Opinion
Nos. COA10-1391, COA10-1392
Filed 3 May 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by plaintiff from orders entered 15 July 2010 by Judge Catherine C. Eagles in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.
Kizzy L. Hunter, pro se, plaintiff-appellant. Sharpless Stavola, P.A., by Joseph P. Booth, III, for defendants-appellees.
Guilford County Nos. 10 CVS 3495, 10 CVS 3496.
On 3 February 2010, pro se plaintiff Kizzy L. Hunter filed complaints against defendants R. Steve Bowden, the managing partner of the law firm R. Steve Bowden Associates, Jarvis T. Harris, an attorney with the firm, and Lawyers Mutual Liability Insurance, the firm's malpractice insurance carrier (collectively, "defendants"). The complaints generally alleged legal malpractice on the part of Mr. Bowden and Mr. Harris, stemming from their representation of plaintiff in her case for workers' compensation benefits. On 14 April 2010, plaintiff filed amended complaints in which she asserted six causes of action: (1) "[n]egligent advice"; (2) "[i]ntentional admission into evidence false and inaccurate information"; (3) "[b]reach of duty"; (4) "[n]egligent interfer[e]nce of workers['] compensation claim"; (5) "[h]arrassment and failure to provide justifiable reasoning for withdrawal of plaintiff's workers['] compensation case"; and (6) "[i]ntentional infliction of emotional, psychological, and physical distress." Plaintiff requested $50M in compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, prejudgment interest, and costs.
As the issues presented in these separate appeals involve common questions of law, we consolidate the appeals for purposes of decision under Rule 40 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaints for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, for improper pleading of damages, for failure to plead the facts and circumstances constituting fraud, and for failure to plead claims for punitive damages in accordance with Chapter 1D and Rule 9(k)." After conducting a hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss on 5 May 2010, the trial court entered orders on 17 May 2010 "dismiss[ing] plaintiff's [amended] complaint[s] for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. . . ." On 4 June 2010, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Reconsider in Support of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint." The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in an order entered 15 July 2010.
On appeal, plaintiff advances several arguments for reversal of the trial court's 17 May 2010 orders dismissing plaintiff's amended complaints for failure to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff's notice of appeal to this Court, however, designates only the 15 July 2010 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration as the ruling from which her appeal is taken:
Plaintiff Kizzy L. Hunter gives notice of its [sic] appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina of the Order in this action which was filed on July 15, 2010 and signed by [Senior Resident Superior Court Judge] Catherine C. Eagles on July 12, 2010. THIS MATTER was heard before the undersigned Judge Presiding over the July 8, 2010 Civil Session of Guilford County Superior Court, on the Motion of plaintiff for reconsideration of the court's prior order dismissing plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 3 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure dictates that a notice of appeal filed by an appellant must "designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken. . . ." N.C. R. App. P. 3(d). "Proper notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement that may not be waived[,]" and, as a consequence, an "appellate court obtains jurisdiction only over the rulings specifically designated in the notice of appeal as the ones from which the appeal is being taken." Chee v. Estes, 117 N.C. App. 450, 452, 451 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1994).
Although plaintiff's motion for reconsideration does not cite to any rule of civil procedure as providing the basis for the motion, this Court has treated motions for reconsideration as being made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Henderson v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., 145 N.C. App. 621, 626-28, 551 S.E.2d 464, 468-70 (analyzing defendant's "motion for reconsideration" of default judgment as motion for relief under N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 572, 558 S.E.2d 869 (2001). This Court has held that a notice of appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion that "`does not also specifically appeal the underlying judgment does not properly present the underlying judgment for our review.'" Croom v. Hedrick, 188 N.C. App. 262, 270, 654 S.E.2d 716, 722 (2008) (quoting Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 156, 392 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1990)).
As plaintiff, in this case, only appealed from the denial of her motion for reconsideration, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider her arguments concerning the underlying orders dismissing her amended complaints. Id. Plaintiff, moreover, makes no argument for reversal of the denial of her motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's appeal or, alternatively, for sanctions, based on violations of the appellate rules. Due to our disposition on appeal, we deny these motions as moot.
Dismissed.
Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).