Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-59J.
March 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
SYNOPSIS
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motion is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Robert H. Huntley (hereinafter "Plaintiff") was hired as a police officer under the rank of patrolman, for the City of Johnstown, Pennsylvania on January 2, 1989 after passing a civil service examination in 1988. Complaint ¶¶ 9, 10. Johnstown was a Third Class City operating under the Pennsylvania Third Class City Code during 1988 and 1989. Complaint ¶¶ 7, 12. On April 12, 1993, Plaintiff was promoted from patrolman to police chief of the City of Johnstown by Mayor Robert Pfuhl. Complaint ¶ 11.
On January 1, 1994, Johnstown became a Home Rule Municipality under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Complaint ¶ 12. Pursuant to Johnstown's Home Rule Charter, the City Manager was responsible "for all personnel matters, including the right to hire, suspend, or remove any municipal employee, subject to any rights such employee may have under the law, this Charter, or personnel ordinances and rules adopted pursuant to this Charter." Complaint ¶ 14. In January 1994, Johnstown sought applications from individuals for the position of Police Chief while permitting Plaintiff to continue his duties in that position. Complaint ¶ 15. On September 28, 1994, Johnstown City Council "adopted the Rules and Regulations for the City of Johnstown Civil Service Board". Complaint ¶ 16. The Civil Service Rules designate the City Manager the appointing authority and grant to the appointing authority the power to appoint the Police Chief while also permitting "[u]nder such appointment, the individual may be returned to a prior rank if promoted from within or dismissed if an outside appointment, without access to Civil Service hearing rights." Complaint ¶¶ 22, 24; § 5.3 of Local Civil Service Rules (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D"). After completion of the application process, Plaintiff was appointed Chief of Police for the City of Johnstown by the city manager on February 27, 1995. Complaint ¶ 17.
Karl Kilduff (hereinafter "Defendant-Kilduff"), the Johnstown City Manager in 2001, spoke with the Plaintiff on March 15, 2001. Complaint ¶ 18. During this conversation, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant-Kilduff gave the Plaintiff "an ultimatum to resign in lieu of termination from the position of Police Chief"; Plaintiff questioned the reasons for the ultimatum, Defendant-Kilduff refused explanation at that time; Plaintiff then questioned Defendant-Kilduff as to any rights belonging to him as a result of his initial hiring as a patrolman under the civil service system and Defendant-Kilduff indicated that Plaintiff did not have any civil service rights. Complaint ¶ 19. Plaintiff further alleges that the "ultimatum amounted to a constructive discharge" of the Plaintiff "from the position of Police Chief." Complaint ¶ 20. Defendant-Kilduff accepted the Plaintiff's verbal resignation in lieu of termination as memorialized in a letter to the Plaintiff dated March 23, 2001. Complaint ¶ 21.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on March 19, 2003 containing one count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of procedural due process. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges: 1) that civil service rights attached to the Plaintiff at the time of his hiring as a patrolman on the Johnstown Police Force; 2) that Plaintiff was constructively discharged from his position of police chief; 3) that upon his constructive discharge, he should have been returned to the rank of patrolman, but instead was terminated as a police officer after the constructive discharge as police chief; 4) Plaintiff was never given any written notice of his removal from the police force in compliance with § 6.3 of the Local Civil Service Rules; 5) Plaintiff was never given any written reasons for his removal; 6) Plaintiff was never given the opportunity of a hearing regarding his removal in accordance with § 6.4 of the Local Civil Service Rules; 7) Plaintiff did not receive a "post-termination hearing" after being removed as a police officer and not returned to his "prior rank"; 8) Defendant-Kilduff's decision not to return the Plaintiff to the rank of patrolman deprived the Plaintiff of his property interest within his position of police officer which was acquired when Plaintiff was hired in 1989; and 9) failure of Defendant-Kilduff to return Plaintiff to his prior rank denied the Plaintiff his right to a post-termination hearing created by the fact of his hiring as a civil service employee in 1989. Complaint ¶¶ 27-38. The Plaintiff demands an award of all back pay and costs for fringe benefits(including sick days, vacation days and health benefits), from March 19, 2001; replenishment of all sick and vacation days; all costs and attorney's fees; and other remedies the Court deems appropriate.
There is no evidence in the record in regard to the filing of the notice of appeal in accordance with § 6.4 a) b).
On June 13, 2003, Defendants' filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss requesting dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims based upon the argument that the Plaintiff is without a property interest in his prior employment as a police officer with the City of Johnstown. Specifically, the Defendants point out that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has already determined, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, that the Plaintiff held no civil service status upon his resignation on March 19, 2001 and that the Commonwealth Court's decision must be given final and preclusive effect by this Court on the issue of whether the Plaintiff had a property interest in his employment as a police officer for the City of Johnstown. Defendants attached the unreported opinion of the Commonwealth Court in the matter of Robert H. Huntley v. City of Johnstown, a Home Rule municipality; and Karl F. Kilduff, No. 633 C.D. 2002 (Pa.Commw. Ct. March 14, 2003).
Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2003. Plaintiff argues that Defendant-Kilduff, as City Manager, could not remove the Plaintiff from the police force without first complying with the Local Civil Service Rules. Plaintiff cites to the cases of Zeloyle v. Bettor, 91 A.2d 901 (Pa. 1952) and Petrillo v. City of Farrell, 29 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1942) for the proposition that civil service rights attach to a demoted police chief in the position as a policeman. Plaintiff then proceeds to argue that a reading of § 5.3 of the Local Civil Service Rules must lead to the conclusion that removal of the police chief, who has been appointed from within the police department, requires two steps: 1) removal of the police chief; and 2) the decision to return the former chief to prior rank or dismiss the former chief from the police force. Plaintiff argues that since he was promoted from within the department he cannot be dismissed without complying with civil service protections established for Johnstown police officers because upon his removal as police chief he returned to being a police officer and was entitled to civil service protections. Further, at the time of Plaintiff's removal from the police force, which was not conducted according to the Local Civil Service Rules, Plaintiff argues that his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated. In addition, the Plaintiff counters the Defendants' argument for issue preclusion by arguing that 1) a Petition for Allocatur was filed by the Plaintiff with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereby precluding this Court from finding that the state court litigation is not fully litigated in accordance with the fourth prong of the issue preclusion test used in Pennsylvania and cited in Rue v. K-Mart Corporation 713 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1998); and 2) a mandamus action is intended to enforce clearly established rights while a § 1983 action is the vehicle by which individuals can enforce the Fourteenth Amendment when state law infringes upon rights found within the federal Constitution.
See § 5.3 of Local Civil Service Rules which states: Under such appointment, the individual may be returned to a prior rank if promoted from within or dismissed if an outside appointment, without access to Civil Service hearing rights.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in mandamus on October 31, 2001 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County.
Defendant filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 2003. In response to the Plaintiff's first argument, the Defendants cite Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1996) for the proposition of Pennsylvania law of res judicata and collateral estoppel that a judgment is final until it is reversed on appeal. In response to the Plaintiff's second argument, the Defendants argue that while the mandamus action was not a § 1983 action, the Commonwealth Court adjudicated the Plaintiff's civil service status and nothing within the policy of a mandamus action prevents the application of collateral estoppel in the present matter.
This matter was assigned to Judge Kim R. Gibson on October 29, 2003.
ANALYSIS
In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 b) 6):
the district court [is] required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); D.P. Enters., Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984). In determining whether a claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record. Moreover, a case should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it clearly appears that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistently with the plaintiff's allegations. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232-33, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); D.P. Enters., 725 F.2d at 944.Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1994). At the outset, it must also be noted by the Court that "in cases where a party seeks to rely on a state court judgment to preclude relitigation of the same issues in federal court, a federal court must look to state law and its assessment of the collateral estoppel doctrine to determine the extent to which the state would give its own judgment collateral estoppel effect." Bailey v. Ness, 733 F.2d 279, 281 (3rd Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The Court must therefore look to Pennsylvania law to render a decision on the arguments regarding the application of collateral estoppel in the case sub judice.
The Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has already determined that the Plaintiff was without any civil service status at the time of his resignation; as a result, such a determination under state law reveals that the Plaintiff is without any cognizable property interest so as to invoke the protections of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
In response to the Plaintiff's first counter-argument, the Court recognizes that the current motion being decided was filed on June 13, 2003. To ensure the Plaintiff's argument is still valid in regard to the Petition for Allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Court reviewed the public records on file and accessible through the world wide web at www.aopc.org, the official website of the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. Under the menu entitled PACMS Docket Sheets a search for the state litigation in this matter revealed that: 1) A Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was filed on June 9, 2003 under Supreme Court docket number 277 WAL 2003; 2) On December 11, 2003, an order was issued denying the allowance of appeal; and 3) On January 5, 2004, the record in that matter was remitted to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
The Court is permitted to consider public records as part of the record before it in evaluating a motion to dismiss without having to convert such motion into a motion for summary judgment. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3rd Cir. 1993); Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 928 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D.N.J. 1996) rev'd on other grounds, 129 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Clearly the state litigation between these parties has ended and no further appeals are pending. Therefore, Plaintiff's first argument that the issues sub judice cannot have preclusive effect because of a pending appeal fails.
In the case of Linnen v. Armainis, 991 F.2d 1102 (3rd Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit recognized the two conflicting lines of Pennsylvania case law that indicate the treatment of a trial court judgment and such judgment's preclusive effect on issues it embraces. One line of Pennsylvania case law finds a judgment is not final for collateral estoppel purposes if an appeal is pending; the second line of case law finds a judgment is final for collateral estoppel purposes until it is reversed. Linnen at 1107. The Third Circuit also recognized in Linnen that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had at that time recently recognized the second line of case law citing to O'Hara Sanitation Co. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 557 A.2d 453 (Pa.Commw. 1989) and Bassett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Philadelphia, 514 A.2d 984 (Pa.Commw. 1986). In 1996, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized this principle in matters of criminal as well as civil appeals in Shaffer v. Smith, stating:
The precise question of whether the pendency of a collateral appeal of a criminal conviction deprives a party of the right to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a case of first impression in this Commonwealth. However, the related question of what effect a civil appeal has on an otherwise final judgment has been answered. A judgment is deemed final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal. Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 832, 78 S.Ct. 46, 2 L.Ed.2d 44 (1957); In re Wallace's Estate, 316 Pa. 148, 174 A. 397 (1934); Bassett v. Civil Serv, Comm'n of Philadelphia, 100 Pa.Commw. 356, 514 A.2d 984 (1986). We see no reason to deviate from this line of reasoning as it applies to an underlying criminal conviction. Thus, we hold that the pendency of an appeal of a criminal conviction does not deprive a party of the right to invoke collateral estoppel in a civil proceeding unless or until that conviction is reversed on appeal.673 A.2d 872, 874-875 (Pa. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
Clearly, current Pennsylvania law embraces the second line of cases recognizing a judgment as final until it is reversed. Since no appeal is pending, the Court need not concern itself with the possibility of reversal of the Commonwealth Court decision.
The Plaintiff's second and third counter-arguments are that collateral estoppel is not applicable: 1) because of the fact that there are differences in policy between the state mandamus action and the current federal § 1983 action and therefore the issues are not the same in the two actions; and 2) because of the fact that the trial court entered a demurrer the issues were not fully litigated. Plaintiff relies upon the case of Rue v. K-Mart Corporation, 713 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1998) to support its policy argument against application of collateral estoppel.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Rue recognizes four elements necessary for the application of collateral estoppel: 1) an issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; 2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; 3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and 4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Rue at 84. The Court in Rue concentrated its analysis on the first and fourth elements, finding that the second and third elements were present. With regard to the first element, the Court's analysis recognized the differences in public policy between an employee's award of unemployment compensation, in which a referee found no misappropriation of employer property, and a subsequent defamation action, in which collateral estoppel was applied using the Referee's factual findings in determining a motion in limine seeking to preclude K-Mart from introducing evidence of misappropriation of employer property. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court differed on the policy analysis of the Superior Court by stating:
The decision of the trial court in the defamation case was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court and then later overturned by an en banc panel of the Superior Court which found collateral estoppel did not apply to the Referee's factual findings. That lead to the appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Although the Superior Court in the instant case correctly noted that the determination of whether Rue committed an act of willful misconduct for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Law is far different from the determination of whether K-Mart made defamatory statements about her, see Rue, 456 Pa.Super. at 649, 691 A.2d at 502, those legal conclusions are not at issue here. Cf. Bortz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 546 Pa. 77, 683 A.2d 259 (1996) (willful misconduct determination in unemployment proceeding differs from disability determination in workers' compensation proceeding). Unlike Bortz and Odgers, the issue in this case is neither one of law, nor a mixed question of law and fact. Instead, it is an issue of pure fact, concerning whether Rue did or did not steal a bag of potato chips. As such, the differences between the public policies of the Unemployment Compensation Law and the civil action for defamation are not relevant. A fact is a fact, regardless of public policy. Thus, we conclude that the first prong of the collateral estoppel test, identity of issues, is satisfied here.Rue at 85. (emphasis added).
In the litigation before the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the parties were the same as the parties in the case sub judice. The state court litigation has resulted in a final judgment.
It is also clear that the trial court and the Commonwealth Court have determined that the Plaintiff was without civil service protections and a property interest in the position of patrolman on the Johnstown police force. The Plaintiff argues that there are differences in the policies behind an state civil action based upon mandamus and a federal civil action based upon § 1983 and that such differences prevent application of collateral estoppel. The Court recognizes that the issue in both cases is a mixed question of law and fact: Upon resignation as police chief, did the Plaintiff retain any civil service status requiring the City of Johnstown to retain him on the police force at the rank of patrolman?
A review of the leading Pennsylvania cases on the manner of distinguishing between the issues so as to prevent application of collateral estoppel demonstrates the manner of framing the query before the Court: Bortz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 683 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1996) (concluding that a holding of willful misconduct in unemployment hearing varies with conclusion of disability in a workers' compensation hearing); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1975) (finding preliminary injunctive relief sought by state insurance department to enforce breaches of insurance statutes differs from preliminary injunctive relief sought by policyholders against the same company to prevent any cancellation of policies during pendency of litigation based upon alleged violation of contractual rights); Odgers v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1987) (determining that a "strike" under the Public Employe Relations Act is not coterminous with a finding that a "work stoppage" is a strike or lock-out under the Unemployment Compensation Law); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt c.
Providing further guidance is the case of Roman v. Jury Selection Com'n of Lebanon County, 780 A.2d 805 ( Pa. Commw. 2001), where the Commonwealth Court applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to state court litigation of a § 1983 suit based upon the Pennsylvania Constitution that had previously been litigated in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to § 1983 and § 1988. Both suits alleged discrimination against minorities in the jury selection procedure of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania. In Roman, the Commonwealth Court set forth the following understanding of a § 1983 action:
In Urbanic v. Rosenfeld, 150 Pa. Commw. 468, 616 A.2d 46 (1992), our Court explained that: [A] Section 1983 action does not create any substantive rights, but merely serves as a "vehicle or . . . `device' by which a citizen is able to challenge conduct by a state official whom he claims has deprived or will deprive him of his civil rights." Harry Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Civil Rights Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985). Id., 616 A.2d at 52. Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he has been deprived of some cognizable federal right by someone acting under color of state law. Id. (citation omitted). If a claim or issue related to that federal right has been determined in a prior adjudication, the established rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
Further, in footnote three of Roman, the Commonwealth Court speaks to the application of collateral estoppel in that case:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, also applies to this case. Collateral estoppel is a doctrine which prevents re-litigation of an issue in a later action, despite the fact that it is based on a cause of action different from the one previously litigated. Allen. The identical issue must have been necessary to final judgment on the merits, and the party against whom the plea is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94-95, 101 S.Ct. 411. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the assertion of issues previously addressed in prior litigation. Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 669 A.2d 309 (1995). Collateral estoppel applies when: the identical issue has been litigated to final judgment; the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to the prior action; and that party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. All three prongs must be met for collateral estoppel to apply. In the present controversy, all three prongs have been met for collateral estoppel to apply. The identical issues have been litigated, discriminatory jury selection; the parties are identical; and Appellant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Thus, Appellant's action would have been barred under this theory as well.Roman v. Jury Selection Com'n of Lebanon County, 780 A.2d 805, 809 (Pa.Commw. 2001).
The Plaintiff argues that "[t]he purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to enforce those rights which are already established." Jamieson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 495 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa.Commw. 1985). Plaintiff also refers to Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), for the following propositions: "Section 1983 opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation." Mitchum at 239. (footnote omitted); "It is clear from the legislative debates surrounding passage of § 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment `against State action, . . . whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial'" Id. at 240. (citation omitted).
Clearly a state mandamus action and a federal § 1983 action are separate and distinct causes of action applicable to a number of different situations. In addition, mandamus actions are used to enforce established rights while § 1983 actions are used to enforce federal Constitutional rights. As applied to this instance, the state mandamus action was used by the Plaintiff to attempt to enforce civil service rights that he allegedly possessed by the fact of being hired as a patrolman. However, that action failed when the trial court and the Commonwealth Court determined that no civil service rights existed for the Plaintiff. On the other hand, the present § 1983 action was filed alleging a deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for the failure of the Defendants to afford a procedure by which he received formal written reasons for discharge as a patrolman, a hearing on his removal as a patrolman from the police force and a post-termination hearing after being discharged and not returned to the rank of patrolman. The Plaintiff alleges the failure to grant the Plaintiff these procedures and return him to the rank of patrolman deprived him of a property interest in the position of police officer that he acquired when he was initially hired by the police department.
While there are differences between the state and federal actions discussed here, the success of each action hinges upon the issue of whether there exists a property interest in the Plaintiff in the form of a civil service position on the police force. In the state mandamus action, the presence of discretion on the part of the city manager to remove the Plaintiff from his employment resulted in a finding of no property interest and precluded the relief sought. In the case sub judice, in order for the Plaintiff to prevail it is necessary for the Court to find that a property interest was vested in the Plaintiff as to the employment at issue.
The seminal case regarding what defines property rights so as to invoke the protections of the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548(1972). The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, recognized the following:
Certain attributes of `property' interests protected by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972) (emphasis added); followed by Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ. 913 F.2d 1064, 1078 (3rd Cir. 1990).
The Plaintiff's rights to his employment as a police officer were determined by state law. Specifically, the local civil service rules of Johnstown, a home rule municipality under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania governed the terms of the Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff was not hired by the terms of a negotiated employment contract, but was brought into the employ of the City of Johnstown Police Department by the local civil service rules and later promoted to police chief outside the terms of those rules, through an application process. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has already determined the Plaintiff's rights to employment under the terms of his hiring and dismissal according to the applicable state laws and rules. It is not the province of this Court to second guess such an analysis as it has already determined the foundation upon which the state mandamus action and the current § 1983 action are based. Thus, the differences in policy between the two types of actions do not detract from the fact that between the two cases, the issue is the same, the facts are the same, and the state law applied to the facts would result in the same analysis and conclusion by this Court. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to prevent the application of collateral estoppel on the basis that the policies between the two separate civil actions are different.
This analysis must now evaluate the final question of whether these issues were fully litigated as required by the Pennsylvania state law governing collateral estoppel.
Few Pennsylvania cases have analyzed the extent to which there was full litigation of matters that are disposed of prior to trial. Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court has recognized that adjudication before a administrative body in an administrative proceeding which resulted in an opinion deciding issues of law before it and disposing of the matter solely on such a basis without factual hearings was a matter that was fully litigated. Glade Park East Home Owners Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 628 A.2d 468 ( Pa. Commw. 1993) (citing Lehigh Valley Power Comm. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 563 A.2d 548 (Pa.Commw. 1989).
However, § 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides more guidance. Pennsylvania adopted this section in the case of Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1985). Section 27 states: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27. Comment d to section 27 speaks to the current issue:
d. When an issue is actually litigated. When an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is actually litigated within the meaning of this Section. An issue may be submitted and determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion for summary judgment (see Illustration 10), a motion for directed verdict, or their equivalents, as well as on a judgment entered on a verdict. A determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof.
The determination of an issue by a judge in a proceeding conducted without a jury is conclusive in a subsequent action whether or not there would have been a right to a jury in that subsequent action if collateral estoppel did not apply. See Illustrations 10 and 11.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. d. (emphasis added).
Part of the Plaintiff's argument reads as follows:
Furthermore, the matter in the Commonwealth Court was not fully litigated. Therefore, the final prong of the Rue test for issue preclusion is not met. The case before the Commonwealth Court was dismissed by the trial court on a demurrer. Huntley's appeal to the Commonwealth Court and Petition for Appeal to the Supreme Court questions if the Common Pleas court committed an error of law when it upheld the Defendants' demurrer.
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court understands the Plaintiff's argument to be that, aside from the fact that an appeal had been filed, the matters were not fully litigated because the determination that Plaintiff was not entitled to civil service rights rested upon the state trial court's finding of no civil service rights by granting the Defendants' demurrer. Nonetheless, comment d of § 27 clearly provides that a matter is actually litigated on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which is in the nature of a demurrer in state court. This matter was litigated before the trial court and the fact that it was dismissed prior to trial upon the demurrer of the Defendants does not take any validity away from the determination that the Plaintiff possessed no civil service rights. This matter was actually litigated, fully and fairly before the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, and a subsequent exhaustion of appeals resulted in a sustaining of such a determination.
Accepting all the facts plead by the Plaintiff as true and having determined that the Defendant has met its burden by proving the application of collateral estoppel to the matter before the Court, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Document # 5) is granted. AND NOW this 12th day of March, 2004, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is ordered to mark this matter closed.