Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD225073, JD225074
BUTZ, J.
Christina P., mother of the minors, appeals from the judgment of disposition and subsequent placement order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 395.) Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support either the jurisdictional findings or the removal of the minors. We shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Health and Human Services removed Alexis U., 8, and Christopher M., 10, from appellant’s custody in November 2006, because appellant failed to protect Alexis from sexual abuse by appellant’s boyfriend, S.S., who was also selling drugs from the home. Additionally, appellant violated a restraining order, intended to protect the minors from domestic violence, by permitting Alexis’s father, R.U., to have contact with the minors.
Alexis reported the sexual abuse to her paternal aunt. She also said she had told appellant, who continued to leave her with S.S. When examined after the most recent incident which resulted in the removal, Alexis said she had not told appellant about it because she did not want her mother to get mad at her. She also told the examiner that S.S. said he would hurt her if she told anyone.
Christopher believed Alexis’s report of sexual abuse and told the social worker that S.S. sold and used drugs in the home and appellant knew about the drug sales. He said that appellant permitted them to have regular contact with R.U. Christopher also reported that S.S. hit him with a belt and threatened to set him on fire.
Initially, appellant did not believe Alexis’s allegations of sexual abuse and insisted the minors were being manipulated by R.U. and the maternal grandmother. Appellant also insisted Alexis had a history of lying and had made a false report of being molested before. She denied there was any domestic violence with S.S. but acknowledged her prior violent relationship with R.U. Appellant denied S.S. used or sold drugs. Appellant said R.U. took the minors from school without her knowledge in violation of the restraining order, but also admitted she recently began allowing supervised contact between R.U. and the minors despite the restraining order. Appellant provided a declaration to the social worker that Alexis was previously examined for sexual abuse by a medical doctor and a counselor, neither of whom found any evidence of such abuse. However, the social worker noted that both professionals were mandated reporters and no reports had been made.
The report for the jurisdictional hearing stated that, about three weeks after the minors were removed, appellant informed the social worker she had separated from S.S. and would try to get a restraining order against him based on his physical abuse of her. Appellant now conceded that Alexis’s allegations of sexual abuse “probably” occurred. Alexis continued to maintain she was sexually abused by S.S. Christopher said appellant knew the abuse had occurred and reiterated that S.S. used and sold drugs and was very violent. A records check showed appellant had a 10-year history of criminal convictions involving fraud, alcohol abuse and escape from prison. Appellant admitted she previously used illegal drugs but was able to stop when she stabilized her mental health condition. She was prescribed medication to treat her condition, although she currently had no medical coverage and was unable to obtain it. Both minors asked to be placed with the paternal aunt and uncle. The report recommended that services include therapy for appellant, addressing domestic violence, molest and victimization because the minors would be at risk of harm in her care without it.
A first amended petition filed in December 2006 alleged Alexis came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) and that Christopher came within section 300 subdivisions (b) and (j). The petitions alleged that appellant knew or should have known of the sexual abuse and drug use and sales, clarified that appellant now believed Alexis and alleged there was ongoing domestic violence in the minors’ presence.
At the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in January 2007, appellant testified she had now accepted that Alexis had been sexually abused. She explained she did not believe her at first due to the earlier report from the maternal grandmother of possible sexual abuse which proved unfounded when she took Alexis to a doctor and a counselor and there were no positive findings. Appellant said Alexis never told her of the abuse and she felt the minor lied about it and was being manipulated by R. U.She changed her mind because she did not think Alexis would still be lying, Alexis had told a number of others and appellant had talked to someone who had spoken to Alexis and had believed her. Appellant said she then realized she needed to change her lifestyle to protect Alexis. Appellant admitted she had a history of many months of domestic violence with both S.S. and R.U. and had ended the relationship with S.S. six weeks earlier. Since then, appellant had moved, gotten a restraining order against S.S. based upon domestic violence, was cooperating in his prosecution related to his domestic violence, and had a new job. Appellant admitted she made a mistake by allowing R.U. to resume contact with the minors despite the restraining order and his history of domestic violence but did not believe the minors were at risk with him because his violence had been directed at her, not them. Appellant agreed that the minors could be damaged by witnessing domestic violence. Appellant was testing clean, completed a parenting class and had done an intake for WEAVE but needed a referral to continue with that program. She was in therapy addressing parenting and responsibility issues. Appellant agreed with the social worker that she needed to work on these issues and her history of domestic violence. Appellant maintained that she never saw S.S. hit Christopher, use or sell drugs or sexually abuse Alexis, but has taken steps to address these problems.
The maternal great-grandmother testified she had cared for the minors on and off over the years until appellant’s last release from prison in August 2005. She said appellant moved in with her to reestablish a relationship with the minors and she thought things would go well when they moved out in May 2006. When she heard Alexis may have been sexually abused by S.S. she believed it. Alexis had not disclosed any instances of sexual abuse to her but she did see inappropriate behavior regarding Alexis by S.S. and told both S.S. and appellant if anything happened again she would call police.
Appellant argued the facts showed there was no longer cause for continued removal and that she had taken significant steps to resolve the problems which led to removal. The court sustained the petitions, detained the minors and ordered services for appellant.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends substantial evidence did not support a finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) at the time of the hearing because the minors were no longer at risk of harm of sexual abuse or physical harm from domestic violence because she had made significant changes in her life following the minors’ removal.
We need find only one ground is supported by substantial evidence to affirm the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112-113.) Appellant does not challenge the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Alexis pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d) and, as to her, we need not explore the evidentiary underpinnings of the remaining allegation. However, since jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) is alleged as to both minors, we shall consider whether substantial evidence supports that basis for jurisdiction.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value--to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) Moreover, when the arguments by petitioner “‘only tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision,’” such arguments are “‘facially meritless in light of the standard of review in this court.’” (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664, italics added.)
The amended petitions alleged, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) that the minors had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm due to appellant’s failure to supervise or protect the minors, to protect the minors from the conduct of a custodian with whom they had been left and by appellant’s inability to care for the minors due to mental illness or substance abuse. In support of these general allegations, the amended petitions alleged the following facts: (1) Appellant failed to protect Alexis from the mother’s live-in boyfriend, S.S., who, on more than one occasion, with the last incident occurring on or about November 1, 2006, committed lewd and lascivious acts upon the child. “The child’s mother now does believe the child was sexually abused by her boyfriend. The child’s mother knew or should have know[n] that [S.S.] was sexually abusing the child, Alexis”; (2) Appellant failed to protect the children “in that the mother’s live[-]in boyfriend, [S.S.,] uses and sells drugs from the home. [Appellant] knew or should have known of her boyfriend using and selling drugs”; and (3) Appellant failed to protect the children “in that she has a history of engaging in domestic violence with men in front of her children, which she admits has adversely affected them. Specifically, [appellant] admitted that there was domestic violence in her relationship with her former husband, [R.U.], who is the father of the child, Alexis U[.] In addition, the mother’s live-in boyfriend [S.S.], is physically abusive to [appellant] in that the child Christopher has seen [S.S.] push the mother; and the child Christopher has seen [S.S.] grab [appellant’s] arm tightly, and has observed [appellant] to have a black eye.”
As to paragraph b-1 of the amended petition, appellant does not challenge the allegation that Alexis was sexually abused by S.S. and now believes the acts occurred. Appellant contends Alexis never told her of the abuse and that she neither “knew [n]or should have known” it had happened. However, the evidence on this point was in conflict. Appellant insists she was not told of the abuse. However, Alexis said she did tell appellant, who continued to leave her with S.S., and did not disclose the most recent incident because she was afraid her mother would be mad at her. Appellant was also on notice of inappropriate behavior by S.S. because the maternal great-grandmother informed her of the incident she observed and threatened to call the police if anything else happened. It was this incident which appellant said prompted her to have the child examined.
As to paragraph b-2 of the amended petition, there was again a conflict in the evidence. Christopher was clear that S.S. was selling drugs from the home and that appellant knew it. Appellant denied such knowledge.
As to paragraph b-3, appellant initially minimized and denied the ongoing domestic violence with S.S. while admitting violence in the relationship with Alexis’s father. Christopher observed the violence and was able to describe specific incidents which had occurred.
The court, in sustaining the petition, resolved the evidentiary conflicts adversely to appellant. Appellant’s credibility was negatively impacted not only because her own statements were inconsistent and lacked the force of commitment, i.e., believing Alexis had been sexually abused primarily because another person had talked to Alexis and believed her, but also because her history of criminal fraud convictions, which were considered by the court as part of the reports, suggested a lack of truthfulness.
In the two months between detention and the review hearing, appellant, with ongoing therapy, went from denial and minimizing S.S.’s sexual abuse of Alexis to grudging belief the abuse occurred. However, she continued to insist she was unaware of S.S.’s drug sales or physical abuse of Christopher. While appellant had begun to take steps to address the issues, including separating from S.S., a risk of physical harm remained at the time of the hearing because it was appellant’s lack of awareness of the dynamics in her home and how to protect the minors which placed the minors at risk, more than a particular individual with whom she shared her home. Her therapy had not begun to address these issues. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the minors came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b).
II
Appellant contends substantial evidence did not support continued removal of the minors from her custody because the court’s concern that she would enter another violent relationship until she had participated in therapy and education on domestic violence was speculative and inadequate to support removal.
Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . .: [¶] [or] [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” As noted above, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the test in the reviewing court is substantial evidence. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214.)
Both minors were physically harmed while in appellant’s care and she knew or should have known they were at risk. Appellant eventually admitted having two very violent relationships, which required her to secure restraining orders for her own protection. However, because she did not recognize that the minors could also be subjected to violence, believing that it was primarily directed toward her, she allowed them to be unsupervised with two violent men. Appellant has begun to change and says she is committed to a different lifestyle. The court is not required to gamble on the minors’ safety in light of appellant’s history of poor choices, which have placed her children at serious risk of harm. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order continuing the minors’ removal from appellant’s physical custody.
Appellant relies upon In re Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 10, for the proposition that speculation is insufficient to support a removal order. The case is factually distinguishable. In Steve W., the mother did not have a history of serial abuse and the father had not abused both children and brought the additional dangers of drug sales into the home. The court’s concern here that appellant would be in another abusive relationship without treatment was not mere speculation, but a reasonable inference from appellant’s history of relationships.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS , Acting P.J., RAYE , J.