Opinion
CV146023643
05-31-2017
Elizabeth Spalter Iino v. Diane Rogers Spalter, Executris of the Estate of Harold F. Spalter
As Corrected June 6, 2017.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT (#275)
Hon. Charles T. Lee, J.
On or about October 14, 2014, plaintiff commenced this action for sexual assault against the estate of her father, Dr. Harold F. Spalter. The complaint alleges that Dr. Spalter sexually abused his daughter on numerous occasions starting when she was six years old and continuing until she was seventeen. Ms. Iino claims that this abuse caused her to suffer emotional and psychological distress and pain and suffering throughout her life and continuing to the present, thirty years later, and that such injury is permanent.
The case went to trial before a jury on February 7, 2017. On March 10, 2017, the jury returned a verdict of $15,000,000 in favor of the plaintiff, with an award of common law punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the court after a hearing to assess reasonable fees and costs. In its responses to the jury interrogatories, the jury found that plaintiff had " proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that [Dr. Spalter] committed intentional sexual assault on her"; that she had " proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Spalter's sexual abuse of plaintiff was a material or substantial factor in causing the harm plaintiff claims"; and awarded the following compensatory damages: " a. Mental anguish and emotional distress--$5,000,000; b. Psychological trauma and injuries--$5,000,000; c. Permanency of injuries--$3,000,000; and d. Inability to pursue life's enjoyment--$2,000,000, " for a total amount of $15,000,000.
On March 20, 2017, the defendant filed this motion to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), with a memorandum in support attached, based on defendant's motion for directed verdict, filed on March 3, 2017, upon which the court reserved decision. Plaintiff filed an opposition on April 27, 2017, and argument was heard on May 1, 2017.
Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and for JNOV is based on the claim that the evidence did not support the verdict as to her plaintiff's damages or causation because:
1. Plaintiff submitted no competent medical evidence that (a) she suffered or suffers from the injuries and disorders she claims, including trauma, mental anguish, and psychological injury, which allegedly are permanent in nature, or (b) that such injuries were caused by the sexual abuse. Defendant notes that no medical professional with whom plaintiff treated testified at trial as to her maladies or their causation by childhood sexual abuse. Further, defendant claims that plaintiff's expert, Dr. Dawn Hughes, did not state with sufficient certainty that childhood sexual abuse causes the type of psychological injuries plaintiff claims to suffer. As a result, defendant claims there was no basis for the jury to conclude that the plaintiff suffered the harm she claimed or that such harm was caused by childhood sexual abuse at the hands of her father.
2. Defendant also argues that the verdict was based on speculation and impermissible sympathy, and that her testimony was so inconsistent with her prior sworn statements that the verdict should be set aside as obtained by perjury.
As more fully set forth below, the court denies defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and for JNOV in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A trial court should not set a verdict aside and grant JNOV where there was some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict, but should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles. Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 106-07, 708 A.2d 937 (1998). The court must consider the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the successful party. Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 635, 791 A.2d 518 (2002); Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services, 249 Conn. 523, 534, 733 A.2d 197 (1998). A motion to set aside should not be granted unless the jurors could not reasonably and legally have reached the verdict they reached. Craine, supra, 259 Conn. 636. A court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when it is contrary to law or unsupported by the evidence; however, recognizing that it may impinge on the parties' rights to a jury trial, the verdict should not be set aside where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion. Carusillo v. Associated Women's Health Specialists, P.C., 72 Conn.App. 75, 83, 804 A.2d 960 (2002).
" [T]he role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as a seventh juror, but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did . . . A verdict is not defective as a matter of law as long as it contains an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear . . . A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Bergman, 106 Conn.App. 660, 680, 943 A.2d 515 (2008), aff'd, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010). Overall, " [a] party challenging the validity of the jury's verdict on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support such a result carries a difficult burden . . . [I]f the jury could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if this court disagrees with it." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn. 280, 299, 984 A.2d 658 (2009).
" A trial court may only grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached any other conclusion . . . and must deny such a motion where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion . . ." Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development Co., 318 Conn. 847, 862-63, 124 A.3d 847 (2015).
II. Proof at Trial
The evidence came in over twelve days of trial. Plaintiff testified on direct examination for two days and was cross-examined for four days. Plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Dr. Dawn Hughes as to the effects of sexual abuse and the symptoms of those effects. Two of plaintiff's brothers (Alan and Jonathan) testified in person and one (Michael) and Alan's ex-wife (Tracy) by deposition. Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories and a prior affidavit were also submitted.
Defendant called Attorney Donald Perry to discuss Dr. Spalter's will; an expert witness Dr. Harrison Pope, to explain issues relating to memory of sexual abuse and to explain causation of psychological distress; and defendant Diane Spalter, the estate's preliminary executrix and Dr. Spalter's second wife, who testified about Dr. Spalter and his relationship with his daughter, among other things. All told, substantial evidence was presented relating to the alleged abuse, Ms. Iino's symptoms, causation of harmful effects by childhood sexual abuse, and permanency. The jury plainly believed Ms. Iino's claims of extensive, long-term sexual violation by her father, causing serious emotional and psychological harm.
A. Elizabeth Iino's Testimony
Defendant's motion is centered upon the claim that plaintiff submitted insufficient medical evidence to allow the jury to award plaintiff damages relating to psychological injury and permanent injury caused by her father's sexual abuse.
Ms. Iino testified as follows:
The Spalter family owned a house on Shippan Point in Stamford, Connecticut, which they visited on weekends and during the summer. The sexual abuse at issue in the trial occurred there.
One evening, when Elizabeth was six years old, she climbed into her parents' bed, and, at some point, felt her father's hand cupping her vulva and otherwise rubbing her body. As she ran out of the bedroom, she heard her father say to her mother, " Josie [the mother's name], she doesn't trust me."
For several years thereafter, similar abuse continued on a roughly bi-weekly basis in Elizabeth's bedroom, with Dr. Spalter rubbing her until he ejaculated on her back and buttocks. Elizabeth testified that this happened thirty or forty times, and that it hurt. Dr. Spalter told her not to tell her mother because it would upset her.
When Elizabeth became ten or eleven years old, she realized the sexual significance of her father's conduct. At that time, she was beginning to develop breasts, which her father fondled while she pretended to be asleep, and he started to insert his finger into her vagina. This would happen with frequency, " like brushing her teeth, " until she was seventeen. Elizabeth said this made her feel ashamed, dirty, and guilty about possibly hurting her mother. Her grades suffered in school, she stopped socializing with friends, and she put on weight with the intention of making herself less attractive to her father.
Elizabeth testified in detail to several events in this period. For example, at Christmas, when she was seventeen, the family went out to dinner and Elizabeth had some wine. After going to bed, she woke up with her father behind her, rubbing her vagina and she experienced her first orgasm, which made her feel very ashamed. The abuse did not continue after that. In all, Elizabeth testified that her father abused her several hundred times. She referred to him as a " monster."
Elizabeth went off to college, where she turned to alcohol, drugs and sex in order to attract boys. She also suffered from an eating disorder, and saw a therapist once in college.
Subsequently, she participated in a weight control program for a year at Duke, where she worked extensively with a psychotherapist. She revealed the abuse to the therapist, and this became a significant element of their discussions, along with binge eating and unhappiness about her weight. She met with the therapist twice a week for a year and consulted with her by telephone for three or four years afterwards. She understood that there was a causal link between her sexual abuse and her subsequent behavior.
In her twenties, Elizabeth testified that she felt she could not function in the presence of competent or powerful men, and felt dirty around them. She would feel a constriction in her chest, fear that something would happen to her, and looked at life as a scary place. She occasionally felt suicidal and had difficulty sleeping.
She also testified that she started to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including flashbacks, where sensory memories of her father's hands on her body would return vividly once or twice a week. On the second day of trial, she testified that she had experienced such a flashback on the previous day.
Elizabeth obtained a master's degree in social work, became a licensed social worker and counseled with children in Philadelphia, some of whom reported sexual abuse. In her late twenties, she worked for three years with young children in early intervention at a mental health clinic in Durham, North Carolina, and served as a weekend supervisor at a group home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
She was not comfortable having sex and waited until after marriage before having sex with her husband. She has two daughters, but testified that she and her husband have stopped having sex because she continues to think it is dirty and does not enjoy it. This has caused stress in her marriage.
After a sojourn with her husband in Japan, she returned to Connecticut at age 34 and worked as a social worker for about a year. Upon her return to Japan, she continued her employment as a social worker until age forty. Currently residing in Austria, she provides therapeutic counseling to private patients.
Elizabeth testified that she engaged in therapy many times during her adult life. She continues to be fearful, suffers from depression and shame, and experiences flashbacks of her father's abuse.
B. Corroborating Evidence
As mentioned above, plaintiff adduced testimony from her three brothers and her former sister-in-law.
1. Alan Spalter is the youngest of Elizabeth's three older brothers. He testified that:
Their father occasionally would walk around the house naked.
When Elizabeth was six or seven, she was playful, had many friends and was cheerful.
When he returned from his first semester at college, Elizabeth had changed. She was not playful, lacked interest in her surroundings, subsequently would not get off the couch and began to put on weight. She started to engage in binge eating.
Years later, at the time of their mother's death, Dr. Spalter admitted to him that, when Elizabeth was little and in her parents' bed, he had thought she was her mother and had touched like he would touch his wife. In a subsequent conversation, Dr. Spalter used the phrase " sexual abuse."
2. Jonathan Spalter, the middle brother, testified that
Elizabeth " was the light of our life, " with many friends and an exuberant personality. When she turned eight years old, she became more withdrawn, and would eat large containers of ice cream at night while the family was asleep.
Jonathan had observed Dr. Spalter several times coming out of Elizabeth's room dressed in pajama bottoms, when she was a little girl.
At the time of their mother's death, Elizabeth told him their father had abused her for many years.
After confrontation by his son, Dr. Spalter gave him the same explanation he had given Alan and never denied touching Elizabeth sexually.
3. Michael Spalter, the eldest brother, testified that:
When he was sixteen or seventeen, he came into Elizabeth's room and saw his father sitting on her bed with a full erection.
Elizabeth told him about her father's sexual abuse at the time of their mother's death. Upon questioning, their father was initially dismissive, but eventually admitted to touching her inappropriately.
4. Plaintiff's affidavit dated March 3, 2015 was admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 917-R. In the affidavit, submitted in opposition to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff testifies to several abusive acts performed by her father in Connecticut. She also states that she received therapy at a rape crisis center and with two or three incest support groups in Stamford in 1994 and 1995, as well receiving treatment from a psychiatric nurse practitioner in Vernon, Connecticut in 2004. Paragraph 29 says, " At trial I intend to call all mental health providers from Connecticut as witnesses as well as witnesses that I knew while I was living in Connecticut." Due to well-founded objections by parties' counsel, no records of medical treatment were admitted into evidence. The above-quoted language from plaintiff's affidavit provides at least circumstantial evidence of such treatment.
C. Expert Testimony
1. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Dawn Hughes, was allowed to testify after the court conducted a hearing as required by the holding of State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), pursuant to which the court determined that Dr. Hughes's testimony was sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. However, the court ordered that her disclosure be amended to delete Dr. Hughes' conclusions that Elizabeth was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other disorders as the result of childhood sexual abuse, pursuant to the holding of State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012), which held that such testimony would improperly " vouch" for the credibility of the plaintiff and was therefore an inappropriate subject for expert testimony. Pertinent parts of her testimony include:
Dr. Hughes testified on the basis of her professional experience as a clinical and forensic psychologist and on the basis of relevant medical literature.
In cases of sexual abuse, the victim is frequently told to keep quiet, especially when a family member is the perpetrator. The victim feels dirty or ashamed.
Childhood sexual abuse is recognized as harmful by many authoritative organizations, including the Center for Disease Control, the World Health Organization and the American Psychiatric Association.
There is a reliable association between childhood sexual abuse and PTSD, depressive disorders, substance abuse disorders, eating disorders, sleep disorders, suicidality, fears, interpersonal and sexual difficulties, as well as low self-worth, guilt, shame and embarrassment.
PTSD manifests with memories or flashbacks of the stressing event (or " stressor"). It stimulates strong emotions and disturbing dreams. It changes the sufferer's world view, which becomes more negative and fearful. It is essential that there have been a serious stressor in the subject's past.
These symptoms can be caused by stressors other than childhood sexual abuse
2. As part of her direct case, defendant presented the expert testimony of Dr. Harrison Pope, a professor of psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School.
Dr. Pope testified about the unreliability of memory, particularly in the context of childhood sexual abuse.
He also testified that PTSD, anxiety, binge eating, depression and other disorders commonly occur without childhood sexual abuse.
On cross-examination, Dr. Pope stated that child sexual abuse " certainly" can cause PTSD, and agreed that depressive disorders and anxiety were possible results of child sexual abuse. Dr. Pope testified that there were insufficient studies to conclude that child sexual abuse causes promiscuity, interpersonal difficulties, guilt and shame.
He also stated that he had testified on behalf of several Catholic dioceses and had never represented a plaintiff in an abuse case.
III. Analysis
As discussed above, defendant's motion to set aside and for JNOV asserts that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that plaintiff suffered from the conditions she claimed and that they were the result of the abuse she suffered at the hands of her father, particularly because plaintiff did not present expert medical testimony as to plaintiff's conditions and their causation.
Because the applicable principles differ, the court discusses below the various categories of damages found by the jury.
A. Mental Anguish and Emotional Distress
With respect to a plaintiff's mental anguish and emotional distress, the plaintiff's own lay testimony has been recognized as adequate proof of her condition. In Delott v. Roraback, 179 Conn. 406, 409, 426 A.2d 791 (1980), our Supreme Court rejected the necessity of expert testimony, holding,
This strongly suggests to the jury that pain and suffering, unless supported by objective findings of medical experts, is not a proper element of damages in a personal injury case. There is no basis for such a suggestion. A plaintiff may recover damages in a personal injury action for pain and suffering even when such pain and suffering is evidenced exclusively by the plaintiff's subjective complaints. Hook v. Dubuque, 153 Conn. 113, 115, 214 A.2d 376 (1965).
The Appellate Court applied the same standard to a claim of mental suffering in Buckley v. Lovallo, 2 Conn.App. 579, 589, 481 A.2d 1286 (1984), " We see no reason to subject a claim of mental suffering, which is ordinarily evidenced by subjective complaints, to stricter scrutiny or greater care than a claim of physical suffering evidenced by the same type of complaints. [M]edical science has unquestionably become sophisticated enough to provide reliable and accurate evidence on the causes of mental trauma.' Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982). Medical science and mental health fields have advanced sufficiently to enable a trier of fact to determine the extent of mental suffering by the same standard of proof as physical suffering. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970). In today's world both supply equal grist for the jury's mill, based on '[t]he ordinary knowledge acquired from everyday experience by the jurors . . .'" Id., 122.
In this case, the plaintiff testified extensively as to the mental anguish and emotional distress she suffered as a result of her father's abuse, which was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on this category of damages.
B. Permanency of Injuries
Similarly, our courts have held that lay testimony is sufficient to support a jury verdict holding that plaintiff's condition is permanent. In Hammer v. Posta, 170 Conn.App. 701, 711-12, 155 A.3d 801 (2017), the Appellate Court explained,
With respect to the defendants' claim that the court could not rely on the plaintiff's testimony alone to conclude that his injuries were permanent, Connecticut case law has long held to the contrary. " Our state courts have recognized that the permanency of an injury is a finding that can be determined by jurors without expert testimony. This principle is based on the recognition by Connecticut courts that jurors are able to evaluate for themselves the testimony of the plaintiff, as well as the nature and duration of the injury, the likelihood of its continuance into the future, and the lack of total recovery by the time of trial . . . If a jury has the opportunity to appraise the condition of a plaintiff and its probable future consequence, an award of damages for permanent injury and for future pain and suffering is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Scandariato v. Borrelli, 153 Conn.App. 819, 828-29 n.5, 105 A.3d 247 (2014). " A trier of facts can conclude, by inference, that an injury will be permanent even though there is no medical testimony expressly substantiating permanency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parker v. Supermarkets General Corp., 36 Conn.App. 647, 650, 652 A.2d 1047 (1995). In Royston v. Factor, 1 Conn.App. 576, 577, 474 A.2d 108, cert. denied, 194 Conn. 801, 477 A.2d 1021 (1984), this court concluded that the trier in fact could conclude, by inference, that the plaintiff's injury was permanent on the basis that her disability still existed two years after the accident.
In this case, the jury had the opportunity to observe plaintiff over twelve trial days and several weeks, and witnessed the difficulty and emotion she experienced when relating her testimony. The plaintiff testified about the continuity of her emotional suffering over many years. Significantly, she testified as to her continuing conditions of fear, shame, depression and violent flashbacks. As a result, the court must conclude that plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict as to the permanency of her injuries.
C. Inability to Pursue Life's Enjoyment
Defendant does not specifically challenge the jury's finding as to this category of damages, but the court nevertheless finds that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict on this topic. Plaintiff testified that she continued to feel fear, shame and insecurity. She also testified that she and her husband had ceased sexual relations because she felt uncomfortable and dirty about intimacy with him. Accordingly, the court finds sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict in this category.
D. Psychological Trauma and Injuries
Defendant claims that expert medical opinion was necessary to support the jury's finding that plaintiff suffered from psychological trauma and injuries caused by her father's sexual abuse, and, accordingly, that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict in this category of damages.
Defendant first points to the well-established principle that a plaintiff must establish a causal connection that is reasonably probable and not merely possible, citing Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 554, 534 A.2d 888 (1987). Defendant further notes that an expert opinion describing a conclusion as possible or merely fifty-fifty is unacceptable speculation, citing Kammerman v. SCB Techs., Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket, Docket No, X03-CV-00506464, (November 6, 2002, Aurigemma, J.).
Defendant relies principally on the decision in Goodall v. United Illuminating, Superior Court, complex litigation docket, Docket No. X04 CV 95 0115437, (December 15, 1998, Koletsky, J.). That case was a " test case" for the many cases brought by workers and others exposed to the inhalation of asbestos. The matter at issue was whether general expert testimony was sufficient to support the plaintiff's claims for damages where they had been exposed to asbestos over an extended period, but no symptoms had yet manifested. The expert did not opine that, more likely than not, the plaintiffs had actually suffered from the asbestos exposure. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the basis of insufficient proof of causation.
Here, defendant claims that plaintiff did not offer competent medical testimony that she suffered from her alleged medical/psychological disorders. Further, defendant claims that plaintiff's expert, Dr. Hughes, merely testified that victims of childhood sexual abuse have a greater likelihood of suffering harmful psychological disorders, but did not say how much greater the likelihood would be or that victims of childhood sexual abuse were more likely than not to suffer from the mental disorders.
The evidence at trial established the traumatic events to which plaintiff was subjected by her father. Plaintiff's testimony also established the disorders and difficulties she experienced. The question remains whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of a causal link between the traumatic events and the symptoms described by the plaintiff or, as provided in the jury charge, that Dr. Spalter's actions were a material or substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Pope, testified unequivocally that childhood sexual abuse can cause PTSD. Dr. Hughes testified that there is a " reliable association" between childhood sexual abuse and PTSD, depressive disorders, eating and sleeping disorders, fears, interpersonal and sexual difficulties, as well as low self-worth guilt, shame and embarrassment. While Dr. Hughes may not have invoked precisely the formula for which defendant argues, our appellate courts have held that the totality of the witnesses' testimony must be considered, not the wording of individual sentences. As stated in Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 555, 534 A.2d 888 (1987),
The defendant contends that an expert in his testimony or in a report must employ the " magic words" that his opinion was " reasonably probable." We reject the proposition that certain formulaic words are essential when an expert renders an opinion. " A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, 62 L.Ed. 372, T.D. 2634, 15 Ohio L.Rep. 562 (1918). As long as it is clear that the opinion of the expert is expressed in terms of probabilities, the opinion should be submitted into evidence for a jury's consideration. See Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170 Conn. 18, 22-23, 364 A.2d 175 (1975).
Here, the court holds that the testimony of Drs. Pope and Hughes was adequately expressed and provided sufficient information to allow the jury to find a causal connection between plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse and the injury she suffered.
Defendant takes the argument a step further and maintains that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find that plaintiff actually suffered from PTSD, depression, eating and sleep disorders, low self-worth, fear, guilt, shame and sexual difficulties. The holding in Favoccia, supra, prevented Dr. Hughes from testifying that plaintiff was suffering from these conditions as a result of childhood sexual abuse. However, both Dr. Hughes and Dr. Pope testified extensively as to how PTSD and the other psychological disorders manifest. Given these descriptions, and plaintiff's descriptions of her symptoms, the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude that plaintiff was suffering from psychological trauma and injuries. It is also worth noting that the jury interrogatory did not itemize which disorders were included within such psychological traumas and injuries. Construing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, the court declines to set the verdict aside as to this category of damages.
E. False Testimony
Finally, defendant contends that plaintiff's testimony at trial was so inconsistent with her previous testimony in deposition and answers to interrogatory questions that the verdict should be set aside as procured by perjury.
The court does not agree with this contention for several reasons. First, Dr. Pope testified at some length that memory of childhood sexual abuse is especially complicated and is subject to many factors which can affect the accuracy of recall. Second, the conclusion of inconsistency is a subjective one in this context and not one where the court will exercise its own assessment, or defendant's, to set aside the result of a multi-week jury trial. Third, and perhaps most important, the jury witnessed the plaintiff's direct testimony and extensive cross-examination where these alleged inconsistencies were raised and used to confront the plaintiff. The jury plainly chose to believe plaintiff and implicitly rejected any charge of perjury.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to set aside the verdict of the jury in this case or to render judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied.