended required meetings of the Women's Wellness Group, claiming that meetings conflicted with her DCF visitation schedule without requesting CWF-WOP's assistance in re-scheduling either obligation. At each Women's Wellness Group meeting that Lynette O. attended, she was reminded that CWF-WOP had individual CT Page 9163-f counseling available for her. Although CWF-WOP had referred Lynette O. to a local mental health center (SMH) for psychiatric care, and although Lynette O. had made a commitment to participate in counseling when she enrolled at CWF-WOP, she never requested assignment to a therapist, and thus did not receive this treatment. (Testimony of Gilberta N.)

16 Lynette O. had applied for participation in CWF-WOP's services in August 2001. However, her entry into the program was delayed due to her misconduct during the latter part of her incarceration. As the DOC placed Lynette O. in segregation for a part of this period, she was not eligible for WOP participation, and was restricted from other privileges such as visiting with the children, as well. (Testimony of Gilberta N.)

17 CWF-WOP proffered comprehensive services to Lynette O., including intensive case management with development of a weekly plan to guide her through the transition from incarceration to life in the community; weekly support counseling through the Women's Wellness Group; referral to the domestic violence program; individual counseling; initial housing at a shelter followed by assistance in obtaining an apartment; vocational training; transportation to DCF visits; and help securing other requirements of daily survival including procurement of state financial aid, clothing, food and attention to her personal needs. (Testimony of Gilberta N.)

In January 2002, after only a few weeks of enrollment in the CWF-WOP program, Lynette O. requested transfer to the center's less demanding, less supportive domestic violence program (CWF-FVOP). At that time, Lynette O. was still eligible for counseling services from CWF-WOP, along with other community support services such as assistance in securing more permanent housing, educational and vocational training. However, Lynette O. denied the need for additional assistance, and elected to attend only the CWF-FVOP sessions. CWF-WOP closed Lynette O.'s file on March 26, 2002, as she had fulfilled DCF's baseline criteria for discharge from this program by securing a temporary job, some housing, and a case management plan. (Testimony of Gilberta N.)

Commencing January 29, 2002 through mid-April 2002, Lynette O. participated in the majority of sessions in the 12-week group domestic violence and parenting education program in which she was enrolled at CWF-FVOP, although she only sporadically attended required AA/NA meetings.¹⁸ On April 11, 2002, Lynette O. received a certificate of "completion" from CWF-FVOP. The agency closed Lynette O.'s file on April 16, 2002. (Exhibit B.; Testimony of Gilberta N., Maria A.)

18 The CWF-FVOP program provides psychoeducational group counseling which focuses on the impact of domestic violence on the victims and the children in the family, and which provides instruction in parenting techniques to apply in families where domestic violence occurs. (Testimony of Susan T.) Lynette O. explained that in lieu of AA/NA meetings, she attended meetings of the Higher Ground program, which has fewer steps to recovery. (Testimony of Lynette O.)

On March 8, 2002, Lynette O. began seeing I.A., D.O., a licensed physician in this state, for receipt of psychiatric care.¹⁹ Dr. I.A. provided brief interview sessions for Lynette O. on a monthly basis, but his primary function was to prescribe and supervise the administration of medication to treat her underlying mental illness. Dr. I.A. initially prescribed Paxil to treat Lynette O.'s depression, and Klonopin to address her anxiety. He subsequently added other medications to this regimen, including Adderal to act as a stimulant and Wellbutrin to enhance the anti-depressant effect of the Paxil.²⁰ (Exhibit 26; Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

19 See General Statutes § 20-9(e). Dr. I.A. is board certified in Forensic Examination, but has no board certification in psychiatry. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

20 Wellbutrin has also shown good effect in reducing cravings for drugs and alcohol, and in addressing ADHD symptoms. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

On April 10, 2002, Lynette O. underwent outpatient surgical removal of her tonsils and adenoids. On April 25, 2002, Lynette O. filed an affidavit with the court seeking a civil restraining order against Ericson B. Although the court granted her ex parte application, the evidence is insufficient to establish whether the order remained in effect after the hearing scheduled for May 13, 2002. (Exhibit 12.)

In May 2002, to comply with DCF's recommendation that she address her CT Page 9163-g continuing substance abuse and narcotic addiction issues, Lynette O. referred herself to a specialized day-treatment drug program (CASA).²¹ After participating in CASA's intake assessment on May 16, 2002, Lynette O. was diagnosed with heroin dependence and failure to accept the severity of her substance abuse issues. "During her tenure at Casa's day treatment program, [Lynette O.] showed little progress or motivation in developing a viable ongoing recovery program as evidenced by denial of positive urine pre-screening toxicology for methadone produced on 5/11/02, consecutive absenteeism, and abrupt disengagement of substance abuse treatment . . ." after May 20, 2002. (Exhibits 16, D-3.) In late May 2002 CASA proffered an inpatient bed available so that appropriate residential treatment could be provided to Lynette O. However, the respondent mother did not indicate any interest in inpatient care, and CASA therefore terminated its services to Lynette O. (Exhibits 16, D-3; Testimony of Katie C.)

21 A substance abuse screen showed that on April 24, 2002, Lynette O. had not used methadone, but that she had ingested codeine and morphine, both narcotic drugs. (Exhibits 15, D-10.) A subsequent substance abuse screen showed that on May 11, 2002, Lynette O. had used methadone, although it had not been prescribed for her use by a health care provider or substance abuse program; this test also showed that Lynette O. also had ingested benzodiazepine. Other screens showed that on May 16, 2002, Lynette O. had not used methadone, but was exposed to benzodiazepine; that on May 20, 2002 she was still negative for methadone, but was still exposed to benzodiazepine; and that on May 30, 2002 she showed no drugs then presently in her system, although she had used codeine in the recent past. (Exhibits 16, A, D-4, D-10.)

On May 14, 2002, Lynette O. married Angel H., whom she had met at a shelter a month earlier.²² (Testimony of Lynette O., Maria A.) As they had no stable housing, Lynette O. and Angel H. lived together at the PHS shelter and then resided at the BSS shelter, until they were discharged because of Angel H.'s threatening behavior. (Testimony of Maria A.)

22 Lynette O. explained that she had maintained her relationship with Ericson B. throughout her incarceration. Soon after discharge from prison, however, she learned that Ericson B. wished to reside with his new girlfriend, Jasmine, who was pregnant with the couple's child. (Testimony of Lynette O.)

On May 24, 2002, on her own referral, Lynette O. had commenced treatment at HBBH, a mental health and substance abuse treatment center. HBBH staff performed a thorough evaluation of Lynette O. and fully examined her past history before assigning her to their dual diagnosis intensive outpatient program. A 3.9 cm sample of Lynette O.'s hair, collected on May 30, 2002, demonstrated that she had used an opiate identified as "Codeine" while she was enrolled with CASA's services during the time period immediately preceding her entry into the HBBH program. HBBH staff identified Lynette O.'s history of physical, sexual and emotional abuse as the causes for her depressive condition and recurrent relapses; the provider recommended counseling to address these issues along with substance abuse treatment. (Testimony of Vanessa S.) At HBBH, Lynette O. attended an intensive outpatient drug treatment program three times a week, and subjected herself to expected urine screens twice a week. She also attended a weekly HBBH course in anger management. All tests indicated that Lynette O. did not use illegal drugs during the active treatment process. (Exhibits 26, A, D-4, D-6).

On June 27 and July 2, 2002, while she was participating in the HBBH counseling and substance abuse treatment program, Lynette O. underwent a court-ordered assessment and interactional evaluation performed by Julia Ramos Grenier, Ph.D., a skilled and experienced psychologist. (Exhibit CT Page 9163-h 23; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

On October 25, 2002, Lynette O. had outpatient gall bladder surgery at a local hospital. At that time, she reported taking Klonopin, Paxil and Wellbutrin to treat her mental health conditions. She received narcotic pain medication in the recovery room, from which she was discharged to home within a few hours following the surgery. Lynette O. did not advise her health care providers that she had a long history of narcotic addiction. Upon discharge, Lynette O. was provided with Percocet, a narcotic medication, to take for pain.²³ (Exhibits C, D-8.)

23 The discharge instructions expressly advised "You may substitute Tylenol, Advil or Motril if you prefer." (Exhibits C, D-8.) Percocet is a controlled narcotic used for pain relief known to be a drug of abuse, the Percocet prescribed for Lynette O. contained both acetaminophen and morphine. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier; Dr. I.A.)

Tests showed that Lynette O. was negative for current drug use on November 6, 2002 (Exhibit D-9.) Subsequent drug screens were negative for specimens provided on November 11, 25 and 27, and December 3, 4, 10, and 18, 2002. (Exhibits 26, D-9.)

While she was attending the HBBH program, Lynette O's relationship with her husband deteriorated, she was subject to domestic violence. On December 13, 2002, Lynette O. applied for an ex parte restraining order to protect her from contact with Angel H. The court (Dewey, J.) granted the application, and confirmed the restraining order on December 24, 2002. (Exhibit 27.)

Lynette O.'s substance abuse screen was negative on January 15, 2003. (Exhibit 26.)

I.C. ERICSON B., THE FATHER

Ericson B. was born on October 29, 1971. Of average intelligence, he completed sixth grade but then lost interest in school. He has worked as an auto-mechanic, in a body shop, as a car dealer, in carpentry, and in construction; he has also been unemployed for long periods of time. (Exhibits 5, 18, 22.) When he was eighteen years old, Ericson B. began using alcohol and illegal drugs such as crack and marijuana. He also used drugs such as Valium and Xanax, although he obtained these substances without a prescription. Ericson B.'s heroin use commenced at the age of twenty; in the summer of 2002, just prior to trial, he reported that he was using three to five bags of heroin daily. (Exhibit 18, 22.) Ericson B. has five children; only the youngest child lives with him.²⁴ (Exhibits 18, 22; Testimony of Matlandy M.)

24 As found in Part I.A., Ericson B. is the father of the first daughter, of Allison and of Addison. Ericson B. is also the father of another child who lives in Puerto Rico. Ericson B.'s girlfriend recently gave birth to their son. (Exhibit 22; Testimony of Matlandy M.)

Ericson B.'s substance abuse has led to consequences from the criminal justice system. On April 24, 1997, along with Lynette O., he was convicted of two counts of sale of narcotics, relating to an offense that had occurred on April 7, 1997. Ericson B. received a total effective CT Page 9163-i sentence of five years in jail, suspended, and was placed on five years of probation. (Exhibits 2, 3.) On June 6, 1997, while he was on probation, Ericson B. was convicted of Interfering with an Officer in relation to an event that had occurred on May 29, 1997. He was sentenced to serve nine months in jail. (Exhibit 2.) Allison was born on August 19, 1997, while Ericson B. was incarcerated, leaving Lynette O. to serve as the infant's sole caretaker. (Exhibit 2.)

In 1997, Ericson B. began treatment at the SMH-JC, a hospital-affiliated outpatient substance abuse treatment program, where he had been sent for services by the Office of Adult Probation (OAP). Ericson B. did not successfully complete this program. Due to his multiple unexcused absences, SMH-JC discharged the respondent father from services on July 2, 1998. As his substance abuse issues remained unresolved, SMH-JC referred Ericson B. to an inpatient treatment detox program at CSEH. Following detox, Ericson B. received substance abuse treatment at a local long-term outpatient drug abuse care facility, HHC. At HHC, Ericson B. received services from a case manager, a clinician, and participated in group support services. Ericson B. received a certificate for having finished the first phase of the HHC program. (Exhibit 1.)

In 1998, DCF referred Lynette O. and Ericson B. for domestic violence counseling at a local counseling center, FSGW-WYS. Initially, Ericson B. indicated that he would attend, but he failed to follow through. (Testimony of Maria A.)

During the previous spring 1999, Ericson B. applied to have his probation file transferred so he could relocate to Puerto Rico. (Exhibits 1, 5.) On August 8, 1999, despite his degree of success with the HHC program, Ericson B. was arrested and charged with possession of narcotics in connection with an offense that occurred on July 14, 1999. When Ericson B. was taken into custody, Lynette O. was nearly nine months pregnant, and she was again left as Allison's sole caretaker. (Exhibits 2, 5.)

When Addison was born to the respondents on September 3, 1999, Lynette O. was left to serve as the sole caretaker for this child, as well. On September 13, 1999, Ericson B. was convicted of his latest narcotics offense, and was also convicted of violating the 1997 orders of probation to which he remained subject. When the respondent father was sentenced to serve twenty-six months in jail, Allison was just two and Addison was newborn. (Testimony of Maria A.) Upon Lynette O.'s arrest and incarceration on December 6, 1999, Allison and Addison were taken into DCF's care, as described in Part I.B. (Exhibit 5.) CT Page 9163-j

On November 3, 1999, while he was serving his sentence of incarceration, Ericson B. underwent a court-ordered psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Grenier.²⁵ (Exhibit 22.)

25 Dr. Grenier's psychological evaluation of Ericson B. was conducted "in Spanish, which is his primary language." (Exhibit 22.) Ericson B. also communicates well in the English language. (Testimony of Katie C.)

On December 10, 1999, the court (Lopez, J.) imposed specific steps upon Ericson B.; those steps were reiterated (Moore, J.) on December 17, 1999. Among other things, the steps required Ericson B. to participate in parenting, individual and family counseling; to refrain from substance abuse, and to submit to substance abuse testing, evaluation and treatment at CCC; to continue attending mental health treatment at CCC; to accept and complete parenting classes; to avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system; and to comply with his conditions of probation. (Exhibit 4.)

On May 2, 2000, the court (Lopez J.) imposed additional steps upon Ericson B. Among other things, the steps required him to participate in parenting and individual counseling; to engage in all services available in prison; to secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income upon release from prison; to cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing; and to comply with the conditions of his probation or parole. (Exhibit 4.)

Having been incarcerated since August 1999, Ericson B. was released from prison in May 2001. He was placed on probation and discharged to a halfway house, where children were not permitted to reside. DCF referred Ericson B. to a substance abuse program at the MF, but he did not complete the treatment provided. (Testimony of Maria A.)

In the spring of 2002, DCF referred Ericson B. to the MF for substance abuse evaluation on several occasions. Ericson B. attended one intake visit on April 25, and tested negative for drug use.²⁶ He failed, however, to appear at the MF for subsequent drug testing and treatment sessions scheduled for June 10, 17 and 25, 2002. (Testimony of Katie C.)

26 Only a very short portion of Ericson B.'s hair could be tested on that occasion. (Testimony of Katie C.)

The court had ordered a repeat individual psychological evaluation of Ericson B., with an interactional assessment including Allison and Addison, to be performed by Dr. Grenier in late June 2002. Although the court provided him with due notice, Ericson B. did not attend these appointments. (See Exhibit 21; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

At DCF's referral, Ericson B. underwent substance abuse evaluation and assessment at CCC on August 16, 2002. (Exhibit 18.) Ericson B. reported to the CCC staff that he had used heroin on August 13, 2002; this report was confirmed by laboratory analysis. Ericson B. also reported that he CT Page 9163-k was facing criminal charges, and that he had a court appearance scheduled for August 21, 2002. CCC staff diagnosed Ericson B. with Opiate Dependence, and recommended a 180-day methadone taper program. (Exhibits 17, 18.)

I.D. ADDISON AND ALLISON, THE CHILDREN

As previously noted, Allison was born on August 19, 1997. Addison was born two years later on September 3, 1999. The children were placed together in DCF foster care on December 6, 1999 and committed to the department's custody on May 2, 2000; they have since been maintained in DCF foster care pursuant to orders of the court. Placed together in a legal risk foster home since June 2002, the children are physically healthy, well-adjusted in foster care, and well-bonded to each other. They have an enjoyable time visiting with Lynette O., although Allison displays bursts of anger and aggression that are directly attributable to her conflicted feelings about being a child in foster care. Allison also enjoys visiting with Ericson B., but Addison does not interact with this respondent during their sessions together. (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Maria A., Katie C., Dr. Grenier.) Allison's emotional difficulties require effective, responsive parenting by a caretaker who is knowledgeable about her developmental stage and psychological concerns. Addison is so young that he requires absolute attention to all of his needs by a similarly stable parent figure. Fortunately both children have grown very attached to their pre-adoptive foster family, who are able to meet the children's needs in an appropriate, nurturing manner. (Exhibit 23; Testimony of Matlandy M., Dr. Grenier.)

II. ADJUDICATION

In the adjudicatory phase of this hearing,²⁷ the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events occurring through the close of trial, as the court has been asked to consider only allegations that the respondent parents have failed to achieve rehabilitation.²⁸ Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to both Lynette O. and Ericson B.

27 "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, CT Page 9163-am 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

28 "Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)], the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, [ 789 A.2d 1024] (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.

II.A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

As a predicate to granting a petition to terminate parental rights, our statutes require the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that "DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification CT Page 9163-l efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see also In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). Given the instant circumstances, the court finds that the petitioner has met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts in this case.²⁹ In addition, based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court now finds that both respondents are either unable or unwilling to benefit from the reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).

29 "Although `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

As a part of its reasonable efforts to promote reunification of the family, DCF appropriately investigated and considered relatives whom the respondents suggested as placement resources. Ericson B.'s father Manuel B. informed DCF that he would be able to care for the children. Lynette O.'s psychological mother, who cares for the respondents' first daughter, has also indicated that she could not provide a home for Allison and Addison. The department rightly determined that Ericson B.'s sister would not serve as an appropriate placement, due to her own child protection issues. (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Maria A., Katie C.)

II.A.1. LYNETTE O.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the petitioner has met her reunification burden both by proving that DCF extended reasonable efforts at reunification to the respondent mother, and by proving that Lynette O. is unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts. In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

A review of the clear and convincing evidence impels this conclusion. Among other services, DCF provided Lynette O. with appropriate family treatment plans and case management services to facilitate the reunification process. (Exhibits 5, 26.) When appropriate, DCF provided permanency plans, transportation so that the children could visit Lynette O., and repeated referrals for services when she was available to participate in rehabilitation programs, all in an effort to promote reunification with her children. To reinforce the importance of the court-ordered specific steps, DCF utilized a service agreement with Lynette O. in May of 2002. (Testimony of Maria A.)

Furthermore, as found in Part I.B., DCF referred Lynette O. for domestic violence counseling at FSGW-WYS in 1998. However, Lynette O. did not cooperate with this reasonable effort to keep the mother's CT Page 9163-m relationship with her children healthy and intact. (Testimony of Maria A.) Prior to her incarceration in December 1999, DCF had assisted Lynette O. in addressing the unstable housing situation which affected her and the children. The department has twice assisted Lynette O. in securing housing and furniture. On one occasion, DCF provided the security deposit that was requisite to her procurement of a suitable apartment. (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Maria A.) DCF provided Lynette O. with an in-home parent aid through the SMH-PAP program in 1998, and with an in-home parent-educator and visiting nurse services through SMH-NBP in 1999. Unfortunately, Lynette O. was unable or unwilling to cooperate with these services, and she was discharged from the programs' rolls due to her non-compliance. (Exhibit 15.)

DCF has also provided Lynette O. with visitation on a consistent basis since her children entered DCF custody. While Lynette O. was incarcerated from early December 1999 through early December 2001, DCF transported the children to see her at the prison on a monthly basis, when the DOC allowed her to participate in visits, and when she made herself available for visits.³⁰ (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Maria A.) After she was released from incarceration, DCF made reasonable efforts to enhance the likelihood that Lynette O. would be able to continue visiting with her children as required by the specific steps, offering visits every other week and communicating with her in writing to remind her of the visitation schedule. (Exhibits 5, 11.)

30 Lynette O. refused to see the children who had been brought to the prison to see her in March 2001, when Allison was three and a half years old and Addison was one and a half years old. In addition, Lynette O. was deprived of at least three other monthly visits with her children while she was incarcerated, due to disciplinary restrictions imposed upon her by prison officials. Moreover, due to her disruptive behavior in prison, Lynette O. was denied early release by the Department of Corrections. (Testimony of Lynette O., Maria A.)

To reinforce Lynette O.'s compliance with her rehabilitation regimen, the family's DCF social worker met with her on May 13, 2002 and formulated a service agreement. The agreement represents the department's reasonable effort to reinforce the respondent mother's obligations to obtain formal substance abuse counseling; to continue with drug testing; to avoid all contact with Ericson B., whom she had accused of domestic violence; to cooperate with all aspects of her psychiatric treatment; to obtain adequate housing; and to visit with the children by herself. (Exhibit 13.)

In reaching its determination that DCF provided the respondent mother with reasonable reunification efforts in the context of this case, and in determining that Lynette O. is unable or unwilling to benefit from such services, the court has given due consideration to the coordinate services that were provided by other agencies.³¹ As found in Part I.A., when DCF became involved with Lynette O., she had already failed to achieve measureable benefit from substance abuse services in which she participated at MF on several occasions, or similar services provided at CCC in 1996. Thereafter, Lynette O. failed again to benefit from two rounds of CCC's drug treatment services in 1997, notwithstanding the CT Page 9163-n one-on-one counseling, detox hospitalization, and hospital-based psychotherapy which was extended to her. Lynette O. attempted substance abuse treatment at CCC again in 1999, but this treatment was terminated when she returned to incarceration.³² Upon her release from prison, the DOC assigned Lynette O. to the CWF-WOP program which provided extensive support services. However, she failed to adequately comply with the conditions of this program, and subsequently transferred to the less comprehensive CWF-FVOP program in early 2002. Lynette O. attempted substance abuse treatment at CASA in 2002, but made no progress there. She was discharged from this program due to non-compliance, positive drug screens, multiple absences, and refusal to accept available in-patient treatment. Lynette O. continued to use illegal drugs during the spring of 2002, as fully discussed in Part II.B.1. Although she eventually enrolled in the services offered through HBBH, and appeared to obtain some benefit from this program, Lynette O. ominously failed to advise her physicians of her addiction when she underwent surgery in October 2002, thus unnecessarily exposing herself to receipt of narcotic medication.

31 The respondent has offered no basis, in law or reason, for requiring DCF to duplicate counseling referrals, rehabilitation services or other reunification services that are otherwise extended to a parent.

32 DCF was unable to extend reunification services to Lynette O., other than visitation, while Lynette O. was under the jurisdiction of the DOC, as the DOC alone is able to assign inmates to rehabilitation services. See In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998) (excusing DCF from providing reasonable efforts at reunification for incarcerated parent.)

Lynette O. may argue that DCF failed to make reasonable reunification efforts in this case because the department did not comply with the court's May 2000 order to facilitate visits at specified intervals in excess of the once monthly visits that were actually provided. (Exhibit 4.) When the court issued this order, Lynette O. had just commenced serving her two-year sentence of incarceration. Indeed, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that DCF provided twice weekly visits only when Lynette O. was at liberty, transporting the children to see her at the prison once a month while she was incarcerated. While the court cannot condone DCF's failure to comply with this order, the file does not reflect that Lynette O. ever made a timely request for the court to review the limited visitation that was provided while she was held in DOC custody.³³ Moreover, as found in Part I.B., Lynette O. canceled one visit and several other scheduled prison visits were missed during Lynette O.'s incarceration due to her misconduct and resulting segregation as a DOC penalty. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of evidence establishing that the mother-children reunification process was in any adverse way affected by DCF's failure to provide bimonthly visits from December 2001, such an argument fails to persuade the court that the department's conduct vitiates the overwhelming evidence that its other efforts were reasonable, and that the respondent mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.

33 While recognizing that DCF bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its visitation efforts, our courts recognize that is incumbent upon a parent who desires increased visitation to request court review of the operative schedule. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 425, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), affirmed per curiam, 262 Conn. 308 (2003).

Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted not by the conduct of the department, but by Lynette O.'s abject failure to timely achieve CT Page 9163-o benefit from the myriad appropriate services proffered to her. It was Lynette O.'s own conduct that led her to fail substance abuse treatment on so many occasions prior to December 1999; her own behavior that led to imposition of a twenty-four months jail sentence, so that she would spend so much of her young children's lives in prison; her own misconduct that led to sequestration and denial of visits during a portion of her incarceration; her own rejection of the multi-faceted CWF-WOP program that led to her receipt of limited services through CWF-FVOP; her own decisions that led to allow narcotics to be a part of her life even after months of treatment, and which delayed recognition of her need for support services regarding issues of depression and parenting deficits. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). As Lynette O. failed to respond to reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1) in a timely way so as to assist her children, and as she is either unwilling or unable to benefit from such services in a timely manner, the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue.³⁴ See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts in a timely way so as to assist the child).

34 Lynette O. may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification based on the analysis promoted by In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. Unlike Lynette O., the parent in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." (Emphasis added.) In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 642. In this case, on the other hand, Lynette O. has sporadically attended a host of substance abuse services throughout the years, but has never attended a long-term inpatient drug treatment program. Moreover, although Lynette O. had failed to complete drug treatment programs in the past, and had failed to take full advantage of the CWF-WOP program, DCF continued to refer her to appropriate services at CASA. However, Lynette O. left that program before completing it, and entered a program on her own. The fact-based decision in Vincent B. is further inapposite to the present case because here DCF has not rested its TPR petition on evidence related to Lynette O.'s history of failed attempts at reunification in regard to her first daughter, but also presented clear and convincing evidence that this respondent mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children at issue. Lynette O.'s positive drug screens in the spring of 2002 without adequate explanation; her departure without reason from the CASA program in the spring of 2002; her lack of a stable residence; and her inconsistency in meeting the children's needs during visits all indicate that Lynette O. has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of benefit from any of the rehabilitation programs in which she participated. Under these circumstances, the fact-bound decision in Vincent B. is not dispositive of the present case. See also Part II.B.1.

II.A.2. ERICSON B.

Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the petitioner has met her reunification burden both by proving that DCF extended reasonable efforts at reunification to the respondent father, and by proving that Ericson B. is unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts.³⁵ In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

35 See footnote 29. In reaching this determination, the court has accounted for the fact that during her November 1999 evaluation, Dr. Grenier recommended that he be subjected to a psychiatric examination; there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that DCF proffered such an examination to him. (Exhibit 22.) However, given Ericson B.'s persistent drug use and his refusal to comply with the court's order for his re-evaluations by Dr. Grenier during the summer of 2002 it is reasonable for the court to infer that he would not have attended a psychiatric examination even if it had been scheduled for him.

A review of the clear and convincing evidence impels this conclusion. DCF has proffered Ericson B. such reasonable reunification efforts as were warranted in this case, given his limited availability due to the substantial amount of time he has spent imprisoned while the DCF case for Allison and Addison was pending. See Part I.C. Among other services, DCF provided Ericson B. with appropriate family treatment plans, permanency plans, case management services, and transportation for the children's visits. While he was incarcerated, DCF brought the children to visit with him on a monthly basis. Those visits went well, given the circumstances. Thereafter, DCF provided biweekly visits to Ericson B. in a continuing reasonable effort at reunification. When Ericson B. failed to attend a scheduled visit in March 2002, DCF wrote to him and reminded him of the visitation schedule. (Exhibits 5, 11, 26; Testimony of Maria A.)

As found in Part I.C., in an effort to reunify, DCF referred Ericson B. for domestic violence at FSGW-WYS in 1998. However, he did not CT Page 9163-p cooperate with the service provided. (Testimony of Maria A.) In 1997, through the OAP, Ericson B. was involved with SMH-JC for substance abuse treatment; he did not succeed with This round of services.³⁶ Thereafter, through the OAP, Ericson B. received additional substance abuse treatment though detox services at CSEH and program participation at HHC. Although he appeared to have made some initial progress at HHC, that treatment was terminated as the result of Ericson B.'s incarceration commencing in August 1999. From that date until he was released from prison almost two years later in May of 2001, DCF provided only visitation to Ericson B., constituting a reasonable effort at reunification under the circumstances.³⁷

36 See footnote 31.

37 See footnote 32.

As found in Part 1.C., DCF continued its reasonable effort to assist Ericson B. in dealing with his ongoing substance abuse issues after his release from incarceration, by referring him to the MF for evaluation and treatment in 2001. However, Ericson B. failed to cooperate with these services. DCF again referred Ericson B. to MF in 2002 for drug screening and evaluation; although he attended one intake session, and although DCF specifically advised him of drug tests scheduled to take place at MF on June 17 and June 25, 2002, Ericson B. refused to participate in these additional services. (Exhibit 14; Testimony of Maria A.) By failing to attend Dr. Grenier's psychological evaluation, scheduled for the summer of 2002, Ericson B. impeded DCF's ability to design and promote other reunification services for him. In August of 2002 when he turned to CCC for substance abuse treatment at DCF's referral, laboratory tests showed that Ericson B. was still actively using narcotics, relentlessly continuing his drug use despite the treatment previously provided, and despite his lengthy incarceration for a drug-related offense.

Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reasonable reunification efforts were thwarted not by the conduct of the department, but by Ericson B.'s own continued drug use; his behavior in repeated criminal acts that led to his lengthy incarceration, sequestration from the children and ineligibility for other DCF services; his avoidance of participation in domestic violence and substance abuse treatment services to which he was referred; and his denial of the need for any attention to his parenting deficits. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). As the department extended reasonable efforts at reunification, and as Ericson B. remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from the services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1), the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue.³⁸ See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

38 Ericson B. may also attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification based on the analysis promoted by In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 637. As with Lynette O., salient factual distinctions render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. As noted earlier, the parent in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." (Emphasis added.) In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 642. In this case, on the other hand, Ericson B. has never completed a long-term inpatient drug treatment program; has only sporadically participated in any substance abuse services throughout the years; and continues to use narcotics despite incarceration and treatment. The fact-based decision in Vincent B. is further inapposite to the present case because here DCF has not rested its TPR petition on evidence related to Ericson B.'s history of failed attempts at reunification in regard to his first daughter, but presented clear and convincing evidence that the respondent father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children at issue. Under these circumstances, the fact-bound decision in Vincent B. is not dispositive of the present case. See also Part II.C.1.

II.B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — LYNETTE O. CT Page 9163-q II.B.1. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)

The petitioner first alleges that Lynette O.'s parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).³⁹ Lynette O. counters that she has attended to the pivotal elements of the specific steps, and has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in her children's lives. As Allison and Addison were found to be uncared for on May 2, 2000, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards⁴⁰ and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p),⁴¹ the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

39 General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable CT Page 9163-ap time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."

40 "`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999) . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]." In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85.

41 Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Lynette O. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to her fundamental issues of substance abuse and parenting deficits as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future she could assume a responsible position in the lives of her children. Although the evidence may indeed indicate that Lynette O. has made some progress in managing the personal effects of her drug addiction, she continues to lack the ability to satisfactorily respond to her children's developmental needs. Thus, the court is constrained to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that any level of rehabilitation Lynette O. may have achieved "falls short of that" which would reasonably allow a determination that she will be able to meet the children's particular needs for a permanent home with a responsible, reliable caretaker. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448.

First, the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that Lynette O. has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation.⁴² Although she can refrain from drug use for months at a time, Lynette O. has not developed adequate, meaningful insight into the fact that her addiction issues present a life-long challenge which she must face and successfully manage every single day.⁴³ From a psychological standpoint, notwithstanding Dr. I.A.'s medication therapy and the resultant significant improvements in Lynette O.'s anxiety, depression, and personality function, and notwithstanding months of individual counseling at HBBH, the respondent mother's emotional instability persisted during the summer of 2002.⁴⁴ At that time, Dr. Grenier credibly and objectively reported that Lynette O.'s "excessive expectations, demands and pressures may strain her physical and emotional CT Page 9163-r tolerance. Such stress may manifest as restlessness, body tension, pain, sleep problems . . . as well as irritability and impatience. The risk for her is that such factors can lead her to use substances as a way of self-medicating in order to reduce her stress and symptoms."⁴⁵ (Exhibit 23.) Dr. Grenier credibly explained at trial that a return to the use of self-medication "as a way of stabilizing her mood" would be fully consistent with life choices Lynette O. has persistently made when facing stress during her adult years, and would have a manifestly negative affect upon her ability to discharge child-care responsibilities.⁴⁶ (See Exhibit 23.) Even if she has currently forsaken the use of drugs, Lynette O.'s present remission is too fragile, too untested to provide valid support for the inference that she will remain substance-free and able to provide responsible care for her children in the future. In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. The risk of Lynette O.'s relapse is a risk that young, vulnerable children should not be forced to face.⁴⁷

42 "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).

43 Lynette O.'s continued comfort with the effects of narcotic medication is apparent from her proffered explanation that a positive methadone test in early May 2002 was attributable to a mistaken ingestion of her husband's methadone, taken in her coffee at home. Of further concern is Lynette O.'s acceptance of Percocet following her gall bladder surgery in October 2002. There is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Lynette O. appropriately advised the medical staff that her addiction problems made the use of such medication dangerous for her. See Part I.B.; see also footnote 23. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

44 Despite this pharmacotherapy and numerous office visits with Dr. I.A., on July 16, 2002, Lynette O. reported to Dr. I.A. when she falls to sleep, she "feels like she is going to die." (Exhibit 26.)

45 In an apparent response to stress while she was imprisoned from CT Page 9163-aq December 1999 through December 2001, Lynette O. attempted suicide. She received unspecified psychiatric treatment for this second suicide attempt. See Part I.B. (Testimony of Lynette O.)

46 At trial, Dr. Grenier credibly explained that Lynette O. would be subject to such stress if she ended a marriage of short duration, and had to face not only the fact of the breakup of her relationship, but also the fact of her need to create a stable home environment for herself. The clear and convincing evidence establishes that the relationship between Lynette O. and her husband Angel H. has been recently interrupted as the result of domestic violence, exposing her fragile sobriety to the type of life stressors anticipated by the court-appointed psychologist. (Exhibit 27.)

47 The clear and convincing evidence consistently establishes that despite Lynette O.'s best intentions, she returns to the use of illegal drugs again and again when faced with stressful circumstances. As described in Part I.B., Lynette participated in multiple treatment sessions at CCC from 1995 through 1999. Each admission was prompted by her stated desire to "work on remaining abstinent and live a drug-free lifestyle" but she failed to follow through with any of the treatment plans then proffered to her. (Exhibit 8) On some occasions, Lynette O. was in fact able to refrain from drug use for a prolonged period of time. However, her opiate dependence chronically led her back to drug use, or to imprisonment for related criminal activities. Such a pattern of conduct is inimical to serving as a responsible, caretaking parent for two young children such as Addison and Allison. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

Second, both the psychological and the empirical evidence shows that Lynette O.'s parenting skills remain rudimentary and inadequate to meet the needs of Allison and Addison. She is unable to identify and appropriately respond to the children's need for emotional support and consistency. She has failed especially to develop the skills necessary to meet the special needs of Allison, whose emotional distress is apparent through her anger at the unresolved parenting issues that she has faced during her three years in foster care. In the summer of 2002, Dr. Grenier observed that while Lynette O. often interacts with Allison in a positive manner, the respondent mother still "does not seem to understand the developmental and emotional issues which are present at this time in each child, and in particular Allison. Her attempts to intervene sometimes led to an escalation of the problem rather than a defusion of it," to the detriment of the child. (Exhibit 23; see also Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) Lynette O.'s interaction with the children at visits is inconsistent; sometime she seems very engaged, but at other times she seems to withdraw, showing little to no emotional response to the interactions, and often leaving Addison to play by himself without sharing precious moments of contact learning about and nurturing this young boy. (Testimony of Monica C.) While she was able to play well with Addison and Allison in some respects, Lynette O. remained unable to effectively implement appropriate parenting strategies when they required direction and guidance to avoid irritation and frustration. She was unable to adequately manage the children's negative, oppositional and angry conduct even though she had ostensibly completed the domestic violence and parenting group program at CWF, despite the psychiatric attention she had received from Dr. I.A., and despite the substance abuse treatment and anger management therapy she had received at CASA and HBBH during that CT Page 9163-s same period, as described in Part I.B. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

Thus, notwithstanding the ample time provided to her, Lynette O. had failed to achieve, to a sufficient degree, the ability to effectively deal with the type of contentious behaviors which are displayed by all children and she notably lacked the capacity to de-escalate and control Allison's anger. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) Allison and Addison, who have remained in foster care throughout their mother's attempts at substance abuse treatment and her incarceration due to risk of injury charges, should not be further burdened by having to wait any longer for their mother to achieve sufficient rehabilitation with regard to her parenting deficits, particularly when the evidence is replete with references to chronic relapse into narcotic addiction. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

Moreover, the empirical evidence establishes that Lynette O. lacks any reliable structure to her life. She lacks secure housing and still fails to maintain a stable, independent home for herself. Despite the omnibus, relevant services that were available through the CWF-WOP program upon her discharge from prison in December 2001, Lynette O. declined offers of appropriate housing assistance, choosing instead to live at a series of shelters and with friends for a period of time. Despite the assistance she was proffered through the CWF-FVOP program, Lynette O. again became involved with a violent partner and was again exposed to domestic violence, although her relationship with Angel H. has since been abandoned.⁴⁸ The respondent's professional support system is minimal and subject to being discarded by this respondent; she admits that she has "no family she can rely on here." (Exhibit 23; Testimony of Lynette O.)

48 The devolution of Lynette O.'s relationship with Angel H. culminated in the domestic violence that gave rise to her December 2002 restraining order, and establishes that as a practical matter the respondent mother was unable to apply the skills of which she had been made aware during the CWF-FVOP sessions during the Spring of 2002. Susan T., the domestic violence counselor, explained at trial that their program is directed at educating women so they can recognize a partner who will potentially expose them to domestic violence, and so that they will avoid such relationships. Despite Angel H.'s threatening behavior which occurred at the BSS shelter in the summer of 2002, however, Lynette O. remained with the man whom she had married in May 2002, leaving him only after the violence that recurred six months later. Lynette O. was unwilling or unable to explain to DCF what had caused the breakup of her marriage. (Testimony of Matlandy M., Susan T.)

There is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Lynette O. has any significant personal attachments other than to her children, who are in need of being supported themselves. (Exhibit 23; Testimony of Lynette O.)

Lynette O. may argue that since late April 2002, she has not used illegal drugs, or medication not prescribed for her by a qualified health-care provider, thus establishing the validity of her sobriety. She would have the court give great credit, for instance, to a 3.9 cm sample of Lynette O.'s hair collected on April 8, 2002, which demonstrated that she had not used any illegal drugs for some time prior thereto. (Exhibit D-1.) However, although she vigorously denies such conduct, the empirical evidence establishes that Lynette O. was abusing drugs during the Spring of 2002, even while she was receiving psychiatric supervision from Dr. I.A. and while she was participating in substance abuse treatment from CT Page 9163-t CASA. (Testimony of Lynette O.) As found in Part I.A., a drug screen on May 11, 2002 clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Lynette O. had recently used methadone, although it had not been prescribed for her by a health care provider or substance abuse program. (Exhibits 16, A, D-4, D-10.) Lynette O. attempts to impute this event to an inadvertent exposure to methadone that her husband Angel H. was using at home as a part of his own recovery regimen. However sincere Lynette O.'s efforts at avoiding responsibility for her methadone exposure may be, the clear and convincing evidence of her past heroin addiction, inadequately treated and subject to repeated relapse, leads to the inference that Lynette O. voluntarily ingested the methadone at issue.⁴⁹ (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.) As a whole, the evidence further impels the inference that rather than acknowledging that her use of methadone was attributable to an acceptable "slip" in her recovery process at the time, despite months of HBBH treatment and prior efforts at substance abuse prevention services, Lynette O. remains currently unable to accept responsibility for her role in this obvious relapse.⁵⁰

49 The evidence clearly and convincingly established that the CASA CT Page 9163-ar substance abuse program terminated Lynette O. from its services due to her own methadone use, even though Lynette O. claims that she left the CASA program because drug use was prevalent among other participants. (Testimony of Lynette O., Vanessa S.)

50 This conduct is consistent with and corroborates Dr. Grenier's credible opinion that the respondent mother has a propensity for continuing to abuse drugs when she faces stress. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

Moreover, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that while Lynette O. began taking Klonopin at Dr. I.A.'s prescription in March 2002, she was also exposing herself to benzodiazepines far in excess of the properly allotted amount.⁵¹ The physician prescribed a "fairly low" amount of Klonopin for his patient; Dr. I.A. credibly testified that this dosage "would possibly show up [in a drug screen] but she would have had to take prob — a lot more than I was prescribing for her for it to be a — a positive reading . . ." (Emphasis added.) (Testimony of Dr. I.A.) Despite the limitations of Dr. I.A.'s prescription of Klonopin to address Lynette O.'s anxiety, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the respondent mother was using more of this drug, or more of other controlled anxiety-reducing drugs, than Dr. I.A. had approved. As found in Part I.B., Lynette O.'s drug screens on May 11, May 16 and May 20, 2002 tested positive for benzodiazepine, supporting the clear inference that she had abused this medication by obtaining additional anxiety-reducing drugs, notwithstanding Dr. I.A.'s efforts at protecting his patient from abusive dosages.⁵² (Exhibits 16, A, D-4, D-10; Testimony of Dr. I.A.) Other laboratory tests have demonstrated no elevated levels of Klonopin in Lynette O.'s system, although Dr. I.A. has maintained her on this medication. At trial, Lynette O. continued to deny and attempt to explain away this aspect of her past substance abuse, which occurred just prior to her departure from the CASA program; she remains unwilling or unable to accept any possibility that she could be responsible for her own actions. This current denial is of great concern because it emphatically demonstrates that the respondent mother remains unable or unwilling to acknowledge the implications of her substance abuse history, as a whole, expanding the likelihood that her recovery CT Page 9163-u remains fragile, and subject to failure again.⁵³ (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

51 The anti-anxiety medication Klonopin is chemically related to benzodiazepine (called "Benz"), and appears as this substance in a drug screen. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.; Gilberta N.) Klonopin is available "on the street," and is subject to abuse. Dr. I.A. candidly and credibly testified that in addition to Klonopin, other prescription medications will show up positive for beozodiazepines on drug screens. Some of these other medications are also available to users without appropriate prescription, including Valium, Atavan, a two milligram portion of Xanax known as a "Xanax stick," and others. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

52 The same laboratory performed the three drug screens at issue. The cut off level for benzodiazepine levels is 200 at this laboratory. Ominously, the specimen collected on May 11, 2002 showed Lynette O.'s benzodiazepine level to be 1030; the benzodiazepine level was 837 on May 16, 2002; and the benzodiazepine level was 425 on May 20, 2002. (Exhibits D-4, D-16.) Each of these levels constitutes a positive reading, indicating that Lynette O. had taken "a lot more [benzodiazepine] than [Dr. August] was prescribing for her" at the time. (See testimony of Dr. I.A.)

53 The petitioner urges the court to find that Lynette O. had abused drugs by ingesting codeine and morphine just before her drug screen on April 24, 2002, yielding positive results for those substances on that date. The evidence is insufficient to enable the court to ascertain whether these positive tests are in fact attributable to Lynette O.'s exposure to these drugs in connection with her tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy on April 10th. (Exhibits 15, 16, D-2, D-4, D-10.) Accordingly, the court gives little weight to this aspect of the petitioner's claims.

Moreover, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that any extended sobriety on Lynette O.'s part has been demonstrated only when she is involved in intensive, formal drug treatment, such as the dual diagnosis program which she commenced at HBBH starting in late April 2002.⁵⁴ Until late August 2002, Lynette O. was under the supervision of HBBH substance abuse counselors. Thereafter, she has been subject to a rigorous protocol of frequent, repeated drug screens at the direction of HBBH or under the supervision of her treating psychiatrists. While it is indeed laudable that Lynette O. has passed each test, this measures only her ability to remain drug free when she is subject to close scrutiny by professionals charged with her care. She has not yet demonstrated, to any measurable degree, an ability to function independently and drug free in a self-supporting, lawful lifestyle in the community, as contemplated by Dr. Grenier. Under the circumstances of this case, replete with indications that Lynette O. returns to drug abuse when she is under stress, it is especially troubling that when she underwent a one-day stay gall bladder surgery in October 2002, following months of the intensive HBBH program, she failed even to advise her medical providers that she was chronically addicted to narcotics, depriving them of the reasonable opportunity to prescribe a non-narcotic analgesic to meet her needs in a safe way. Thus, Lynette O. has recently demonstrated either her unwillingness to acknowledge the danger of relapse to which she exposes herself when she has access to narcotics, or her functional inability to safeguard herself from re-exposure. Neither scenario is consistent with a safe, realistic understanding of Lynette O.'s substance abuse problems, and either demonstrates that she has not yet achieved a reliable means of implementing the rigorous plan of abstinence she will need to follow throughout the remainder of her life. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

54 As found in Part I.B., during the earlier part of spring 2002, Lynette O. had attempted to meet the requirements of CASA, another self-selected substance abuse treatment program, but she had there failed to demonstrate motivation or willingness to accept the severity of her drug dependence issues. She failed to attend program sessions, denied CT Page 9163-as responsibility for a positive urine screen, and abruptly left the program. (Exhibits 16, D-3.)

Even if the empirical evidence establishes that Lynette O. has maintained sobriety for over a year, of her own accord and without the support of professional substance abuse treatment providers, this evidence would only show that Lynette O. may have improved the ability to manage her own life. Under the circumstances of this case, such evidence does not establish that the respondent mother has developed a sufficient degree of parenting skills, self-reliance and independence from drugs so that she can serve as a responsible parenting resource for her two young children and their particular needs. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448.

Third, although specific steps were assigned to assist Lynette O. in CT Page 9163-v achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that she failed to fulfill a number of significant measures.⁵⁵ (Exhibit 4.) Although the December 1999 steps directed that she refrain from using drugs, Lynette O.'s violation of this prohibition is evident through her positive Klonopin and methadone drug screens in the spring of 2002, following her discharge from prison, as discussed above. Although she has attended the majority of visits made available to her by DCF, pursuant to the steps at issue, Lynette O. failed to participate in a number of prison visits, as described in Part I.B. (Testimony of Monica C.) Although she was required to do so by the specific steps, Lynette O. has not maintained stable housing, and has lived at shelters for many months at a time. (Testimony of Marie L-B.) Apparently complying with the specific steps, in November 2002, Lynette O. advised DCF that she had moved to a designated address. However, when DCF staff attempted to visit that home on January 24, 2003, Lynette O. was found to have moved out on December 12, 2002, over a month earlier. She did not advise DCF of her present address until the TPR trial reconvened on January 27, 2003, although she had the opportunity to relay this information at visits with her children on December 30, 2002 and January 13, 2003. Also, although the steps required her to keep DCF advised of changes in the composition of her household, Lynette O. did not advise DCF of the restraining order she had obtained against Angel H., and did not inform the department that she was no longer cohabiting with her husband until January 27, 2002. (Exhibits 4, 27; Testimony of Matlandy M.)

55 In reaching this determination, the court acknowledges that through its July 25, 2001 Social Study, DCF has admitted that Lynette O. had partially complied with the steps by signing releases, keeping her whereabouts known, and abstaining from substance abuse. (Exhibit 5.)

Lynette O. protests that the psychiatric treatment she has received from Dr. I.A. has rendered her sufficiently rehabilitated so that she can provide effective permanent parenting for the children. Dr. I.A. sees Lynette O. for the primary purpose of managing her medication regimen and addressing her mental health needs without providing individual psychotherapy.⁵⁶ Dr. I.A. stated at trial that Lynette O. has improved her outlook, is planning a college career, and has real remorse for her involvement in the conduct that led DCF to take her children into custody. Dr. I.A. further opined at trial that he has no concerns that the respondent mother would ever use illegal drugs again. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

56 Although he is not board certified in psychiatry, Dr. I.A. completed a three-year residency in psychiatry at Connecticut Valley Hospital and Norwich State Hospital. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

However well-meaning Dr. I.A.'s pronouncements may be, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he had thorough knowledge of Lynette O.'s substance abuse history when he reached his conclusions, significantly diminishing the value of his opinions. When Dr. I.A. commenced working with Lynette O., her chief complaints were depression and anxiety; the symptoms of these conditions have been largely resolved through the use of medication. However, even though he has been seeing Lynette O. regularly since March of 2002, Dr. I.A.'s meetings with her are very CT Page 9163-w brief, typically consisting of a fifteen- to twenty-minute discussion of current stresses, how effective her medication is, and whether the medication is causing her any side effects.⁵⁷ (Testimony of Dr. I.A.) The evidence does not support the inference that Dr. I.A. has ever examined records or reports of Lynette O.'s past substance abuse treatment history, that he is aware of the actual extent of her past involvement with domestic violence, that he is aware of the results of Dr. Grenier's court-ordered evaluation, or that he has even considered the implications of this evaluation for the patient's future psychiatric treatment. Dr. I.A. has attributed Lynette O.'s anxiety to DCF's interference in her life. (Exhibit 26.) In making this determination, however, Dr. I.A. had no knowledge about and therefore paid insufficient attention to the implications of the reasons why the children were in DCF's care, or exactly how long they had been out of Lynette O.'s custody. Regarding her criminal history, Lynette O. only told Dr. I.A. that she was on probation; she never told him, and therefore he never considered, the nature of her offense history or the basis for the lengthy sentence which followed her criminal conduct in December 1999, necessitating the placement of her children in foster care to ensure their safekeeping. Lynette O. informed Dr. I.A. that she supports herself through receipt of Supplemental Security Income benefits, but she never advised him, and he never determined, the nature or extent of her underlying disability. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.) The court appreciates Dr. I.A.'s candor with the court concerning the status of his psychiatric credentials. However, due to the overall lack of foundation, the court attributes little weight to Dr. I.A.'s opinions concerning Lynette O.'s ability to maintain sobriety in the future.⁵⁸

57 Dr. I.A. has recognized Lynette O.'s need for counseling, but erroneously understood that she received this treatment through her work with CWF. Dr. I.A. credibly indicated that he would have liked to do long-term therapy with Lynette O., and attributed the nature and extent of his work with this patient to the strictures imposed by our modern health care system. (Testimony of Dr. I.A.)

58 Lynette O. may argue that evidence related to the medical supervision she has received from Dr. I.A. over a period of many months outweighs the value of any evidence adduced through Dr. Grenier, who has seen the respondent mother only on two occasions. However, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Dr. I.A. has never conducted an in-depth assessment of her mental health status, while Dr. Grenier performed a thorough, comprehensive and detailed assessment at court order. All of Dr. I.A.'s information concerning Lynette O. is based upon what she has chosen to tell him during their short meetings, while Dr. Grenier has also examined written records from other treatment providers, giving breadth and depth to her understanding of the respondent mother's limits and capabilities. Dr. I.A. has never evaluated the children or seen them interacting with Lynette O. On the other hand, Dr. Grenier conducted an interactional evaluation which provided her with valuable data concerning the respondent mother's ability to react to the stresses attendant to responsibility for care of her children. The psychologist alone based her opinion upon the sum of the relevant factors, and not upon overly limited aspects of the matter. Under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that there is insufficient foundation to support Dr. I.A.'s conclusions about Lynette O.'s mental health status and potential for relapse. As such, his conclusions cannot prevail over the more credible, well-founded opinions of the independent court-appointed psychologist. Keans v. Bocciarelli, supra, 35 Conn.App. 241-42.

Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that Lynette O. has failed to achieve a degree of rehabilitation that is adequate to meet her children's needs, and that achievement of a sufficient degree of rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Latifa K., supra, 67 Conn.App. 748; In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In making this determination, the court acknowledges that Lynette O. has finally demonstrated the ability and willingness to undergo individual counseling, ordered through the specific steps in 1999 and again in 2002. (Exhibit 4.) At HBBH, Lynette O. begun to address the root causes of her depression, including physical, sexual and emotional abuse by her father and her brother, along with the effects of prolonged separation from her children. In reliance on the HBBH program, Lynette O. continues to attend weekly counseling and appears to have gained some stability in some aspects of her own life.

The court empathizes with Lynette O.'s recent cooperation with services, and appreciates her renewed interest in improving the ability CT Page 9163-x to manage her own life. However, even if Lynette O. has improved the ability to manage her own affairs, and even if she has achieved a level of stability within her own limitations, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the respondent mother is not yet ready to met the children's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide them with emotional stability, security, and consistency. After three years in foster care, the children's well-being cannot tolerate any additional time for their biological mother to attempt to achieve rehabilitation. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385. Even if Lynette O. should now actively engage in rehabilitation, even if she should be able to manifest current sobriety, come to terms with the physical and sexual abuse to which she has been exposed in the past, learn to improve her choice of partners, gain the ability to avoid domestic violence, and develop the capacity to consistently understand and appropriately respond to her children's developmental needs, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for Allison and Addison given the time that has passed since their adjudication as uncared for children in May 2000. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). Where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that a respondent cannot be a competent parent to the children because she cannot provide the nurturing, safe and structured environment warranted by their ages and special needs, "[a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough" to overcome clear and convincing evidence of failure to achieve rehabilitation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667.

Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that Lynette O. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her children, and lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in their young lives within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. While understanding and appreciating "the hardship suffered by the respondent," based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court is constrained to find that the petitioner has proved Lynette O.'s failure to achieve § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 667, 674, 723 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999).

II.B.2. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE WITH PREVIOUS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS — § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)

As to Lynette O., the petitioner also claims that the statutory ground for termination established by General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(E) exists in this case, supporting termination of her parental rights to Allison and Addison.⁵⁹ It is uncontroverted that Lynette O.'s parental rights to her first biological daughter were terminated by court order on August CT Page 9163-y 23, 2000, pursuant to a petition filed by DCF; that Allison has not yet reached her sixth birthday; and that Addison has not yet reached his fourth birthday. Adopting the discussion concerning Lynette O.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation as set forth in Part II.B.1., supported by the findings in Part II.A.1., the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has met her burden of proving the other elements of the ground for TPR established by § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).

59 Largely mirroring the elements of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), § CT Page 9163-at 17a-112(j)(3)(E) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to: "(E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."

II.C. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — Ericson B. II.C.1. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)

The petitioner first alleges that Ericson B.'s parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).⁶⁰ Ericson B. counters that he has attended to the pivotal elements of the specific steps, and has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in his children's lives. As Allison and Addison were found to be uncared for on May 2, 2000, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards⁶¹ and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p),⁶² the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

60 See footnote 39.

61 See footnote 40.

62 See footnote 41.

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Ericson B. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to his fundamental issues of substance abuse, parenting deficits and involvement in domestic violence as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future he could assume a responsible position in the lives of his children. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that Ericson B. has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation.⁶³ Upon examination in November 1999, the court-appointed psychological evaluator found that the respondent's emotional function was marked by "anxiety and mental turmoil [which] interfere with focusing on tasks, thinking clearly, considering alternatives, and solving problems." (Exhibit 22.) Dr. Grenier also found that Ericson B. showed signs of antisocial traits, and that he had "little basis for acting sensibly and learning from experience, even when it involves bringing pleasure or pain to himself or to those closest to him." (Exhibit 22.) Chronic in nature and unremediated, these characteristics are incompatible with an ability to provide a safe, nurturing, and consistent environment for young children such as Allison CT Page 9163-z and Addison. (Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

63 See footnote 42.

Even though Ericson B. refused to participate in Dr. Grenier's re-assessment process during the summer of 2002, the psychologist's opinions were confirmed by the evaluation and analysis performed by the trained CCC staff when the respondent father applied for drug treatment services in August 2002.⁶⁴ There, a licensed alcohol and drug counselor (LADC) also noted Ericson B.'s history of "past and present abuse of illicit drugs, specifically heroin." (Exhibit 18.) Consistent with Dr. Grenier's earlier findings, this LADC counselor also noted that Ericson B. "has had the ability to stop using drugs, on his own, yet not for long periods of time" and that he is subject to chronic, disabling relapse "which inhibits his ability to make long-term positive life changes." (Exhibit 18.) CCC further recognized that notwithstanding his prior efforts, Ericson B. had a continued need for a substantial period of "treatment regarding substance abuse and addiction issues."⁶⁵ (Exhibit 18.) Thus, in the summer of 2002 just prior to trial, Ericson B. was in almost the same position with regard to his addiction issues as he had been in May of 2000 when Allison and Addison were adjudicated uncared for children. Although Ericson B. is now able to admit "that he has difficulty overcoming psychosocial stressors, as a result of his episodes of relapse," from a psychosocial perspective, he has made no other significant progress in rehabilitation with regard to his drug use. (Exhibit 18.)

64 Due notice was provided to Ericson B. to enable him to attend both the individual and interactional assessments that were ordered by the court. (Exhibit 21.) The clear and convincing evidence permits the inference that Ericson B. elected not to participate in Dr. Grenier's updated psychological evaluations, despite this notice. The court further infers that Ericson B. made this choice due to the fact that he was actively using drugs at the time, because he failed to attend drug treatment sessions at MF after April 25, 2002; his laboratory test was positive in August 2002; and on August 13, 2002, he admitted continued use of heroin. (Exhibit 12; Testimony of Katie C.)

65 The court received insufficient evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that the respondent father participated in CCC's proffered 180-day treatment program.

Second, the empirical evidence establishes that Ericson B. has not yet achieved statutory rehabilitation, and that he is not likely to achieve this goal in the foreseeable future. As found in Part I.C., Ericson B. has been addicted to heroin since he commenced its use over ten years ago. As fully set forth in Parts I.C. and II.A.2., Ericson B.'s lackluster efforts at cooperating with treatment for his drug addiction issues have almost always failed to measurably improve his ability to maintain sobriety. More often than not, Ericson B.'s substance abuse has caused him to be involved with criminal activities, leading to his drug-related convictions in April of 1997, months before Allison was born, and again in September of 1999, just after Addison's birth. As a result of these convictions, Ericson B. has spent a substantial part of Allison's life in prison; he has been incarcerated for more than half of Addison's life, and has effectively provided but scant care for either child.

Ericson B.'s experience clearly and convincingly establishes the intractable nature of the respondent father's substance abuse issues, and eliminates any reasonable basis for inferring that there is any likelihood that he will learn to successfully manage his addiction in the CT Page 9163-aa foreseeable future. As fully set forth in Parts I.C. and II.A.2., although he attended some drug treatment sessions at SMH-JC in 1998 as a part of his probation from the criminal court, Ericson B. did not complete this substance abuse program. Subsequently, he underwent detox at CSEH, and then did complete the first phase of the HHC program. However, Ericson B. was unable to continue with the HHC treatment because he was incarcerated for a drug-related offense and probation violations. Upon his discharge from prison in 2001, DCF referred Ericson B. to drug treatment at the MF; however, he failed to cooperate with this program. In the spring of 2002, DCF again referred Ericson B. for treatment at the MF; although his April 2002 drug screen was negative, Ericson B. failed to attend subsequent sessions at MF. When he returned to CCC in August 2002, he admitted recent use of heroin, which was confirmed by laboratory analysis.⁶⁶ Mere months before trial, CCC's staff found that Ericson B. was still in need of that program's 180-day methadone taper program "in order to allow him enough time to resolve psychosocial stressors, obtain intensive counseling and gain a greater understanding of his substance abuse behaviors." (Exhibit 18.)

66 Although Ericson B. had been evaluated for methadone treatment at CCC on many occasions prior to the summer of 2002, the provider explained that he was never able to follow through with treatment, "often times due to incarceration." (Exhibit 18.)

This experience clearly and convincingly demonstrates that while Ericson B. is able to obtain some transient benefit from substance abuse treatment, he persistently falls back into his habitual pattern of using illegal drugs. The court fully credits the CCC staff's succinct explanation that the respondent father "has a history of chronic relapse, where he is able to remain drug free for a period of time before `picking up' again." (Exhibit 18.) Despite the three years that the children have spent in foster care, and despite the multiple substance abuse programs to which he has been referred by OAP and DCF, Ericson B. has not yet achieved a measurable degree of control over his addiction issues. His past program failures give little reason to anticipate that he will, in the future, reap any lasting success from additional drug treatment. Under these circumstances, it is fundamental that Allison and Addison's safety and well-being could not be reasonably assured if they were returned to the care of a parent whose resistance to drug treatment, and propensity to return to substance abuse, is so well-known and entrenched.

Third, although specific steps were assigned to assist Ericson B. in achieving rehabilitation, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that he failed to fulfill a number of significant measures.⁶⁷ (Exhibit 4.) As discussed above, Ericson B. continued to use illegal drugs, although such use was proscribed by the specific steps in 1999 and 2000. Although he has attended many of the scheduled visits with the children, as the specific steps require him to do, Ericson B. has failed to attend on a number of occasions, leaving Allison feeling especially CT Page 9163-ab confused and unhappy about his absence. (Testimony of Monica C., Matlandy M.) Ericson B. has failed to maintain stable housing or employment that would accommodate Allison and Addison. He makes his current residence with his girlfriend, their infant son, and his girlfriend's child; there is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that there is physical room for Allison and Addison in this household, or that they would be emotionally welcomed or even safe in residence with Ericson B.'s new family. (Testimony of Matlandy M.)

67 DCF has admitted that Ericson B. has partially complied with the steps by signing releases and visiting the children as often as the department permits. (Exhibit 5.)

Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that Ericson B.'s achievement of an adequate degree of rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed Ericson B.'s relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to the children's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide them with emotional stability, security, and consistency. As found in Part II.B.1., given Allison's recent expressions of anger and frustration at her foster-child status, this child has a specific need for permanency on an immediate basis; after three years in foster care, her well-being cannot tolerate any additional time for her biological father to attempt to achieve rehabilitation. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385. Even if Ericson B. should now actively engage in rehabilitation and find a way to make his stubborn reliance on illegal drugs yield to lasting sobriety, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for Allison and Addison given the time that has passed since their adjudication as uncared for children in May 2000. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).

Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that despite some participation in a rehabilitation regimen, Ericson B. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent his children, and lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in their young lives within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved Ericson B.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

II.C.2. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE WITH PREVIOUS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS — § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)

As to Ericson B., the petitioner also claims that the statutory ground for termination established by General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(E)⁶⁸ exists in this case, supporting termination of his parental rights to Allison and Addison. It is uncontroverted that Ericson B.'s parental rights to his first biological daughter were terminated by court order on CT Page 9163-ac August 23, 2000, pursuant to a petition filed by DCF; that Allison has not yet reached her sixth birthday; and that Addison has not yet reached his fourth birthday. Adopting the discussion concerning Ericson B.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation as set forth in Part II.C.1., supported by the findings in Part II.A.2., the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has met her burden of proving the other elements of the ground for TPR established by § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).

68 See footnote 59.

III. DISPOSITION

As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. 103; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n15, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book 33-5.

III.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516.

III.A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)

As found in Part II.A., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that neither Lynette O. nor Ericson B. is able or willing to benefit from reasonable reunification services in a timely manner as befits the best interests of their children. Nonetheless, DCF provided timely and appropriate services for the respondents as set forth in Part II., including case management, permanency planning, administrative case reviews, a service agreement, visitation and related transportation; and a referral for domestic violence counseling at FSGW-WYS. (Testimony of Maria A.) Other services for Ericson B. included referrals for substance evaluations, testing and treatment at MF and CCC. (Exhibits 14, 17, 18.) Through probation, Ericson B. was provided with substance abuse assessments and treatment at SMH-JC, CSEH, and HHC.⁶⁹ (Exhibit 1.)

69 See footnote 32.

Other DCF services for Lynette O. included a parent aide through SMP-PAP; a parenting education program through SMH-NBP; substance abuse treatment services through MF; assistance in finding housing and CT Page 9163-ad furnishings for herself and the children. (Exhibits 15, D-1, D-10; Testimony of Maria A.) Through the DOC, Lynette O. was provided with opportunities for substance abuse and wrap-around support services, including individual counseling at the CWF-WOP program; she participated in the CWF-FVOP program, instead. Lynette O. accessed her own services through multiple referrals to CCC for methadone management with related substance abuse treatment and evaluation; a local hospital for detox; additional substance abuse treatment at CASA; and substance abuse treatment with individual counseling at HBBH.⁷⁰ (Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, D-6).

70 See footnote 31.

III.A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, though the provision of timely reunification services, as described in Part III.A.1. However, the respondent parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from these services, as described in Part II.A. DCF made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of these children from their home prior to Lynette O.'s incarceration on December 6, 1999.

III.A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)

Both Lynette O. and Ericson B. have partially complied with court-ordered specific steps. (Exhibit 4.) However, Lynette O. violated the specific steps through her drug use; failing to make timely use of the individual counseling and other services offered through the CWF-WOP program; and failing to timely comply with the recommendations of her substance abuse treatment providers. Ericson B. violated the specific steps by failing to attend his court-ordered psychological evaluations in June 2002; failing to complete the CCC program; failing to adequately visit the children; failing to attend parenting counseling; and continuing his substance abuse. See Parts II.B. and C.

III.A.4. THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)

Both Allison and Addison are well-bonded to their foster parents. Allison sees Lynette O. as a significant figure in her life and understands that she is her biological mother, while Addison does not. Neither child sees Lynette O. as a psychological parent; this role is occupied by their foster mother. Allison presents with conflicted feelings about her desire to remain in her foster home which, concurrent with her desire that Lynette O. not be left "alone." (Exhibit 23.) These CT Page 9163-ae feelings are manifest though the child's anger and aggression toward Lynette O. (Exhibit 23; Testimony Dr. Grenier, Matlandy M.)

Neither Allison nor Addison have any fear of Ericson B. Although Addison shows no interest in his biological father, Allison looks forward to visits. Allison is markedly disappointed when Ericson B. does not appear at their scheduled meetings. (Testimony of Matlandy M.)

III.A.5. AGES OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(5)

Allison was born on August 19, 1997. She is nearing her sixth birthday and has been in foster care since December 1999. Addison was born on September 3, 1999 and is nearing his fourth birthday. He has been in foster care for all but the first few months of his life.

III.A.6. PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)

Although they have participated in many visits and have made sporadic progress in addressing their substance abuse issues, neither respondent parent has made realistic and sustained efforts to conform his or her conduct to even minimally acceptable parental standards. Although Lynette O. is apparently comfortable with her services at HBBH, she remains without a stable structure to her life outside of this program. Ericson B. has created another family unit, living with his current girlfriend, her daughter and their child, without making reasonable efforts to accommodate Allison and Addison. Giving either Lynette O. or Ericson B. additional time would not likely bring either's performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the children to be reunited.

III.A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)7)

No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented either respondent parent from maintaining relationships with the children at issue in this case, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect. Both Lynette O. and Ericson B. were separated from the children for many months at a time due to the respondent parents' own criminal acts, and the long-term incarceration that resulted.

III.B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(j)(2) CT Page 9163-af

The court is next called upon to determine whether terminating the parental rights of Lynette O. and Ericson B. would serve the children's best interests.⁷¹ Applying the appropriate legal standards to the facts which are clearly and convincingly apparent in this case,⁷² the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

71 The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."

72 "Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents." (Quotation marks and internal citation omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000). "[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).

In determining whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the best interests of Allison and Addison, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability, and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with their foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents.⁷³ In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816. The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

73 "[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in the best interests of either Allison or Addison to continue a legal relationship with either biological parent. The children's attorney cum GAL has found termination of parental rights to be in the best interests of these children, and has vigorously argued for such result on their behalf. Allison and Addison have been in foster care for over three years, yet neither Lynette O. nor Ericson B. is now able to provide a safe, stable, and secure home for the children; as found in Part II., neither respondent will be able to provide such a home for them in the foreseeable future.

Both the facts of this case and the applicable law support the decision to terminate the respondents' parental rights at this time. Factually, Allison and Addison are at a developmental stage that demands consistency and permanency in placement. The children need to be cared for in an environment that promotes creation and maintenance of a stable relationship with trusted, reliable caregivers, to help foster the independence and emotional maturity that are appropriate for their ages. As Dr. Grenier has opined, Allison is "in need of permanent placement as soon as possible, since she is showing some significant emotional difficulties, which are related to feelings of insecurity and instability" derived from her ongoing status as a foster child. (Exhibit 23.) Allison blames Lynette O. for her current insecure situation, yet CT Page 9163-ag retains great affection for this respondent. (Exhibit 23.) The child is mature enough to understand the significance of her relationship to Lynette O., and recognizes that the ongoing court proceedings place at issue the possibility of future reunification with her biological mother. As found in Part I.D., Allison manifests her conflicted feelings about her status as a foster child and her feelings for the respondent mother through anger, aggression, and other inappropriate, oppositional behavior. This child deserves a safe, permanent placement so that she will be able to finally resolve her conflicts and confusion about who will provide her with safe care and nurturance throughout the remaining years of her childhood. (Exhibit 23; Testimony of Dr. Grenier.)

Addison has similar need for a secure placement, in which he is not subject to any vagaries or concerns about the identity of his permanent caretaker. He appears to see Lynette O. as a friendly adult, rather than recognizing the importance of her biological status.⁷⁴ As he becomes developmentally independent and mature, his emotional maturity will be best enhanced if he, too, is enabled to develop a trusting relationship with a reliable caretaker, living in a safe and stable environment that he knows to be "home." As Dr. Grenier explained, it would "emotionally detrimental" for this young boy to remain in an insecure foster-child status, waiting to see whether his biological mother can achieve the ability to care for him. (Exhibit 23.)

74 Lynette O. would prefer to attribute the nature of her limited relationship with Addison to improper action on the part of DCF. However, as discussed in Parts I.B. and II.B.1., the facts of this case clearly and convincingly establish that it was Lynette O.'s own criminal acts and misconduct during incarceration that kept her sequestered from Addison for a two-year period following his entry into foster care at the age of three months.

It is clear that Lynette O. loves her children, and that she wants to serve as their caretaker. However, she has unduly delayed in responding to Allison's and Addison's need for a reliable parent, pursuing her substance abuse for too long without remedy, and engaging in criminal acts which required her incarceration for a substantial period of time while the children's best interests were met by others. (Testimony of Marie L-B.) The clear and convincing evidence establishes that this respondent has not gained a sufficient degree of stability with regard to her own substance abuse issues, housing, and parenting skills to enable her to appropriately discharge the child care responsibilities that are called for given Allison's and Addison's young age and need for total emotional and physical support. Maintaining Lynette O.'s parental rights under these circumstances cannot factually serve the best interests of her children.

As to Ericson B., the respondent father has demonstrated some interest in the children, and he has visited with them from time to time. Allison knows her father, and enjoys spending limited amounts of time with him. Addison does not know Ericson B. well, and certainly does not identify him as a father figure; the child has little interaction with Ericson B. during those visits that do take place. Moreover, Ericson B. has also CT Page 9163-ah spent a substantial portion of the children's lives serving prison time, depriving them of the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with him.

In this case, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably infer that Ericson B. is truly committed to serving as a full-time caretaker for Allison and Addison. His failure to participate in the repeat psychological evaluation scheduled for the summer of 2002 amply demonstrates this respondent's ambivalence toward his children's welfare. He utterly failed to make adequate use of the substance abuse treatment services offered to him in the past and continued to use illegal drugs during the summer of 2002. For Ericson B. as well as for Lynette O., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that each respondent failed to gain a sufficient degree of stability with regard to his or her substance abuse issues to enable him or her to appropriately discharge the child care responsibilities that are due to Allison and Addison. Maintaining Ericson B.'s parental rights under these circumstances cannot factually serve the best interests of his children.

Legally, the statutes forming the basis of the TPR petition and the applicable case law also support the severance of parental rights in this case. Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected or uncared for children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Applying these principles to the facts and circumstances of this case, the court is constrained to agree with the children's GAL and the court-appointed psychological evaluator who have indicated that the respondents' parental rights should be terminated without further delay. Allison and Addison should be freed for adoption and placement in a secure, permanent family setting that is available and willing to serve their particular needs.

Having balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parent, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that both Allison and Addison are entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the uncertainty of the issues raised through this litigation. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence CT Page 9163-ai presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Lynette O. and Ericson B. will serve the best interests of Allison and Addison.

IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship with their foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the children's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Lynette O. and Ericson B. are hereby terminated as to the children Allison B. and Addison B.

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for these children for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for them.

That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of the children shall be offered to their current foster parents, as a sibling pair.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.