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Ice v. Benedict

Colorado Court of Appeals. Division IV
Mar 15, 1990
797 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1990)

Summary

requiring employer to prove damages as an element of defense of fraud in the inducement in the context of a suit by an employee for unpaid wages under an employment contract

Summary of this case from Crawford Rehab. Ser. v. Weissman

Opinion

No. 86CA1415

Decided March 15, 1990. Opinion Modified, and as Modified Rehearing Denied May 10, 1990. Certiorari Denied September 24, 1990 (90SC348).

Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County Honorable Henry E. Nieto, Judge

Bradley, Campbell Carney, P.C., Jim Hansen, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ireland, Stepleton, Pryor Pascoe, P.C., Neal S. Cohen, James E. Nesland, William J. Leone, for Defendant-Appellant.


In this action to recover wages claimed under an employment contact, the defendant, Benedict Nuclear Pharmaceuticals, Inc., appeals the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Rodney Ice. We affirm.

The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of a "misrepresentation" by plaintiff in support of defendant's affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement. The context of the court's ruling is that defendant admittedly breached its obligations under the employment contract for reasons totally unrelated to the misrepresentation, and there was no showing by defendant that the "misrepresentation" had damaged, harmed, or otherwise diminished the performance that it had bargained for and that it had received from the plaintiff.

In late 1983, defendant needed to hire someone with contacts in the medical arena to develop and market a certain pharmaceutical manufactured by it. Initially, defendant satisfied this need by hiring plaintiff as a consultant for a six-month period. The contract for the hiring of plaintiff was negotiated through defendant's executive vice-president who had a long working relationship with the plaintiff. After about three months as a consultant, defendant asked plaintiff to accept full-time employment as vice president of professional affairs.

In his capacity as a consultant, and later as a vice president of defendant, plaintiff worked approximately one and one-half years for defendant. He not only performed his duties regarding the initial pharmaceutical, but also successfully assisted defendant in obtaining an Investigational New Drug number from the Food and Drug Administration, for another pharmaceutical. It was anticipated that annual gross sales of the latter product, if developed, could approach $100,000,000.

After approximately a year of receiving only partial compensation from the financially beleaguered defendant, plaintiff decided to resign. Defendant's directors and officers pleaded with plaintiff not to resign, promising to make payroll payments timely.

Things did not change and plaintiff eventually resigned. After unsuccessfully demanding full payment of all past due wages, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.

In response to plaintiff's complaint, defendant affirmed the agreement and, in its answer, pled a general denial, eight affirmative defenses, and two counterclaims. The affirmative defenses pled by defendant included the following:

"Ice is barred from recovering on his claims because of his misrepresentations in which he induced Benedict Nuclear to enter into an agreement to employ him."

In the first counterclaim, defendant asserted that plaintiff willfully breached the contract by failing to move to Colorado, and prayed for actual and exemplary damages. In the second, defendant asserted that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by loans advanced to him and prayed for actual damages. It then prayed that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that it be awarded attorney fees. Defendant did not state a claim in rescission, nor did it proffer restitution to plaintiff on a quantum meruit basis.

During discovery, defendant learned of certain alleged misrepresentations apparently made by plaintiff during negotiations prior to the defendant's contracting with plaintiff. It is not clear from the record whether these "misrepresentations" were repeated prior to the negotiation of the employment contract. Defendant did not seek to amend its affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation to include this information, nor did it seek to amend any other pleadings it had filed.

During trial, defendant's counsel sought to cross-examine the plaintiff regarding the alleged misrepresentations made during the negotiations concerning formation of the resulting agreement. Plaintiff's counsel objected, contending that the evidence was not material.

In response to a direct question from the trial court, defendant admitted that it could show no specific damages that had been incurred by the defendant because of the claimed fraudulent inducement. Nor did it proffer any evidence that if plaintiff were to be compensated on the basis of unjust enrichment that the value of the services received would be less than the sum agreed to in the contract.

The trial court ruled that, since defendant, concededly, could not prove the element of damages, evidence concerning plaintiff's alleged misrepresentations during the negotiations was irrelevant and inadmissible. The reasoning behind this ruling was that, under the admitted facts here, any misrepresentations which had not, in fact, injured the defendant nor diminished the value of plaintiff's bargained-for performance and the consideration received was, at best, immaterial. We find this reasoning to be persuasive.

This court has adopted the majority rule that: "The necessity of proof of damages in a fraud action is the same whether fraud is asserted as a claim for damages or as an affirmative defense to a counterclaim." Greenleaf, Inc. v. Manco Chemical Co., 30 Colo. App. 367, 492 P.2d 889 (1971).

Defendant cites a few cases and commentators which subscribe to the proposition that it is not relevant whether harm or damage has been caused. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164 comment c (1981). This rule, however, "undoubtedly goes a little further than the cases." J. Calamari J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-16 (3rd ed. 1987). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 165 (1985), stating: "[I]f a contract is voidable because of the misrepresentation and, before notice of an intention to avoid the contract, the facts come into accord with the assertion, the contract is no longer voidable unless the recipient has been harmed by relying on the misrepresentation." Thus, it would appear that even the Restatement rule would prohibit voidability when, as here, the substance of the performance promised has been, in fact, delivered and there has been no harm.

For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Bird, 79 Ariz. 302, 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill. App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 1982, 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75, 360 P.2d 412 (1961); Dungan v. Smith, 76 N.M. 424, 415 P.2d 549 (1966); Planters Bank Trust Co. v. Yelverton, 185 N.C. 314, 117 S.E. 299 (1923); Coral Gables, Inc. v. Schmieding, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 327, 68 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio App. 1940); Carter v. Barclay, 476 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972).

Our Supreme Court in Trimble v. Denver, 697 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1985), discussing plaintiff's claim of fraud in the inducement, set forth the elements of fraud, and as one such element included:

"`Action on the representation or concealment resulting in damage.'"

Further, the court reaffirmed the general rule that "proof of damages is an element of fraud." Thus, we conclude that if there is no evidence of the element of damage, a claim of fraud based on material misrepresentation, whether in support of or in defense of a claim, must fall.

Nor are we persuaded that defendant's affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation can be construed as one for rescission. Defendant did not specifically plead or demand rescission, as required by well-established rules of practice. C.R.C.P. 8 9; CJI-Civ.2d 19:1, 30:33 (1980). The record does not indicate that defendant gave plaintiff or the court any notice, prompt or otherwise, of its intention to rescind, a prerequisite which has long been the law. See Gerbaz v. Hulsey, 132 Colo. 359, 288 P.2d 357 (1955). See also McCleary, Damages as Requisite to Rescission for Misrepresentation, 36 Mich. L. R. 227 (1937).

Defendant's reliance on cases such as Kavarco v. T.J.E., Inc., 2 Conn. App. 294, 478 A.2d 257 (1984) and Wood v. Jotham Bixby Co., 29 Cal.App.2d 294, 84 P.2d 204 (1938), which hold that proof of damages is not required to avoid a contract in a rescission action, are inapposite here. These cases not only concerned specifically pled claims for rescission, but also involved factual situations in which the rescinding party had not received the consideration bargained for, nor had it defaulted prior to its discovery of the alleged misrepresentation for totally unrelated reasons. Further, in Kavarco and Wood, the parties seeking equity came before the court with clean hands. The facts in this case do not render those decisions apposite.

Moreover, even if we were to characterize the affirmative defense as one for rescission, it would not cure the evidentiary deficiencies. Defendant's concession that it could produce no evidence concerning actual damages and its failure to proffer evidence that the actual value of the unique services it received were less than the contract price is as fatal to a rescission theory as it is to a fraudulent misrepresentation theory.

Therefore, based upon the record before us, we find no reason to deviate from the rule that once a party has received the full consideration for which it bargained, that party may not, after being in default for reasons totally unrelated to the claimed fraudulent misrepresentation, assert a misrepresentation as a defense to its breach of contract if it cannot show that the misrepresentation did, in fact, cause damage.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for assessment of attorney fees in accordance with § 8-4-114, C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B); see Kennedy v. Leo Payne Broadcasting, 648 P.2d 673 (Colo.App. 1982).

JUDGE METZGER concurs.

JUDGE DAVIDSON dissents.


Summaries of

Ice v. Benedict

Colorado Court of Appeals. Division IV
Mar 15, 1990
797 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1990)

requiring employer to prove damages as an element of defense of fraud in the inducement in the context of a suit by an employee for unpaid wages under an employment contract

Summary of this case from Crawford Rehab. Ser. v. Weissman

refusing to construe an affirmative defense of fraudulent misrepresentation as an affirmative defense of rescission

Summary of this case from Soicher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Case details for

Ice v. Benedict

Case Details

Full title:Rodney Ice, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Benedict Nuclear Pharmaceuticals, Inc.…

Court:Colorado Court of Appeals. Division IV

Date published: Mar 15, 1990

Citations

797 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1990)

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