Opinion
No. COA09-1473
Filed 20 April 2010 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent from order entered 25 August 2009 by Judge John W. Davis in Warren County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2010.
Stainback, Satterwhite, Burnette Zollicoffer, PLLC, by Caroline S. Burnette, for petitioner-appellee. Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant. Deana K. Fleming for Guardian ad Litem.
Warren County Nos. 08 JT 25-27.
Barbara P. ("respondent") appeals from an order terminating her parental rights in her minor children, T.P., M.P., and K.P. After careful review, we affirm.
On 1 September 2006, Warren County Department of Social Services ("WCDSS") filed juvenile petitions alleging that T.P. and M.P. were neglected and dependent juveniles. On 28 November 2006, T.P. and M.P. were adjudicated neglected and dependent. Respondent gave birth to K.P. in March 2007, and K.P. was taken into WCDSS's custody shortly after birth. The trial court adjudicated K.P. neglected and dependent on 29 January 2008.
On 20 June 2008, WCDSS filed juvenile petitions to terminate respondent's parental rights with respect to all three children. On 28 October 2008, the trial court entered orders terminating respondent's parental rights. Respondent appealed from the trial court's orders. On 7 July 2009, this Court reversed and remanded the case, stating:
We have little doubt after studying the record that there existed evidence from which the trial court could have made findings and conclusions to support its orders for termination of parental rights. Unfortunately, the skeletal orders in the record are inadequate to allow for meaningful appellate review.
In re T.P., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 678 S.E.2d 781, 787 (2009).
On 25 August 2009, the trial court entered a new order terminating respondent's parental rights. Respondent now appeals from that order. Respondent first argues that the trial court committed reversible error and violated her substantial rights by finding the existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights that WCDSS had not alleged in its termination of parental rights petitions.
In its written order entered 25 August 2009, the trial court found that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights, as to all three children, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (neglect), (a)(2) ("[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months. . . ."), and (a)(7) (willful abandonment) (2009). However, respondent contends WCDSS did not allege that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent further contends WCDSS did not allege that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) with regard to K.P. Therefore, respondent argues she was not provided adequate notice as to these grounds, and, therefore, it was error for the trial court to terminate her parental rights. We agree that respondent was not on notice and it was error for the trial court to terminate her parental rights on the basis of § (a)(2) or (a)(7). See In re C.W. J.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 228-29 641 S.E.2d 725, 735 (2007) ("Because it is undisputed that DSS did not allege abandonment as a ground for termination of parental rights, respondent had no notice that abandonment would be at issue during the termination hearing. Accordingly, the trial court erred by terminating respondents parental rights based on this ground.").
However, a finding of any one of the grounds enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 is sufficient to terminate respondent's parental rights. In re Yocum, 158 N.C. App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403-04, aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003). In this case, in addition to § (a)(2) and (a)(7), WCDSS also alleged neglect as a ground to terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The trial court found that a ground existed to terminate respondent's rights based on neglect. Respondent does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that a ground existed to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The unchallenged conclusion of law, standing alone, constitutes a sufficient basis to terminate respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). See In re S.B.M., 173 N.C. App. 634, 636, 619 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2005) (affirming order terminating parental rights where respondent challenged only two of the three statutory grounds found by the trial court).
Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her statutorily-conferred procedural due process rights when it conducted a hearing on remand without respondent or her guardian ad litem present. Respondent cites no legal authority in support of this argument in violation of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) and has not challenged the adequacy of the notice she received. Moreover, respondent's attorney was present at the termination hearing and had an opportunity to review the proposed termination order prior to the hearing and to request a continuance if desired. We find respondent's argument to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).