Opinion
No. 1775 EDA 2008.
Filed: July 8, 2010.
Appeal from the Dispositional Order of June 12, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court Division, at No. 651-08-02, 649-08-02, Petition # 270-08-03, 653-08-02, 645-08-02.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the dispositional order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered following Appellant's adjudication of delinquency based on his commission of acts constituting four incidents each of burglary, conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime ("PIC"), and one instance of receiving stolen property ("RSP"). We reverse and remand.
¶ 2 The relevant facts of this case are as follows. On February 21, 2008, Philadelphia Police Officer Scott Gill and his partner were notified that a 2003 white Lincoln Town Car, which had been reported stolen, was being operated in the area of the 1100 block of Alcott Street. The officers responded to the area and observed Appellant driving the Lincoln. The officers followed Appellant until he entered a gas station and they placed him under arrest. Appellant, who was fifteen years old, was held in a juvenile holding facility.
¶ 3 At that time, Detective Joseph Baird was investigating Appellant's possible involvement in numerous burglaries in the area. Three days prior to Appellant's arrest, a different detective spoke with Appellant's mother and requested permission to speak with Appellant about the burglaries. Appellant's mother indicated that she would attempt to arrange for Appellant to speak with the police. Upon learning of Appellant's arrest, Detective Baird contacted Appellant's mother and obtained permission to speak with Appellant about the burglaries and the stolen Lincoln. The record does not indicate that Detective Baird discussed Appellant's Miranda rights with Appellant's mother at any time.
¶ 4 Approximately two hours after the police placed Appellant in the holding cell, Detective Baird interviewed Appellant. Prior to beginning the interview, Detective Baird verbally provided Appellant with his Miranda warnings. The officer also supplied Appellant with a printed copy of the Miranda warnings, which Appellant initialed, signed, and dated. After the police provided Appellant with his Miranda warnings, Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and waived his right to counsel. Thereafter, Appellant admitted that he and another individual named Steven Hayes committed burglaries at four separate residences. Appellant identified a photograph of Mr. Hayes and named a location where Mr. Hayes could be located. However, Appellant denied stealing the Lincoln and claimed that he bought the vehicle for $500.
¶ 5 According to Appellant, he knocked on the doors of the houses and/or rang the doorbell to determine whether anyone was at home. He then acted as a lookout while Mr. Hayes forcibly entered the residences utilizing a crowbar. Appellant acknowledged that the burglaries occurred between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. and that Mr. Hayes paid him after taking the stolen items to a pawnshop or selling the items on the street. Appellant also indicated a third person was involved, but he refused to identify that individual. Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statements.
¶ 6 At the suppression hearing it was stipulated that Appellant's I.Q. was sixty-seven, he read at a third grade level, and that this arrest was his first. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion and immediately held an adjudicatory hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court adjudicated Appellant delinquent. Thereafter, on June 12, 2008, the trial court committed Appellant to St. Gabriel's Hall. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant raises four questions for our review.
1. Was not the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdicts of guilt on the charges of burglary an[d] related offenses at 1105 Alcott Street (complainant Marie Carmelle) and 1036 Van Kirk [S]treet (complainant Louise Bleil) in that there was no testimony regarding ownership and non-permission to enter?
2. Did not the Commonwealth fail to established [sic] a corpus delicti for the burglaries at 1105 Alcott Street and 1036 Van Kirk [S]treet, prior to utilizing [Appellant's] statement to establish guilt?
3. Did not the lower court err in denying [Appellant's] motion to suppress his statement, where the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof that [Appellant's] Miranda waiver and subsequent statement was knowing, intelligent and voluntary under both the Pennsylvania and federal constitutions, where: defendant was only fifteen years of age, reading at a third grade level with an IQ of sixty-seven, was inexperienced with the criminal justice system, and was not given the opportunity to consult with or have an informed[,] interested adult present?
4. Did not the [Appellant] receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel (after investigation and consultation with a witness) failed to call the witness who was willing and able to testify that she is [Appellant's] mother and was never asked for permission to speak to her son by the police while he was in custody, nor did she give the police permission to do so?
Appellant's brief at 4.
¶ 7 Appellant's first contention is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction on two of the four counts of burglary. According to Appellant, since the Commonwealth failed to present testimony regarding ownership and non-permission to enter the premises regarding the burglaries at 1105 Alcott Street and 1036 Van Kirk Street, it did not establish the elements of burglary.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have found that each element of the offense charged was supported by evidence and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, it is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced. The factfinder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with the defendant's innocence, but the question of any doubt is for the [factfinder] unless the evidence be so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. A.W.C., 951 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa.Super. 2008).
18 Pa.C.S. § 3502, burglary, provides:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a). The Commonwealth may prove ownership and non-permission to enter circumstantially. Instantly, Detective Lauder testified that each of the burglaries was committed by forcible entry through the back door of the houses between 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Additionally, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant resided at 1131 Alcott Street, within close proximity to the residences which were burglarized. Since Appellant was fifteen at the time and resided at 1131 Alcott Street, it can be logically inferred that he did not own the burglarized houses. Further, because the homes were entered forcibly it is evident that permission to enter was not granted. Moreover, Appellant admitted that he acted as a lookout while another individual forced open the doors with a crowbar, entered the home, and stole electronic items. See Commonwealth v. Sanford, 863 A.2d 428 (Pa. 2004) (concluding that in addressing a sufficiency claim we consider all testimony without regards to its admissibility). Accordingly, sufficient evidence was introduced to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed burglary.
¶ 8 The second issue raised by Appellant on appeal is that the Commonwealth failed to establish a corpus delicti for the two burglaries discussed supra; therefore, the trial court should not have considered his confession as evidence of Appellant having committed those crimes.
The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidence. Our standard of review on appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion.
The corpus delecti [sic] rule places the burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession or admission of the accused connecting him to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delecti [sic] is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone. The criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the rule. The historical purpose of the rule is to prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession or admission, where in fact no crime has been committed.
Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1097 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citations and footnotes omitted). Hence, the Commonwealth is required to corroborate a confession with independent evidence that the circumstances are more consistent with the commission of a crime than an accident. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587, 590 (Pa. 2003). Simply put, the Commonwealth cannot convict a person solely based upon a defendant's confession.
¶ 9 In the present case, the prosecution presented evidence that the homes were forcibly entered through rear doors between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Appellant did not reside at these locations and did not have permission to enter as demonstrated by the forced entry. Since evidence was introduced that the locations were entered forcibly and items were taken from those residences, sufficient independent evidence that a crime occurred was introduced. Thus, Appellant's second issue does not warrant relief.
¶ 10 Appellant's third claim is that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion.
When we review an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we must determine whether the factual findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence of record. In making this determination, this court may only consider the evidence of the Commonwealth's witnesses, and so much of the witnesses for the defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, which remains uncontradicted. If the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous.
In Interest of N.L., 711 A.2d 518, 522 (Pa.Super. 1998). "Whether a confession is constitutionally admissible is a question of law and subject to plenary review." Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 890 (Pa.Super. 2004). Appellant maintains that based on the totality of the circumstances, his Miranda waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Specifically, Appellant argues that his age, I.Q., inexperience with the criminal justice system, and the deprival of the opportunity to consult with an interested adult prior to his interview, rendered his confession involuntary. We agree.
We have held that during a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was the product of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights, and, thereby, not the product of coercion.
In Interest of C.L., 714 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Pa.Super. 1998).
A determination of whether a juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda rights and made a voluntary confession is to be based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including a consideration of the juvenile's age, experience, comprehension and the presence or absence of an interested adult.
In Interest of N.L., supra at 520.
¶ 11 At the time of Appellant's confession herein, he was fifteen years old and had never been arrested. The parties also stipulated that he was reading at a third grade level and his I.Q. was sixty-seven. In addition, when Appellant confessed, an interested adult was not present, nor had he consulted with an interested adult immediately prior to the confession. More importantly, the police did not inform Appellant's mother of Appellant's right to remain silent or right to an attorney at the time of his arrest.
¶ 12 While we acknowledge that the per se requirement of the presence of an interested adult during a police interview of a juvenile is no longer required, it remains a factor in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1984). Both the trial court and Commonwealth have made much of Appellant's mother having previously informed the police that she would arrange for Appellant to speak to the police about the burglaries. However, at that time, Appellant was not under arrest and therefore he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. Accordingly, Appellant's mother was not informed of Appellant's right to remain silent or right to an attorney. Nor did the police inform Appellant's mother of Appellant's rights when she authorized the police to speak to him after his arrest. This is in stark contrast to cases which have allowed the police to question a defendant after providing an opportunity to consult with an interested adult or having an interested adult present. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra; Commonwealth v. Waters, 483 A.2d 855 (Pa.Super. 1984); Commonwealth v. Morningwake, 595 A.2d 158 (Pa.Super. 1991); In Interest of N.L., supra; Commonwealth v. Carter, supra.
¶ 13 In Williams, supra, our Supreme Court held that a seventeen-year-old juvenile's confession was valid where: (1) the juvenile had considerable experience with the legal system; (2) the defendant was not subjected to physical or psychological abuse; (3) was of normal intelligence; (4) had the opportunity to speak with his father prior to his confession and; (5) his father was present during the interview. Id. at 1288.
¶ 14 Similarly, in Waters, supra, this Court determined that a confession made by a sixteen-year-old was constitutionally sound. We found that since the defendant was not subjected to physical or psychological abuse, he and his father were informed of his Miranda rights on two separate occasions, and the defendant consulted privately with his father, the confession was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Waters, supra at 859.
¶ 15 Further, in Morningwake, supra, we concluded that a fifteen-year-and-eleven-month-old defendant's confession was properly elicited. We reasoned that, despite the juvenile's youth, his confession was lawfully obtained because he had previous encounters with police, was given the opportunity to consult with an interested adult who was informed of the defendant's Miranda rights, was himself given Miranda warnings three separate times, spoke with an interested adult, and his mother also was made aware of his rights. Id. at 161.
¶ 16 In In the Interest of N.L., supra, a fourteen-year-old defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his two-and-one-half-year-old stepbrother after the father of both boys found the defendant assaulting the younger boy. The defendant's father called the police and reported the incident at which time the defendant was arrested. The police brought the defendant to the Sex Crimes Unit, placed a telephone call to the defendant's parents at the local children's hospital, and requested to speak with his mother. The defendant's stepmother, the mother of the victim, responded to the call, consented to allow the defendant to be interviewed by police, and indicated that the parents did not wish to be present for the interview. The stepmother, however, was specifically informed that the defendant had the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent.
¶ 17 Lastly, in Carter, supra, we held that the appellant's confession was voluntary where: (1) the police contacted the appellant's mother; (2) informed her of his Miranda rights; (3) offered to provide her a ride to the police station so she could be present, which she refused; (4) the appellant was arrested several times before; (5) was familiar with the juvenile system; and (5) the interview of approximately two hours was not unreasonably long.
¶ 18 The present case, however, does not involve a juvenile who was familiar with the legal system, nor was his mother or any other interested adult informed of Appellant's legal rights, and Appellant was not specifically offered an opportunity to speak with his mother. Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that Appellant was of average intelligence is unsupported by the evidence of record. The Commonwealth and Appellant stipulated that Appellant's I.Q. was sixty-seven and he could read only at a third grade level despite being of high school age. Although I.Q. and intelligence level alone do not warrant a finding that a confession was unintelligent, involuntary, and unknowing, when combined with the additional factors present in the case herein, suppression is warranted.
¶ 19 Appellant's age, fifteen, combined with his intelligence level, his lack of consultation with an interested adult immediately prior to the interrogation, and the fact that no adult was present or informed of Appellant's rights before the police interviewed him, all weigh in his favor when examining the totality of the circumstances. Hence, we reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's suppression motion.
¶ 20 Dispositional order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.