Opinion
CV186085982S
12-20-2018
HUNTER BUILD, LLC v. ALLNEX USA, INC.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Corradino, Judge
The plaintiff on this matter has filed a lis pendens on a parcel of land that had been the subject of an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant for the sale of the property to the plaintiff by the defendant. The sale did not come to pass because of alleged violations of the sales agreement by the defendant owner of the land.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a lis pendens as "3. A notice, recorded in the chain of title to real property ... to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome."
The Lis Pendens filed by the plaintiff reads in the first sentence "Notice is hereby given of the pendency of a civil action." It goes on to say, after identifying the parties ..."which action seeks specific performance with regard to a contract for real property located on Toelles Road in Wallingford."
In Garcia v. Brooks Street Associates, 209 Conn. 15, 22 (1988) the court set forth the general principal that "Where ... a party to a pending action seeks only monetary damages that will not affect the title of the real estate owned by an adverse party, a notice of lis pendens is properly discharged." If one examines the complaint in this case and its demand for relief regarding all of its counts, all of the requests for relief from section (b) through (h) demand monetary relief. Section (a) requests "(a) An order of specific performance that would place the plaintiff in a position to notify the defendant that the premises is unsuitable to the plaintiff’s purposes."
This request for relief in section (a) is offered to support the plaintiff’s claim that it obtained equitable title to the property pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion. The plaintiff quotes from Southport Congregational Church v. Hadley, 320 Conn. 103, 111 (2016) defining that concept.
Equitable conversion is a settled principle under which a contract for the sale of land vests equitable title in the buyer. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the purchaser of land under an executory contract is regarded as the owner, subject to the vendor’s lien for the purchase price, and the vendor holds the legal title in trust for the purchaser. The vendor’s interest thereafter in equity is in the unpaid purchase price, and is treated as personalty, while the purchaser’s interest is in the land and is treated as realty.
Therefore, it is argued that a lis pendens should lie on the plaintiff’s behalf.
This case does not present an equitable conversion situation. The complaint is replete with conditions that must be met before a sale could be finalized. Paragraph 13 of the complaint, for example, states that the sales agreement is contingent upon the plaintiff buyer "having determined ... that the premises was acceptable." We do not have here a sale where the only factor remaining to finalize it is the payment of the purchase price.
Given the definition of lis pendens previously quoted and its purpose to warn "all persons" that the outcome of this litigation will affect their interests, it seems clear that the outcome of this litigation will have no affect on the interests of other parties that might have been acquired during the pendency of this action.
The very bringing of the suit and the allegations it contains are more than sufficient to comply with section (a) of the complaints requests for relief-an order of specific performance which would place the plaintiff in a position to notify the defendant that the premises in issue is unsuitable to the plaintiff’s purposes-all the defendant would have to do is read the complaint.
Any interest the plaintiff may have prior to judicial resolution of this case can be adequately protected by prejudgment remedies.
For the foregoing reasons, the lis pendens is discharged.