Opinion
No. 3-797 / 03-1540
Filed October 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
David Pargulski of Des Moines for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and William Sales, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
David Backstrom of Des Moines for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Angela is the mother of Cristian-Alexander, born June 18, 2001. The child was removed from the home in July 2002 after he was admitted to Broadlawns Hospital and diagnosed with failure to thrive. During the time Cristian-Alexander was in the hospital, Angela provided several different addresses where she could be reached, arrived at the hospital intoxicated, and had different men stay with her in the child's room overnight.
The juvenile court entered an order terminating Angela's parental rights on August 28, 2003. Her parental rights were terminated under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (h), (i), and (l) (2003). The juvenile court found Angela has a severe chronic substance abuse problem. She has refused to comply with her substance abuse treatment on two occasions and refused to provide urine for analysis. Further, the court concluded Angela has been provided an array of rehabilitative services and she has failed to take advantage of many of the services offered to her. Angela appeals.
I. The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
II. Angela contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to warrant termination of her parental rights. Specifically, she asserts the State did not show her child could not be returned to her care at the present time, which is an element of Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). We disagree. Angela has not addressed her substance abuse problem. Further, she has inconsistently participated in services and attended visitation. In fact, she missed approximately eleven visits due to transportation problems or illness. When she did attend visitation, Angela usually arrived fifteen minutes to an hour late. In addition, Angela was supposed to attend Cristian-Alexander's speech and nutritional therapy appointments, and she missed fifteen appointments. We find Angela has made very little progress from the time her child was adjudicated a child in need of assistance and, thus, find the circumstances which gave rise to the adjudication continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). We determine Angela's parental rights were properly terminated under section 232.116(1)(h).
III. Angela contends the district court erred by not granting her additional time for reunification. While we recognize the law requires a "full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills," Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of Iowa Code chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494. The time period and patience are "limited because patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate into intolerable hardship for the children." In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987); see also In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Iowa 1986) (stating "we cannot gamble with the children's future. They must not be made to await their mother's maturity.").
As previously mentioned, Angela has failed to participate in the services offered by the Department of Human Services and has had very little contact with Cristian-Alexander. Cristian-Alexander has waited over a year for his mother to provide the safe and stable home he needs and deserves. Given his age and need for permanency and the mother's failure to utilize the services that would have fostered reunification, we find it would not be in Cristian-Alexander's best interests to force him to wait any longer.
We affirm the decision of the district court.