Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of wardship of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ17469 Steven R. Klaif, Juvenile Court Referee.
Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GRIMES, J.
Alex D., a minor, appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court, finding he committed the felony of possession of marijuana for sale and declaring him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Alex contends there is insufficient evidence in support of the sole count sustained by the court of possession of marijuana for sale. Alex also contends probation condition 15 imposed by the juvenile court is unconstitutionally vague as it lacks a knowledge requirement. We conclude there is sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment and order of wardship and that the court’s minute order reflecting the disposition correctly contains a knowledge requirement as to probation condition 15. We therefore affirm without modification.
BACKGROUND
During September 2009, a residence on East 58th Street in Los Angeles was under surveillance by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for suspected drug sales. Alex lived there with his father, mother, and eight-year-old brother. The father was observed on at least three occasions selling drugs outside the home. During one transaction, Alex was in front of the house but was not seen directly participating in the sale. Alex was 17 years old at the time and had no juvenile record.
LAPD officers obtained a search warrant for the home and executed that warrant at 4:00 a.m. on October 2, 2009. Officer James Fillmore participated in the execution of the warrant. Upon arrival, the officers contained the home and then announced their presence. They heard a lot of noise from within the house, so Officer Fillmore’s supervisor ordered the officers to immediately breech breach the door and enter the home.
Officer Fillmore was the first to enter and he saw Alex run into a bathroom, and then into a room later determined to be Alex’s bedroom. Officer Fillmore entered the bedroom and found Alex in bed with a juvenile female. Officer Fillmore searched Alex’s bedroom. Six baggies of marijuana were found in a laundry basket in his clothes closet and $1,414 in United States currency was found in a pair of pants lying discarded on the floor. The bills recovered were thirteen $100 bills and several smaller denominations. Officer Fillmore also seized one baggy of a crystal substance, determined to be methamphetamine, from underneath the sink in the bathroom. Additional contraband was seized from the home, including money found in the younger brother’s bedroom. The father was arrested and Alex was taken into custody.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed October 5, 2009, charging Alex with two felony counts: (1) possession for sale of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11378, and (2) possession for sale of marijuana for sale in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11359. Alex was placed with his grandparents on home detention under supervision of a probation officer pending adjudication.
Following the close of the prosecution evidence, the court dismissed count 1. Alex’s counsel called defense witnesses, including Alexis Hernandez, who stated he had purchased a refurbished car from Alex in late September 2009 and had paid Alex $1500 in cash. At the conclusion of evidence, the court heard argument and then sustained the petition as to count 2, felony possession of marijuana for sale.
Alex was adjudged a ward of the court. (Wel. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The juvenile court ordered care, custody and control of Alex transferred to the probation department, with Alex allowed to return to the home of his parents under supervision of probation, subject to various terms and conditions. Condition 15 of the probationary terms required that Alex not associate with anyone known by him to be disapproved of by his parents or probation officer. In orally announcing these terms at the hearing, the court inadvertently omitted the knowledge requirement, but it is duly reflected in the minute order of the disposition. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. There Is Sufficient Evidence to Support Count 2.
Alex contends there is insufficient evidence establishing he was in possession of the marijuana seized from his home. We disagree.
“The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment (order) to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making such a determination we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment (order) the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (In re Oscar R. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 770, 773; see also In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809 [in order to protect due process rights of juvenile, appellate courts apply same standard of review as in adult criminal trials in considering sufficiency of evidence admitted in juvenile proceedings].)
In the trial below, Officer Fillmore, a seven-year veteran of the LAPD experienced in narcotics transactions, testified that after announcing their presence at the home, the officers heard noisy activity inside the house. When Officer Fillmore went inside, he saw Alex running through the house, disappearing into the bedroom where he was found moments later, in bed with a female minor. A search of his room revealed the individual baggies of marijuana in his clothes closet, as well as the money in his pants lying on the floor. Alex had been seen outside the home while his father engaged in a drug sale transaction. Alex was 17 years old at the time of the offense. Officer Fillmore testified to his opinion that the marijuana found in Alex’s room was for purposes of sale, given the manner of packaging, the money found in his bedroom, and the fact that no paraphernalia related to the smoking of marijuana was discovered in his room.
Indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment as we are required to do, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support a finding of Alex’s possession of the marijuana for sale. (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583-584 [possession may be imputed when contraband found in place subject to accused’s dominion and control or found with accused’s personal effects]; see also People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 287-288 [evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt may bolster finding of possession].)
Alex argues that a “fair reading” of the evidence is that Alex’s father, who also was seen running around the house when the police entered, and who was the only person observed during surveillance conducting drug sales, was responsible for the contraband in the home, including the drugs found in Alex’s bedroom. However, simply because the evidence may also support a plausible explanation, exculpatory to Alex, for the presence of the contraband in his room, does not justify this court’s rejecting the determination of the trier of fact unless the record on appeal plainly shows that under no reasonable hypothesis is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached below. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372-1373.)
The juvenile trial court is properly vested with the sole authority to resolve the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) The record here amply supports the trial court’s findings sustaining the petition as to count 2. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215 [“elements of unlawful possession may be established by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence”].) The court was clearly mindful of its duties in this regard as reflected by the court’s dismissal of count 1 because of a lack of sufficient evidence showing Alex had the requisite level of dominion and control over the home’s common bathroom to be held responsible for the methamphetamine discovered there.
2. Condition 15 Contains a Knowledge Requirement.
Alex contends that condition 15 is unconstitutionally vague for lack of a requirement that he have personal knowledge that his parents or probation officer disapprove of someone with whom he associates. Our review of this question of law is de novo. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894.) Moreover, because the issue is one of law that does not require factual reference to the sentencing record below, Alex has not forfeited the constitutional challenge on appeal by failing to raise the objection in the juvenile court. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
The juvenile court is vested with broad discretion to set reasonable terms of probation for any ward under its supervision such that “justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Wel. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, ’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (Sheena K., at p. 890.) There is no dispute here a knowledge requirement is necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness.
As reflected in the written minute order recording the court’s adjudication of the petition, condition 15 does properly include a knowledge requirement. Condition 15 requires that Alex not associate with “anyone known by minor to be disapproved of by parents [or] Probation Officer.” (Italics added.) In orally stating the terms of probation, the court inadvertently omitted the phrase “known by minor” with respect to condition 15. We conclude this erroneous omission is of no effect and that the written minute order controls the scope of the disposition.
Our Supreme Court has held that when the reporter’s transcript of the court’s oral pronouncement and the clerk’s transcript are in conflict, the inconsistency need not always be resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 (Smith).) The Court explained that where the court’s oral ruling and the minutes reflecting the ruling cannot be harmonized, it may be proper that “ ‘that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
In People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, the Supreme Court followed the rule articulated in Smith, giving credence to the minute order and abstract of judgment over the reporter’s transcript from the sentencing hearing. There, the reporter’s transcript reflected that the court had sentenced the defendant to a five-year enhancement for a prior felony under Penal Code section 667 and a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5. (Cleveland, at p. 768.) But the record established the defendant had been charged with, and admitted to, only a prior serious felony and not a prior prison term. (Ibid.) In affirming the validity of the sentence as reflected in the abstract of judgment, the court explained: “Thus, the reference in the reporter’s transcript to a one-year term under section 667.5 is incorrect. However, the minute order and abstract of judgment in the clerk’s transcript are correct. Neither mentions a prior prison term or section 667.5. Under the circumstances, we will deem the minute order and abstract of judgment to prevail over the reporter’s transcript. [Citations.] The erroneous statement in the reporter’s transcript is of no effect.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Thompson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 974, 977-978 [deeming minute order and abstract of judgment reflecting correct calculation of sentence to prevail over court’s oral pronouncement where court erroneously calculated length of one-third the middle term].)
Here, we conclude the April 6, 2010 minute order reflecting the court’s imposition of the terms of probation accurately sets forth condition 15 as requiring a personal knowledge component. The erroneous omission of the knowledge requirement in the court’s oral pronouncement is of no effect. As such, there is no need to modify the judgment and order of wardship.
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUBIN, Acting P. J., FLIER, J.