Opinion
July 11, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Jefferson County, Sullivan, J.
Present — Callahan, J.P., Denman, Boomer, Green and Balio, JJ.
Judgment unanimously modified, on the law, by reinstating respondents' determination terminating AFDC benefits to petitioner's minor children and, as modified, affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: In each of the cases before us, the Commissioner of Social Services suspended the public assistance benefits of the entire household in accordance with the so-called "lump-sum" rule ( 18 NYCRR 352.29 [h]). The common issue for resolution is whether the Commissioner validly applied the regulation to suspend the benefits of minor children of the household as a consequence of their parents' receipt of excess lump-sum income which was not turned over to the Department. We find that the Commissioner's determinations were based on a proper application of the regulation (see, Knapton v Kitchin, 113 A.D.2d 540, appeal dismissed 67 N.Y.2d 917).
First, the regulation provides for suspension of payments to the entire "assistance unit", "household" and "family" and makes no distinction between Home Relief and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) ( 18 NYCRR 352.29 [h]; see, Sutter v Perales, 103 A.D.2d 1029, 1030, affd for reasons stated below 64 N.Y.2d 1095). Thus, the regulation clearly authorizes the action taken in these cases. Second, despite the fact that the Social Services Law contains no provisions pertaining to receipt of lump-sum income, there is sufficient statutory authority for this regulation in the Federal enabling legislation (see, Knapton v Kitchin, supra; Sutter v Perales, supra). The Federal statute provides that a "State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must * * * provide" for the suspension of benefits of the entire family upon one family member's receipt of excess lump-sum income ( 42 U.S.C. § 602 [a] [17] [A]). If the Commissioner had failed to promulgate this regulation in conformity with the Federal statute, Federal funding to the State's ADC program would have been jeopardized (see, Knapton v Kitchin, supra; Matter of Calkins v Perales, 107 A.D.2d 849, 850; Sutter v Perales, supra, p 1029). The regulation is therefore not only consistent with the enabling legislation, but is actually required by Federal law. Finally, the regulation is not contrary to N Y Constitution, article XVII, § 1, which imposes an affirmative duty upon the State to aid the needy (see, Knapton v Kitchin, supra; see also, Sutter v Perales, supra).