Opinion
No. 3-247 / 02-1410
Filed September 24, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forPolk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
Adoptive mother appeals from the dispositional order in a child in need of assistance proceeding. AFFIRMED.
Lora McCollom of Gonzalez, Saggio Harlan, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Brett Lucas, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Charles Fuson of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, for minor child.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Patricia N., an Iowa resident, adopted eight-year-old Dung N. in Vietnam. She renamed the child Sarah and brought her to Iowa in December of 2001. Several months after Sarah came to live in Iowa, Patricia concluded she could no longer care for the child she had adopted. As a result, a petition was filed seeking to have Sarah adjudicated as a child in need of assistance. The juvenile court granted the petition. Patricia does not contest the adjudication of Sarah as a child in need of assistance, but argues that, following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court erred in vacating a portion of the prior adjudicatory order that found Sarah had "no parent." We affirm the juvenile court.
Background Facts and Proceedings : Sarah was born in Vietnam in 1993. She was diagnosed with severe medical and behavioral problems soon after her birth. In 1995 Sarah's biological mother placed Sarah in a medical orphanage because she could no longer care for her daughter.
Patricia became acquainted with Sarah during visits to Vietnam in the spring and summer of 2001. She adopted Sarah in Vietnam on July 31, 2001, with the consent of the child's biological parents. Patricia returned to Iowa without Sarah, but returned to Vietnam in December 2001 and brought the child back to Iowa. At the time Sarah came to live with Patricia, Iowa law required a parent who adopted a child in the child's country of origin to undergo further adoption in the parent's state of residence. Iowa Code § 600.15(2) (2001). As a result, Patricia began the process of readopting Sarah in Iowa.
Patricia held herself out as Sarah's parent after she brought Sarah to Iowa. Sarah resided with Patricia at her home in Warren County. Patricia placed Sarah on her medical and dental insurance policies. She also arranged for and consented to non-emergency medical procedures for Sarah.
Patricia hospitalized Sarah on March 1, 2002, for behavioral and medical problems. However, when it was time for Sarah to be discharged, Patricia informed social workers she could no longer maintain Sarah in her home. As a result Sarah was placed in shelter care.
On March 15, 2002, the Youth Law Center filed a petition on Sarah's behalf seeking to have her adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA). The petition alleged Sarah was in need of assistance because 1) she was without a "parent, guardian or other custodian" pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(j), and 2) her "parent, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of [her] care and custody," pursuant to section 232.2(6)(k). Sarah's Iowa adoption had not yet been completed, and the adoption petition was dismissed shortly before the March 28, 2002 pretrial conference.
The March 28 hearing was presided over by the Honorable Constance Cohen. At that hearing all involved were aware the legislature had recently passed H.F. 2190, which amended section 600.15 to recognize all adoptions "issued pursuant to due process of law by a . . . court of any other jurisdiction within or outside the United States . . . ." 2002 Iowa Acts ch. 1040, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 600.15 (2003)). However, the juvenile court and the parties were not certain of the effective date of the amendment to section 600.15. Following the hearing, Patricia signed a consent to Sarah's temporary removal and the court placed the child in the temporary legal custody of the Department of Human Services. The court also scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for May 14, 2002.
The record reveals an expedited hearing was held before Judge Cohen the day after the pretrial conference. The record suggests the hearing was held so that an adjudication order could be entered before the governor signed H.F. 2190. Based on the parties' stipulation, the court adjudicated Sarah as a child in need of assistance on both grounds in the petition. Explaining the need for out-of-home placement, the court found that Sarah had "no parent," as her biological parents' rights had been terminated in Vietnam, and the international adoption was "not valid in Iowa." Later that same day, March 29, 2002, the governor signed H.F. 2190. The bill went into effect immediately.
The court scheduled a CINA dispositional hearing, which was held on July 10, 2002 before the Honorable William Price. At the hearing, the State moved to vacate the portion of the prior adjudication order that found Sarah to be in need of assistance under section 232.2(6)(j), as a child having no parent, guardian or custodian. The State argued Patricia was Sarah's parent pursuant to a valid adoption, and that public policy precluded Patricia from relying on the prior version of section 600.15 as "an escape hatch" to challenge her parental status. The State argued a parental assessment for the costs of Sarah's foster care should be made against Patricia. Patricia resisted the motion, arguing that, absent an Iowa adoption, she was not Sarah's parent.
The juvenile court reaffirmed Sarah's adjudication under section 232.2(6)(k), but found the adjudication under section 232.2(6)(j) should be vacated. It rendered its decision under the 2001 version of section 600.15 and determined that, despite the statutory language requiring a subsequent Iowa adoption, "[p]ublic policy and the best interests of the child require that comity should be accorded to the Viet Nam adoption." The court also based its decision on the fact that the two grounds of adjudication were inconsistent, one requiring that Patricia be Sarah's parent, guardian or custodian, and the other requiring that she not have such status. The court vacated the adjudication under section 232.2(6)(j), as well as the underlying findings that Sarah had no parent, and that the Vietnamese adoption was not valid in Iowa.
Patricia appeals, but only from the portion of the dispositional order that vacated the adjudication under section 232.2(6)(j), and the corresponding factual findings. She does not appeal from the adjudication under section 232.2(6)(k).
Scope of Review . We conduct a de novo review of CINA proceedings. In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1999). We give weight to the fact findings of the juvenile court, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g). Our overriding concern in such cases is always the best interests of the children. In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001).
Procedural Defects . Patricia first argues the juvenile court was precluded from vacating a portion of the adjudicatory order because the State's request was procedurally defective. She contends that vacation was not authorized by Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.1012 and 1.1013. She further argues that, to the extent the State was requesting reconsideration or amendment of the adjudicatory ruling, such request was untimely, as the State filed no post-adjudication motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). We find these claims to be without merit.
Initially, we note that neither claim was preserved for our review. Patricia's argument regarding rules 1.1012 and 1.1013 was neither raised before nor ruled upon by the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing. We do not consider for the first time on appeal an issue that was not passed on by the trial court. In re C.D., 508 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). While Patricia's rule 1.904(2) argument was raised before the juvenile court, it was never ruled upon by the court, and Patricia did not alert the court to this omission via a post-ruling motion. See In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Iowa 1994) (finding failure to file a rule 1.904(2) motion precluded mother from challenging deficiencies in juvenile court dispositional order).
Moreover, rules 1.1012 and 1.1013 govern the vacation or modification of a final judgment or order. Patricia herself admits that an adjudicatory order, without a disposition, is not a final order. See In re Long, 313 N.W.2d 473, 475-76 (Iowa 1981). Finally, even if the State failed to make appropriate and timely filings, modification of an adjudicatory order, prior to disposition, is something within the juvenile court's authority. See McCormick v. Meyer, 582 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1998) (noting that courts are generally vested with the authority to review and change any prior interlocutory ruling).
Statutory Preclusion . Patricia next argues the court erred in vacating the adjudication under section 232.2(6)(j), because Iowa Code section 600.15 (2001) precluded recognition of the Vietnamese adoption. In essence, Patricia is arguing that Sarah should have been adjudicated under section 232.2(6)(j), because clear and convincing evidence established that Sarah had no parent, guardian, or other custodian. For a number of reasons, we cannot agree.
Even if the facts underlying an adjudicatory ground are established by clear and convincing evidence, the entry of a CINA adjudication is within the juvenile court's discretion. See Iowa Code § 232.96(9). Here, the ground vacated by the juvenile court was clearly inconsistent with the second ground upon which Sarah was adjudicated, a ground that Patricia stipulated to during the hearing and from which she does not appeal. CompareIowa Code § 232.2(6)(j) (requiring that the child be without a parent, guardian or other custodian) with Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(k) (requiring that child has a parent, guardian or custodian who wishes, for good cause, to be relieved of her care). See also Iowa Code § 232.2(11), (21) (defining guardian and custodian in a manner that does not encompass Patricia's relationship to Sarah). We conclude the juvenile court's decision to vacate a portion of the March 29, 2002 order because it contained inconsistent findings was not in error. Although we believe the juvenile court's order can be affirmed on this basis alone, we will address Patricia's argument that section 600.15, as it existed prior to March 29, 2002, requires us to reverse the juvenile court.
Because Patricia does not meet the statutory definitions of a guardian or custodian, id., our inquiry is limited to whether Patricia meets the definition of a parent under chapter 232. Iowa Code section 232.1(39) defines "parent" to include both biological and adoptive parents. Patricia does not challenge the validity of the Vietnamese adoption decree, and nothing before us indicates the decree is invalid. Absent a contrary statutory directive, the decree is entitled to recognition. See In re Marriage of Lunina, 584 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Iowa 1998) (citing Corbett v. Stergios, 257 Iowa 1387, 1391, 137 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1965)); 2 Am.Jur.2d Adoption § 151, at 1064-65 (1994) (noting parents should be estopped from denying validity of adoption after they have taken in and reared the child, receiving the benefits of parenthood).
Patricia argues just such a contrary directive is located in Iowa Code section 600.15 (2001), which provides, in pertinent part:
1. a. A decree establishing a parent-child relationship by adoption which is issued pursuant to due process of law by a juvenile court or court of any other jurisdiction in the United States shall be recognized in this state.
. . . .
2. If an adoption has occurred in the minor person's country of origin, a further adoption must occur in the state where the adopting parents reside in accordance with the adoption laws of that state.
Patricia argues that under section 600.15 the absence of a finalized Iowa adoption precludes recognition of the Vietnamese adoption, and without a recognizable state or international adoption decree, there is clear and convincing evidence she is not Sarah's adoptive parent. There is some merit to Patricia's analysis, as the language of the statute, as well as its legislative history, indicate a legislative intent to recognize only those international adoptions where the parent has finalized a subsequent state adoption. We conclude, however, that Patricia is construing this procedural and protective statute in a manner never intended by the legislature.
When initially enacted section 600.15 explicitly recognized any international adoption "issued pursuant to due process of law by a court," but required, in the event the international adoption was by proxy, that a further adoption occur within the parent's state of residence. Iowa Code § 600.15 (1977). The section was later amended to entirely remove the statutory recognition of international adoptions, and provide that any international adoption must be followed by an adoption in the parent's state of residence. Iowa Code § 600.15 (1989). H.F. 2190 eliminated the requirement for an additional United States adoption, and required recognition of any court-ordered international adoption comporting with due process. Iowa Code § 600.15 (2003).
The term adoptive parent, as used in chapter 232, must be liberally construed to serve the best interests of both the child and the state. See Iowa Code § 232.2(1). Sarah's best interests are also of "paramount concern" when construing section 600.15. Id. § 600.1. In addition, we must consider the practical effects of any particular statutory interpretation. See In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1993). Unreasonable, unjust, and absurd results should be avoided. Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995). We further presume the legislature did not intend a result that defeats the avowed public policy of this state. Monroe Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 251 Iowa 992, 999, 103 N.W.2d 746, 750 (1960). With these principles in mind, we conclude the district court did not err when it determined Patricia was a parent within the context of chapter 232.
Other than dismissing the Iowa adoption prior to its finalization, Patricia has acted as Sarah's mother in every way. She took the child into her home, cared for her, and saw to her medical needs. She signed various releases in the role of Sarah's parent, including one within the context of the CINA proceeding itself. She also stipulated to being a parent who wished to be relieved of her child's care.
Allowing Patricia to arbitrarily abrogate the parental responsibilities and obligations that she voluntarily assumed under the Vietnamese decree serves neither Sarah's best interests, nor the interests of Iowa. It is a clearly established public policy of this state that parents, whether biological or adoptive, are responsible for the support of their children. See Iowa Code §§ 252A.2(3), .3(2); Burke v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 546 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Iowa 1996). It is not a responsibility that may be abandoned lightly. See, e.g., In re B.J.H., 564 N.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Iowa 1997) (holding that to annul an adoption there must be both proof of extrinsic fraud and a finding that the annulment is in the child's best interest).
The logical extension of Patricia's argument regarding former section 600.15 would allow an individual to adopt a child in a foreign country, bring the child to this State, abandon the child, and then avoid financial responsibility for the child's care by failing to complete an adoption in Iowa. We believe this interpretation gives little weight to the child's best interests, and no consideration to any emotional or other concern the child may have in their new relationship. Cf. In re R.K., 649 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa Ct.App. 2002) (noting that both parent and child have an interest in the relationship). The legislature could not have intended this result.
Under the facts of this case, we conclude the juvenile court did not err when it vacated the portion of the adjudicatory order that concluded Sarah had no parent, guardian or custodian, as well as the factual findings supporting that conclusion.