Opinion
23-1412
10-25-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF A.H., Minor Child, A.H., Mother, Appellant.
Brian P. Donnelly of Mayer, Lonergan and Rolfes, Clinton, for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Cheryl Traum, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Affirmed.
Brian P. Donnelly of Mayer, Lonergan and Rolfes, Clinton, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
AHLERS, JUDGE
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a mother and any putative father to a child born in 2022. Only the mother appeals. Although the juvenile court determined that several statutory grounds authorized termination, the mother does not challenge the statutory grounds on appeal. Instead, she requests additional time to work toward reunification, contending termination is not in the child's best interests.
The mother's petition on appeal alludes to details potentially supporting a reasonable-efforts challenge, but she did not develop any argument for our review. As a result, to the extent the mother is attempting to assert a reasonable-efforts challenge, we find she has waived it. See In re E.W., No. 22-0647, 2022 WL 2347196, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (finding an issue waived when the parent failed to develop a supporting argument). Even had the mother developed a reasonable-efforts argument, it was not preserved for our review because she never alerted the juvenile court of any perceived deficiencies. See In re A.W., No. 23-1125, 2023 WL 6290680, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2023) (explaining the error-preservation requirements for a reasonable-efforts challenge). The mother's petition also references Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) (2023), which permits the court to forgo termination when a parent establishes by "clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship." See In re AS., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475-76 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing the parent resisting termination has the burden to establish a permissive exception to termination). She did not seek application of this permissive exception below, so any claim is not preserved for our review. See E.W., 2022 WL 2347196, at *3. Moreover, she has not developed any argument beyond her passing reference to the applicable code section, waiving any would-be claim. See id. at *2. Finally, we note there is no persuasive evidence of a strong parent-child bond in this case.
We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Typically, our review follows a three-step process that involves determining if a statutory ground for termination has been established, whether termination is in the child's best interests, and whether any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). However, if a parent does not challenge any of the three steps, we need not address the unchallenged steps on appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
As previously noted, the mother does not challenge the statutory grounds authorizing termination. Nor does she challenge best interests in the traditional sense. Instead, she argues it is in the child's best interests to grant her additional time to work toward reunification. We break down her claim into two parts. First, we consider whether there is a basis to grant the mother more time to work toward reunification. Then, we consider whether termination is in the child's best interests.
With respect to additional time for the mother to work toward reunification, the court may grant a parent six additional months to work toward reunification in lieu of termination under certain circumstances. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to section 232.104 if it does not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving an additional six months to work toward reunification). Before the court may grant a parent additional time to work toward reunification, it must be able to "enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child's home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period." See id. § 232.104(2)(b).
The record is devoid of any evidence that the need for removal would no longer exist in six months' time. The mother has not made any meaningful progress toward reunification over the past year, so we cannot conclude that the numerous barriers to reunification would be cleared within just six months. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997) ("[W]e look to the parents' past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future."). Nor does the mother identify what changes she anticipates occurring in the near future, aside from noting continued services would enable her "to receive more direct services with regard to housing." Even if the mother resolved her housing instability, reunification would not be possible given the other barriers to reunification such as the mother's unresolved mental-health issues, ongoing substance abuse, and inability to meet the child's needs during supervised visits. We agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that "[b]ased on [the mother's] efforts and lack of progress since the child was originally removed, there is no indication that the reasons for removal will no longer exist after an additional six months." Because we agree the need for removal would likely remain at the end of an additional six months, there is no basis to grant the mother additional time.
When making a best-interests determination, we "give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the longterm nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child." P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Termination is in this child's best interests. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services involved itself with this family after the child tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and benzodiazepine at birth due to the mother's drug abuse during pregnancy. The child has never been in the mother's care, and she looks to others to meet her needs. The mother does not consistently attend visits with the child, and she does not provide the child with appropriate care when she does attend. Conversely, the child's foster care placement meets the child's physical and emotional needs and is willing to serve as a long-term placement. Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). Termination now helps the child achieve permanency and stability as soon as possible, meaning it is in the child's best interests.
Concluding termination best serves the child's interests and there is no basis to grant the mother additional time to work toward reunification, we affirm the termination of her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.