Opinion
C087521
03-27-2020
In re MARQUES ADAMS on Habeas Corpus.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16HC00200)
The People appeal the trial court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus following its determination prison officials violated petitioner Marques Adams's right to due process when they denied him the ability to present potentially exculpatory surveillance video evidence that had been destroyed. The People contend Adams's failure to timely request the video led to its destruction, due process did not require prison officials to produce a video that no longer existed, and he otherwise received all the process he was due at the disciplinary rehearing. Adams responds that prison officials were aware of the exculpatory value of the video at the time it was destroyed and had a duty to preserve it given the particular facts of this case.
We conclude the prison did not violate Adams's right to due process when it destroyed potentially useful surveillance video pursuant to its established policy and without any evidence in the record from which we could infer prison officials were acting in bad faith. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and order that the disciplinary decision revoking 90 days of good time custody credit be reinstated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Writ and Informal Responses
Following the prison hearing officer's determination that Adams violated prison regulations by possessing a cell phone, and Adams's administrative exhaustion of the appeal of that determination, Adams filed a pro per petition for writ of habeas corpus in Sacramento Superior Court. This petition alleged that other prisoners had planted a cell phone in Adams's personal property during a physical assault of Adams in the early morning of June 5, 2015. Adams's property was thereafter collected and delivered to the administrative segregation section in the late afternoon, but Adams was not allowed to inspect it. He was provided an inventory list, which was missing "a large amount" of his property, resulting in his filing a grievance on June 12, 2015. Twenty-eight pieces of stolen property were returned on or around July 2, 2015. Adams received payment for the outstanding missing items on August 12, 2015.
Unbeknownst to Adams, on June 9, 2015, a confidential informant told prison officials that Adams had a cell phone, which was located on June 10 in the exact location identified by the informant, inside a box of oatmeal, along with a cell phone charger.
The first rule violation hearing pertaining to the cell phone possession occurred on June 18, 2015. Adams pleaded not guilty, but was found to have committed the violation on the basis of the confidential informant statement and the fact that the cell phone was found within Adams's property. This decision was reversed for noncompliance with confidential informant requirements and set for rehearing on August 5, 2015.
At the August 5, 2015 hearing, Adams argued that other prisoners had accessed his property on the day of the fight as evidenced by his successful grievance for his missing property. Adams had requested the surveillance video but was told it was unavailable. Adams nonetheless alleged staff had used that footage to locate his 28 pieces of stolen property. The hearing officer found Adams in violation of the rules based upon the confidential informant's statement and cell phone.
In his writ, Adams argued there was no evidence he actually or constructively possessed the cell phone because it was planted while he was in custody and should be treated like contraband intercepted before reaching a prisoner. Adams further argued the evidence used to find him guilty was not reliable and there was evidence showing prisoners had access to his "property to plant and steal." Evidence attached to the writ noted that Adams had objected at the August 5 hearing that the June 5 surveillance video was being withheld in violation of his right to due process.
On June 23, 2016, the trial court requested an informal response to "address [Adams's] allegation that he was improperly found guilty of a rules violation when the evidence shows his property was accessed by other inmates prior to impound in Administrative Segregation. This response is to include, but is not limited to, an explanation of the extent to which the other inmates' access to [Adams's] property was factored into the disciplinary process."
The People's informal response argued that a disciplinary decision need only be supported by some evidence, and because it was undisputed that the cell phone was discovered within Adams's oatmeal container, it was immaterial that another inmate could have planted the cell phone. "[T]he existence of this contradictory evidence is not a basis for granting review under the some-evidence standard of review." Adams's informal reply repeated his previous arguments and requested that his rule violation report be dismissed with prejudice.
The Order to Show Cause , Return , Traverse , and First Decision
On August 8, 2016, the trial court issued an order to show cause that recognized the People's argument that there was some evidence in the record to support the decision and Adams had argued, "the confidential information acted upon by prison staff was unreliable where the evidence shows inmates had unfettered access to [Adams's] property prior to staff conducting an inventory and later search." The court appointed counsel for Adams and ordered the People to file a return "addressing [Adams's] allegation he was improperly found guilty of a rules violation when the evidence shows his property was accessed by other inmates prior to impound in Administrative Segregation. This response is to include, but is not limited to, an explanation of the extent to which the other inmates' access to [Adams's] property was factored into the disciplinary process."
The People's return alleged Adams was lawfully in custody, a cell phone was found within his property as a result of a confidential informant tip, Adams had defended the cell phone possession charge by arguing the phone had been planted, but the hearing officer had nonetheless found him guilty based upon the credible confidential informant information and fact the cell phone was found within Adams's property. Adams being compensated for lost property did not prove the cell phone had been planted.
In his traverse, Adams admitted he was lawfully in custody, but denied the People's remaining allegations. Adams argued the People's position ignored that his property was unsecured prior to its packing and a cell phone planted in that period would not have been actually or constructively possessed by him. The day Adams learned he would be granted a new hearing, he requested the surveillance video from June 5, 2015. CDCR responded stating no surveillance footage was available for June 10, 2015. CDCR's response was for the wrong date, and footage from June 5, 2015 had been used against Adams at the related rule violation hearing. Adams filed a grievance identifying this discrepancy. Adams argued due process required that he be allowed to present the correct video at a new hearing.
On May 9, 2017, the trial court issued a written ruling granting Adams's request for a writ of habeas corpus. The court agreed with Adams that the prison's failure to allow him to present the surveillance video violated due process. "Not only was this opportunity denied to him at the hearing, the way in which the opportunity was denied did not comport with notions of due process. The institution did not offer institutional safety or correctional goals as justification for the denial. Nor would such a position have merit. The institution processed the very clear request for the June 5th video as a request for June 10th video, while selectively using a portion of the June 5th video against [Adams]." Accordingly, the court granted the writ and ordered a new disciplinary hearing, unless the video was unavailable. In that case, the court ordered the restoration of Adams's 90 days of good time credits.
The Rehearing Request , Supplemental Briefing , Evidentiary
Hearing , and Oral Decision
On May 18, 2017, the People filed a motion for a rehearing, arguing whether the withholding of the video violated Adams's due process rights was outside the scope of the court's order to show cause. Adams filed a response arguing: (1) the language of the order to show cause was broad enough to encompass this claim, which had been raised in the writ of habeas corpus and (2) at most, the court should reissue the order to show cause and reopen briefing. The court granted the petition for rehearing on June 9 and ordered additional briefing.
On August 7, 2017, the People filed a supplemental return, alleging that following a fight, Adams was assigned to administrative segregation and his belongings were packed up "within a couple hours following the fight." Adams did not present witnesses at his first disciplinary hearing, nor did he request any surveillance video. Following Adams's successful challenge of the rule violation, a new rule violation report was issued, and Adams requested the surveillance video footage. His request did not specify the date of video footage requested, and his request was denied as surveillance for July 10 from "Main Medical" was unavailable. Further, the video cameras did not record the inside of Adams's cell, but did record the common area of Adams's housing unit. Unless requested, surveillance video was purged after 45 days. Pursuant to the procedures in place at the time, only Adams and his cellmate had access to Adams's cell. Thus, at best, the footage would have shown Adams's cellmate. Adams did not specifically request the June 5 surveillance video, the June 5 footage had already been destroyed, and due process did not require the prison "to indefinitely preserve all video recordings." The People further asserted that even if there had been error, Adams was not prejudiced given the limited evidentiary value of what could be on the surveillance video.
Adams's supplemental traverse denied all allegations of the supplemental return. Adams agreed he did not request the surveillance video prior to the first disciplinary hearing, but argued the footage was not relevant until Correctional Officer Daniel Udell testified at that hearing. Adams specifically requested surveillance video footage from June 5 of relevant areas, including outside his cell. Further, he received a new hearing as a result of an internal review procedure, not an appeal. The original rule violation decision was not final and thus not appealable at the time of the reversal.
Adams argued the prison unnecessarily delayed in serving him with the notice of the new hearing. The decision was made on July 8, but not served on him until July 22. The surveillance video was erased under the 45-day policy two days earlier on July 20. Adams was unaware of any such policy, and if anyone should bear the blame for the destruction, it should be the prison. Adams also argued the footage would have shown a prison officer opening the doors to each cell in succession and those doors remained open and thus accessible to other inmates for some period of time during the unlocking and locking processes. Adams argued it was undisputed that he was denied the opportunity to present this exonerating information.
On January 9, 2018, the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing for the resolution of these disputed factual issues. The court noted the People contended: "[Adams] failed to request specific Pelco video evidence in a timely manner. As a result, the Pelco video evidence was purged from the system prior to [Adams's] hearing on the re-issued rule violation report. Respondent also contends that the video would not contain relevant evidence, and the lack of Pelco evidence at the hearing did not violate [Adams's] due process rights. Respondent claims that the cell locking procedures in place would have prevented other inmates from accessing [Adams's] property and the video would only show access to the cell by [Adams's] cellmate."
On the flip side, the court noted Adams "asserts that he had no way of knowing that the rule violation report would be re-issued and that he requested the Pelco video evidence on the same day he received the re-issued rule violation report. [Adams] argues that the prison delayed reissuing the rule violation report until just after the video was scheduled to be purged and, in doing so, deprived [him] of his defense. [Adams] also disagrees that the video evidence was not relevant and disagrees that the cell locking procedures in place at the time prevented other inmates from accessing his property. [Adams] has provided documentation which, he alleges, shows the procedure in place left the cells open for a substantial amount of time. [Adams] does not discount his cellmate as a possible culprit but claims that some of his property was found in the possession of other inmates, demonstrating other inmates had access to his property."
The hearing was held on May 11, 2018, wherein the trial court received documentary evidence and testimony. Adams testified he learned on July 9 that he would be getting a second hearing, and in preparation for his new rules violation hearing, drafted a request for video surveillance footage to be made when he was served with the new rule violation report. This request was for June 5, 2015 surveillance video footage in the area around his cell and other relevant areas starting at 12:18 p.m. Adams made that request when he was served with the report on July 22, 2015. The prison denied his request, stating there was no video available for June 10. Adams complained the response concerned the wrong day of footage, but never received the video he requested. Adams's request for the video at the disciplinary hearing was also denied.
Adams defended the charge at the second hearing by arguing that "it had already been established that other inmates had access to [his] property due to the fact that [he] filed a grievance pertaining to missing property, and it had been granted and [he was] reimbursed for the missing property." He argued the requested video would prove other inmates had access to his property.
Adams testified there was "a large amount of property" missing including: clothes, shoes, video games, other electronic items, a lamp, a CD player, and food. These items were not on the original invoice, and he discovered this property was missing on June 11. He withdrew his grievance after most of his property was returned and CDCR agreed to reimburse him for the outstanding items.
Adams also testified concerning the cameras and the procedures in place at the time for exiting cells. The video would show a guard opening each door on the pod in succession and then later closing each door in succession, thus resulting in a lapse of time wherein inmates could have entered and exited Adams's cell, and the video would have captured images of such activity. Inmates could enter or exit their cells at the top of the hour and enter their cells at the bottom of the hour.
Adams conceded he was served with the first rules violation report on June 15, 2015 and requested witnesses, but not surveillance video footage. He also did not request the video at his first rules violation hearing even though he had received the inventory slip concerning his property at night on the day of the fight. Adams did not request the video at the first hearing because he did not know Officer Udell would testify his "property was rolled up and sent with him when he was sent to medical." This statement was credited by the first hearing officer as supporting the officer's discrediting of Adams's defense. Therefore, discrediting Udell's untrue statement then became relevant to his defense.
Notably, surveillance video footage of his fight was played at the disciplinary proceeding concerning that fight, but it showed the outside, not the inside of his housing unit.
Following Adams's testimony, the People moved to dismiss, arguing Adams had not carried his burden because he had waived any right to the video by not requesting it prior to the first hearing and was provided an opportunity to present other evidence, which he chose not to do. The court denied the motion.
Thereafter, the People presented the testimony of Officer Billy Brown, Officer Grace Johns, and Hearing Officer Udell. Officer Brown testified concerning the disciplinary hearing process generally, including that he would accommodate requests for evidence made at a hearing because "99.9 percent of the time if it's a request that can be, you know, granted and I can do it, I have no problem doing that and finding that witness" even if that means delaying the hearing a day or two. Adams was housed in a private contract prison, and disciplinary decisions were therefore reviewed by CDCR staff.
Officer Brown stated Adams had refused to participate at his disciplinary rehearing, instead handing him a paper arguing the withholding of the video was violating his right to due process. However, the response to the request for the surveillance video made clear it was not available for use. Aside from the fact the memorandum denying Adams's request for the video referenced the wrong day, because of the timing of the hearing, the video from June 5 would not have been available because Pelco surveillance video was only available for 45 days. Had the video still been available, Brown would have allowed it. Brown's written decision reflected Adams had indeed entered a not guilty plea, explained why he thought he was not guilty, and he refused to participate further because the video was not available. Brown found Adams guilty because the majority of the evidence indicated the cell phone and charger recovered belonged to Adams.
Officer Johns testified to serving Adams with the second rules violation report on July 22, 2015 and that Adams had requested surveillance video evidence documenting the transport of his property from his cell to medical. Officer Johns told Adams the request would be denied because it was not relevant to the cell phone possession charge given there was no video of the interior of the cell. Further, because the request came over 45 days after the recording, it was already purged from the system. If Adams had initially asked for the surveillance video, it would have been preserved on a disk. When the court inquired regarding the 15-day delay, Johns explained that Adams was not served with the reissued rules violation report until the last permissible day, which was their standard practice.
Finally, the People offered the testimony of Officer Udell, who had packed Adams's property and brought it to medical. Once Udell saw Adams being escorted away after the fight, he contacted the pod officer and said to keep Adams's door closed. He did this because "[i]n the past we've had items stolen from property, and to alleviate that and cost the company that I work for, I do that." He did not see anyone secure the cell and did not recall who the pod officer was. Further, it was against regulations for inmates to access the cells of other inmates, and they write them up if they are caught doing this.
Officer Udell did not see Adams's cellmate in the cell. He packed Adams's property "within an hour from when the incident happened." It took him between 30 and 45 minutes to pack the property. Udell then "took it directly to medical" and had Adams sign the inventory form. Adams could see his boxed property, but not the interior of the boxes.
On cross examination, Officer Udell stated he had arrived at Adams's cell and started packing less than 30 minutes after calling the pod officer.
Thereafter, the parties presented arguments. Adams argued the surveillance video footage was akin to a witness, that nothing established Adams knew or should have known about the deletion policy, and that it was not Adams's fault the video was deleted. Adams's petition should be granted "for failure to allow him to present necessary evidence." The People responded that had Adams originally requested the video it would have been preserved, and the due process clause does not require the surveillance video footage be maintained in perpetuity. It did not exist when it was requested, and thus, CDCR did not have to provide it. Further, as an alternative, Adams could have presented his cellmate as a witness in order to establish whether the cell door was opened. Moreover, Adams had been served with the rule violation report within the 15 days allowed, and the evidence did not show a conspiracy to delay service.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled Adams did not have the opportunity to present evidence at his second rule violation hearing because the video had been destroyed. While the court did not find a conspiracy, it nonetheless held Adams's right to due process had been violated. The People timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
The People argue: (1) the prison did not violate Adams's due process rights when it refused to produce a video recording that no longer existed at the time it was requested; (2) because Adams did not timely request the surveillance video, the prison had no duty to preserve it; and (3) Adams received all the process he was due at his second disciplinary hearing.
A.
The Trial Court's Ruling
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court framed its decision as follows: "So the question before the court is did [Adams] have the opportunity to present evidence at his second hearing in August. He did not have the opportunity to present that evidence because the video was purged." The court then went on to explain the People had argued Adams waived his right to the video by not requesting it at the first hearing, "However, that assumes that he should have anticipated that Officer Udell would testify the way he did, which I don't know how he could have anticipated Officer Udell testifying that his property was rolled up and sent with him when he was sent to medical. So when he heard that statement as [Adams] testified, that's when it became relevant."
The parties then interjected and cleared up a few evidentiary conflicts by stipulating: (1) video used at the July 9 disciplinary hearing did not show Adams's cell door; however, video on the pod would show the cell door, but not the inside of the cell; and (2) defendant's first opportunity to request the June 5 video was when he was served with the reissued rule violation on July 22; however, by then the video had been purged because more than 45 days had elapsed since the recording.
The trial court then went on to find Adams received all his property listed on the inventory receipt on July 11. However, there was some property not reflected on the receipt, for which he made a claim. Some of that property was found and returned to him, while he was reimbursed for property that was not recovered. Adams believed his cell had been accessed by other inmates and his property tampered with. The court found this "evidence was not disputed or challenged."
The People had just disputed whether the missing property returned to Adams was the actual missing property or replacement property and also disputed the implications arising from the payment Adams received for his unrecovered property. Thus, this statement likely pertains to whether the parties disputed whether defendant had argued his cell had been accessed by other inmates and his property tampered with. The People did not object to the court's statement.
The trial court found Adams credible and expressed concerns regarding Officer Udell's testimony given that between his testimony and declarations, he had offered four different versions of the timing of what happened, ranging from immediately packing the items to packing the items within two hours of the fight. The court then completed its ruling, stating: "[T]he Court is not suggesting there's a conspiracy in here whatsoever. However, the Court finds in this specific case [Adams's] due process right to present evidence was violated and the Court will order that the 90 days should be restored that was assessed as penalty to him."
B.
Standard of Review
Our review of an order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus following an evidentiary hearing requires that we independently review questions of law, while reviewing the superior court's determinations of fact for substantial evidence. (In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 [citing In re Collins (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1181].) In the case of mixed questions of law and fact, the standard is dependent on whether the inquiry is predominantly factual or legal. If predominantly factual, our review utilizes the clearly erroneous standard. (Collins, at p. 1181.) However, where the mixed question is "predominantly legal, such as when it implicates constitutional rights and the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles, this court's review is de novo. [Citations.]" (Ibid.; In re Taylor, at p. 1035.)
C.
Adams's Due Process Right to Present Evidence
The Supreme Court of the United States long ago recognized due process protects the liberty interest of an inmate facing the loss of statutorily authorized good time credits. (Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 (Wolff).) However, prison inmates do not share the same panoply of constitutional rights protecting individuals from criminal prosecution or revocation of parole or probation. (Wolff, at pp. 555-556, 560-563.) Rather, the due process protections to be afforded a prison inmate must be balanced against weighty considerations associated with prison administration and rehabilitative reform efforts. (Wolff, at p. 556, 561-563; Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 454-455, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (Hill) ["in identifying the safeguards required by due process, the Court has recognized the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation"].)
In recognition of these considerations, Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. 539 recognized a prison may constitutionally deprive a prison inmate of good time credits as a result of an adverse disciplinary decision where the inmate: (1) receives advance written notification of the claimed violation, (2) receives a written decision detailing the evidence relied upon and rationale supporting the disciplinary action, and (3) is afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence unless doing so will be "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." (Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 564, 566; see also Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 454; In re Jackson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 501, 505.) Due process requires that prison disciplinary decisions must be supported by "some evidence." (Hill, at p. 454; In re Jackson, at p. 510.)
Here, there is no question Adams received advanced written notice of the disciplinary charge and received a written decision. It is also not disputed he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. Further, while Adams initially challenged the evidence supporting the disciplinary decision, the trial court's ruling did not address this argument. Nonetheless, we conclude some evidence supporting the disciplinary decision given that the cell phone was recovered within Adams's property, in addition to the confidential informant information the hearing officer determined was both reliable and true. (Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 454.)
II
The Prison's Destruction of the Surveillance Video
A.
De Novo Review
There remains the issue of the requested surveillance video. If the video still existed, due process may have required Adams be afforded the opportunity to present that video, subject to certain institutional considerations. (See In re Fratus (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348 [refusal to allow inmate to present testimony of favorable witness was prejudicial error in violation of due process].) In fact, the trial court originally premised its grant of the writ of habeas corpus on the prison's refusal to allow Adams to present the surveillance video.
However, following the trial court's grant of the People's petition for rehearing, it became clear the surveillance video had been destroyed, pursuant to the prison's policy, two days prior to Adams's request for that footage on the day he was served with the reissued rules violation report. It was stipulated Adams requested that footage on the day he was served with the reissued rules violation report and the video footage would have shown anyone entering or exiting Adam's cell, but not the interior of the cell. There was also testimony Adams had been served the reissued rule violation report on the last permissible day, which was the prison's standard operating practice. Further, Adams testified the video only became relevant as a result of Officer Udell's testimony at his first hearing, and the trial court credited this testimony, as well as Adams's testimony in general. The trial court also questioned the veracity of Udell's testimony, noting he had given four different accountings of the timing of the packing of Adams's possessions. It did not issue credibility determinations for any of the other state witnesses and expressly stated it was "not suggesting there's a conspiracy in here whatsoever."
As noted above, the trial court ruled Adams's "due process right to present evidence was violated." The statements at the outset of the court's ruling suggest the court determined Adams had been deprived of his due process right to present evidence at his hearing because the requested video had been purged. We review this constitutional determination de novo, while reviewing any factual findings of the court for substantial evidence. (In re Taylor, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1035.) Having done so, we disagree.
These statements were: "So the question before the court is did [Adams] have the opportunity to present evidence at his second hearing in August. He did not have the opportunity to present that evidence because the video was purged."
B.
Trombetta/Youngblood
In the context of criminal trials, as well as parole and probation revocation hearings, a defendant has a due process right in the preservation of evidence under specified circumstances. (See, e.g., California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488-489, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (Trombetta); Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (Youngblood); United States v. Boyd (3rd Cir. 1992) 961 F.2d 434, 435-437 [destruction of urine sample used in probation violation].) Trombetta recognized in a criminal prosecution: "Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (Trombetta, at pp. 488-489, fn. omitted.) In Youngblood, the court recognized that if evidence is merely potentially useful, bad faith destruction must also be established. (Youngblood, at p. 58.) Notably, a pending request for evidence does not eliminate the need to show bad faith destruction of only potentially useful evidence. (Illinois v. Fisher (2004) 540 U.S. 544, 547-549, 124 S.Ct. 1200.)
The parties have not presented, nor has our research uncovered, any authority finding the qualified right to preservation of evidence should extend to prison disciplinary proceedings. Nonetheless, the parties identified one case that denied a prison disciplinary due process claim through reference to Youngblood. (Griffin v. Spratt (3rd Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 16, 21-22 [fermented beverage destroyed upon discovery pursuant to standard operating procedure].) The court in Spratt recognized constitutional safeguards in a prison context are less than those afforded in a criminal prosecution, but nonetheless utilized the Youngblood analysis in finding the prison had not violated due process when it destroyed fermented beverage contraband discovered in that inmate's cell. (Spratt, at pp. 20-21.)
While not conceding the applicability of Trombetta/Youngblood to the preservation of evidence related to a prison disciplinary proceeding, we shall use the analysis to establish what would be the constitutional minimum showing an inmate would have to make to establish this kind of due process violation. (Trombetta, supra, ) 467 U.S. 479; Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51.)
We further recognize the appropriate standard to be applied to inmate claims of this nature may very well be more stringent than the test articulated in Trombetta/Youngblood and their progeny. (See Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 560 [recognizing "that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison"].)
Even if we accept all of the trial court's factual findings and potential inferences arising therefrom as true, Adams has not established a due process violation under Trombetta/Youngblood. (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479; Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51.) First, video footage of the outside of Adams's cell was not of apparent exculpatory value prior to its destruction, but rather was merely potentially useful. At best, it would have shown the opportunity to plant evidence, not the planting of any evidence. As such, this claim fell outside of Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 and required an affirmative showing of bad faith. (See People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 761, 772-773 [explaining the interplay and nuances of the Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 and Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51 tests].)
Second, Adams did not establish the requisite bad faith on the part of the prison, thus dooming any due process claim under Youngblood. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 772-773.) While the trial court discredited Officer Udell's testimony concerning the timing of the packing and movement of Adams's belongings, there is no evidence Udell or any other prison official acted in bad faith to assure the video's destruction on the 45th day in accordance with its retention policy. We recognize the peculiar timing involved in this case, and it is true that had the reissued rule violation report been served on Adams two days sooner, the video footage would have still existed at the time of his request. However, service on the last permissible day was effectuated pursuant to the prison's standard operating practice. Thus, there is no evidence from which we can infer bad faith.
While Adams argued in his writ petition that the prison officials viewed the surveillance video in order to track down his missing property, there is no such evidence in the record. Adams actually testified that he did not know where his property had ultimately been found. Thus, we cannot infer prison officials viewed the surveillance video and knew of its possible exculpatory value. Further, given that Adams's cellmate was not in the cell at the time the property was packed, it is entirely reasonable to infer Officer Udell merely failed to pack some, if not all, of the missing property without any underlying malfeasance. This is especially true in light of the trial court's determination there was no underlying conspiracy.
We also cannot ignore that fairness dictates Adams must bear some responsibility for the video's destruction. Even if we accept the trial court's determination Adams did not have a reason to request the video until after Officer Udell testified at the first hearing, this is no explanation for why Adams failed to request such footage at that hearing after Udell's testimony. According to the hearing officer, same day requests for evidence were granted "99.9 percent of the time." Given that the first hearing occurred on June 18, Adams could have and would have been allowed to present the surveillance video footage had he requested it at that time.
Finally, even if the surveillance video footage showed individuals coming in and out of Adams's cell, this would only establish an opportunity to plant contraband given the parties' stipulation the video footage would not have shown the inside of his cell. Adams was already in possession of evidence that prisoners had access to his property in his cell either to plant or steal: the prison had returned 28 pieces of missing property to him and paid a claim for the two personal items that were not returned. While Adams did not affirmatively testify at the second disciplinary hearing, he did present written evidence that set forth this defense. Thus, Adams possessed a comparable and more persuasive means of establishing his innocence regardless of the deleted video. (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489; Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 56.) In spite of this evidence, the hearing officer still determined the majority of the evidence showed Adams possessed the cell phone, and on that basis, Adams was found to have violated the prison rules.
Therefore, whatever the potential threshold for triggering the constitutional duty of a prison to maintain evidence for use in a prison disciplinary hearing may be, we conclude it was not met under the circumstances of this case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the superior court granting Marques Adams's writ of habeas corpus is reversed. The prison disciplinary decision depriving Adams of 90 days of good time credit shall be reinstated.
/s/_________
HOCH, J. We concur: /s/_________
HULL, Acting P. J. /s/_________
BUTZ, J.