Opinion
J-S46018-17 No. 183 MDA 2017
09-06-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.J.J., A MINOR
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Dispositional Order January 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-JV-0000025-2016 BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ. and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, A.J.J., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered in the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County, following his adjudication of delinquency on two counts of aggravated indecent assault. We affirm.
The juvenile court accurately set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case in its opinion filed March 23, 2017. Therefore, we adopt the court's uncontested recitation as our own and shall not restate them. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17, at 1-3.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [juvenile c]ourt err in finding that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense of [a]ggravated [i]ndecent [a]ssault[?]Appellant's Brief at 7.
The issue included in Appellant's brief expressly contests the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the juvenile court, we conclude Appellant's sufficiency challenge merits no relief. The court's opinion adequately and accurately addresses the issue. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17, at 4-5 (crediting the victim's testimony from the adjudicatory hearing that, on two separate occasions, Appellant penetrated her vagina with his penis without consent and without a good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement purpose and further concluding that the victim's testimony alone constituted adequate grounds to sustain a conviction in a sexual assault case). Because the juvenile court has prepared a precise and thorough assessment of Appellant's sufficiency claim, we adopt the court's analysis as our own and deny relief for the reason stated therein.
Our review on this matter does not end here, however, as we turn now to Appellant's assertion that his delinquency adjudications were contrary to the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant argues that the court relied solely on the victim's testimony and improperly overlooked that there was an ongoing sexual relationship between himself and the victim, that the victim's testimony expressed only her isolated recollection of relevant events, that both Appellant and the victim continued their relationship after the assaults, that the victim delayed reporting the incidents to police, and that the Commonwealth failed to corroborate the events with third party witnesses or physical evidence. Under these circumstances, Appellant contends that his delinquency adjudications should shock one's sense of justice. See Appellant's Brief at 12-13.
The following principles guide our review of Appellant's weight claim.
"[T]he general rule in this Commonwealth is that a weight of the evidence claim is primarily addressed to the discretion of the judge who actually presided at trial." Armbruster v. Horowitz , 813 A.2d 698, 702 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Edwards , 903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006). In reviewing a trial court's adjudication of a weight of the evidence claim, "an appellate court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion based upon review of the record; its role is not to consider the underlying question in the first instance." Commonwealth v. Blakeney , 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2008). Thus, a weight of the evidence claim must be presented to the trial court so that it may address it in the first instance. Commonwealth v. Widmer , 689 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa. 1997)[; s ] ee also Commonwealth v. Karkaria , 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 n.3 (Pa. 1993) ("An allegation that the verdict is against the 'weight' of the evidence is a matter to be resolved by the trial court.").
Once a weight of the evidence claim has been presented to the trial court, it then reviews the evidence adduced at trial and determines whether "notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice." [ Commonwealth v. Clay , 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)]. A trial court should award a new trial if the verdict of the fact finder "is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail." Id. Stated
another way, "[a] weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one's sense of justice." Commonwealth v. Lyons , 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013). These principles have been deemed equally applicable to the adjudication of weight of the evidence challenges brought in juvenile court proceedings. McElrath v. Commonwealth , 592 A.2d 740, 745 (Pa. 1991).In re: J.B., 106 A.3d 76, 94-95 (Pa. 2014) (parallel citations omitted).
Before we proceed to the substance of Appellant's weight claim, we are compelled to consider whether he sufficiently preserved this issue by first raising it in the juvenile court. "The question of whether [an appellant] waived appellate review of his weight-of-the-evidence claim is a question of law, and, accordingly, our standard of review is plenary." Id. at 95. While the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 specifies that weight-of-the-evidence claims in criminal proceedings are waived unless they are raised with the trial court in a motion for a new trial, "the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Procedure have no counterpart requiring the same manner of preservation." In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 91. Indeed, "the current Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure—which 'govern delinquency proceedings in all courts'—are utterly silent as to how a weight-of-the-evidence claim must be presented to the juvenile court so that it may rule on the claim in the first instance, which is ... a necessary prerequisite for appellate review." Id. at 98 (footnote omitted). Pa.R.J.C.P. 620(A)(2) governs the filing of what it expressly designates as an "optional post-dispositional motion." See Pa.R.J.C.P. 620(A)(2) ("Issues raised before or during the adjudicatory hearing shall be deemed preserved for appeal whether or not the party elects to file a post-dispositional motion on those issues."). The relevant case law holds that where a juvenile raises his weight claim for the first time in a concise statement under Rule 1925, the claim is sufficiently preserved for purposes of appellate review. See In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 96-99 (declining to find waiver where juvenile included weight claim in concise statement and trial court considered the issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion); see also In the Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1187-1188 (Pa. Super. 2016).
We note that Appellant failed to include his weight claim in his statement of questions involved, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) ("No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby."). We shall overlook this omission, however, as it has not hampered our review.
It is uncontested that Appellant did not file post-dispositional motions. Instead, Appellant referenced his challenge to the weight of the evidence for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement and the juvenile court rejected his claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, finding that the victim was more credible than Appellant and that the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain an adjudication. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17, at 3 and 5. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Appellant preserved his weight claim for purposes of appellate review. Hence, we address the claim.
We acknowledge the procedure followed by prior appellate courts that have remanded cases under similar circumstances to give the appellant the opportunity to file, nunc pro tunc, post-dispositional motions challenging the weight of the evidence. See In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 99; see also In the Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d at 1188. We decline to follow that procedure in this instance. The facts of this case are very straightforward and the juvenile court has adequately explained its reasons for rejecting Appellant's weight challenge. We need nothing more to undertake our assessment of the manner in which the juvenile court exercised its discretion. --------
Within the context of our limited review of challenges to the weight of the evidence, and given the well-settled principle that we are to defer to the juvenile court on issues of credibility, we are satisfied that this matter does not warrant a new adjudicatory hearing. There is ample support in the certified record for the findings and inferences drawn by the juvenile court. In the absence of circumstances that disclose a palpable abuse of discretion, we are without grounds to upset the challenged ruling and the trial judge's reasons should prevail. See Clay , 64 A.3d at 1054-1055 ("[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony"). Because the court acted well within the limits of its judicial discretion in rejecting Appellant's weight claim, the adjudications in this case do not shock one's sense of justice and we therefore conclude that Appellant's weight claim lacks merit.
Because we rely upon the juvenile court's opinion in deciding this case, the parties are directed to attach a copy of the juvenile court's March 23, 2017 opinion to any future filings regarding this appeal.
Order of disposition affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/6/2017
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