Opinion
23-CV-4381 (LTS)
08-28-2023
YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, v. ELLEN BIBEN; MS DANA LEVIN; MS KELLEY DUFFY; MR CHRISTOPHER DISANTO; MICHAEL DIMGGIO; LOUIS A. MOLIA, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Named as Defendants are New York County Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Administrative Judge Ellen Biben; “Secretary” Dana Levin, Esp.; “Secretary” Kelley Duffy; “Chief Clerk Executive” Christopher Disanto, Esq.; and New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”) Commissioner Louis A. Molina. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Hon. Ellen Biben, No. 1:23-CV-2770 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated August 3, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action.
On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Eastern District. (ECF 4.) The amended complaint is the operative pleading.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated June 6, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff's prisoner authorization on July 7, 2023.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Yessuh Suhyes Hussey brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was unlawfully held in custody of the DOC beyond the expiration of a 364-day jail term. The amended complaint contains few details. Plaintiff alleges that he was detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island from August 4, 2021, to March 3, 2023, but his sentence of 364 days was completed on August 4, 2022. (See ECF 4, at 5.) He further alleges that “[e]ach defendant listed deliberately acted congruently in the extra detainment of [Plaintiff] . . . with the aid of Supreme Court officials whom col[l]aborated” in holding Plaintiff in Department of Correction custody “for longer than [he] should have been.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated his rights under “Civil Procedure Code 52.3.” (ECF 1, at 5.) It is unclear to the Court to what state or federal provision Plaintiff refers.
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the amended complaint. All grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff seeks money damages.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that he was detained beyond his release date. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. Judicial Immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff does not allege how Judge Biben was personally involved in the events giving rise to his claims. He does allege, however, that “Supreme Court officials . . . col[l]borated in holding” him in DOC custody. (ECF 4, at 4.) The Court understands Plaintiff to be alleging that he was confined to DOC custody based on an order by Judge Biben in Plaintiff's criminal case. Plaintiff fails, however, to allege any facts showing that Judge Biben acted beyond the scope of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because the Court understands Plaintiff to be suing Judge Biben for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before [her],” the Court concludes that she is immune from suit for such claims. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Judge Biben because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous' for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”).
B. Personal Involvement
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how Defendants Levin, Duffy, Disanto, Dimggio, and Molina were personally involved in the events underlying his claims. Plaintiff's claims against these defendants are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
It is unclear whether Levin, Duffy, Disanto, Dimggio are court employees. If they are, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for damages against these defendants may also be barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that judicial immunity has been extended to nonjudicial officers, such as court clerks, who perform acts that are “‘functionally comparable' to that of a judge'” or “are integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding” (citations omitted)); Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Court also construes Plaintiff's claims against Molina as being asserted against him in his official capacity as Commissioner of DOC. Plaintiff's claims against Molina in his official capacity can be construed as claims against the City of New York. See, e.g., Nassau County Emp. “L” v. Cnty. of Nassau, 345 F.Supp. .2d 293, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that “[a] claim against a municipal employee in his or her official capacity may be treated as an action against the municipality itself”) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).
In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that a DOC policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of his constitutional right. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Molina in his official capacity for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Claim for Prolonged Detention
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that he was held beyond his release date as an attempt to assert a claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' including punishments that are ‘totally without penological justification.'” Hurd v. Fredenburgh, 984 F.3d 1075, 1085 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “‘A plaintiff asserting an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must meet two requirements. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious. Second, the charged official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Id. at 1084 (quoting Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2019)). To meet the first requirement, “a plaintiff must plead ‘a harm of a magnitude that violates a person's eighth amendment rights.'” Id. (quoting Calhoun v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 1993)). As to the second element, a plaintiff must show “‘a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.'” Id. (quoting Francis, 942 F.3d at 130). Liability attaches only when officials engage in a “‘deliberate infliction of punishment, and not an ordinary lack of care for prisoner interests or safety[.]'” Id. (quoting Francis, 942 F.3d at 130).
The Second Circuit has concluded that “[t]here is no penological justification for incarceration beyond a mandatory release date because ‘any deterrent and retributive purposes served by [the inmate's] time in jail were fulfilled as of that date.'” Id. (quoting Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989)). The Second Circuit has stated that, “[n]ext to bodily security, freedom of choice and movement has the highest place in the spectrum of values recognized by our Constitution,” and “freedom from unlawful restraint is a right so core to our understanding of liberty that suffering even one day of unlawful detention is a harm recognized by the Constitution.” Id. n.4 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff who could show that correction officials held him, with deliberate indifference to his right to be released, could state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for prolonged detention under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that he was held for 212 days beyond his release date. He does not, however, provide sufficient facts to suggest that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff asserts only that “[e]ach defendant . . . deliberately acted congruently . . . with the aid of Supreme Court officials” to hold Plaintiff “for longer than [he] should have been.” (Id. at 4.) He does not identify a non-immune defendant whom he believes made the decision not to release him, nor does he allege whether he told anyone that he should have been released, and, if so, the nature of their response. In sum, even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff was detained beyond his release date, he alleges no facts suggesting that any prolonged detention was the result of deliberate indifference of any defendant.
Because an over-detention, under Second Circuit law, “qualifies as a harm of constitutional magnitude” in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Hurd, 984 F.3d at 1085, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend this claim to provide more facts indicating that he was subjected to additional days of detention after he was entitled to release. Plaintiff should provide specific facts about his conviction and sentence, and the reasons he was entitled to release, and any steps he took to inform correction officials that he believed he was entitled to release. Plaintiff must also name as defendants the individuals who were responsible for his unlawful continued detention, and allege facts showing that they acted with deliberate indifference.
D. State Law Claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). As the Court is granting Plaintiff leave to amend, the Court has not dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction. Thus, the Court reserves its decision whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid Section 1983 claim for prolonged detention beyond his release date, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the amended complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-4381 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for the reasons stated in this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.