Opinion
No. 4-852 / 04-0762
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sherman W. Phipps, Judge.
Diyonda L. Avant appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing the Employment Appeal Board's decision granting her unemployment benefits. AFFIRMED.
Richard R. Ramsey Anita M. Garrison, Des Moines, for appellant Employment Appeal Board.
Robert C. Oberbillig, Des Moines, for appellant Diyonda L. Avant.
Brian L. Stowe of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee Hy-Vee, Inc.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., Mahan, Miller, and Vaitheswaran, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
Diyonda L. Avant appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing the Employment Appeal Board's decision granting her unemployment benefits. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings.
Diyonda Avant was employed by Hy-Vee, Inc. as a full-time programmer analyst from October 7, 1998, to January 10, 2003. In January 2002 Diyonda received a performance evaluation that indicated several areas in which she could improve, including communicating with her employer. On January 28, 2002, Diyonda met with her employer to discuss her performance evaluation. Diyonda indicated she felt she received low marks on her evaluation because she had previously voiced complaints to management regarding her working environment. Diyonda further indicated she felt her race was the reason she was not being promoted or receiving the assignments she desired. Based on Diyonda's complaints, the employer developed an action plan designed to improve Diyonda's working conditions. During this time, Diyonda filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.
On June 13, 2002, Diyonda received another evaluation from her supervisor that indicated an improvement in Diyonda's overall performance. However, Diyonda again received low marks in the area of communication with her employer. Diyonda's supervisor attributed the poor rating in communication to Diyonda's refusal to provide details regarding an illness that caused her to be absent from work for several days. After June 13, 2002, Diyonda never returned to work. She requested a medical leave of absence based on recommendations from her doctor and social worker. The employer requested a meeting with Diyonda to establish when she could return to work. Diyonda refused to accommodate this request.
On June 19, 2002, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission administratively closed Diyonda's January 2002 complaint. However, on September 17, 2002, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission determined, without explanation or justification, that Diyonda's complaint warranted further investigation. Diyonda tendered her resignation to Hy-Vee, Inc. on January 10, 2003. She indicated the reason for her resignation was her deteriorating mental health, which resulted from working in a hostile environment.
The Commission's report indicated the employer had provided "a legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation for their actions, along with supporting documentation." The report further stated Diyonda "failed to provide any information to the Commission that might either support her allegations and/or refute the position given by [the employer]."
Avant's resignation letter specifically states, "My decision to resign is based chiefly upon my deteriorating mental health, which directly stems from the hostile working environment I was exposed to at the Hy-Vee, Inc. corporate office."
On June 30, 2003, the Iowa Workforce Development determined Diyonda was entitled to receive unemployment benefits because she voluntarily quit with good cause attributable to her employer. The decision stated as follows:
Our records indicate you voluntarily quit work on 01/10/03, because of illness or allergy caused by your job. This illness or allergy was the result of your work and you left for good cause. Your leaving was caused by your employer.
No explanation or factual basis for this decision was given. The employer appealed this decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing in which Diyonda did not participate, the ALJ reversed the decision of the Iowa Workforce Development. The ALJ found that although Diyonda had notified the employer of the alleged hostile working conditions, she never indicated her intent to quit if the conditions were not rectified. Thus, the ALJ concluded Diyonda voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employer. Diyonda appealed the ALJ's decision to the Employment Appeal Board. The Employment Appeal Board, without further hearing, reversed the ALJ's decision on October 9, 2003, and determined Diyonda was entitled to benefits. The Employment Appeal Board found as follows:
Although the claimant did not participate in the hearing, the employer provided enough evidence to establish that they were well aware of the claimant's mental condition, which was documented as being a direct result of the work environment. The employer argues that they attempted to work with Ms. Avant, however, she was oftentimes "poor" in her communication skills. This problem appears to be a factor of her mental condition that had over time deteriorated as she, herself, had warned them back in January of 2002. Her need to take a medical leave of absence beginning in June 2002, and was authorized, is corroborative of the stressful conditions under which she had until that point continued to work. Based on this record, we would conclude that her quit was with good cause attributable to the employer.
(Emphasis added.). The employer filed a petition for judicial review. On April 16, 2004, the district court reversed the Employment Appeal Board's decision. The district court found the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Diyonda appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
This court's review of an agency determination is ordinarily for correction of errors at law. Cobb v. Employment Appeal Bd., 506 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Iowa 1993). We apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) to the agency action to assess whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1993); Swanson v. Employment Appeal Bd., 554 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). While we accord an agency only limited deference on matters of law, an agency's findings of fact are binding on this court if supported by substantial evidence. Cobb, 506 N.W.2d at 447. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same conclusion. Eaton v. Employment Appeal Bd., 602 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Freeland v. Employment Appeal Bd., 592 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1992). The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether it supports the finding the agency actually made. Id. The court should broadly and liberally apply agency findings to uphold, rather than defeat, an agency's decision. Titan Tire Corp. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 641 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 2002).
III. The Merits.
An employee who quits her employment without good cause attributable to her employer is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(1) (2003). In Suluki v. Employment Appeal Board, 503 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1993), the Iowa Supreme Court held that as a condition of entitlement to unemployment benefits, an employee must inform his or her employer of work-related health problems and allow the employer to have the opportunity to correct the conditions before the employee may quit and collect benefits. See also Cobb, 506 N.W.2d at 448. Diyonda maintains that under the plain language of Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.26(6) and the holdings of Suluki and Cobb, the notice requirement only applies to cases in which an employee leaves due to work-related injury, illness, or allergy. She asserts she was not required to give notice to her employer because she left her employment as a result of the unlawful and intolerable working environment.
However, the issue before the court on appeal, as the district court understood, is whether or not the decision of the Employment Appeal Board is supported by substantial evidence. We conclude it is not. Diyonda did not participate in the hearing that occurred before the ALJ. However, even in light of Diyonda's absence, the Employment Appeal Board determined there was enough evidence provided by the employer during the ALJ hearing to establish that the employer was "well aware of the claimant's mental condition, which was documented as being a direct result of the work environment." However, no such documentation exists in the record. The Employment Appeal Board then concluded Diyonda was entitled to benefits because she left her employment due to intolerable working conditions. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that this decision by the Employment Appeal Board is simply not supported by substantial evidence. Other than Diyonda's own allegations, there is no evidence contained in the record demonstrating the existence of an intolerable working environment or detrimental working conditions. The problem we are faced with is that Diyonda never agreed to meet with anyone to discuss her allegations or provide reasons for her long absences from work. Later, after she filed for benefits, she did not take part in the hearing where she could have been placed under oath to determine if she was entitled to benefits. If she had done so, her credibility could have been tested and we would have no problem agreeing with the Employment Appeal Board's conclusion that the evidence was documented and that a hostile working environment existed. But on the record presented to us, we have nothing but mere allegations in an atmosphere of uncooperation. These allegations have never been reduced to written statements under oath, nor has Diyonda ever agreed to give sworn testimony.
The only documentation relating Diyonda's mental condition to her work contained in the record is a letter from Paul W. Danforth, a clinical social worker, dated June 26, 2003. Mr. Danforth states, "It is my opinion that Ms. Avant's emotional health was compromised and deteriorated because of undue stress on her job presented by managers." However, Mr. Danforth's opinion is based solely on Diyonda's own allegations. Mr. Danforth did not testify at the ALJ hearing.
Although this evidence was probably not before the Employment Appeal Board, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission came to this same conclusion on June 19, 2002, when Diyonda's complaint was administratively closed because she failed to provide enough information to sustain her allegations.
Rather, contrary to Diyonda's assertions, the overwhelming evidence in the record indicates Diyonda quit due to health reasons. Therefore, under Suluki and Cobb, she was required to provide her employer with notice of her work-related health problem and allow the employer an opportunity to correct the conditions before she could quit and collect benefits. Diyonda concedes in her brief she did not provide her employer with the requisite notice. As a result, we conclude, as did the district court, the decision made by the Employment Appeal Board awarding Diyonda unemployment benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Diyonda's own letter of resignation indicates she quit for health reasons. Furthermore, the initial decision rendered by the Iowa Workforce Development concluded Diyonda quit work "because of illness or allergy. . . ." Additionally, an earlier letter written by Mr. Danforth, dated August 8, 2002, requests an extension of Diyonda's medical leave, due to "emotional stress in her life," not due to emotional stress created by her working environment.
AFFIRMED.
All judges concur except Vaitheswaran, J., who dissents.
I respectfully dissent. The majority states "[o]ther than Diyonda's own allegations, there is no evidence contained in the record demonstrating the existence of an intolerable working environment or detrimental working conditions." The majority also states, "the overwhelming evidence in the record indicates Diyonda quit due to health reasons." The majority concludes Diyonda Avant was required to notify Hy-Vee of her intent to quit. I disagree with these statements and conclusion.
The Iowa Employment Security Act vests the Department of Workforce Development with authority and discretion to make findings on voluntary quits without good cause attributable to the employer. Iowa Code § 96.5(1) (2003). Here, the Employment Appeal Board found that Avant "left due to intolerable or detrimental working conditions." Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(4). We can grant Hy-Vee relief only if this determination of fact "is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 19.10(f); ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res. 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2004).
Avant understandably did not challenge this agency fact finding in her favor. Therefore, I question whether the substantial evidence question is properly before us. The district court made reference to substantial evidence, but in the context of explaining that there was no evidence Avant provided her employer with a notice of intent to quit. Avant concedes this fact. In my view, she raises a purely legal issue on appeal: whether an employee must provide a notice of intent to quit where the quit is based on intolerable or detrimental working conditions. Nevertheless, I will proceed to address the substantial evidence question discussed by the majority.
The agency's finding is supported by a letter from Avant introduced by the employer during the fact-finding process. The letter states, "[m]y decision to resign is based chiefly upon my deteriorating mental health, which directly stems from the hostile work environment I was exposed to at the Hy-Vee, Inc. corporate office." Although this language could support an inference that Avant quit for health reasons, "evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2003). Our limited appellate role does not permit either the district court or our court to re-characterize Avant's quit as being for health reasons. See 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995) ("We review for the correction of errors at law, not de novo."); Meads v. Iowa Dep't of Soc. Servs., 366 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 1985) ("When resolution of a controversy has been delegated to an administrative agency, district court has no original authority to declare the rights of parties or the applicability of any statute or rule.") (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
I am awarethat the agency initially found Avant's quit was for health reasons. This fact does not change my view, because the agency's initial determination was superseded by its final decision. See Iowa Code § 96.6(3) ("The decision of the appeal board is final agency action. . . ."); see also id. § 17A.15(3) ("On appeal from or review of the proposed decision, the agency has all the power which it would have in initially making the final decision except as it may limit the issues on notice to the parties or by rule. The agency may reverse or modify any finding of fact if a preponderance of the evidence will support a determination to reverse or modify such a finding, or may reverse or modify any conclusion of law that the agency finds to be error.").
As for the fact that Avant did not provide sworn testimony, I do not believe her statements must be discounted on this basis. The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act authorizes an agency to rely on evidence that would be inadmissible in a jury trial, as long as it is "the kind of evidence on which reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely for the conduct of their serious affairs." Iowa Code § 17A.14(1). The employer introduced the key statement at issue here. Under these circumstances, the employer would be hard pressed to challenge its competence.
Because the final agency decision contains a finding that Avant quit due to intolerable or detrimental working conditions rather than for health reasons, and because that finding is supported by substantial evidence, I would conclude that Avant was not required to notify Hy-Vee of her intent to quit. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the plain language of the rule on which the agency relied. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(4). That language contains no requirement that an employee notify the employer of an intent to quit. Significantly, the agency considered adding such a notice requirement in response to a 1999 executive order to review its rules, but elected not to do so. Specifically, Item 15 of the proposed rules would have amended the rules regarding "change in contract of hire," "unsafe working conditions," and "intolerable or detrimental working conditions" to require the type of notice mandated for health-related quits. Compare Notice of Intended Action, 25 Iowa Admin. Bull. 1628, 1634 (proposed June 11, 2003) with Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(6)( b). When the rules were adopted, however, Item 15 was deleted. Adopted and Filed, 26 Iowa Admin. Bull. 234 (Aug. 6, 2003). In my view, this is powerful evidence that no notice of intent to quit is required under the subsection at issue here. See Pottawattamie County v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 272 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Iowa 1978) (applying rules of statutory construction to administrative regulations); Lenertz v. Mun. Court, 219 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 1974) ("The striking of a provision is an indication the statute should not, in effect, be construed to include it."). Moreover, this clearly expressed intent post-dated our court's imposition of such a requirement in Swanson v. Employment Appeal Board, 554 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (statingan employee must notify the employer of an intent to quit unless unsafe working conditions are corrected). Therefore, it appears the agency intentionally declined to adopt the holding of Swanson. Because this case is governed by a rule that post-dates the rule-making mentioned above, Swanson is inapplicable and the agency was correct in declining to follow it. In other words, the agency's application of law to fact was not "irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m); ABC Disposal Sys., Inc., 681 N.W.2d at 604.
I would affirm the final agency decision in its entirety.